Opinion
CV126037229S
01-23-2017
Elizabeth Hadden et al. v. Capitol Region Education Council
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Susan A. Peck, Judge Trial Referee.
On April 30, 2014, the plaintiff, Elizabeth Hadden, filed a second amended complaint, which is the operative complaint, against the defendant, Capitol Region Education Council. The second amended complaint consists of one count that sets forth a claim of indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § 10-236a. In the second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. At some time prior to October of 2010, the plaintiff began her employment with the defendant as a physical education teacher at the Metropolitan Learning Center in Bloomfield, Connecticut. On approximately October 8, 2010, while she was acting in the discharge of her duties and in the scope of her employment, the plaintiff attempted to break up a fight between students. In so doing, a student " assaulted" the plaintiff. As a result of the alleged assault, the plaintiff was injured, and she incurred expenses that are, or were, not covered by her insurance, workers' compensation, or any other source not involving an expenditure by the plaintiff (uncovered expenses). The plaintiff further alleges that, under § 10-236a, the is responsible for protecting and saving her harmless from the uncovered expenses that she allegedly incurred.
On September 4, 2015, the defendant filed an answer in which it denied the allegation that the plaintiff was assaulted by a student while acting in the discharge of her duties and in the scope her employment. In addition, the defendant specifically denied the allegation that it is under a statutory responsibility to indemnify the plaintiff for the uncovered expenses that she allegedly incurred. Moreover, the defendant admitted in the answer that it is a regional educational service center; it employed the plaintiff as a physical education teacher; and that, on approximately October 8, 2010, she was working as a teacher at the Metropolitan Learning Center. With respect to the remaining allegations of the second amended complaint, the defendant answered that it lacked sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the plaintiff's allegations. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On January 15, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the second amended complaint accompanied by a memorandum of law. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted the signed and sworn affidavit of Leonard Lindsay, the student who allegedly assaulted the plaintiff. The defendant also submits two Superior Court decisions cited n its memorandum of law.
On April 15, 2016, the plaintiff filed, together as one document, both an objection to the defendant's summary judgment motion and a cross motion for summary judgment on the second amended complaint, also accompanied by a memorandum of law. In support of her motion, the plaintiff submitted: (1) a copy of the defendant's answer; (2) transcript excerpts from the plaintiff's testimony before the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission); (3) transcript excerpts from Anne McKernan's and Chris Glowacki's testimony before the commission; (4) a copy of Lindsay's signed and sworn affidavit; (5) a copy of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the First District; (6) a copy of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Review Board; (7) a copy of a motion to transfer to the Supreme Court that the defendant filed pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-2; (8) a copy of the Appellate Court's opinion in Hadden v. Capitol Region Education Council, 164 Conn.App. 41, 137 A.3d 775 (2016) ( Hadden I ), affirming both the award of the commissioner and the decision of the board in favor of the plaintiff (9) a copy of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Sixth District, concerning the plaintiff's right to reimbursement for medical bills; (10) transcript excerpts of testimony and remarks from an education committee hearing regarding the enactment of § 10-236a; and (11) copies of three Superior Court decisions that are cited in her memorandum of law.
On June 2, 2016, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment along with a memorandum of law and copies of four Superior Court decisions. In turn, the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant's objection, excerpts from the decision of the commissioner, and a copy of the Supreme Court's decision in Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1, 707 A.2d 725 (1998). Oral argument was heard at short calendar on September 26, 2016.
I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
" Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mariano v. Hartland Building & Restoration Co., 168 Conn.App. 768, 776, 148 A.3d 229 (2016). " [T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). " 'Issue of fact' encompasses not only evidentiary facts in issue but also questions as to how the trier would characterize such evidentiary facts and what inferences and conclusions it would draw from them." United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Com., 158 Conn. 364, 379, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). " [S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way . . . [A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party . . . [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
" The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mariano v. Hartland Building & Restoration Co., supra, 168 Conn.App. 777. " To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015).
II
THE PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The defendant argues that the court should grant its motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that, for purposes of § 10-236a, the plaintiff was not " assaulted" while acting in the discharge of her duties as a teacher, and therefore, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that basis. The defendant contends that a teacher is " assaulted" within the context of § 10-236a only if he or she is subjected to an " intentionally violent and hostile attack." The defendant further contends that, because the plaintiff was accidentally, not intentionally, struck by a student when she intervened in the fight, she was not " assaulted."
