Opinion
1:23-cv-303
05-31-2024
COREY L HARRIS, SR., Plaintiff v. JULIA ANN WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE SCREENING OF COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ECF NOS. 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). It is further recommended that Plaintiff's motions pending at ECF Nos. 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, and 30 also be denied as legally frivolous.
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Corey L. Harris, an individual incarcerated at the Erie County Prison, initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a motion to proceed in forma paupers (“IFP”) and Complaint on October 30, 2023. ECF Nos. 1 (IFP), 1-1 (Complaint). On January 23, 2024, the Court dismissed his motion without prejudice and administratively closed the case because Harris had yet to submit the certified institutional account statement required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). ECF No. 7. On March 5, 2024, Harris filed another IFP motion, along with a declaration. ECF No. 10 (IFP); ECF No. 10-1 (Declaration). On March 19, 2024, the Court granted his motion and docketed the Complaint. ECF No. 14 (Order); ECF No. 15 (Complaint).
The Complaint names as Defendants Erie Court of Common Pleas Judge Marshall J. Piccinni and Judge J. Trucilla, the City of Erie Police Department (“EPD”), the Erie County Sheriff's Office, the Deep State Court of Common Pleas, Harris's wife Julia Ann Williams, Williams' sister Denise Whitaker, and board member Constance Ratcliff. See ECF Nos. 15, 151. The Complaint asserts violations of Harris's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq., and state contract law. See id. More specifically, Harris asserts a due process clause claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants; freedom of religion claim under the First Amendment and general Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against Williams, Whitaker, EPD, Erie County Sheriff's Office, Judge Piccinni, and Judge Trucilla; a Commerce Clause claim under the Fifth Amendment against the Erie County Sheriff's Office, Judge Piccinni, and Judge Trucilla; and NLRA and breach of contract claims against Ratcliffe. See ECF No. 15-1, at 6-8; ECF No. 15, at 5.
The claims asserted in the Complaint arise from a dispute between Harris and his wife. Harris explains that on October 6, 2023, Williams left their home after their “religious freedom conversation . . . became personal.” ECF No. 15-1, ¶ 2. When she returned the next day, he locked her out of the house and “call[ed] the City Police” to stop Williams' sister, Whitaker, from “tak[ing] . . . Julia from [their] home.” Id. ¶ 3. He also asked Williams not “to go with her sister, but she did go.” Id. Williams came back a day later and “call[ed] the Police” to help her get inside. Id. The Police ordered Harris to unlock the door, and he complied. Harris “was arrested at [his] home” fifteen days later on October 27. Id. Harris adds that Williams has “put a deep state PFA [Protection from Abuse] Order on [him]” to avoid certain matters related to her library degree and their divorce decree. Id. ¶ 4.
Six motions that Harris has filed since submitting his Complaint are also pending before the Court: Motion for Service of Process Rule 4(C)(2)(i) (ECF No. 20); Motion for Relief from Unlawful Custody (ECF No. 25); Motion for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 27); Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 28); Motion to Report a Deliberate Indifferent Threat and Report Intimidation (ECF No. 29); and Motion Preliminary Relief (ECF No. 30). To the extent each of these motions seeks injunctive relief or another form of equitable relief, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be denied for the same reasons set forth in this Report.
B. Standard of Review
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Harris is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See D'Agostino v. CECOMRDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
C. Analysis
Harris's claims fail as a matter of law and are facially frivolous for several reasons. First, Harris cannot state a claim against the Erie Court of Common Pleas, EPD, or the Erie County Sheriff's Office for which relief can be granted for his alleged injuries. This is because none of these Defendants constitute a legal entity capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Shallow v. Rogers, 201 Fed.Appx. 901, 904 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[The Court of Common Pleas] is not a ‘person' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F.Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (citations omitted) (“The City of Erie Police Department is a sub-unit of the city government and, as such, is merely a vehicle through which the city fulfills its policing functions.”); Duffy v. County of Bucks, 7 F.Supp.2d 569, 578 (E.D. 1998) (“The County of Bucks, Pennsylvania Sheriff's Office is not a suable entity and must be dismissed; the proper party would be the Bucks County Sheriff.”); Baxter v. Gander Mountain Corp., 2006 WL 3455074, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2006) (citations omitted) (“Neither Defendant Millcreek Township Police Department nor Defendant Erie County Courthouse is a legal entity capable of being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
Next, the facts alleged fail to demonstrate that either Williams, Whitaker, or Ratcliff acted under state law. To prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that each defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, private citizens “do not act under color of state law” and thus “are not liable under Section 1983.” Luck v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, 901 F.Supp.2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (The “under color of state law” element of § 1983 excludes from its reach “merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”). That said, “providing false information to the police, coupled with a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, can transform a private actor into a state actor.” Pinkney v. Meadville, Pennsylvania, 2021 WL 37664, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2021) (quoting Yoast v. Pottstown Borough, 437 F.Supp.3d 403, 420-21 (E.D. Pa. 2020)).
