Opinion
Case No. 3:15-cv-1054-BJD-PDB
2024-05-17
Wendall HALL, Plaintiff, v. Sergeant Charles WATSON and Officer Wright, Defendants.
Jesse B. Wilkison, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff. Wendall Hall, Arcadia, FL, Pro Se. Bilal Ahmed Faruqui, Erik Kverne, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.
Jesse B. Wilkison, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff. Wendall Hall, Arcadia, FL, Pro Se. Bilal Ahmed Faruqui, Erik Kverne, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants. ORDER BRIAN J. DAVIS, United States District Judge
On September 20, 2023, Defendants Watson and Wright notified the Court they privately settled with Plaintiff, Wendall Hall, who is a civil detainee housed at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC) (Doc. 280). Plaintiff initially sought to avoid the agreement (Docs. 283-85), but he later withdrew his request, stating that he "now accepts the settlement agreement as written, stipulated and agreed to" (Doc. 286). On November 19, 2023, defense counsel filed a Joint Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice (Doc. 288), which Plaintiff had signed on September 27, 2023. See Doc. 288 at 2. The following day, the Clerk received and docketed Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Withdraw from Settlement Agreement (Doc. 289), which was mailed from FCCC on November 15, 2023 (Doc. 289-1).
In his Motion, Plaintiff explains the parties executed settlement paperwork in October and, in satisfaction thereof, he received a check, but defense counsel notified him about 30 days later that a stop-payment had been processed because he had not yet cashed the check. See Doc. 289 at 2-4. Defense counsel informed Plaintiff a new check would be issued. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends in his Motion, id. at 2-3, and in other duplicative filings (see, e.g., Docs. 290, 291, 293, 293-1, 294, 295, 296, 296-1, 298, 301, 306, 306), many of which are not proper motions, that Defendants breached the settlement agreement by issuing a stop-payment on the first check even though the check itself indicated he had 90 days in which to cash it, and by handing the second check directly to an FCCC official for direct deposit into his resident account, which effectively deprived him of his settlement proceeds because his account had been frozen due to an incarceration lien imposed against him pursuant to Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Doc. 291 at 2-3; Doc. 293-1 at 2, 4-5; Doc. 296-1 at 1-2.
In Doc. 294, Plaintiff moves the Court for an order directing FCCC to remove the "freeze" on his resident bank account. The FCCC is not a party to this action, and Plaintiff is not entitled to such relief through this action. In Doc. 298, Plaintiff requests leave to file a reply to Defendants' response. Despite the Court's Local Rules, which provide that a party "must not include the proposed reply" with such a motion, Plaintiff included the proposed reply. See M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(d). The Court will deny this motion as violative of the Local Rules but also as redundant of other filings.
According to records filed by Defendants and a review of the relevant state court docket, a civil restitution lien order was entered in Escambia County case number 1994-CF-3077 on June 12, 2023. See Doc. 292-4 at 2. See also Escambia County Clerk of Court, available at https://www.escambiaclerk.com/258/Online-Public-Records (last visited May 15, 2024). The state court docket reflects that the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) filed a motion for imposition of a civil restitution lien on June 1, 2023, and Plaintiff responded to the motion on June 12, 2023. Id. The order was recorded in public records on June 13, 2023. Id. The order reflects that a copy was sent to both FDC and Plaintiff at FCCC (resident #4637871). See Doc. 292-4 at 3.
A district court may take judicial notice of the contents of a publicly available docket sheet. See McDowell Bey v. Vega, 588 F. App'x 923, 926 (11th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff asserts that, while he personally received the first check defense counsel mailed to him and on which payment was stopped, he never personally received the second check, which instead was hand-delivered to an FCCC official, processed without his knowledge or signature, and then used to satisfy his lien. See generally Doc. 296-1; Doc. 297 at 2. Apparently because Plaintiff never obtained physical possession of the second check, he steadfastly maintains that the second check was "never deposited into [his] resident bank account at [FCCC]." See Doc. 293-1 at 4; Doc. 296-1 at 1-2; Doc. 297 at 2. He even filed a copy of his resident account statement, which he claimed showed no deposit of the settlement proceeds. See Doc. 297-1. Defense counsel, who noted the account statement appeared to have been altered, contacted the Clerk's office requesting that the original document Plaintiff mailed for filing be retained, and counsel filed a response alerting the Court of the fraudulent conduct. See Doc. 300. See also Doc. 300-2 at 3 (declaration of FCCC business manager). Plaintiff thereafter wisely withdrew his request that the Court consider the account statement, which the Court agrees shows evidence of tampering. See Doc. 297-1; Doc. 299.
