Opinion
NO. 14-16-00282-CR
02-22-2018
BRANDON TRENT HARRIS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 248th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1400458
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He appeals his conviction, raising two issues. First, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Second, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence an irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial note written by one of the complainants, which suggested they were ceasing financial support of appellant.
We conclude there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that appellant committed the crime with the required mental state. As to the note, appellant preserved his objection to its relevance, but the trial court reasonably could find it relevant in showing the nature of appellant's relationship to the complainants. Additionally, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the note's probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We therefore overrule both issues on appeal and affirm appellant's conviction.
BACKGROUND
The complainants in this case were appellant's aunt and uncle, Harold "Fuzzy" Crampton and Marion "Virginia" Crampton. Appellant had lived with the complainants previously, and the complainants frequently assisted appellant financially.
A few days before the complainants' deaths, a grandchild of the complainants noticed an uncomfortable atmosphere between appellant and complainants while at the complainants' house. The grandchild testified that appellant seemed drunk at the time because he was slurring his speech.
The complainants were found dead in their house with bullet wounds to their heads. Each complainant was shot from close range with the same .25 caliber firearm in a manner inconsistent with a murder/suicide. Harold was found in the kitchen and Marion was found in her bed; a pillow with a bullet hole through it lay over her head.
On the night the complainants were killed, appellant went to stay at his father's house in Nederland, Texas, about an hour and 15 minutes away from Houston. At 3:01 a.m. the next morning, a red light camera in Willis, Texas—32 miles from the complainants' home—captured a photo of appellant's car driving in the direction of the home. Surveillance footage from the complainants' neighbor showed a car similar to appellant's driving up to the house 33 minutes later, and an individual walking from the car to the front door of the house. Marion had a heart monitor that indicated she died at 4:03 a.m., while the individual was inside the house. The surveillance footage showed the individual left and drove away from the house at 4:10 a.m., approximately 34 minutes after arriving. A toll road record showed appellant's car driving away from the area at 4:35 a.m., which was consistent with the time it would have taken a car leaving the complainants' house at 4:10 a.m. to arrive at the tolling location. There was evidence that the door to the complainants' house was locked from the outside after the murders were committed, and there was no sign of forced entry.
A key to the complainants' house was later found in the trunk of appellant's car, along with a purse and wallet belonging to the complainants. Aside from the purse and wallet, nothing had been taken from the house.
In the house, investigators found a note written by one of the complainants, Mrs. Crampton, which suggested they would be ceasing their long-term financial assistance of appellant sometime before the murders. The note contained short, independent words and phrases referencing cash for jail, car payments, miles for gas, child support, and insurance, all of which complainants' daughter testified implied complainants' deteriorating relationship with appellant. She explained that the complainants had bought appellant a car and he was supposed to be making payments to them, and that the complainants paid for appellant's car insurance. The note stated: "No more bailing out for anything! Next time will repo car!" The complainants' daughter also testified that appellant's mother had been living with the complainants and appellant's children sometimes visited the complainants' house. In this regard, the note stated: "No more visits except to kids," and "can come to Mother 2 times a month."
The complainants' daughter had no direct knowledge that appellant had ever seen the note, and there was nothing in the note directly referencing appellant. She acknowledged that the note's reference to "jail" could also have been alluding to one of the complainants' grandchildren, Joshua Crampton, who was jailed for DWI in 2013. The complainants' daughter also testified outside the presence of the jury that based on her personal knowledge of the family, this note could not have applied to anyone other than appellant.
When the State attempted to introduce the note into evidence, appellant objected, "[t]here's no indication whatsoever this information was transmitted to [appellant]." Upon his objection, the trial court asked appellant why the note wasn't "relevant" to show the surrounding circumstances. Appellant responded: "[W]e talk about the mindset of [appellant], not necessarily the mindset of the mother or the father." Appellant then argued that the note's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed it into evidence with the State redacting the mention of "jail."
ANALYSIS
I. The evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction of capital murder.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because it fails to show that he (a) committed the crime and (b) had the specific intent to kill. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict in a criminal case, we consider whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under this standard, "all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Courts of appeals consider all evidence in the record, whether admissible or inadmissible, to make this determination. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). On its own, circumstantial evidence can be enough to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Identity may be proven by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or reasonable inferences made from available evidence. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A defendant's possession of the complainant's personal items is evidence of his identity as the guilty party. See Youens v. State, 742 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1987, pet. ref'd) (defendant pawned off complainant's jewelry shortly after her death).
A person commits murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011). "A person acts intentionally . . . when it is his conscious objective" to commit the act or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a). "A person acts knowingly . . . when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist," or "when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Id. § 6.03(b). A person commits capital murder when he murders two or more people "(A) during the same criminal transaction; or (B) . . . pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct." Id. § 19.03(a)(7); see Coble v. State, 871 S.W.2d 192, 198-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (finding that murders committed in or near the same house, within a few hours of each other were part of the same criminal transaction).
