Opinion
24A-PL-875
12-13-2024
Tyler Cody Hall, Appellant-Defendant v. JAAK Properties, LLC, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Michael C. Cooley, Corwin S. Marcum, Allen Wellman, Harvey Keyes Cooley, LLP. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Jennifer F. Perry Clark, Quinn, Moses, Scott & Grahn, LLP
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Patricia C. McMath, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D02-2107-PL-26013.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Michael C. Cooley, Corwin S. Marcum, Allen Wellman, Harvey Keyes Cooley, LLP.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Jennifer F. Perry Clark, Quinn, Moses, Scott & Grahn, LLP
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[¶1] Tyler Cody Hall appeals the Marion Superior Court's denial of his Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside its prior order in which the court had granted a motion by JAAK Properties, LLC ("JAAK") to transfer possession of Hall's abandoned personal property to a warehouseman. Hall presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to set aside the warehouseman order.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay JAAK's attorney's fees.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] In 2019, Hall leased commercial property from JAAK to operate an automobile repair business. After Hall missed several rent payments, in June 2021, JAAK commenced eviction proceedings against Hall and obtained a default judgment. In July, Hall filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and asked for a jury trial. The trial court transferred the case to the Marion Superior Court.
[¶4] In August, JAAK filed its complaint and alleged that Hall had breached the lease agreement when he fell behind on his rent payments. In October, JAAK filed a summary judgment motion. Thereafter, JAAK and Hall entered into a settlement agreement whereby Hall agreed to vacate the premises by December 31 and to pay JAAK $29,375.32 in back rent. The parties agreed that, upon Hall's payment in full to JAAK, JAAK's complaint would be dismissed. However, neither party moved to dismiss the complaint after full payment was made.
[¶5] Further, Hall did not vacate the premises by December 31. Instead, the parties agreed to a month-to-month lease. In April 2022, Hall and JAAK executed an agreed entry whereby Hall would vacate the leased premises within seven days of the order being filed. JAAK could file this agreed entry at its discretion if Hall failed to pay his rent in a timely fashion. In the event that Hall did not vacate the premises in that time, the parties agreed that the "contents of said leased premises will be removed and placed in storage at [Hall's] cost." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 43. And the parties agreed that, if requested, the Marion County Sheriff's Department would forcibly remove Hall and return the premises to JAAK's possession. But neither party filed the agreed order with the trial court at that time. Rather, Hall's month-to-month lease continued throughout 2022 and into the beginning of 2023.
[¶6] In April 2023, JAAK's counsel emailed Hall's counsel regarding a missed rent payment. On April 18, JAAK then filed the parties' April 2022 agreed entry with the trial court. Accordingly, Hall had seven days to vacate the leased premises. Hall ceased business operations but left dozens of vehicles on the premises. On June 2, JAAK's counsel emailed Hall, who was, at that time, not represented by counsel, to notify him about the planned warehousing of the remaining property and requested information about any exempt property or any objections. Hall did not respond to the email. On June 12, JAAK filed a motion seeking an order to allow a warehouseman to take possession of the remaining property and warehouse it on site due to the expense that would be incurred to remove the property. On June 26, the trial court granted that motion. The CCS indicates that Hall was timely notified of that order.
[¶7] Three months later, on September 22, Hall filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside both the April 18 agreed entry and the June 26 warehouseman's order. Hall alleged that the parties' October 2021 settlement agreement precluded the judgment against him; that JAAK, not Hall, had breached the lease agreement; and that JAAK had misrepresented facts to the trial court. JAAK filed an objection to the motion to set aside and requested attorney's fees on the ground that Hall's motion was untimely, frivolous, and misrepresented facts. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Hall's motion to set aside the April 2023 agreed entry, but the court instructed the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding the June 2023 warehouseman's order and attorney's fee request. Thereafter, the trial court denied Hall's motion to set aside the warehouseman's order, and the court ordered Hall to pay $8,500 in attorney's fees to JAAK. This appeal ensued.
We note that Hall mischaracterizes the trial court's comments during the hearing as a "finding" that his Trial Rule 60(B) motion was "timely" with respect to the warehouseman's order. Appellant's Reply Br. at 14. The trial court made no such finding.
Hall's April 2024 notice of appeal indicated that he was appealing both the January 2024 judgment denying his motion for relief from the agreed entry and the March 2024 judgment denying his motion for relief from the warehouseman's order and attorney's fee order. JAAK moved to dismiss Hall's appeal as untimely and/or inappropriate under the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. A motions panel of this court granted that motion, in part, dismissing Hall's appeal of the trial court's January 2024 judgment. Accordingly, we consider only Hall's appeal of the March 2024 judgment.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Trial Rule 60(B) Motion
[¶8] Hall contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to set aside the warehouseman's order under Trial Rule 60(B). Where, as here, the trial court entered a general judgment, the judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained upon any legal theory consistent with the evidence. Helmuth v. Distance Learning Sys. Ind., Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). In making this determination, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. Rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
[¶9] In his motion to set aside the warehouseman's order, Hall alleged in relevant part that JAAK had breached the parties' settlement agreement, breached the parties' lease agreement, misrepresented facts to the trial court, and violated several statutes that govern the procedures and notice requirements relevant to a landlord's possession of abandoned personal property. But we do not reach the merits of Hall's Trial Rule 60(B) motion because, as JAAK correctly argues, Hall's motion was merely an impermissible attempt to file an untimely motion to correct error.