The account statement Defendants filed shows a $20,000 deposit into Plaintiff's FCCC resident account on November 28, 2023. See Doc. 300-3 at 3. See also Doc. 300-2 at 2 (declaration averring $20,000 was deposited into Plaintiff's account). The initial deposit was subject to a temporary hold, which was released on December 8, 2023, and the funds were subsequently withdrawn on December 11, 2023. See Doc. 300-3 at 3-4. See also Doc. 300-2 at 2. It appears the withdrawal was not made by Plaintiff but rather was initiated to satisfy in part his incarceration lien.
Plaintiff claims to have had no knowledge of the Escambia County lien when he entered into the settlement agreement and, had he known of it, he would not have signed the settlement agreement. See Doc. 293-1 at 5-6. See also Doc. 294; Doc. 296-1. He contends Defendants' conduct—stopping payment on the first check and hand-delivering the second check to an FCCC official for direct deposit into his FCCC account—amounts to a breach of contract, thereby permitting him to repudiate the agreement. See Doc. 289 at 4. See also Doc. 290 at 1-2. Plaintiff asks that the Court reopen the case for further proceedings. See Doc. 291.
In light of the state court docket, which shows Plaintiff responded to the FDC's motion for imposition of a civil restitution lien, the lien order, which shows a copy was mailed to Plaintiff at FCCC, and Plaintiff's blatant attempt to deceive the Court by filing an altered document, the Court finds Plaintiff's assertion lacks credibility.
In Defendants' response to Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 292), defense counsel acknowledges having spoken with Plaintiff by phone on November 14, 2023, to tell him a stop-payment was issued on the first check because it had not been cashed and was believed to be lost. See Doc. 292 at 2-3. Counsel contends that, during the phone call, Plaintiff said he "wanted to once again back out of the settlement agreement." Id. at 3. After that phone call, on November 18, 2023, counsel hand-delivered a second settlement check to FCCC and the following day, filed the Stipulation of Dismissal, which Plaintiff had signed in September. Id. at 4.
Defendants argue the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) by virtue of the filing of the Stipulation of Dismissal signed by all parties. Id. at 5. Alternatively, Defendants contend Plaintiff's Motion should be denied on the merits. Id. at 6. Defendants provide a copy of the "Settlement and Release of all Claims," which Plaintiff signed on September 27, 2023, and defense counsel signed on October 5, 2023 (Doc. 292-1) ("Agreement").
The first paragraph of the Agreement provides in relevant part that $20,000 would "be placed in Plaintiff's account . . . . within thirty (30) working days after the Statement is fully executed and the Plaintiff has signed and filed with the Court a Stipulated Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice . . . ." See Doc. 292-1 at 2-3 (emphasis added). The Agreement further provides, "Plaintiff agrees that the settlement amount of $20,000 . . . to be placed in Plaintiff's account, [sic] constitutes a resolution of the issues in this case." Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Finally, the Agreement addresses what would occur in the case of a purported breach: "[I]f any of the parties breach this Settlement . . . the only remedy therefor will be an action for breach of contract and that the proper venue for such action will be in state court in Leon County, Florida." Id.
Before an action is dismissed, a district court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement reached by the parties. Kent v. Baker, 815 F.2d 1395, 1398, 1400 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing with approval Cia Anon Venezolana De Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1967)). The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that settlement agreements are favored and enforceable: "An agreement by the parties settling a disputed liability is as conclusive of their rights as a judgment would be if it had been litigated." Id. at 1398 (quoting Cia Anon, 374 F.2d at 35) (emphasis omitted). See also Reed By & Through Reed v. United States, 891 F.2d 878, 881 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Once an agreement to settle is reached, one party may not unilaterally repudiate it.").
