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Habelmann v. City of Los Angeles

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Aug 31, 2023
No. B322879 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023)

Opinion

B322879

08-31-2023

KRISTINE HABELMANN, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

Matthew J. Kita, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nos. BC692990, BC696190, Lia Martin, Judge.

Matthew J. Kita, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

Mori, J.

In March 2017, Stefan Habelmann was riding his motorcycle through a street that curves like the letter "S" (a reverse curve) when he hit the side of an automobile making a U-turn, leading to his death. His daughters, plaintiffs and appellants Kristine Habelmann and Katarina Habelmann (collectively, the Habelmanns), filed this action against defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles (City) alleging a dangerous condition of public property. The Habelmanns asserted the lack of traffic controls and center dividers, as well as the failure to warn drivers of a concealed trap, created a dangerous condition. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability for the design of the roadway under Government Code section 830.6 and immune from liability for failing to post signs under sections 830.4 and 830.8. It asserted it was not otherwise liable for a dangerous condition because it did not have notice of any such condition. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each ground. We conclude that while design immunity precludes the Habelmanns from holding the City liable for creating the alleged dangerous condition, the Habelmanns raise triable issues of fact that allow them to maintain their action seeking to hold the City liable for failure to warn of a concealed danger.

All further statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise noted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Accident and Complaint

On March 4, 2017, decedent Stefan Habelmann was riding his motorcycle eastbound on Oxnard Street between Yolanda Avenue and Reseda Boulevard in Tarzana, California. This is an east-west roadway in a business district divided by double yellow lines. It has a center turning lane and two lanes of travel in each direction delineated by broken white lines. The posted speed limit on Oxnard Street is 35 miles per hour (mph). However, there is a yellow advisory sign recommending a speed limit of 25 mph in advance of a reverse curve for motorists traveling eastbound on this segment of Oxnard Street. There is also a sign posted warning of the reverse curve.

The complaint alleges that prior to the accident, Alexandra Price (Price) was parked at the curb on the south side of Oxnard Street facing eastbound traffic in front of Tarzana Treatment Center, Inc. After dropping off a patient there, Price decided to make a U-turn through the eastbound traffic lanes, so that she could proceed westbound on Oxnard Street. While attempting the U-turn through the traffic lanes in the reverse curve, Price allegedly turned her vehicle in front of the decedent's motorcycle, causing the decedent to collide into the driver's side of Price's vehicle. The decedent died as a result of the accident.

The decedent's daughters, the Habelmanns, filed this action against the City and others. The Habelmanns alleged a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property pursuant to section 835. The complaint asserts, "[t]he lack of traffic signs, traffic lights, center dividers, as well as lack of visibility due to the curvature of the roadway, caused a known dangerous condition on the roadway." The dangerous condition "caused drivers to make unsafe U-turns onto oncoming traffic in opposite directions....When a driver is traveling east bound or west bound on Oxnard Street, they cannot adequately stop in time when a driver . . . attempts to make a [U]-turn in front of them." "Further, sign[s], warnings or other devices were necessary to warn of these dangerous conditions which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not be anticipated by, a person exercising due care."

The other defendants are not parties to this appeal.

B. The City's Summary Judgment Motion

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing in pertinent part that it was immune from liability for failing to post signs pursuant to sections 830.4 and 830.8 and that no condition at the subject location constituted a concealed danger for motorists exercising reasonable care. Next, the City contended that it was immune from liability for the design of the road pursuant to section 830.6. The City's evidence showed that local officials approved plans for the roadway in June 2009, including the 35 mph speed limit, the advisory 25 mph for the reverse curve, and the placement of the traffic signs. Finally, the City argued that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition.

In opposition, the Habelmanns argued that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the subject location was in a dangerous condition due to inadequate and improperly placed signage, motorists driving above the posted speed limit, and limited visibility for persons travelling eastbound through the curve. They argued that the City was not immune from liability under section 830.4 or 830.6 because the City still had a duty to warn of non-obvious dangers or "traps." They further contended that the dangerous condition was not based on the design of the roadway, but rather was based on the City being aware that the signage on Oxnard Street was inadequate to prevent speeding. Additionally, they argued that the City had notice of the dangerous condition because it received numerous complaints about drivers going too fast through the curve, and it was aware of multiple collisions in the area.

In reply, the City reiterated that it was immune from liability for failing to provide traffic signs, and that there was no condition at the location that could be considered a trap. The City contended that it established the elements required for design immunity, and that there was no evidence of any similar incidents at the subject location such that it would have notice of a dangerous condition.

