Opinion
24A-CR-01330
11-19-2024
David Ray Hall, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT KATRINA MARIE DYSON LYNN LAW OFFICE, P.C. WABASH, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA ROBERT MARTIN YOKE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court The Honorable James R. Heuer, Senior Judge Trial Court Cause No. 35C01-2307-F6-000196
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT KATRINA MARIE DYSON LYNN LAW OFFICE, P.C. WABASH, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA ROBERT MARTIN YOKE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
DeBoer, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] David Ray Hall beat his fellow inmate, Dillon Weinley, and then made numerous threats to harm and kill him. A jury convicted Hall of Intimidation as a Level 6 felony and Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury as a Class A misdemeanor. Hall claims the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of Intimidation as a Level 6 felon. We disagree and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Hall and Weinley were inmates in the D block of the Huntington County Jail. One morning while breakfast was being served, Hall struck Weinley in the head with his breakfast tray, grabbed him, and accused him of telling on Hall's son, who was also in the Huntington County Jail at the time. Two officers from C block, who overheard noises and screams coming from D block, responded to assist and observed Hall on top of Weinley "punching repeatedly." Tr. Vol 2 at 48. Staff Sergeant Paul Douglas ("Staff Sergeant Douglas") responded to D block, helped the officers restrain Hall, and heard him repeatedly say, "I will kill you n****," and, "you let it out about my boy[.]" Id. at 62.
[¶3] Once Hall was restrained, the officers, assisted by Jail Commander Debbie Meier ("Commander Meier") and Deputy Daniel Cowan ("Deputy Cowan"), placed Hall and Weinley in separate holding tanks approximately 15 feet apart. The metal door on Hall's holding tank was shut. Commander Meier and Deputy Cowan tended to Weinley's 1.5-inch gash on his scalp. Commander Meier observed that Weinley was "worked up" and "very fidgety" while they worked on his injuries. Id. at 67, 68. From Weinley's holding tank, Deputy Cowan heard Hall yell yelling at Weinley, stating "you're dead bitch," and "you better watch out when you go south," which Deputy Cowan understood to mean going to the Department of Corrections. Id. at 27. Weinley could also hear Hall "yelling stuff[,]" saying "something about when we get down state[.]" Id. at 41.
[¶4] Outside the holding tanks, the original responding officers heard Hall shouting, "you're going to die in prison" and "that he would kill [Weinley] and other things like that." Id. at 49, 57. The officers also heard Weinley respond to Hall from his tank.
[¶5] The State originally charged Hall with Intimidation and Battery Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury, both Level 6 felonies, and Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury, a Class A misdemeanor; however, the State only proceeded to jury trial on the intimidation and misdemeanor battery charges. Hall was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to two years of incarceration for intimidation to run concurrently with one year of incarceration for the battery.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Hall argues the State did not produce sufficient evidence at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of intimidation. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is well settled. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). Sufficiency claims "trigger a deferential standard of review in which we 'neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.'" Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)). "A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if 'there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). When conducting this review, "we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it." Id. We will "affirm a defendant's conviction unless 'no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).
[¶7] A person commits Level 6 felony Intimidation when he communicates a threat with the intent that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out and the threat is to commit a forcible felony. Ind. Code. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4); (b)(1)(A). A forcible felony is statutorily defined as a felony "that involves the use or threat of force against a human being, or in which there is imminent danger of bodily injury to a human being." I.C. § 35-31.5-2-138. A threat is defined as "an expression, by words or action, of an intention to," among other things: "(1) unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property; (2) unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or restraint; or (3) commit a crime." I.C. § 35-45-2-1(c)(1)-(3).
[¶8] Hall contends that the State did not produce sufficient evidence to prove the communication element of the Intimidation statute was satisfied; specifically, that any of the threats Hall made were actually communicated to and received by Weinley. However, "a defendant need not speak directly with a victim to communicate a threat for purposes of Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1." E.B. v. State, 89 N.E.3d 1087, 1091 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). "[T]o communicate a threat for purposes of the offense of intimidation, the statement must be transmitted in such a way that the defendant knows or has good reason to know the statement will reach the victim." Id. at 1092. The defendant's "specific intent which must coincide with the threat" may be proven by "circumstantial evidence alone, and knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case." Peterson v. State, 187 N.E.3d 305, 309 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022); B.B. v. State, 141 N.E.3d 856, 860 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).
[¶9] At trial, Staff Sergeant Douglas testified that while Hall was being restrained, he said, "[Y]ou let it out about my boy, I will kill you n****," two to three times. Tr. Vol 2 at 62. Although Weinley testified he did not recall other statements made by Hall during or after the attack in D block, Weinley's memory of any specific threat, or his willingness to testify regarding any threats he heard, is not in contention. The issue is whether Hall knew or had good reason to know his threats to take Weinley's life would reach Weinley. See S.D. v. State, 847 N.E.2d 255, 258 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (concluding that S.D. knew or had good reason to know her threat to kill her teacher would be communicated to her teacher when she told a different faculty member and several students that she would kill the absent teacher, harm the school, and did not care who heard her statements); E.B., 89 N.E.3d at 1092-93 (concluding that it should have been foreseeable to E.B. that his school shooting plan would spread throughout the school after he impliedly warned friends he would be engaging in an act of violence at school and told them to share his instructions with others they cared about.); B.B., 141 N.E.3d at 862 (concluding that B.B. "knew or should have known that R.A. would report a plan of mass murder to other students" at their high school after B.B. sent R.A. pictures of an assault rifle, told R.A. not to come to school on a certain day, and showed R.A. his manifesto).
[¶10] Here, unlike the indirect communications analyzed in S.D., E.B., and B.B., Hall communicated his threats directly to Weinley. Crediting Staff Sergeant Douglas's testimony, as we must, it was well within the province of the jury to conclude that Hall communicated a threat to commit a forcible felony against Weinley while in D block, and that Hall knew or had good reason to know Weinley would hear his threat. After Hall and Weinley were initially separated following the altercation, they remained in the same room together. Multiple officers testified that Hall was saying things to Weinley while being restrained, including the specific death threat Staff Sergeant Douglas witnessed. Additionally, this evidence must be viewed against the backdrop of what had just occurred at breakfast. Hall had attacked Weinley with a tray, causing a 1.5-inch laceration to Weinley's scalp, conveyed his belief that Weinley told on his incarcerated son, and repeatedly punched Weinley before officers pulled him off and forcibly restrained him. Because Hall was no longer within physical reach of Weinley, Hall threatened him, intending to place him in fear for his life.
[¶11] Likewise, the jury could reasonably infer from the totality of the evidence that while the men were in their respective holding tanks approximately 15 feet apart, Hall knew or had good reason to know his threatening statements were being heard by Weinley. Although the door to Hall's tank was closed, Commander Meier heard Hall yelling and Weinley heard him say something about "when we get down state." Deputy Cowan, in the holding tank with Weinley, could hear Hall yelling threats at Weinley, including "you better watch out when you go south, you're dead bitch." Tr. Vol 2 at 27, 41, 67. Other officers convening outside of the holding tanks heard Hall threatening Weinley's life and heard Weinley yell back at Hall. Thus, Hall was threatening Weinley so loudly from his secured tank that those outside the tank could hear his specific threats, and Weinley's response to Hall suggests he understood Hall's shouting was directed at him. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found that Hall committed Level 6 felony Intimidation while he was restrained in D block and while he was in his holding tank.
Conclusion
[¶12] The State presented sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall committed Intimidation, as a Level 6 felony.
[¶13] Affirmed.
May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.