Opinion
2003-04380.
Decided June 1, 2004.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Dillon, J.), dated April 14, 2003, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Stephen J. Hammerling did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).
Corbally, Gartland and Rappleyea, LLP, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Annette G. Hasapidis of counsel), for appellants.
McCabe Mack, LLP, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Christina M. Bookless of counsel), for respondents.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, SANDRA L. TOWNES, STEPHEN G. CRANE, REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendants made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff Stephen J. Hammerling (hereinafter the plaintiff) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident through the submission of the plaintiff's deposition testimony, the affirmation of the defendants' medical expert, and the plaintiff's own medical and business records ( see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955; Hodges v. Jones, 238 A.D.2d 962; Fragale v. Geiger, 288 A.D.2d 431) . The affirmation of the plaintiff's physician submitted in opposition to the defendants' motion was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The limitations in movement which were quantified by the plaintiff's physician were of an insignificant nature ( see Trotter v. Hart, 285 A.D.2d 772; Williams v. Ciaramella, 250 A.D.2d 763; Cabri v. Myung-Soo Park, 260 A.D.2d 525; Waldman v. Dong Kook Chang, 175 A.D.2d 204; Medina v. Zalmen Reis Assocs., 239 A.D.2d 394), and were obviously based upon the plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain ( see Barrett v. Howland, 202 A.D.2d 383; LeBrun v. Joyner, 195 A.D.2d 502).
Moreover, the plaintiff failed to submit any competent medical evidence supporting his claim that he was unable to perform substantially all of his daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days as a result of the subject accident ( see Sainte-Aime v. Ho, 274 A.D.2d 569; Jackson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 273 A.D.2d 200; Greene v. Miranda, 272 A.D.2d 441; Arshad v. Gomer, 268 A.D.2d 450; Bennett v. Reed, 263 A.D.2d 800; DiNunzio v. County of Suffolk, 256 A.D.2d 498, 499). In any event, such a claim was belied by his business records.
Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly granted.
RITTER, J.P., S. MILLER, TOWNES, CRANE and RIVERA, JJ., concur.