Opinion
No. 75, 2001.
June 28, 2001.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County. Cr.A. Nos. 95-11-0803, 95-11-0804, 95-12-1510.
AFFIRMED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
WALLACE E. HARDEN, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 75, 2001. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: May 11, 2001. Decided: June 28, 2001.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County. Cr.A. Nos. 95-11-0803, 95-11-0804, 95-12-1510.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices ORDER
This 28th day of June 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Wallace E. Harden, filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2) In this appeal, Harden claims that: a) it was improper to charge him with sex crimes in the Superior Court rather than charge him with incest in the Family Court; b) the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to indict and convict him on those charges; c) his due process and equal protection rights were violated by the Superior Court assuming jurisdiction over the charges;
d) the indictment should have been dismissed because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and e) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.
(3) In 1996 Harden was convicted by a Superior Court jury of one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree and two counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree. He was declared an habitual offender and was sentenced to a total of 22 years imprisonment at Level V, to be suspended after 20 years for 2 years of work release and probation.
This Court affirmed Harden's convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
Harden v. State, Del. Supr., No. 107, 1997, Holland, J., 1998 WL 309841 (May 29, 1998) (ORDER).
(4) When reviewing a motion under Rule 61, this Court must first determine that the motion satisfies the procedural requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues. Because Harden's claims were not asserted either at trial or in his direct appeal, they are procedurally barred.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Moreover, Harden has failed to overcome the procedural bar by demonstrating cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from a violation of his rights.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A) and (B).
(5) To the extent Harden seeks to avoid the procedural bar by characterizing his claims as "jurisdictional," that effort is unavailing because the claims are baseless. Harden's first four claims are grounded in his contention that the Attorney General's office should not have charged him with sex crimes in the Superior Court. As long as a prosecution is undertaken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner, the State has broad discretion to determine what charges should be brought. In the absence of any evidence of bad faith or selective prosecution in this case, the State was within its discretion to charge Harden as it did and the Superior Court had jurisdiction to indict him and convict him on those charges.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 61-62 (1988).
Del. Const. art. IV, § 7; 10 Del. C., Ch. 5.
(6) Harden's final claim that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the Superior Court's jurisdiction is also unavailing. In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Harden must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable." Because there is no merit to Harden's underlying "jurisdictional" claims, there is also no basis for Harden's claim that his counsel's failure to challenge the jurisdiction of the Superior Court constituted ineffective assistance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.