Opinion
Civil Action 23-1433
07-10-2024
SHEILA HARPER, as administrator of the ESTATE of ROBERT EDWARD HENRY HARPER, Plaintiff, v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY; ORLANDO HARPER in his individual capacity; JOHN/JANE DOE(S) 1 in their individual capacity; JOHN/ JANE DOE(S) 2 in their individual capacity, Defendants.
Re: ECF No. 12
District Judge Cathy Bissoon
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 12. For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sheila Harper (“Plaintiff”) commenced this counseled civil rights action in her capacity as administrator of the estate of her husband, Robert Edward Henry Harper (“Decedent”).ECF No. 1. In accordance with this Court's “meet and confer” Order, the parties met to address asserted pleading deficiencies in her initial Complaint. ECF Nos. 2, 9. Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint and brings claims against Warden Orlando Harper, Allegheny County and several unidentified employees and medical professionals (collectively, the “County Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of the Decedent's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights, and for recovery pursuant to Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death and Survival Action statutes, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8301, 8302. ECF No. 11.
Because Plaintiff, Decedent, and Warden Harper share a common surname and to avoid confusion, the Court refers to Mrs. Harper in her role as the Plaintiff and Mr. Harper as the Decedent.
Plaintiff's claims arise out of her husband's death on September 12, 2021, while he was in the custody of the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”) as a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff alleges that prior to August 10, 2021, Decedent was diagnosed with diabetes. “Upon information and belief,” Plaintiff asserts that the County Defendants were informed of the Decedent's diabetes diagnosis upon intake at ACJ. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. On or about August 10, 2021, the Decedent tested positive for COVID-19 and was placed in quarantine. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. From that point, Plaintiff alleges that the County Defendants failed to treat Decedent's symptoms resulting from his known comorbidities of diabetes and COVID-19. Plaintiff contends that Decedent suffered for several days with difficulty breathing, pain, and an inability to stand or walk. Decedent also suffered a lack of nutrition because ACJ employees refused to enter the Decedent's cell to bring him food while he was bedridden. Id. at 3-4. On August 19, 2021, nine days after his COVID-19 diagnosis, the County Defendants transported the Decedent to Allegheny General Hospital for medical treatment. He died at the hospital three weeks later of complications associated with COVID-19. Id. ¶ 23.
Plaintiff broadly alleges that the County Defendants had a practice of providing inadequate treatment to inmates experiencing COVID-19 symptoms or other serious medical needs, and that the County failed to properly train its staff in treating seriously ill inmates. She asserts that Warden Harper was aware of and acquiesced in the actions of the County and that through his inaction, he ratified the conduct of the individual Defendants. Id. at 5. Thus, Plaintiff brings four claims: (1) a claim against all Defendants for the violation of Decedent's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (Count I); (2) a failure to train claim against Allegheny County for the violation of Decedent's rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count II); a Wrongful Death claim against all Defendants for pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301 (Count III); and a Survival Action claim against all Defendants pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 8302 (Count IV). Id. at 6-12.
In response to the Amended Complaint, the County Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and a Brief in Support as to Plaintiff's claims against Warden Harper and Allegheny County, and Plaintiff's claims under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death statute, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301. ECF Nos. 12, 13. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment and Survival Act claims against the John Doe/Jane Doe Defendants are not addressed. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 21. The County Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 23.
The Motion to Dismiss is ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[D]etailed pleading is not generally required.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Rather, the rules require “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct..” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice. The complaint therefore “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s of his claim].”). Id. at 233, 234.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Warden Harper
The County Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Warden Harper in his individual or supervisory capacity. ECF No. 13 at 2-6. First, the County Defendants argue that Warden Harper cannot be considered deliberately indifferent for not responding to the Decedent's medical care needs because the Decedent was under the care of medical professionals. Id. at 3. Second, the County Defendants contend that there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983. Thus, Warden Harper cannot be held liable for the acts of his subordinates unless he was personally involved in the denial of medical care through his direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence. Id. at 4 (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988), Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir. 2003)). Third, the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not set forth facts sufficient to state a claim against Warden Harper based on his role as a decisionmaker at ACJ for an allegedly unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom. Id. at 6.
Upon review, the Court agrees that Plaintiff's claims against Warden Harper should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's claims related to the denial of adequate medical treatment fall under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n. 40 (1977)). “Because the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections at least as great as those available to inmates under the Eighth Amendment [the Court will review Plaintiff's] claims for failure to render medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment by applying the same standard used to evaluate claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 n.23 (3d Cir. 2023).