To properly allege a private citizen's participation in a civil rights conspiracy, Harris must plead facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred. See id. The pleading falls far short of this requirement. Harris claims that Williams violated his First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights when she asked the police to help her get inside their home and obtained a PFA against him. But it is well-settled that Williams' communications to the police do not, alone, convert her to a state-actor. See Lapp v. Cohen, 2023 WL 7932479, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2023) (“merely reporting a potential crime to police does not convert a private individual into a state actor”); Yoast, 437 F.Supp.3d at 420-21 (“[p]roviding false information to the police- even deliberately-does not transform a private party into a state actor.”); Boyer v. Mohring, 994 F.Supp.2d 649, 658 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“A private entity who reports a plaintiff to police is not considered a state actor.”). See also Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999). Nor does any other allegation hint at her conspiratorial agreement with a government actor. The brief allegations of Whitaker's incidental involvement in Harris and Williams' dispute similarly provide no basis for inferring the existence of a conspiracy between Whitaker and the government. As to Ratcliffe, the Complaint's first and only mention of her is as the target of Harris's conclusory breach of contract and NLRA claims. In fact, the Complaint does not attribute any conduct to Ratcliffe or connect her to any event described in the factual allegations or other Defendant. Accordingly, Williams, Whitaker, and Ratcliff are not state actors and, therefore, not amenable to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Massey v. Crady, 2018 WL 4328002, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018) (“Private citizens, such as [defendants] are not state actors, and therefore . . . any § 1983 claims against [them] should be dismissed.”); Little v. Hammond, 2016 WL 7324593, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2016) (same).
Harris's claims against Erie Court of Common Pleas Judges Piccinini and Trujillo are also facially implausible. “A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). A judge will only be subject to liability “when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See Shallow, 201 Fed.Appx. at 904 n.4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting the impropriety of § 1983 suits against a judge where a judge acts as an adjudicator)). Here, although Harris asserts general claims against Judge Piccinini and Trujillo, he does not make any factual allegations against them in the pleading. To the extent Harris intends to assert constitutional claims against these Defendants for their role in the PFA and/or his arrest, no governmental impropriety can be gleaned from the pleading. As such, Judge Piccinini and Judge Trujillo are immune from the claims asserted against them in the Complaint.
Even if the Complaint had named a proper Defendant, Harris's claims would fail as a matter of law. Harris's due process claim pursuant to the Fifth Amendment fails because “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal officials.” Bergdoll v. City of York, 515 Fed.Appx. 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983)). As to the Commerce Clause claim, in Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991), the Supreme Court held that only “suits alleging economic injury as a result of state regulation which violate the Commerce Clause may be brought under § 1983.” Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Mktg. Bd., 138 F.Supp.2d 593, 614 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (citing, inter alia, Dennis, 498 U.S. at 450, 451). No such claim is brought in this case. The Fifth Amendment therefore provides no viable cause of action against state and municipal government actors. The other § 1983 claims fair no better, as no violation of Harris's First, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights can be identified from the conduct depicted in the Complaint.
The Complaint also fails to plead a viable claim under Section 7 of the NLRA. This provision “grants employees certain rights, notably ‘the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively ..., and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.'” Voilas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 170 F.3d 367, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157). No factual allegation concerns the interference of Harris's rights as an employee, let alone Harris's employment. As such, the NLRA claim must be dismissed.
Lastly, Harris does not establish any of the elements required for a viable breach of contract claim. See Fortunato v. CGA L. Firm, 2018 WL 4635963, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2018) (quoting Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citing Corestates Bank v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)) (“A plaintiff must generally establish three elements to support a breach of contract claim: (1) ‘the existence of a contract, including its essential terms'; (2) ‘a breach of a duty imposed by the contract'; and (3) ‘resultant damages.'”). Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a breach of contract claim. Each of Harris's claims must therefore be dismissed.
D. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). And though “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court,” it may not “outright refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial.” Id. These instructions are equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, it would be futile to allow Harris to amend his Complaint because he has not asserted a cause of action against a proper party or asserted a plausible claim for relief. Nor do the facts indicate that these deficiencies can be cured on amendment. Thus, leave to amend should be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and that leave to amend be denied as futile. It is further recommended that Plaintiff's motions pending at ECF Nos. 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, and 30 also be denied as legally frivolous.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).