Opinion
24A-CR-969
12-19-2024
Thomas Michael Haig, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Riley L. Parr Lebanon, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Thomas E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kelly A. Loy Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Section Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Boone Superior Court The Honorable Bruce E. Petit, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 06D02-2303-CM-598
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Riley L. Parr Lebanon, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Thomas E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kelly A. Loy Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Section Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Thomas Michael Haig ("Haig") appeals, following a bench trial, his conviction for Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. Haig argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶2] We affirm. Issue Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Haig's conviction. Facts
[¶3] On February 27, 2023, Haig was driving a semi-truck, which was loaded with mattresses, from Indianapolis to Chicago. The truck's trailer had a Tempur-Pedic logo on the driver side and a Sealy logo on the passenger side. Around 5:00 a.m., Haig exited the interstate in Boone County and drove into the parking lot of a Marathon gas station ("the Marathon station"), which contained eight gas pumps. As Haig circled his semi-truck around the gas pumps, he struck one gas pump with the middle of the truck's trailer on the passenger side. When Haig struck the gas pump, he ripped it off its foundation and knocked it onto the ground. The rear wheels of Haig's truck dragged the gas pump a few feet and partially ran over the gas pump, which caused the trailer to lift slightly off the ground. Haig also hit the gas pump's U-shaped security barrier and ripped it out of the concrete. Haig stopped his truck near the gas pumps, got out, and walked around surveilling his truck. Haig first walked to the front of the truck and bent over to look under the cab of the truck. He walked past the damaged lower skirting on the passenger side of his trailer and then around the back of the trailer to the driver's side. Haig got back into the truck and drove to the Love's Travel Station ("the Love's station") across the street from the Marathon station.
[¶4] The Marathon station had several security cameras that recorded videos of the outside of the store, including the gas pumps, parking lots, and the entrance/exit of the gas station. Haig's actions were captured on the Marathon station's security cameras. The owner of the Marathon station was able to see the accident on the station's security cameras and called the police. The owner informed the police that the semi-truck had a Tempur-Pedic logo on it and had been driven to the Love's station across the street.
[¶5] When police officers arrived at the Marathon station, they saw the "severely" damaged gas pump and watched some of the security footage. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26). The officers went to the Love's station, recognized Haig's trailer from the security video, and saw damage to the skirting on Haig's trailer. The officers spoke to Haig about the damaged gas pump at the Marathon station, and he told the officers that he did not realize that he had hit the gas pump. Later that day, Haig went to the Marathon station and provided his name, driver's license, and employer information to one of the clerks.
The State has included photographs of the damaged gas pump in its Appellee's Brief. See State's Br. 7.
[¶6] The State charged Haig with Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief and Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court held a bench trial in February 2024. Haig's theory of defense was that he did not know that he had hit the gas pump. During the trial, the State introduced the security videos from the Marathon station and also introduced photographs of the damage to the gas pump and to Haig's trailer.
[¶7] Haig testified on his own behalf. Haig told the trial court that, when he had exited the interstate, he had intended to drive to the Love's station but had missed his turn and had to drive into the Marathon station. He testified that he had not known that he had hit the gas pump because he had not felt his truck hit anything. Haig testified that the truck's cab and trailer were connected with an "articulated" pin, resulting in him not being able to "feel the trailer rock[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 39). Haig also testified that his truck's warning lights had come on when he was on the interstate. He testified that the warning light was for "low on air pressure" and that such a condition could "lock up the rear wheels of the trailer and the cab." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 42). He indicated that he had felt his back tires "lock[] up" when he had been at the Marathon station and that he had gotten out of his truck to "reset the brakes." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 43). Haig testified that when he had reset the brakes, he noticed that he had a broken air canister with a missing cap on his rear wheels and that the cap must have fallen off when he was on the interstate. Haig introduced a photograph of an air canister that was missing a cap. Haig also testified that he had not noticed any damage to the gas pump or to his trailer when he had gotten out of his truck and walked around it.
[¶8] During closing arguments, Haig argued that it was "a far cry to assume" that Haig "knew [that] he [had] hit the gas pump" because he had not hit the pump head on with his cab. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 68). Haig argued that he had been having air pressure issues with his brakes and that he had exited the truck only because he "had noticed the vehicle [had been] shaking" and had needed to determine whether he could get across the street to the Love's station. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 69).
[¶9] The State, on the other hand, argued that the trial court should reject Haig's assertion that he had been unaware that he had hit the gas pump and that his testimony about the brake issue was "not consistent with the facts." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). The State pointed out that Haig had stopped his truck near the gas pumps before he had attempted to circle around them and that he had then stopped his truck again and exited it just after he had struck the gas pump and the safety barrier, ripping both of them from the parking lot and onto the ground.
[¶10] The trial court took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued a detailed written order, containing findings and conclusions. The trial court found Haig not guilty of Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief and guilty of Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. Specifically, the trial court found that "[a]s [Haig] rounded an island containing gas pumps, the midrear portion of his trailer struck pump number 3[,] knocking it off [its] concrete vase and moving it several yards away" and that while Haig "did stop his semi at the Marathon Station for a short [p]eriod of time," he "never attempted to make contact with an attendant at the station." (App. Vol. 2 at 20). The trial court also noted that the video from the Marathon station showed that after Haig had hit the gas pump, his trailer's tires had pushed the pump and had driven over the pump, thereby "lifting [the trailer] off the ground." (App. Vol. 2 at 25).