In opposition, the plaintiff counters that it is beyond dispute that she was " assaulted" for purposes of § 10-236a. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that, under Connecticut common law, an actionable assault need not be committed intentionally; rather, it is sufficient if the alleged assault was committed negligently. In light of this assertion, the plaintiff argues that, even if the student struck her accidentally, it is clear that an " assault" occurred within the meaning of § 10-236a, which is consistent with Connecticut tort law. The plaintiff further asserts that, even if intent is an essential element of an assault, the evidence that the defendant submitted in support of its summary judgment motion supports a finding that, under the doctrine of transferred intent, she was intentionally assaulted.
The plaintiff's objection and cross motion for summary judgment were filed together as one document accompanied by a combined memorandum of law wherein the plaintiff sets forth three primary arguments: (1) she was clearly injured as a result of an assault within the meaning of § 10-236a; (2) Lindsay's affidavit supports a finding that, under the doctrine of transferred intent, she was intentionally assaulted; and (3) the issue of whether she was assaulted was litigated previously before the commission and the board; thus, the defendant is collaterally estopped from litigating the same issue in the present case. The plaintiff does not specify which of the arguments form the basis of her objection to the defendant's summary judgment motion and which of the arguments constitute the discrete grounds of her cross motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court addresses all three of the plaintiff's arguments as both as grounds for her objection to the defendant's motion and in support of her own motion.
In general, § 10-236a provides in relevant part: " Each board of education . . . and each state agency which employs any teacher . . . shall protect and save harmless . . . any teacher . . . from financial loss and expense, including payment of expenses reasonably incurred for medical or other service necessary as a result of an assault upon such . . . teacher . . . while such person was acting in the discharge of his or her duties within the scope of his or her employment . . . which expenses are not paid by the individual teacher's . . . insurance, workers' compensation or any other source not involving an expenditure by such teacher . . . (Emphasis added.) § 10-236a(a). Essentially, § 10-236a creates, for the benefit of teachers who are injured in the line of duty as a result of an assault, a right of action for indemnification beyond the compensation that lie or she would receive pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.
In the present case, the dispute between the defendant and the plaintiff centers on the meaning of " assault." There is no appellate authority that has construed the term " assault" for purposes of § 10-236a, and the word is not defined in the statute. Nevertheless, the term " assault" has been construed in two Superior Court decisions. In Patrie v. Area Cooperative Education Services, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-00-0440418-S (June 16, 2004, Corradino, J.) (37 Conn.L.Rptr. 470, 474, ), an " assault" for purposes of § 10-236a was defined as " an intentionally violent and hostile attack on another person." (Emphasis added.) The court, Corradino, J., arrived at this particular meaning by looking to the dictionary definition of " assault." Id., 471-72, ; see also General Statutes § 1-1(a); General Statutes § 1-2z. By contrast, in Gorman v. New Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-08-5004455-S (September 28, 2011, Cobb, J.) (52 Conn.L.Rptr. 654, 658, ), the term was construed in conformity with " the well established civil standard for an assault. It has long been established [i]n this state [that] an actionable assault and battery may be one committed wilfully or voluntarily, and therefore intentionally; . . . or one committed negligently . . . Thus, intentional conduct is not required for an assault and battery." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 78, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985) (stating that an actionable assault can be committed intentionally or negligently).
The construction of " assault" set forth by the court, Cobb, J., in Gorman is based on the presumption " that in enacting § 10-236a, the legislature was aware of this long established civil standard of assault, and intended the term assault in § 10-236a to include negligent assault which does not require intent." Gorman v. New Milford, supra, 658, ; see also Red Rooster Construction Co. v. River Associates, Inc., 224 Conn. 563, 570, 620 A.2d 118 (1993) (" A long-standing rule of statutory construction is that if a statute 'makes use of words [that] have an accepted meaning at the common law they ought, in the absence of other controlling reasons, to be expounded and received with that meaning' "). In sum, according to Patrie, a teacher can obtain relief under § 10-236a only if he or she was intentionally attacked in a hostile and violent manner. On the other hand, in accordance with Gorman, for a teacher to obtain relief under the statute, it is sufficient if he or she was injured as a result of a negligently caused assault.
