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Hartford Federation of Teachers, Local 1018 v. Howe

Superior Court of Connecticut
Jul 11, 2018
HHDCV176078460S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 11, 2018)

Opinion

HHDCV176078460S

07-11-2018

HARTFORD FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1018 v. James HOWE


UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Bright, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Hartford Federation of Teachers, Local 1018, brings this action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4) seeking to vacate an arbitration award entered in favor of the defendant, James Howe, and other similarly situated employees. The arbitration arose from a grievance filed on behalf of the defendant with the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration by Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 376 (union), of which the defendant was a member. The grievance alleged that the plaintiff had violated the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the union by denying the defendant money he was due upon his retirement. In particular, the defendant claimed that he was due $87,908.98 in vacation pay. The plaintiff disputed the defendant’s claim. A three-person arbitration panel agreed with the defendant and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $87,908.98.

The plaintiff’s application to vacate alleges that the award must be vacated because it did not conform to the submission to the panel, which the plaintiff claims was restricted in the following ways: 1) the defendant’s complaint about vacation pay was not an appropriate subject of a grievance, and therefore not arbitrable; 2) the award impermissibly modified the terms of the collective bargaining agreement; and 3) the arbitration panel impermissibly entered an award for employees other than the defendant. The plaintiff further alleges that the award "is simply untenable, textually inaccurate, and not based on a reading of the [collective bargaining agreement] as a whole." Application to Vacate, ¶ 14.

In response, the defendant argues that the submission to arbitrate was unrestricted, and that the award answers the very question put to the panel in the parties’ submission. The defendant further argues that any argument that the defendant’s claim was not arbitrable was waived by the plaintiff. Finally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff agreed that the award of the arbitrator would apply to all similarly situated employees and not just the defendant.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court conducted an initial hearing on the plaintiff’s application on September 27, 2017. At the hearing, defendant’s counsel agreed that the defendant’s claim for vacation pay was not the proper subject of a grievance, but argued that the plaintiff waived any objection to the arbitrability of the claim by not timely objecting pursuant to General Statutes § 31-97(b), which provides that "no panel of said board may consider any claim that one or more of the issues before the panel are improper subjects of arbitration unless the party making such claim has notified the opposing party and the chairman of the panel of such claim, in writing, at least ten days prior to the date of the hearing, except that the panel may consider such claim if it determines there was reasonable cause for the failure of such party to comply with said notice requirement."

Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that the plaintiff did not notify the defendant, the union or the chairman of the panel ten days prior to the hearing before the panel of any objection to the arbitrability of the defendant’s vacation pay claim. Nevertheless, the plaintiff claims that there was a reasonable cause for its failure to do so in that it did not fully appreciate the nature of the defendant’s claim until the hearing was underway. The plaintiff further notes that it did raise the issue of arbitrability before the panel, albeit in its reply brief, after the hearing had concluded and after the union had filed its last brief. Furthermore, the plaintiff notes that the panel’s decision makes specific reference to the plaintiff’s arbitrability claim, confirming that it was raised and not waived. Consequently, the plaintiff argues that this court should decide the issue of arbitrability on its merits.

Following the initial hearing, the court ordered the parties to appear at a second hearing to discuss further how § 31-97(b) impacted the plaintiff’s claims and whether the court should remand the matter to the panel for further explanation as to its consideration of § 31-97(b). The court concluded that such a hearing was necessary in light of the panel’s limited discussion of the arbitrability issue in the award. In the award, the panel summarized the plaintiff’s argument as follows: "under Connecticut law, accrued vacation pay is not defined as ‘wages’ under the state wage payment statute, thus severance and vacation pay should be considered benefits, not wages. Under the collective bargaining agreement, grievances pertaining to ‘benefits’ are not subject to the parties’ grievance procedure because Article IV, Section 1 provides that only grievances ‘relating to the interpretation and application of any provision of the Agreement to matters of wages, hours of work and working conditions’ are grievable. Since vacation pay is not any of these subjects, it cannot be a proper subject of a grievance." Award at p. 4. The panel made no further mention of the arbitrability question in its award; nor did it make any reference to § 31-97(b). Thus, it is clear that the panel acknowledged the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s claim was not arbitrable. It is also clear that the panel did not adopt the plaintiff’s arbitrability argument, instead deciding the defendant’s claim on the merits. What is unclear is the basis for the panel’s rejection of the plaintiff’s arbitrability argument. The award does not state whether the panel: rejected the argument as untimely pursuant to § 31-97(b); otherwise determined that the plaintiff had waived the argument; or rejected the argument on the merits.

At the second hearing, held on March 9, 2018, the court raised this lack of clarity with the parties and sought their input on the question of whether the court had the authority to remand the matter to the panel for clarification of its award as it related to the issue of arbitrability and the application of § 31-97(b), and, if the court had such authority, whether it should remand the matter. Although the parties were unsure about the court’s authority to remand the matter to the panel, they both agreed that the court should not do so. The plaintiff argued that the court should decide the arbitrability question itself. The defendant argued that the court should on its own find that the plaintiff had waived its argument that the defendant’s claim was not arbitrable. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court gave the parties an opportunity to file post-hearing briefs. Both parties filed briefs on April 2, 2018.

