Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11869 No. 6272
01-20-2016
HOLLY C. HANDLEY, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Michael Barber, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Raymond E. Beard, Assistant District Attorney, Palmer, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3PA-13-1768 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, David L. Zwink, Judge. Appearances: Michael Barber, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Raymond E. Beard, Assistant District Attorney, Palmer, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Coats, Senior Judge. Senior Judge COATS.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).
A state trooper contacted Holly C. Handley after she drove her mother's Volvo off the road and hit a newspaper box pole, bending the pole and causing substantial damage to the Volvo's front end. During this contact, the trooper observed signs that Handley was intoxicated, and Handley was ultimately convicted of driving under the influence.
On appeal, Handley argues that the district court should have suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of her investigative stop because the trooper had no reasonable suspicion to believe she committed a crime. For the reasons explained below, we find no merit to this claim and therefore affirm the decision of the district court.
Facts and proceedings
On July 14, 2013, Alaska State Trooper Brandon Viator was dispatched to Wasilla on a report that a white Volvo had gone into a ditch. When Trooper Viator arrived at the scene, he observed skid marks on the road leading into the ditch, a bent newspaper box pole that appeared to have been struck by a vehicle, and gouges in the ditch and in an adjacent homeowner's lawn. Viator also observed vehicle fluid marking the vehicle's route from the ditch back onto the roadway. The road surface was otherwise dry.
A mile or two away, at a gas station and food mart, Trooper Viator located an unoccupied white Volvo that had substantial damage to its front end and was leaking fluid from the undercarriage. Inside the vehicle was a photograph of a blonde woman, and the station attendant identified that woman as the driver of the Volvo. The attendant said that after the woman parked the Volvo, she was picked up by a friend.
During Viator's investigation, a woman named Alisha Bolinder arrived to retrieve items from the Volvo. Bolinder told Viator that she had picked up her friend Holly Handley, the driver of the Volvo, and had dropped her off at Perkup Espresso, a coffee stand where Handley worked. Viator later learned that the Volvo was registered to Handley's mother.
Viator then went to the Perkup Espresso and asked to speak with Handley. Handley told Viator she could talk to him in about twenty minutes. Viator then threatened to place Handley in handcuffs unless she came outside to talk with him, and Handley complied. During this contact, Viator observed signs that Handley was intoxicated. After Handley performed poorly on field sobriety tests, Viator arrested her for driving under the influence.
Before her trial on that charge, Handley filed a motion to suppress incriminating admissions she had made to Trooper Viator when he contacted her at the espresso stand. In that motion, Handley argued that Viator subjected her to custodial interrogation in violation of her Miranda rights. During the evidentiary hearing, Handley also argued that Viator had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe she had been driving recklessly or under the influence, and that the trooper's contact with her was therefore illegal.
Trooper Viator was the only witness at the evidentiary hearing. Based on his testimony, the district court suppressed the incriminating statements that Handley made to Viator, concluding that those statements were obtained in violation of Handley's Miranda rights. But the judge upheld the investigatory stop, ruling that when Trooper Viator contacted Handley he had both reasonable suspicion and probable cause to believe she was guilty of reckless driving.
Handley was then convicted of driving under the influence in a bench trial. She appeals.
AS 28.35.030(a).
Why we affirm the district court's decision upholding the investigatory stop
Handley argues that she was subjected to an illegal investigatory stop at the espresso stand because Trooper Viator had no reasonable suspicion to believe she committed the offense of reckless driving.
Under AS 28.35.400(a), a person is guilty of reckless driving if the person "drives a motor vehicle ... in a manner that creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to a person or to property." The statute defines a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" as "a risk of such a nature and degree that the conscious disregard of it or a failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation."
AS 28.35.400(a).
Handley argues that the district court had no factual basis for concluding that Trooper Viator had reasonable suspicion to believe she drove recklessly because no eyewitness testified at the evidentiary hearing to her driving. Handley also argues that the district court applied the wrong legal test. Specifically, Handley faults the court for focusing on the actual damage caused by her driving, instead of resolving whether the manner in which she drove constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. Handley observes that any number of circumstances might have led her to swerve into the ditch, including "attempting to avoid a moose or a child in the roadway."
We acknowledge that the district court's discussion at the evidentiary hearing of the elements required to prove reckless driving was inexact. But the question before the court at that hearing was not whether the State had proved all the elements of reckless driving beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether the facts known to the trooper gave him reasonable suspicion to believe Handley committed that offense. The reasonable suspicion test does not require an officer to affirmatively rule out all innocent possibilities before an investigatory stop will be warranted. Thus, an officer may have reasonable suspicion to believe that a motorist was driving recklessly even if the evidence known to the officer was equally consistent with innocent conduct — such as swerving to avoid a moose or a pedestrian.
Hays v. State, 850 P.2d 651, 652-53 (Alaska App. 1993) (quoting Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976)) ("Under Alaska law, an investigative stop is permitted where an officer 'has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred[.]'").
Marsh v. State, 838 P.2d 819, 821 (Alaska App. 1992).
The district court recognized this. In its findings, the court acknowledged that there "could be many reasons why" Handley drove off the road and collided with a pole. But the court also found that Handley's conduct was "very consistent with reckless driving."
That conclusion is supported by the record. Trooper Viator received a report of a single vehicle accident involving a white Volvo that drove into a ditch. When the trooper arrived at the scene, he observed skid marks on the road, tire gouges in the ditch, a bent newspaper box pole, and a trail of vehicle fluid — evidence strongly suggesting that the Volvo left the road, collided with the pole, and was then driven away leaking fluids.
Within a mile or two of the accident, Viator located an unoccupied white Volvo that had damage to the front end and was leaking fluids from its undercarriage. A woman who arrived to collect items from the Volvo identified Holly Handley as the driver and said she dropped Handley off at work. The station attendant corroborated these facts. This evidence gave Trooper Viator reasonable suspicion to believe Handley had been driving the Volvo in a manner that created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to a person or property. Viator was therefore entitled to detain Handley to further investigate whether she committed the offense of reckless driving. And during that contact, when Viator observed signs that Handley was intoxicated, he was justified in shifting the focus of his investigation to the risk that Handley had been driving under the influence.
Russell v. Anchorage, 706 P.2d 687, 689 (Alaska App. 1985). --------
We conclude that Handley was subjected to a legal investigative stop, and we uphold the district court's decision denying her motion to suppress on this ground.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the decision of the district court.