B. There was sufficient evidence of appellant's identity as the person causing the complainants' deaths.
Appellant argues "there was not sufficient direct evidence to prove that [he] was actually the perpetrator." As noted above, however, direct evidence is not required. The traffic footage from the stoplight, the toll booth record, the neighbor's surveillance footage around the time of death indicated by the heart monitor, appellant's strange behavior before the murders, and the fact that the house door was locked from the outside with no sign of forced entry are all circumstances tending to show appellant's identity as the perpetrator. In addition, as discussed further below, the note written by Marion makes it somewhat more likely that the complainants were inclined to cut appellant off financially, which could supply a motive for the crime.
Appellant also had the complainants' purse and wallets in the trunk of his car, which tends to support his identity as the murderer. See Youens, 742 S.W.2d at 860. Appellant argues there was an innocent alternative reason for the presence of the complainants' belongings in the trunk, as there was evidence he often took the complainants shopping. But rational jurors might disbelieve appellant's proposed reason based on their experience that people do not typically leave essential personal items like purses and wallets—which are generally required to make purchases while shopping—in the trunk of someone else's car indefinitely. In addition, even if the jury credited appellant's reason, this evidence was not essential to prove appellant's identity.
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant caused the complainants' deaths. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant committed this crime.
Appellant does not dispute that there is sufficient evidence the murders occurred during the same criminal transaction.
C. There was sufficient evidence of specific intent to cause the death
of the complainants, although such evidence was not required.
Appellant also contends that capital murder requires the defendant to have the specific intent to cause the death of an individual. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained, however, "the gravamen of capital murder is intentionally (or knowingly) causing a death, plus any one of various different types of aggravating elements." Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "The theory of capital murder under which appellant was indicted and convicted, Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(7)(A), includes within its ambit both intentional and knowing murders." Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Although not required, we conclude there is sufficient evidence that these murders were committed intentionally. See id. "[T]he means used and the wounds inflicted" may be used to infer intent to kill, and such intent is presumed where a deadly weapon is fired at close range resulting in death. Draper v. State, 335 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd ) (quoting Womble v. State, 618 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). Firearms are classified as deadly weapons. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A).
Appellant argues that specific intent was not shown because there was insufficient direct evidence that appellant intended the complainants' deaths as a result of his conduct. The complainants were shot in the head from close range with a .25 caliber firearm, and one was shot through a pillow. From these facts, the jury could infer that the actor had the requisite specific intent to cause the death of the complainants. Because there is sufficient evidence that appellant murdered the complainants intentionally, we overrule his first issue.
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the note into evidence.
A. Standard of review
Appellant's second issue challenges the trial court's decision to admit the note written by one of the complainants regarding changes in their relationship with appellant, contending the note was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Rulings admitting evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In close cases, there is a presumption of admissibility for relevant evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on rehearing). The trial judge's decision will be upheld unless it was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
B. The objection to relevance was preserved, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the note relevant.
1. Preservation
A party may claim error in a ruling admitting evidence only if the party timely objects and states the specific ground for the objection, unless it was apparent from the context. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Where the trial judge understands the ground for an objection from context, the objection is preserved for appeal. See Shaw v. State, 329 S.W.3d 645, 654-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd).
The State contends that appellant did not preserve his objection to the note's relevance. During his objection, appellant did not mention the words "relevant" or "relevance." Instead, he began by pointing out that there was no indication the information in the note was transmitted to appellant. In response, the judge asked him why the note was not "relevant" to show surrounding circumstances and state of mind regardless of whether it was communicated to appellant. Because the trial judge was aware of the grounds for the objection from context, and appellant otherwise complied with the rules for preservation, the relevance ground may be reviewed on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
2. Relevance
Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Tex. R. Evid. 401. A fact is "of consequence" when it is either an elemental fact or an evidentiary fact that gives rise to an inference of an elemental fact. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on rehearing) (explaining that motive is an evidentiary fact from which an elemental fact can be inferred). In murder cases, all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the previous relationship existing between appellant and the complainants are admissible as evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.36(a) (West 2005).
Appellant argues that the note did not serve to make a fact of consequence more probable because it was not directly connected to appellant or to the complainants' deaths, it could have applied to another relative, and there was no evidence its contents were communicated to appellant. The State responds that the note is probative of the relationship between him and the complainants and also goes to his state of mind at the time of the offense.
