Opinion
A23-1193
02-21-2024
Maikijah HaKeem, Appellant, v. Jodi Harpstead, Commissioner of DHS, et al., Respondents.
Carlton County District Court File No. 09-CV-23-452
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Gaitas, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
THEODORA GAI'TAS, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE: 1. Appellant Maikijah HaKeem-who was indeterminately civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program-Moose Lake (MSOP) as a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP) and a sexually dangerous person (SDP) in 2010-appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. Because a habeas petition challenging HaKeem's civil commitment is an improper vehicle for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction underlying the civil commitment, we affirm.
HaKeem previously went by the name Michael Pittman. See In re the Application of Michael Dijon Pittman for a Change of Name, Case No. 09-CV-13-687 (Minn. Dist. Ct. March 29, 2013). Many of his prior legal proceedings, which we reference in this order, refer to him by that name.
2. HaKeem was initially civilly committed to MSOP as an SPP and SDP in 2009 and was indeterminately committed in 2010 after a review hearing. His commitment was based on a pattern of harmful sexual conduct that included the following incidents:
(1) in 1989, while living in Kansas, [HaKeem] had sexual contact with three children . . .; (2) in 1995, [HaKeem] . . . . pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct; (3) in 1999, [HaKeem] forcibly anally raped another inmate while incarcerated . . .; [and] (4) two inmates at Moose Lake reported unwanted sexual contact by [HaKeem] in 2008 while [HaKeem] was participating in sex offender treatment.In re Civ. Commitment of Pittman, No. A11-0049, 2011 WL 1938318, at *2 (Minn.App. May 23, 2011) (Pittman II), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011). We affirmed both his initial civil commitment, see In re Civ. Commitment of Pittman, No. A09-1931, 2010 WL 1541453, at *4 (Minn.App. Apr. 20, 2010) (Pittman I), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2010), and his indeterminate commitment, see Pittman II, 2011 WL 1938318, at *2.
3. HaKeem never directly appealed his 1995 first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction but did file three postconviction petitions challenging it between 2000 and 2011. His third, and last, petition was denied by the district court in 2011 because it was untimely.
4. In 2017, the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP) denied HaKeem's request for a "transfer, provisional discharge, or discharge" from MSOP.
Before requesting relief from the CAP, HaKeem challenged his commitment by filing a motion under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(e) "asserting that the treatment at MSOP is inadequate." His motion was denied because the relief he was seeking-to be transferred or discharged from his commitment-was not available under rule 60.02(e).
5. In March 2023, HaKeem filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Carlton County District Court. HaKeem's petition did not assert that he is being illegally detained at MSOP. Instead, the petition claimed that HaKeem "was unlawfully/wrongfully convicted of a crime he did not commit" and that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the police arrested him without probable cause and he was convicted based on insufficient evidence. The petition did not specify which conviction HaKeem was challenging, but it referenced a 1992 arrest and criminal charge. Additionally, the petition included a police report as an attachment, which details an alleged sexual assault of a child that occurred in St. Paul in 1992. HaKeem's petition "request[ed] an evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence."
6. The district court summarily denied HaKeem's petition. In the order denying relief, the district court stated that it could not determine which conviction HaKeem was challenging, and thus, HaKeem had failed to satisfy "his burden of proving that his current detention at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program is unlawful."
7. HaKeem now appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On appeal, respondents Jodi Harpstead, Commissioner of the Department of Human Services (DHS), Nancy Johnston, CEO of MSOP, and Terry Kneisel, MSOP-Moose Lake facility director, filed a motion to strike pages 5 through 15 of HaKeem's addendum and the corresponding arguments in his brief, asserting that HaKeem was relying on evidence not in the appellate record. HaKeem's addendum contains the 1992 police report he originally filed alongside his habeas petition. Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 110.01 defines the record on appeal as "documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings." An appellate court may not consider or base its decision on "matters outside the record on appeal," including "matters not produced and received in evidence below." Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). If a party includes references to matters outside the record or cites to matters outside the record, an appellate court "will strike references to such matters from the parties' briefs." Stageberg v. Stageberg, 695 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn.App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2005). HaKeem filed the 1992 police report in the district court, so it is part of the appellate record. We therefore deny respondents' motion to strike.
8. A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory civil remedy by which a petitioner may obtain relief from unlawful imprisonment or restraint. Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2022). It is an "extraordinary remedy," and is generally "limited to resolving jurisdictional issues and violations of constitutional rights." State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652, 67374 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). A habeas petition "may not be used as a substitute for an appeal." State ex rel. Shannon v. Tahash, 121 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. 1963). A petitioner may not use habeas review "as a cover for a collateral attack upon a judgment of a competent tribunal which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant." Breeding v. Swenson, 60 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1953). A petition is properly denied where the petitioner could have raised the underlying claims through other legal means. See Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Minn. 1979) (stating that a habeas petition must be dismissed when used as a vehicle for raising issues that could have been raised in a direct appeal or postconviction petition).
9. A district court will grant a petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing "only if a factual dispute is shown by the petition," Seifert v. Erickson, 420 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn.App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 1988), and will grant the petition only if it alleges "sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for [the petitioner's] discharge," State ex rel. Fife v. Tahash, 111 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Minn. 1961); see also Case v. Pung, 413 N.W.2d 261, 262 (Minn.App. 1987) (stating that the petitioner has the burden of showing they are being illegally detained), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987). Appellate courts may affirm the denial of a habeas petition when the petition, on its face, fails to present a case for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. State ex rel. Nelson v. Rigg, 107 N.W.2d 378, 379 (Minn. 1961).
10. As a threshold issue, we first address respondents' argument that HaKeem filed his habeas petition in the wrong venue. Minnesota Statutes section 589.02 (2022), which governs "to whom and how" habeas petitions are made, provides that "[a] person may apply for a writ of habeas corpus by petition . . . to the district court of the county where the petitioner is detained." HaKeem is currently committed at MSOP-Moose Lake-which is in Carlton County-so filing his habeas petition in Carlton County District Court was proper.
11. HaKeem argues that the district court erred in dismissing his petition because, he contends, a writ of habeas corpus may be used to challenge his wrongful conviction given that he has "no other [legal] avenue" available. He reasserts the argument that he raised in his petition that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, and he claims for the first time on appeal that the state violated Brady v. Maryland when it "wrongfully" convicted him. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963) (requiring the state to turn over all evidence favorable to a defendant prior to trial).
We interpret the "wrongful conviction" referenced in HaKeem's petition to be the only formal conviction underlying his MSOP commitment-his 1995 first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction.
12. Hakeem is requesting relief outside the scope of what is available by a writ of habeas corpus. See State ex rel. O'Neill v. Rigg, 98 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Minn. 1959) (observing that "the scope of review in habeas corpus proceedings is limited," and "[t]he writ may not be issued as a substitute for an appeal or motion to correct, amend, or vacate"). By his own admission, HaKeem is "not challenging his illegal confinement in this proceeding." Moreover, his petition raises no jurisdictional issues. See Young, 956 N.W.2d at 673-74. Instead, HaKeem's habeas petition collaterally attacks a conviction that was but one basis for his MSOP commitment. See Breeding, 60 N.W.2d at 7 (stating that a petition for habeas corpus may not be used to collaterally attack a petitioner's conviction). And finally, HaKeem has already challenged his 1995 conviction multiple times and his postconviction petitions were denied. Simply put, habeas relief does not become available just because a petitioner has no more remedies due to the passage of time or the exhaustion of appellate and postconviction remedies.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Respondents' motion to strike is denied.
3. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.