[¶11] The trial court rejected the credibility of Haig's testimony and his "contention that he had no knowledge of hitting the gas pump[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 24, 25). The trial court pointed out that Haig had testified that he had not felt any movement of his truck because of the pin that connected the cab and the trailer, while at the same time, had testified that he had gotten out of his truck because he had felt a movement that he had attributed to a brake malfunction. The trial court explained that it found "[t]hese theories to be inherently conflicting" and concluded that there was "no question in this Court's mind that [Haig] felt the impact when his trailer struck the gas pump." (App. Vol. 2 at 24, 25). The trial court also discounted Haig's testimony that his brake issue story was supported by his photograph of a missing cap of an air canister. The trial court pointed out that the security video revealed that a round cap was on the Marathon parking lot near where the impact had occurred and that this round object had not been on the parking lot immediately before Haig had struck the gas pump.
[¶12] Upon finding that Haig "knew he had struck something at the Marathon Station but did not immediately provide attendants with the required information[,]" the trial court determined that Haig had knowingly or intentionally failed to provide the information required under INDIANA CODE § 9-26-1-1.1, the leaving the scene of an accident statute. (App. Vol. 2 at 25). Thereafter, the trial court then sentenced Haig to 180 days suspended to probation.
[¶13] Haig now appeals. Decision
[¶14] Haig argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. We disagree.
[¶15] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled. We "consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict." Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (emphasis in original). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 146-47. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.
[¶16] The leaving the scene of an accident statute, INDIANA CODE § 9-26-1-1.1, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident shall do the following
(1) Except as provided in section 1.2 of this chapter, the operator shall immediately stop the operator's motor vehicle:
(A) at the scene of the accident; or (B) as close to the accident as possible; in a manner that does not obstruct traffic more than is necessary. (2) Remain at the scene of the accident until the operator does the following:
(A) Gives the operator's name and address and the registration number of the motor vehicle the operator was driving to any person involved in the accident.
(B) Exhibits the operator's driver's license to any person involved in the accident or occupant of or any person attending to any vehicle involved in the accident.
* * * * *
(4) If the accident involves a collision with an unattended vehicle or damage to property other than a vehicle, the operator shall, in addition to the requirements of subdivisions (1) and (2):
(A) take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the damaged vehicle or property of the damage; and
(B) if after reasonable inquiry the operator cannot find the owner or person in charge of the damaged vehicle or property, the operator must contact a law enforcement officer or agency and provide the information required by this section.
(b) An operator of a motor vehicle who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply with subsection (a) commits leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor.I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1.
[¶17] "A person engages in conduct 'knowingly' if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that [s]he is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). "A person engages in conduct 'intentionally' if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). "Because intent is a mental state, the fact-finder often must resort to the reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether- from the person's conduct and the natural consequences therefrom-there is a showing or inference of the requisite criminal intent." Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (cleaned up). See also Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 275 (Ind. 2020) (explaining that intent is a mental function that can be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points).
[¶18] Haig argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he knowingly or intentionally failed to comply with the leaving the scene of an accident statute. Specifically, Haig argues that the trial court erred by finding that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction when Haig had testified that he did not know that he had hit the gas pump and where the trial court could not have reasonably inferred that he knew he had been involved in an accident.
Haig also suggests that we should interpret the leaving the scene of an accident statute to apply a knowingly or intentionally culpability requirement to every subsection of the statute. Specifically, he contends that the statute should be read to require the State to prove that he knowingly or intentionally caused the accident. We reject Haig's suggestion to interpret that statute as requested. INDIANA CODE § 35-41-2-2(d) provides that "[u]nless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct." Here, however, the relevant statute defining the offense of leaving the scene of an accident "provides otherwise[,]" and the legislature specifically required the knowingly or intentionally requirement to apply to subsection (b). Accordingly, we reject Haig's argument. See Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016) (explaining that when interpreting a statute, we will apply the statute's "plain and ordinary meaning, heeding both what it 'does say' and what it 'does not say'") (citation omitted).
[¶19] Here, the trial court, as finder of fact, reviewed the evidence and determined that Haig "knew he had struck something at the Marathon Station but did not immediately provide attendants with the required information" as required under the leaving the scene of an accident statute. (App. Vol. 2 at 25). The trial court specifically determined that Haig's testimony was not credible.
[¶20] Haig's argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence and the trial court's credibility determination, which we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. The evidence presented during the bench trial supports the trial court's determination that Haig knowingly or intentionally failed to provide the information required under INDIANA CODE § 9-26-1-1.1. Accordingly, we affirm Haig's conviction for Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident.
We also conclude that Haig's apparent reliance on a case interpreting a now repealed version of a different subsection of the leaving the scene of an accident statute to be unavailing. Haig cites to Allen v. State, 844 N.E.2d 534 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied, which involved INDIANA CODE § 9-26-1-2 (repealed, effective Jan 1, 2015), a statute that related to an accident resulting in damage to a vehicle that was driven or attended by a person. The defendant in Allen argued that the State had failed to provide sufficient evidence that he knew that the other person's vehicle had sustained damage in the collision. Allen, 844 N.E.2d at 536. The Allen Court concluded that the State was not required to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge that the other vehicle was damaged and that, instead, the State was merely required to provide sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that the defendant should have known that the other vehicle was damaged by the collision. Id. at 537. Even if we were to apply the knowledge analysis in Allen to this case, we would still conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's judgment that Haig was guilty of Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident.
[¶21] Affirmed.
Weissmann, J., and Felix, J., concur.