Opinion
23-CV-04452-AMO (PR)
01-09-2024
JOEY L. HAINES, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF SANCHEZ, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY HIS FEDERAL CLAIM SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS UNEXHAUSTED
ARACELI MARTÍNEZ-OLGUÍN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This suit was reassigned from a magistrate judge to the undersigned in light of Ninth Circuit authority. Plaintiff Joey L. Haines, who is in custody at the Santa Rita Jail (“SRJ”), filed the present pro se prisoner Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss case on initial screening because unserved defendants had not consented to proceed before a magistrate judge).
The Court now conducts its initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Venue is proper because the events giving rise to Haines's claims in his complaint are alleged to have occurred at SRJ, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of the district court. Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1856-58 (2016); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “Prisoners must now exhaust all ‘available' remedies, not just those that meet federal standards.” Id. at 85. Even when the relief sought cannot be granted by the administrative process, i.e., monetary damages, a prisoner must still exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 85-86 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734).
B. Legal Claims
Haines alleges a claim for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, stemming from an incident on January 5, 2023 related to a claim of deliberate indifference to his safety. See Dkt. 1 at 2-3. However, a review of the complaint reveals that Haines has not exhausted California's prison administrative process and thus it must be dismissed.
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides that inmates and parolees “may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). Section 1997e(a) requires “proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93. A prisoner not only must pursue every available step of the prison appeal process but also must adhere to “deadlines and other critical procedural rules” of that process. Id. at 90.
Here, Haines fails to allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies for the federal claims he seeks to assert. Dkt. 1 at 2-3. Specifically, he states that he received “no response” to the “[s]econd formal level” of review. Id. at 2. Moreover, Haines did not attach any prison grievance forms. Thus, the Court has no additional basis to assess whether he exhausted his admirative remedies prior to filing his suit. Furthermore, he has not presented any extraordinary circumstances which might compel that he be excused from complying with PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Cf. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6 (courts should not read “futility or other exceptions” into section 1997e(a)).
A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies for constitutional claims prior to asserting them in a civil rights complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). If a prisoner exhausts a claim after bringing it before the court, his subsequent exhaustion cannot excuse his earlier failure to exhaust. Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A prisoner] may initiate litigation in federal court only after the administrative process ends and leaves his grievances unredressed. It would be inconsistent with the objectives of the statute to let him submit his complaint any earlier than that.”) When the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted administrative remedies on a claim, “the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d, 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). However, the Court will provide Haines one final opportunity to show cause, within twenty-eight (28) days, why his federal claim should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust, as instructed below. Specifically, to avoid dismissal, Haines needs to provide proof that extraordinary circumstances existed in order to excuse him from complying with PLRA's exhaustion requirement. See e.g., Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1859-60 (identifying “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.”)
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:
1. Haines will be provided one final opportunity to show cause within twenty-eight (28) days, why his federal claim should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust. Failure to reply will result in dismissal without prejudice of Haines's federal claim.
2. All communications by Haines with the Court must be served on the defendants' counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to them.
3. It is Haines's responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11, a party proceeding pro se whose address changes while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and (2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b).
4. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.