Opinion
C.A. No. 97C-12-044-JOH
Submitted: January 17, 2001
Decided: February 2, 2001
Upon Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine — GRANTED Upon Defendants' Motion in Limine — GRANTED in part, DENIED in part
Kenneth M. Roseman, Esq., of Ciconte, Roseman Wasserman, attorney for plaintiffs
Richard Galperin, Esq., and Eileen K. Andersen, Esq., of Morris, James, Hitchens Williams, attorneys for defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Court has before it two motions relating to the retrial of this medical negligence case. The first trial in August 1999 resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendants finding that no negligence had occurred. The potential liability of defendant Christiana Care Health Services, Inc. at the first trial was vicarious. It is the employer of codefendant Kay Taylor, a nurse.
The plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial. It held that this Court improperly (1) removed plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages from the jury and (2) removed some of the various claims of negligence against Taylor. The second trial, scheduled to start in February 2002 is, by Supreme Court decision, to allow presentation of the claims of negligence against Taylor that were prohibited at the first trial. Also, since those claims will now be presented, this Court is to consider whether Taylor's acts of negligence, both those submitted before and those to be allowed in the new trial, are enough to allow the punitive damages' claim to go to the jury.
Hambleton v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., Del.Supr., No. 380, 1999, Holland, J. (September 25, 2000) (ORDER).
During the first trial, this Court ruled that, as a matter of law, if the jury found Taylor negligent, as to any of the claims that remained, such negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries. The jury was instructed as follows:
As I mentioned, if you find that Ms. Taylor committed medical negligence, that would mean that the Estate of Mrs. Albanese has shown that any injury she suffered as a result of that negligence was a cause of injury to Mrs. Albanese. If you make that finding of negligence, that means the Estate of Mrs. Albanese is entitled to recover the cost of medical care. The plaintiffs still must show, however, if the negligence of Ms. Taylor was a proximate cause of any other damages suffered by the Estate of Mrs. Albanese or by Mrs. Hambleton.
Jury Instructions at 11.
The first motion is plaintiffs'. They argue this ruling is the law of the case and should govern the retrial, since they intend to make the same negligence claims against Taylor, plus the ones previously excluded. Plaintiffs point out that the defendants did not cross-appeal this Court's ruling. Further, the defendants have not responded to this motion. Instead, they have moved in limine to preclude plaintiffs from making certain claims of negligence. The defendants rely, too, on the law of the case doctrine and that the remand of this case limits the retrial issues to the two specified areas.
In a letter, plaintiffs informed the defendants that at the retrial, they intend to "expand" their standard of care violations to include the following: (1) the failure to respond to the nurses' call button, (2) the failure to respond to the (pulse oximeter) alarm between 1:30 and 1:55 p.m., and (3) the failure to provide appropriate staffing. In that letter, dated December 7, 2000, notifying the defendants of these claims, plaintiffs state, "Additionally, the violations set forth above are not limited to violations committed by Taylor. The plaintiff [sic] will allege that the violations were committed by Taylor and/or other unknown agents of the defendant." The defendants oppose this proposed expansion of claims and/or basis for additional liability of defendant Christiana Care.
Roseman letter to McReynolds (December 7, 2000).
Plaintiffs' Motion on Proximate Cause
During the first trial, the defendants presented no evidence on causation. The plaintiffs presented expert testimony that the oxygen depravation experienced by Mrs. Albanese between 1:15 and 1:55 p.m. on December 30, 1995 caused injury to her. This Court ruled that, if the jury found Taylor negligent, proximate cause had been established as a matter of law. That decision was not appealed. The plaintiffs ask that this ruling be the law of the case in the retrial.
When an appellate court, as the Supreme Court here, remands a case for further proceedings, "the trial court must proceed in accordance with the mandate and the law of the case as established on appeal." The trial court is bound to strictly comply with the appellate court's determination of any issues expressly or impliedly outlined in its decision. The trial court is free to make any determinations, which are not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court, but that freedom to act is constrained by the holding of the appellate court. The Supreme Court's decision to remand an issue is the law of the case, which this Court is bound to follow. Once a matter has been addressed already by a court, it is generally held to be the law of that case, unless a compelling reason is shown to reopen the issue.
Insurance Corp. of America v. Barker, Del.Supr., 628 A.2d 38, 40 (1993) (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 3rd Cir., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (1985)).
Id.
Id. at 41.
See Frank G. W. v. Carroll M. W., Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 715, 718-19 (1983).
Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., Del.Ch., No. 12883, Chandler, V.C. (June 30, 1995).
Zirn v. VLI Corp., Del.Ch., No. 9488, Allen, C. (September 23, 1994).
The Supreme Court, in this case, held that this Court impermissibly prevented the plaintiffs from presenting to the jury several of its claims of negligence against Taylor. All those claims arise from allegations of action or inaction on her part during the 1:15 to 1:55 p.m. time frame. They would, therefore, fit into the causation expert's testimony covering that period of time. Based on all of this, the Court sees no compelling reason to reopen its ruling on proximate cause. It remains the law of the case.
Defendants' Motion to Preclude More Claims
Plaintiffs' December 7, 2000 letter to the defendants indicating an expansion of claims is a little unclear. Are the so-called additional claims being made against Taylor only or are they against her and/or other employees of Christiana Care? The first two could be either way but the third claim, relating to inadequate staffing, can only be directed against other employees of Christiana Care and not at all against Taylor.
In the first trial, as noted, Christiana Care's potential liability was vicarious and only premised on the actions or inactions of Taylor. The only standard of care evidence was directed at her. None was directed at any other nurse or hospital employee. No claim or evidence was presented about staffing. Several nurses who were around at various times that day testified. One was at lunch during the 1:15-1:55 p.m. period. Another was treating a different patient around 1:15-1:20 p.m.
Plaintiffs' standard of care expert opined at trial about a number of areas where she believed Taylor was negligent. One of them was that Taylor did not respond to the nurse's call in Mrs. Albanese's room when the button was pushed there and lit up at the nurse's station. Another alleged breach by the expert indicated was that Taylor did not respond to the alarm on the pulse oximeter which allegedly sounded continuously from 1:30 to 1:55 p.m. These are two of the three so-called expanded negligence claims contained in the December 7th letter. These allegations are specifically several which this Court, for various reasons, excluded (erroneously) from the jury's consideration. They are, therefore, within the scope of the remand and can be presented against Taylor.
The more fundamental issue, however, is whether these two claims and the staffing claim can be presented during the retrial. In their response to the defendants' motion to exclude the expansion of claims, plaintiffs appear to abandon (1) making the first two claims against anyone other than Taylor, and (2) making the inadequate staffing claim. They correctly argue that their expert did address the first two claims — the call button and the pulse oximeter alarm — in the first trial. They can, therefore, present these claims against Taylor in the retrial. Except for the negligence claims against Taylor, no other claims can be made against any other Christiana Care employee, including anything about inadequate staffing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs' motion to declare as law of the case the prior ruling on proximate cause is GRANTED, and the defendants' motion in limine about expanded claims is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.