Hall argued that the trial court should set aside the warehouseman's order under both Trial Rule 60(B)(3) and 60(B)(8).
[¶10] As this Court has explained, it is
"well-established that a motion under T.R. 60 may not serve as a substitute for a direct appeal." Magnuson v. Blickenstaff, 508 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987); see also In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010). "Trial Rule 60(B) motions address only the procedural, equitable grounds justifying relief from the legal finality of a final judgment, not the legal merits of the judgment." P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740 (quoting MidWest Fed. Sav. Bank v. Epperson, 579 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991)).
Thus, "[Trial Rule] 60(B) is meant to afford relief from circumstances which could not have been discovered during the period a motion to correct error could have been filed." Bello v. Bello, 102 N.E.3d 891, 894 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018). "[A]ny issue which was raised by[,] or could have been raised by[,] timely motion to correct error[ ] and timely direct appeal may not be subject of motion for relief from judgment." Cullison v. Medley, 619 N.E.2d 937, 945 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993), trans. denied.Eminger v. State, 204 N.E.3d 926, 930 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023).
[¶11] Here, each of Hall's arguments in support of his Trial Rule 60(B) motion was known and available to him during the period in which he could have filed a motion to correct error. For example, Hall's primary contention was that the warehouseman's order should be set aside because JAAK had failed to comply with the specific notice requirements of Indiana Code section 32-31-4-3, which include stating the identity and location of the warehouseman or the storage facility. Hall maintains that, had JAAK notified him of the name of the warehouseman, Hall could have exercised his right to claim any exempt property. But that argument, along with the others made by Hall in his motion, could not be brought in a Trial Rule 60(B) motion. See Eminger, 204 N.E.3d at 930. Because Hall was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hall's motion.
The June 2023 notice JAAK sent to Hall stated only that JAAK had "asked" a certain company to take possession of the abandoned vehicles and was "in discussions" with another company to take possession of the other abandoned property. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 48.
JAAK points out that Hall had alleged in his Trial Rule 60(B) motion that he was not provided timely notice of the June 26, 2023, warehouseman's order. But Hall does not make any such allegation on appeal. Indeed, the CCS shows that Hall was given timely notice of the order.
Issue Two: Attorney's Fees
[¶12] Hall next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay attorney's fees to JAAK. As our Supreme Court has made clear, "the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees and any amount thereof is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law." Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ind. 2012) (some citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds, Cosme v. Clark, 232 N.E.3d 1141, 1149 (Ind. 2024).
[¶13] JAAK sought attorney's fees under Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1(b), which provides:
In its supplemental brief to the trial court, JAAK also alleged that it was entitled to attorney's fees under the parties' lease agreement. But JAAK makes no cogent argument in support of that argument in the alternative on appeal.
In any civil action, the court may award attorney's fees as part of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either party:
(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;
(2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the party's claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or
(3) litigated the action in bad faith.
A claim or defense is "unreasonable" if, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the law and the facts known at the time of filing, no reasonable attorney would consider that the claim or defense was worthy of litigation. Chapo v. Jefferson Cnty. Plan Comm'n, 926 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). A claim or defense is "groundless" if no facts exist which support the legal claim presented by the losing party. Id.
[¶14] Hall argues that his Trial Rule 60(B) arguments were not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. He maintains that the trial court "did not find that [his] position lacked a factual basis or asserted implausible legal arguments." Appellant's Br. at 37 (emphasis removed). And, while the trial court found that Hall had not timely challenged the order on the agreed entry, the court made no such finding with regard to the warehouseman's order and requested the parties to submit additional briefing on that order. But just because the trial court asked the parties to submit additional briefing on the warehouseman's order does not mean that the court found Hall's challenge timely. Again, the trial court entered a general judgment, so we do not know the exact reasons for the court's denial of Hall's motion. Finally, Hall points out that the trial court described his arguments as "creative" and "not necessarily frivolous even if at the end of the day, they don't hold any merit." Tr. p. 33.
[¶15] Given that Hall had no basis in the law to bring a Trial Rule 60(B) motion, his motion was not reasonable. The facts and circumstances reveal that Hall, through his own fault, failed to file a timely motion to correct error or appeal and attempted to salvage his claims through Trial Rule 60(B). Hall's arguments on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Hall to pay JAAK attorney's fees.
Hall also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the parties' settlement agreement precludes the attorney's fee award. That issue is waived for our review. See Breneman v. Slusher, 768 N.E.2d 451, 463 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.