C. The Trial Court's Ruling

After taking the matter under submission, the trial court granted the City's motion. First, the court concluded that the City met its burden of proving that it is immune from liability for failing to post traffic control signals, and that the Habelmanns failed to establish triable issues of fact as to the existence of a trap. Second, the court determined that "[e]ven if the Court were to find triable issues of material fact as to Defendant's sign immunity based on the improper placement of signage, . . . design immunity applies, warranting the granting of summary judgment." Lastly, the court found that the City met its burden of showing that it did not have notice of a dangerous condition and that the Habelmanns did not submit evidence showing otherwise. The court entered judgment in favor of the City, and the Habelmanns timely appealed.

No reporter's transcript of the hearing is part of the record on appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

"Summary judgment is appropriate only 'where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" (Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff s cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable juror to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) "We review the trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of the opponent." (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 637.)

B. Law Governing Liability for a Dangerous Condition of Public Property

Except as provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury arising out of an act or omission by itself or its employees. (§ 815, subd. (a).) Section 835 "'"is the principal provision addressing the circumstances under which the government may be held liable for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property."' [Citation.]" (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 652-653 (Tansavatdi).) "To establish liability under section 835, a plaintiff must show: '(1) "that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury"; (2) "that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition"; (3) "that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred"; and (4) either (a) that a public employee negligently or wrongfully "created the dangerous condition" or (b) that "[the] public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition."' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 653.) "Thus, section 835 expressly authorizes two different forms of dangerous conditions liability: an act or omission by a government actor that created the dangerous condition (§ 835, subd. (a)); or, alternatively, failure 'to protect against' dangerous conditions of which the entity had notice (id., subd. (b))." (Ibid.)

The Government Code includes numerous statutory immunities, two of which are pertinent here: section 830.6 and section 830.8. "Section 830.6, commonly referred to as 'design immunity,' precludes liability for any injury caused by 'the plan or design of . . ., or an improvement to, public property.'" (Tansavatdi, swpra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 653.) "Section 830.8 provides a second form of immunity, precluding public entity liability 'for an injury caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices described in the Vehicle Code.' (§ 830.8.)" "Section 830.8, however, sets forth a limitation to such immunity: 'Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity . . . from liability for injury . . . caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or device . . . was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.'" (Id. at p. 654.) Thus, "while section 830.6 shields public entities from liability for injuries resulting from the design of the physical features of a roadway, they nonetheless retain a duty to warn of known dangers that the roadway presents to the public." (Id. at p. 647; Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 941 (Grenier) ["The failure to warn of a trap can constitute independent negligence, regardless of design immunity"].)

C. The City is Entitled to Design Immunity

The City argues that section 830.6 immunizes it from liability arising from the design of the road. To the extent the Habelmanns seek to hold the City liable for creating the alleged dangerous condition, we agree.

A public entity raising this defense must establish three elements: (1) a causal relationship between a plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design. (Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 69 (Cornette.) The first two elements, causation and discretionary approval, involve factual questions to be resolved by a jury, unless the facts are undisputed. (Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 550 (Alvis).) The third element, the existence of substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design, is a legal matter for the court to decide. (Cornette, supra, at p. 66.) "The rationale for design immunity is to prevent a jury from second-guessing the decision of a public entity by reviewing the identical questions of risk that had previously been considered by the government officers who adopted or approved the plan or design." (Id. at p. 69.)

As to the first element, the Habelmanns do not dispute a causal relationship between the accident and the City's design of the road, as the complaint alleges that the lack of traffic control devices and lack of visibility due to the curvature of the road created a dangerous condition. (See Alvis, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 536, 550 ["[t]he County may rely on the allegations of the complaint to establish [the] causation" element of design immunity].) As to the second element, it is undisputed that the City Engineer reviewed and approved the plans and specifications used to construct Oxnard Street, including the accident location and placement of traffic signs. (See Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1263 [city established discretionary approval where city engineer declared another city engineer had approved plans, and where plans themselves showed they had been signed and approved by second engineer in his official capacity].) With respect to the third element, the City's expert opined that the plans, which were approved by the City Engineer, were reasonable and in full compliance with applicable guidelines. (Grenier, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 941 ["Generally, a civil engineer's opinion regarding reasonableness is substantial evidence sufficient to satisfy this element. . . Approval of the plan by competent professionals can, in and of itself, constitute substantial evidence of reasonableness"].)

The City meets its burden to show that it is entitled to design immunity. Therefore, the burden shifts to the Habelmanns to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the applicability of the defense.

On appeal, the Habelmanns do not dispute that the City satisfies the elements required for design immunity. Accordingly, the City's design immunity bars the Habelmanns' claims to the extent they seek to impose liability on the City for creating the alleged dangerous condition. However, that does not end our inquiry. As our Supreme Court has recently affirmed, even if an allegedly dangerous design of public property is subject to design immunity, the City can face liability for failure to warn of a concealed danger. (Tansavatdi, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 647.)