Under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials constituting deliberate indifference to that need. Thomas, 88 F.4th at 281 (citing Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). The standard generally is satisfied by, among other things, an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
Liability may also exist for unconstitutional acts undertaken by Warden Harper's subordinates if he either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm; or (2) or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). A “policy” arises when a decision-maker possessing final authority issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and that [the] failure, at least in part, led to [the plaintiff's] injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
In the Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that the Amended Complaint adequately states a claim against Warden Harper based on three allegations.
• On “information and belief,” Warden Harper was “informed of Decedent's diabetes diagnosis upon his intake into Allegheny County Jail.”
• “Plaintiff believes Defendant[] Harper. [was] aware that Decedent was extremely ill and experiencing serious symptoms including, but not limited to, an inability to stand and/or move, pain, and trouble breathing.”
• Despite ... Harper's ... actual knowledge of Decedent's worsening medical condition, .. [Harper] took no legitimate action to treat [Decedent's] medical needs prior to his death.ECF No. 21 at 5 (citing ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 13, 21, 25).
Mrs. Harper points to other allegations related to Mr. Harper's deteriorating condition and inability to file grievances due to his illness. ECF No. 21 at 5 (citing ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 15, 22, 27). However, these allegations are not directed at Warden Harper.
“[P]leading upon information and belief is permissible where it can be shown that the requisite factual information is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge or control-so long as there are no boilerplate and conclusory allegations[,] and plaintiffs accompany their legal theory with factual allegations that make their theoretically viable claim plausible.” McDermott v. Clondalkin Grp., Inc., 649 Fed.Appx. 263, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted). Facts that may support a nonspeculative inference of personal involvement based on awareness of the seriousness of Decedent's condition could include Warden Harper's personal observation of the Decedent, his receipt and review of reports generated in accordance with ACJ administrative procedures that disclosed Decedent's debilitating serious condition, or that he learned of the Decedent's serious need for care through ACJ channels of communication. See Thomas, 88 F.4th at 281 (deliberate indifference to arrestee's medical condition can be found based on allegations of awareness of facts of a substantial risk of harm). None of these facts are alleged in the Amended Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege with particularity a plausible basis for her conclusory statement that Warden Harper acted with deliberate indifference to the Decedent's serious medical needs.
As related to supervisory liability, Plaintiff alleges also in conclusory terms that Warden Harper was aware of and acquiesced to a policy or custom of “providing inadequate treatment to inmates experiencing COVID-19 symptoms and/or inmates with other serious medical needs.” ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 28, 29, 40. However, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to identify an existing policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation or that as the person in charge, Warden Harper had knowledge of and acquiesced to a constitutional violation resulting from an allegedly deficient policy or custom. See e.g., Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015) (deliberate indifference to inadequate medical care requires indifference to known deficiencies in a policy or procedure to impute the required culpable mental state). Facts sufficient to support awareness or knowledge could include a pattern of past constitutional violations that typically will put an actor on notice that policies are constitutionally deficient, so that “continued adherence to the original practices will demonstrate the ‘conscious disregard' required to establish deliberate indifference.” McCracken v. Fulton Cnty., No. 3:19-CV-1063, 2020 WL 2767577, at *8 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2020) (citing Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014); Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts to identify or explain what the ACJ policy was or why the ACJ policy or custom was insufficient, nor does she plead facts to state a plausible claim that Warden Harper was aware that ACJ's policies or customs created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional injury. Because her conclusory allegations are not made with the degree of particularity necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, it is recommended that the claims against Warden Harper be dismissed without prejudice.
2. Qualified Immunity
The County Defendants argue that the doctrine of qualified immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against Warden Harper because she alleges in the Amended Complaint that Decedent received medical care, and because Warden Harper did not have a material role in rendering medical decisions.ECF No. 13 at 7. Qualified immunity is intended to shield officers who make “reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions” and safeguards “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 744 (2011). The court must engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether qualified immunity applies to official actions: (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... make out a violation of a constitutional right”; and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2001) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
The Court believes it has gleaned the meaning of the County Defendants' statement that, “[a]s noted above, when an ill inmate is receiving medical care a correctional employee may is not responsible if that care is adequate or even amount to medical malpractice in the absence of unusual circumstances, such as the correctional office prevent an inmate from receiving medical or he has knowledge that adequate medical care was not being provided that would be obvious to a laymen.” ECF No. 13 at 7 (sic throughout).