A
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (#126)
Turning to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the following additional facts are relevant to resolving the issue of whether there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was not " assaulted" while discharging her duties as a teacher. As discussed previously, he defendant submitted the affidavit of Leonard Lindsay in support of its summary judgment motion. In the affidavit, Lindsay avers that, on October 8, 2010, he engaged in an argument which " became physical" with another student, Onyx Sanchez, in the gymnasium of the Metropolitan Learning Center. Moreover, Lindsay avers that " [w]hile he was punching Onyx, [he] accidently struck Ms. Hadden in the jaw." Lindsay further avers that he " had no intention whatsoever of hitting Ms. Hadden and [he] certainly did not intend to cause her any harm." In opposition to the defendant's summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted transcript excepts from the testimony that she gave before the commission. Specifically, the plaintiff testified that, as she attempted to break up the fight between the two students, " the other student came on top of [her], and that's when [she] took [a] punch to [her] jaw, and then [she] fell backwards and hit [her] head."
In light of the evidence that the defendant and plaintiff have submitted in the present case, the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists. If the court were to apply Patrie, as the defendant suggests, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Lindsay intentionally struck the plaintiff. Although Lindsay avers, in essence, that he lacked the element of intent that Patrie requires, given the plaintiff's account of the events that led to her injuries, a fact finder may reasonably conclude that, in fact, Lindsay intended to hit the plaintiff because she was in the way of him getting to his primary target. Thus, even if the court adopted the definition of " assault" set forth in Patrie, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether, for purposes if § 10-236a, the plaintiff was assaulted while discharging her duties as a teacher. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
B
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#134)
The plaintiff contends that the court should grant her cross motion for summary judgment on three grounds. First, the plaintiff argues, relying on Gorman v. New Milford, supra, 52 Conn.L.Rptr. 658,, that it is undisputed that she was injured as a result of an assault within the meaning of § 10-236a. Second, the plaintiff contends that Lindsay's affidavit supports a finding that, under the doctrine of transferred intent, she was intentionally assaulted. The plaintiff further contends that the issue of whether she was assaulted was litigated previously before the commission and the board; and therefore, the defendant is collaterally estopped from litigating the same issue in the present case.
In opposition, the defendant counters, again relying on Patrie v. Area Cooperative Education Services, supra, 37 Conn.L.Rptr. 474,, that " § 10-236a does not extend to unintentional injuries to teachers. Rather . . . § 10-236a is limited to providing indemnification for injuries suffered as a result of an intentional, violent attack upon a teacher or other board of education employee." Moreover, the defendant asserts that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply in the context of § 10-236a. The defendant further asserts that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the issue of whether the plaintiff was assaulted for purposes of § 10-236a. Because the cross motion for summary judgment cannot be granted on the second ground upon which the plaintiff relies; see footnote 2 of this memorandum; the balance of the discussion will address whether the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the first and third grounds of her motion.
To the extent that the doctrine of transferred intent applies in the present action; see Alteiri v. Colasso, 168 Conn. 329, 335 n.4, 362 A.2d 798 (1975) (" The principle of transferred intent applies to both civil and criminal cases."); the court previously concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Lindsay's intent. See part 11(A) of this memorandum. Therefore, the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment cannot be granted on the ground that Lindsay's affidavit supports a finding, under the transferred intent principle, that she was intentionally assaulted.
1
Assault Under Gorman
As discussed previously, the court, Cobb, J., in Gorman v. New Milford, supra, 52 Conn.L.Rptr. 658,, construed the word " assault" in accordance with Connecticut common law. " Under Connecticut law, assault, an unlawful application of force or violence to the person of another, need not be intentional. An assault may arise out of a defendant's negligence." Jonelis v. Russo, 863 F.Supp. 84, 88 (D.Conn. 1994), citing Russo v. Porga, 141 Conn. 706, 708, 109 A.2d 585 (1954). This construction stands in contrast to the definition of " assault" that the court, Corradino, J., set forth in Patrie v. Area Cooperative Education Services, supra, 37 Conn.L.Rptr. 474,, which includes an intent element.
Turning to the plaintiff's cross motion, the following additional facts are relevant to resolving the present case. In support of her cross motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted transcript excepts from Chris Glowacki's testimony before the workers' compensation commission. According to his testimony, Glowacki, a coworker of the plaintiff, witnessed the alleged fight. Glowacki testifies further that, as he was running over to help the plaintiff, " the boy was throwing punches and I saw his right hand connect with her jaw, her left jaw." On the other hand, Lindsay avers in his affidavit that he did not intend to strike the plaintiff.