Whether parties reached an enforceable settlement agreement depends on state law. See BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Oakridge at Winegard, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (M.D. Fla. 2007). In BP Products, the court set forth the relevant standard:
In Florida, settlement agreements are favored as an efficient way to settle disputes and as a means to conserve judicial resources. Courts will enforce them when it is possible to do so. See Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 704 So.2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Settlement agreements in Florida are interpreted and governed by the law of contracts. Williams v. Ingram, 605 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The party seeking to enforce a settlement agreement bears the burden of showing the opposing party assented to the terms of the agreement. Carroll v. Carroll, 532 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).Id. at 1133. A court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement without holding an evidentiary hearing unless "there is a substantial factual dispute as to the terms of the settlement." Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994).
To compel enforcement of a settlement agreement, its terms must be sufficiently specific and mutually agreed upon as to every essential element. See, e.g., Don L. Tullis and Assoc., Inc. v. Benge, 473 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Uncertainty as to nonessential terms or small items will not preclude the enforcement of a settlement agreement. "[T]he making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing." Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So.2d 404, 407 (Fla. 1974) (quoting Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957)).
A trial court's finding that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties must be supported by competent substantial evidence. See, e.g., Long Term Mgmt., 704 So.2d at 673. When that evidence exists, the court will enforce the agreement between the parties. See, e.g., Spiegel v. H. Allen Holmes, Inc., 834 So.2d 295, 297 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
Given Plaintiff mailed his Motion before the Stipulation of Dismissal was filed, the Court finds it has jurisdiction to rule on the Motion. However, the Court concludes the Motion lacks merit. There is competent substantial evidence that the parties reached a "meeting of the minds" on every essential term of the settlement agreement, and there is no substantial dispute regarding those essential terms. Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that he agreed to settle all claims against Defendants Watson and Wright in exchange for $20,000. See generally Docs. 289, 290, 293-1, 296-1.
Plaintiff's assent to the terms of the settlement is further evidenced elsewhere on the record. In his motion to withdraw his original request to avoid the settlement agreement, Plaintiff stated, "Plaintiff now accepts the settlement agreement as written, stipulated and agreed to and signed by Plaintiff." See Doc. 286 at 1. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion in his Motion, the Agreement does not "require[ ] Defendants to mail the settlement check payment[ ] to Wendall Hall." Cf. Doc. 289 at 5; Doc. 290 at 1 with Doc. 292-1 at 2-4. The Agreement, which Plaintiff signed and ratified, see Doc. 292-1 at 4; Doc. 286 at 1, speaks for itself. It provides that $20,000 would be "placed in Plaintiff's account." Doc. 292-1 at 2, 4. To the extent Plaintiff now disputes the meaning of that term, the circumstances suggest the word "placed" reasonably was contemplated to mean the funds would be directly deposited into Plaintiff's FCCC resident account. Defendants satisfied their obligation under the Agreement by delivering a check in the amount of $20,000 to FCCC for placement in Plaintiff's resident account, and the funds were placed in Plaintiff's resident account within 30 working days of the filing of the Stipulation of Dismissal. See Doc. 300-3 at 3-4. See also Doc. 300-2.
To the extent Plaintiff believes Defendants breached the Agreement, the Agreement expressly provides that such a claim must proceed through "an action for breach of contract" in state court. See Doc. 292-1 at 4. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff disagrees with FCCC's handling of the check that was hand-delivered to FCCC for placement in his resident account or of FCCC's maintenance of his resident account, see, e.g., Doc. 296-1 at 2, he may not seek relief against FCCC through this action. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff disputes the civil restitution lien entered against him in Escambia County case number 1994-CF-3077, he must seek any relief related thereto by filing appropriate motions, actions, or appeals in the appropriate court.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Withdraw from Settlement Agreement (Doc. 289) is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen or Reinstate Case for Further Proceedings (Doc. 291) is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Order (Doc. 294) is DENIED.
4. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Reply (Doc. 298) is DENIED.
5. Pursuant to the parties' Joint Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice (Doc. 288), the claims against Defendants Watson and Wright are DISMISSED with prejudice. The parties shall bear their own fees and costs. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate any pending motions as moot. The file shall remain closed.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of May 2024.