The qualified immunity doctrine cloaks government officials with “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted), and “ensure[s] that insubstantial claims against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery,” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32 (second alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987)). Because this Court has recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against Warden Harper without prejudice, it must consider whether qualified immunity applies. See Roth v. City of Hermitage, 709 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Failing to consider the qualified immunity defense before dismissing without prejudice on the merits was error because the District Court failed to resolve a motion asserting qualified immunity ... at the earliest possible stage in the litigation[]”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are sufficiently clear' that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640) (cleaned up)). The ultimate question is whether the state of the law when the offense occurred gave the Warden Harper “fair warning” that his acts were unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
The Court finds that at the time of Decedent's incarceration at ACJ, the law was clearly established that a non-medical prison official such as Warden Harper could be liable for deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs if the official had a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that medical personnel were mistreating or not treating a detainee's serious medical needs. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining when a non-medical prison official can be held liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need). Thus, if Plaintiff can cure the identified pleading deficiencies and allege sufficient facts to state a claim for supervisory or individual liability, qualified immunity will not bar Plaintiff's claims against Warden Harper. For these reasons, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity be denied.
3. Allegheny County - Monell
The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against Allegheny County at Count I for maintaining a policy or practice of failing to provide adequate medical care must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 13 at 8-10.
In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury,” the government as an entity is responsible. Id. at 694. The facts alleged must plausibly show that the municipality was the moving force of a constitutional violation. Id. Thus, to plead municipal liability under Monell, Plaintiff must allege “(1) [the Decedent] possessed a constitutional right of which [he] was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy [or custom]; (3) the policy [or custom] ‘amount[ed] to deliberate indifference' to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy [or custom] was the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.'” Vargus v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 974 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff pleads in conclusory terms that Allegheny County had a “policy, practice, or custom of failing to provide adequate medical care to inmates with severe medical needs.” ECF No. 11 ¶ 39. However, Plaintiff has not substantively identified the policy, custom, or practice that the County implemented or failed to implement that led to the Decedent's injury, or how that policy or lack of policy caused the Decedent's injury. Thus, she fails to state a claim against Allegheny County. See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (“As an initial matter, McTernan fails to specify the relevant ‘custom' or ‘policy' here. To satisfy the pleading standard, McTernan must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was. Mere assertion of an entitlement to relief, without some factual showing, is insufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint, which gives no notice as to the Defendants' improper conduct, simply alleges that McTernan's rights were violated ‘due to the City's policy of ignoring First Amendment right[s.]' This is not sufficient.”) (internal citations omitted); Est. of Fabics v. City of New Brunswick, 674 F. App'x. 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Appellants must not only identify a municipal custom or policy that caused their injury, but also specify what exactly that custom or policy was.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wood v. Williams, 568 F. App'x. 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing a failure to train claim and noting that “[t]he complaint did not allege facts showing any particular or specific policy or custom, or how it allowed the claimed constitutional violation to occur, identifying the policymaker or decisionmaker, or showing prior notice through a pattern of similar constitutional violations.”).
Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Allegheny County for failing to provide medical care to the Decedent, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it at Count I without prejudice.
4. Allegheny County - Failure to Train
The County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim against Allegheny County at Count II for failure to train because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to establish that the training provided was inadequate, or that the County (or Warden Harper in his official capacity) knew that the training provided was inadequate. ECF No. 13 at 10-12. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “the Defendant County failed to properly train its staff in treating inmates experiencing COVID-19 symptoms and/or inmates with other serious medical needs. This practice created an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death to inmates with serious medical needs.” ECF No. 11 ¶ 30.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not plead facts sufficient to state a failure to train claim. The pleading requirements for failure-to-train claims differ from Monell claims because a plaintiff need not allege an unconstitutional policy. See Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (citing Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[I]n the absence of an unconstitutional policy, a municipality's failure to properly train its employees and officers can create an actionable violation ... under § 1983.”). But “[s]he must demonstrate that [the County's] failure to train its employees reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. “Ordinarily, ‘[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees' is necessary ‘to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.'” Beers v. Cnty. of Northumberland, No. 23-2555, 2024 WL 2874283, at *3 (3d Cir. June 7, 2024) (quoting Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223, and quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). This is so because “[w]ithout notice[,] ... decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223).
Sometimes “the need for training ‘can be said to be so obvious that failure to do so could properly be characterized as deliberate indifference to constitutional rights' even without a pattern of constitutional violations.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223 (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n. 10 (1989)). While “it is possible to establish deliberate indifference based on a single incident[,] ... this showing is available in a very narrow range of circumstances.” Peters v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., No. 11-850, 2014 WL 981557, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014). “To find deliberate indifference from a single-incident violation,” the risk of injury must be a “highly predictable consequence” of the municipality's failure to train and supervise its employees. Thomas, 749 F.3d at 225 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-64). “Liability in single-incident cases depends on ‘[t]he likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens' rights.'” Id. at 223-24 (quoting Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 409). However, even with a failure to train claim based on a high risk of injury, the plaintiff must identify a deficiency in a training program and the causal connection of that deficiency to the constitutional injury. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
In this case, Plaintiff does not plead prior incidents when inmates with diabetes suffered severe illness or death that would provide notice of training deficiencies. Nor does the Plaintiff identify a particular failure in an existing training program that would make the need for additional training necessary. Without this foundation, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to support a claim that Allegheny County made a deliberate choice to maintain a deficient training program that will cause a violation of constitutional rights. Under these circumstances, her failure to train claim is properly dismissed without prejudice.