We hold that it was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the trial court to conclude that the note's contents addressed relevant circumstances surrounding the relationship between appellant and the complainants. "The nature of the relationship—such as whether the victim and the accused were friends, were co-workers, were married, estranged, separated, or divorcing—is clearly admissible under . . . Article [38.36(a)]." Garcia v. State, 201 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The complainants' daughter testified that the note was in Mrs. Crampton's handwriting and that the phrases in it, taken together, could not have applied to anyone other than appellant. Regarding the nature of their relationship, the contents of the note show that appellant relied financially on the complainants, his aunt and uncle. In addition, regardless of whether the specific phrases in the note were communicated to appellant, the note's contents tend to make it more probable that their relationship was deteriorating or the parties had become estranged.
The effect of this evidence is to make it more probable that appellant had a motive to commit the murders. Because motive is an evidentiary fact that leads inferentially to an elemental fact, the note is of consequence in determining the action. See Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 84; Rankin, 974 S.W.2d at 718. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant's relevance objection.
C. The note's probative value was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.
Appellant also objected to the note's admission under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. "The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Tex. R. Evid. 403; see Garcia, 201 S.W.3d at 702 (explaining that admissibility of relationship evidence under Article 38.36(a) is subject to limits of Rules of Evidence 403 and 404).
Probative value is the evidentiary force of a piece of evidence, determined by its relevance and necessity to the proponent's case. See Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (concluding State had strong need for breathalyzer evidence in DWI case where defendant did not appear intoxicated). There is a presumption that the probative value of relevant evidence outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389 ("trial courts should favor admission in close cases, in keeping with the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence.").
One of the dangers to be considered under Rule 403, "unfair prejudice," occurs where it is likely the jury will be induced to render a decision on an improper basis, often an emotional one. See Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (suggesting that particularly gruesome photos could give rise to unfair prejudice); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 377. "Confusion of the issues," the second potential danger, "refers to a tendency to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues in the case." Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641; see Ripstra v. State, 514 S.W.3d 305, 318-19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) (holding that admitting evidence of prior misdiagnosis would have confused or distracted jury from issues in current case). "Misleading the jury" concerns whether the evidence had a tendency "to be given undue weight by the jury on other than emotional grounds." Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641 (considering whether the jury was "equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence"). The last two dangers set forth in Rule 403 concern whether an inordinate amount of time is required to present and develop the evidence at trial. Id.
To account for these considerations, a court ruling on a Rule 403 objection examines four factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence, (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible way, (3) the time needed to develop the evidence, and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390. The second Montgomery factor includes "unfair prejudice," "confusion of the issues," and "misleading the jury." See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390. Regarding the fourth Montgomery factor, the proponent's need for the evidence, there are three questions to consider: (1) Does the proponent have other available evidence to establish the fact of consequence that the evidence is relevant to show? (2) If so, how strong is that other evidence? (3) Is the fact of consequence related to an issue that is in dispute? Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Turning to the first factor, as discussed above, the note offered insight into the relationship between appellant and the complainants. In addition, the presumption that the probative value of relevant evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect must also be taken into account. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389. Therefore, the note had some probative value for establishing motive, and this factor weighs in favor of admissibility.
Concerning the second Montgomery factor, appellant has not raised the dangers of "confusing the issues" or "misleading the jury." Instead, appellant argues that using the note and speculative testimony about its meaning as evidence of motive is unfairly prejudicial given the lack of evidence that appellant was aware of its contents. The "unfair prejudice" danger is not applicable, however. As in Gigliobianco, where the breathalyzer results did not suggest unfair prejudice because they were not inflammatory or emotional, the note here was not likely to induce an emotional response from the jury. See 210 S.W.3d at 642. Instead, the jury would simply use the note as intended, considering its evidentiary value in establishing motive. Because there was no danger of unfair prejudice, the second factor also weighs in favor of admissibility.
The third Montgomery factor concerns the dangers of "undue delay" and "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." This evidence did not take a large amount of time to develop, as it consisted solely of a portion of a single witness's testimony. Additionally, it was not presented for the purpose of delaying the proceedings or wasting time, which the court in Gigliobianco suggests is the main concern regarding these dangers. 210 S.W.3d at 642. It was instead introduced into evidence to shed light on appellant's motive to commit the offense. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of admissibility as well.
Finally, the State's need for the evidence is moderate under the fourth Montgomery factor. There was no other evidence in the record to establish motive, which goes to the elemental fact of identity that appellant was contesting. See Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 495-96. As in Gigliobianco, where the State's need for breathalyzer evidence favored admissibility, here appellant admits that the note was the only piece of evidence the State had to show motive. See 210 S.W.3d at 642. On the other hand, evidence of motive is not required, and the State offered other evidence to prove appellant's identity, though that evidence was circumstantial. Therefore, the trial court could conclude that the fourth factor did not weigh heavily either in favor of or against admissibility.
Because most of the Montgomery factors favor admissibility, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the prejudice from admitting the note into evidence did not substantially outweigh the note's probative value. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the note. We overrule appellant's second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled appellant's issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ J. Brett Busby
Justice Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Busby, and Jewell.
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).