III. DISCUSSION

In Hartford Steam Boiler Inspections & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s & Co. Collective, 271 Conn. 474, 482, 857 A.2d 893 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 974, 125 S.Ct. 1826, 161 L.Ed.2d 723 (2005), our Supreme Court held that in response to a motion to vacate pursuant to § 52-418, the trial court had authority to remand the case to the arbitrators for clarification of its award, without vacating the award. Although a case cannot be remanded to an arbitration panel to redetermine an issue, our Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that "a remand is proper, both at common law and under federal law of labor arbitration contracts, to clarify an ambiguous award or to require the arbitrator to address an issue submitted to him but not resolved by the award." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Id., 486-88. Consequently, our Supreme Court concluded that it was proper for the trial court to remand the case to the arbitration panel "to clarify the factual basis for its allocation of the sums representing each party’s liability; there is no question pertaining to Hartford Steam Boiler’s and the underwriters’ respective liability and the sums to be paid under the award because the arbitrators already have determined the dollar amount representing the parties’ respective liability." Id., 492. The court further noted that its determination that the trial court had the authority to remand the case to the arbitration panel for such a clarification "is consistent with, and furthers, the federal and state policies favoring arbitration as a means for expedient resolution of disputes ... [and] likewise ensures that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Id., 493-94.

In this case, the panel’s award explicitly notes that the question of arbitrability was submitted to it. By deciding the defendant’s claim on the merits, the panel, without explicitly saying so, necessarily rejected the plaintiff’s arbitrability argument. The award though does not explain the basis for the panel’s rejection of the argument. Thus, the award is ambiguous in that it does not set forth whether the panel rejected the plaintiff’s arbitrability argument on the merits, because it was untimely under § 31-97(b), or for some other reason. The court concludes that it has the authority to remand the matter to the panel for an explanation of its conclusion that it had the authority to address the defendant’s claim on the merits despite the plaintiff’s arbitrability argument.

Having concluded that it has the authority to remand the matter to the panel, the court addresses whether it should do so in light of the agreement of the parties that the case should not be remanded. After careful consideration of the common position of the parties, the court nonetheless concludes that a remand to the panel is required. Section 31-97(b) is clear that it is the panel that should consider a claim of arbitrability in the first instance. How the panel addresses such a claim and the ground upon which it decides the claim can have a material impact on how the issue is reviewed in connection with the plaintiff’s motion to vacate. For example, if a claim that an issue is not arbitrable is timely filed pursuant to § 31-97(b), the panel’s legal determination of the issue may be entitled to little deference because the question of arbitrability, if properly raised before the panel, is typically reviewed de novo by the court. Bacon Construction Co. v. Department of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 709-10, 987 A.2d 348 (2010). Although in this case the plaintiff acknowledges that it did not meet the ten-day notice provision in § 31-97(b), if the panel decided that there was reasonable cause for the plaintiff’s failure to do so, and considered and rejected the plaintiff’s arbitrability argument on its merits, the court, absent other grounds for waiver, would likely be required to conduct a de novo review of the panel’s legal conclusion. By contrast, the panel’s factual determination that any claim regarding arbitrability was waived either because the plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirement of § 31-97(b) and failed to establish reasonable cause for its noncompliance, or for some other reason, likely would be entitled to great deference when the court considers the motion to vacate. Without knowing the basis for the panel’s rejection of the plaintiff’s arbitrability argument, the court simply cannot determine the appropriate standard of review on this issue, which must be resolved before the court addresses the other grounds raised by the plaintiff in its motion to vacate. Consequently, the case must be remanded to the panel for a clarification as to the basis for its decision to reject the plaintiff’s argument that the issue submitted to the panel was not arbitrable.

To be clear, the court is not vacating the panel’s decision. Nor may the panel reconsider or redetermine the issues previously submitted to it. Its award in favor of the defendant and other similarly situated employees stands and cannot be altered by the panel. The panel is to provide only the clarification requested by the court. "[W]hen a court remands an arbitration award for clarification ... there is no opportunity for redetermination on the merits of what has already been decided ... On remand, the arbitrator is limited in his review to the specific matter remanded for clarification and may not rehear and redetermine those matters not in question." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Steam Boiler Inspections & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s & Co. Collective, supra, 271 Conn. 486.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the case is remanded to the panel for a clarification as to the basis for its rejection of the plaintiff’s claim that the grievance submitted by the defendant for arbitration is not arbitrable.


Summaries of

Hartford Federation of Teachers, Local 1018 v. Howe

Superior Court of Connecticut
Jul 11, 2018
HHDCV176078460S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 11, 2018)
Case details for

Hartford Federation of Teachers, Local 1018 v. Howe

Case Details

Full title:HARTFORD FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1018 v. James HOWE

Court:Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jul 11, 2018

Citations

HHDCV176078460S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 11, 2018)

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