Opinion
March 5, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A motion to be relieved of a default pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of such discretion will generally not be disturbed if there is support in the record therefor (see, Vista Plumbing Cooling v Woldec Constr. Corp., 67 A.D.2d 761; Machnick Bldrs. v Grand Union Co., 52 A.D.2d 655). "In exercising such discretion courts should undertake a balanced consideration of all relevant factors, including the merit or lack of merit in the action, the seriousness of the injury, the extent of the delay, the excuse for the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party and intent or lack of intent to deliberately default or abandon the action" (Kahn v Stamp, 52 A.D.2d 748, 749; Batista v St. Luke's Hosp., 46 A.D.2d 806).
In this case, the complaint was served on or about April 18, 1988, and the defendants attempted to serve their answer on or about May 27, 1988, approximately 20 days after the time to answer had expired. When the late answer was rejected by the plaintiff as being untimely, the defendants promptly moved to vacate their default and to compel acceptance of the answer.
Under the circumstances and in view of the absence of prejudice to the plaintiff, the meritorious nature of the defense, the relative shortness of the delay, the lack of willfulness on the part of the defendants and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, it cannot be said that it was an improvident use of discretion to excuse the defendants' default (see, Shure v Village of Westhampton Beach, 121 A.D.2d 887; Matter of Prudential Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v Rothman, 116 A.D.2d 652; Sonju v Continental Garage Mgt. Corp., 108 A.D.2d 671; Leogrande v Glass, 106 A.D.2d 431). Lawrence, J.P., Rubin, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.