In light of the evidence submitted by both parties in the present action, the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Assuming arguendo, that Gorman, and not Patrie, applies here, as the plaintiff suggests, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she was negligently assaulted. Specifically, the determination of whether Lindsay negligently assaulted the plaintiff " involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in [this] specific situation . . . [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975). Therefore, even if the court assumes, without deciding, that Gorman is controlling, the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment cannot be granted on the first ground relied upon by the plaintiff that it is undisputed that she was injured as a result of an assault within the meaning of § 10-236a.
2
Collateral Estoppel
" Claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) have been described as related ideas on a continuum. [C]laim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits . . . [I]ssue preclusion . . . prevents a party from relitigating an issue that has been determined in a prior suit . . . Both doctrines protect the finality of judicial determinations, conserve the time of the court, and prevent wasteful relitigation . . . and express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest . . . Res judicata . . . is [however] distinguishable from collateral estoppel . . . Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action . . . between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim . . . In contrast, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pollansky v. Pollansky, 162 Conn.App. 635, 645, 133 A.3d 167 (2016).
Specifically, " [t]o assert successfully the doctrine of issue preclusion . . . a party must establish that the issue . . . actually was litigated and determined in the prior action between the parties or their privies, and that the determination was essential to the decision in the prior case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364, 374, 727 A.2d 1245 (1999). " An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined . . . An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered . . . If an issue has been determined, but the judgment is not dependent upon the determination of the issue, the parties may relitigate the issue in a subsequent action. Findings on nonessential issues usually have the characteristics of dicta." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coyle Crete, LLC v. Nevins, 137 Conn.App. 540, 549, 49 A.3d 770 (2012).
Turning to the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment, the following additional facts are relevant to resolving whether the defendant is collaterally estopped from litigating whether the plaintiff was assaulted under § 10-236a. As referenced previously, in support of her cross motion, the plaintiff submitted a copy of the Hadden I opinion, in which the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the board " that both (1) upheld an award . . . of temporary total disability benefits to . . . the plaintiff . . . for her ongoing total disability since she was injured at work in 2010; and (2) denied the defendant's request . . . to reduce the plaintiff's award in proportion to the percentage of her disability caused . . . by the natural progression of . . . [her preexisting] condition." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Hadden I, supra, 164 Conn.App. 42. In so holding, the Appellate Court explained that " [a]fter the injury, the plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for temporary total disability benefits. The defendant contested that claim. The commissioner held seven days of formal hearings . . . concerning the plaintiff's work injury and ensuing total disability. The core dispute was whether, as the plaintiff argued, the October 8, 2010 punch had aggravated the plaintiff's preexisting multiple sclerosis, causing her total disability; or whether, as the defendant argued, the punch had merely dislocated the plaintiff's jaw, with her total disability resulting instead from the natural progression of her preexisting multiple sclerosis." Id., 44.
After the plaintiff and the defendant presented their evidence and filed post-trial briefs, '[t]he commissioner rendered a decision on May 3, 2013. He ruled in favor of the plaintiff on compensability, finding that she suffered a physical compensable injury and a compensable Traumatic Brain Injury on October 8, 2010 . . . The defendant then appealed from the commissioner's decision to the board, arguing that the commissioner erred in (1) finding that the plaintiff's October 8, 2010 work injury caused her total disability after that date; (2) holding that the defendant was not entitled to apportionment . . . and (3) denying the defendant's motion to correct . . . The board rendered its decision on May 20, 2014. It affirmed the commissioners judgment on all three counts . . ." (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 46-47.
In light of the prior proceedings before the commission and the board, as outlined by the Appellate Court in Hadden I, the court concludes that the issue of whether the plaintiff was assaulted within the meaning of § 10-236a in the present case is not precluded by collateral estoppel. Specifically, the issue was not either actually litigated or necessarily determined in the previous proceedings because the commissioner's decision did not depend on a finding that the plaintiff was assaulted under § 10-236a. Rather, it was premised on the broader conclusion that lie plaintiff suffered some personal injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. Therefore, the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment must also be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the cross motions for summary judgment are hereby denied.