5. Section 1983 and Wrongful Death Action
The County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death statute, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301. This claim is asserted in Plaintiff's capacity as the administrator of Decedent's estate. ECF No. 13 at 12-14. The County Defendants acknowledge that the Wrongful Death statute provides a remedy for losses suffered because of a defendant's tortious acts. However, the County Defendants contend that such damages are based on the deprivation of another's civil rights and thus are unavailable to a plaintiff in a Section 1983 action. Id. (citing O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that one cannot sue under Section 1983 for violating another's civil rights)).
Defendants do not move to dismiss the Survival Action claim in Count IV. ECF No. 12.
Plaintiff responds that the Wrongful Death statute provides a separate vehicle for recovery for a decedent's tort claim. Thus, because she pleads a plausible underlying constitutional violation, recovery is permitted. ECF No. 21 at 8.
The County Defendants reply that a wrongful death claim is intended to compensate survivors for their pecuniary loss suffered because of the decedent's death. As a result, the County Defendants argue that recovery cannot be obtained under Section 1983. ECF No. 23 at 4-5.
The Court finds that dismissal on this basis is not warranted. Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death statute is a vehicle through which plaintiffs can recover damages “for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another if no recovery for the same damages claimed in the wrongful death action was obtained by the injured individual during his lifetime.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301(a). A plaintiff in a wrongful death claim also may recover damages for the decedent's hospital, medical, funeral, and administration expenses necessitated by reason of injuries causing death. 42 Pa. C.S § 8301(c). Plaintiff's claim under the Wrongful Death statute seeks damages for the violation of the Decedent's Fourteenth Amendment rights, economic damages related to the Decedent's medical or other consequential costs, and death. ECF No. 11 ¶ 56. Because the underlying claimant is deceased, recovery for death and expenses necessarily passes to statutorily identified beneficiaries and to the personal representative of the deceased's estate. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301(b),(d). But this is not a bar.
“Wrongful death and survival actions have often been brought alongside § 1983 claims. § 1983 is thus recognized as a sufficient underlying basis for wrongful death and survival claims under Pennsylvania law.” Maldet v. Johnstown Police Dep't, No. 2:19-CV-325, 2019 WL 2435869, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2019). To hold otherwise would mean that the Decedent's death and his related expenses resulting from the violation of his civil rights “could never be vindicated.” Id.
In this regard, the Court finds persuasive the analysis in Becker v. Carbon County, 177 F.Supp.3d 841, 848 (M.D. Pa. 2016), and concludes that to the extent that Section 1983 is silent on the method of redress for damages suffered, recovery under the Wrongful Death statute is permissible pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988:
It is clear that a cause of action for violation of civil rights does not die with the victim of the alleged constitutional deprivation. Moyer v. Berks Heim Nursing Home, No. 13-CV-4497, 2014 WL 1096043, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2014) (quoting Baffa v. Black, 481 F.Supp. 1083, 1085-86 (E.D. Pa.1979)) (citations omitted). However, because Section 1983 is silent on the method of “redress”, courts must turn to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(a), providing in relevant part:
The jurisdiction in civil...matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies..., the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause...Becker, 177 F.Supp.3d at 848. Thus, if Plaintiff can establish entitlement to damages, including damages for medical and funeral expenses and Decedent's death, recovery for wrongful death is not inconsistent with Sections 1983 and 1988 to permit redress and the vindication of the violation of the Decedent's rights. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim under the Wrongful Death statute be denied.
6. Leave to Amend
Generally, a court should freely grant leave to amend the complaint when justice so requires "unless it would be inequitable or futile." Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff amended her complaint once as of right. ECF No. 11. However, "[n] either inequity nor futility of amendment is present" and there is no indication that Plaintiff "lacks good faith or proper motives." Id. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court grant Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to cure the identified deficiencies.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of the County Defendants, ECF No. 12, be granted as to Plaintiffs claims against Warden Harper and Allegheny County but denied as to Plaintiffs claims under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death Act. It is further recommended that the Plaintiff be granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.