D. The City is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment as to the Habelmanns' Failure to Warn Claim

The Habelmanns argue that the trial court erred when it ruled that the City was immune from all liability without fully considering their failure to warn theory. They assert that there are triable issues of fact concerning whether the City had notice that the reverse curve and inadequate signage, along with other factors, created a trap and whether the City failed to adequately warn motorists about a concealed trap. We conclude that the Habelmanns raise triable issues of fact regarding both contentions.

Section 830.8 generally immunizes a public entity from liability for injuries caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, but the statute allows public entity liability "if a sign was necessary [to] warn of a dangerous condition which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person using the highway with due care." (Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 327.) This exception to signage immunity is known as the "concealed trap" exception. (Tansavatdi, swpra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 660.)

When pursuing a claim for failure to warn of a dangerous traffic condition that is subject to design immunity, the plaintiff must prove that: "(1) the public entity had actual or constructive notice that the approved design resulted in a dangerous condition (see §§ 835, subd. (b) &835.2 [defining "notice" within the meaning of § 835, subd. (b)]); (2) the dangerous condition qualified as a concealed trap, i.e., "would not [have been] reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care" (§ 830.8); and (3) the absence of a warning was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury." (Tansavatdi, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 661-662.)

In its motion for summary judgment, the City challenges only the first two elements. While the Habelmanns assert that the trial court erred by concluding that the alleged dangerous condition did not cause the Habelmanns' damages, the complained of language from the court's ruling is located in a subheading. The court concluded in the relevant section that there was no evidence that the City had notice of any dangerous condition; it did not make a ruling on causation.

1. There is a Triable Issue as to Whether the City had Notice the Reverse Curve Constituted a Dangerous Condition

Under section 835, subdivision (b), a public entity had actual notice of a dangerous condition if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. (§ 835.2, subd. (a).) "To establish actual notice, '[t]here must be some evidence that the employees had knowledge of the particular dangerous condition in question'; 'it is not enough to show that the [public entity's] employees had a general knowledge' that the condition can sometimes occur." (Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 508, 519.)

A public entity had constructive notice of a dangerous condition "only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character." (835.2, subd. (b).) In general, "it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the condition complained of has existed for a sufficient time to give the public agency constructive notice." (Erfurt v. State of California (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 837, 845.)

In the ten years prior to the accident, the City did not receive any other claim for personal injury or wrongful death due to any condition at the accident location. The annual traffic volume passing through the intersection is approximately 3.7 million vehicles, and the traffic volume of vehicles that passed through the site from January 1, 2000, to March 4, 2017, is over 62 million vehicles. From January 1, 2000, to March 4, 2017, the subject accident was one of eight incidents occurring between Yolanda Avenue and 190 feet to the east on Oxnard Street, and it was the only incident involving a vehicle making a U-turn. The overall collision rate is approximately 0.13 collisions per million vehicles passing the location on Oxnard Street. The City meets its initial burden to show it had no actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.

Accordingly, the burden shifts to the Habelmanns to raise a triable issue of fact as to notice. The Habelmanns contend that the City's Department of Transportation reports show there have been numerous collisions in which excessive speed was implicated as a substantial cause at that location.

Prior accidents at the same location may be relevant to show notice of a dangerous condition.

"As a general rule, '[w]here the circumstances are similar, and the happenings are not too remote in time, other accidents may be proved to show a defective or dangerous condition, knowledge or notice thereof, or to establish the cause of an accident. [Citations.]' [Citations.] 'The evidence must relate to accidents which are similar and which occur under substantially the same circumstances. [Citations.]' [Citation.] '[T]he requirement of similarity may vary in strictness according to the purpose for which the evidence is introduced. Thus, if offered to show a dangerous condition of a particular thing-such as a step- the other accident must be connected in some way with that thing; but if offered only to show knowledge or notice of a dangerous condition, an accident at the place-a broader area-may be shown.' [Citation.]" (Genrich v. State of California (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 221, 227-228, italics in original (Genrich).)

"The requirement of similarity of conditions is 'much relaxed' when the evidence is offered to show Notice of the dangerous condition." (Hilts v. Solano County (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 161, 169.) The previous incidents must "be such as to attract the defendant's attention to the dangerous situation which resulted in the litigated accident." (Ibid.; Laird v. T.W. Mather, Inc. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 210, 220.)

The City's reports show that in the 17 years before the accident, there were 11 collisions near the area where unsafe speed was a factor, and four collisions where drivers lost control of their vehicles at the reverse curve. Here, the Habelmanns allege in part that the decedent could not stop in time to avoid hitting Price's car. Under the relaxed standard for notice of a dangerous condition, the prior incidents did not need to specifically involve vehicles making U-turns. Rather, the prior accidents involving unsafe speed are such as to have put the City on notice that the curve created a dangerous situation in the area for drivers going over 35 mph.

The City and the trial court both understandably focused on the fact that this accident involved a U-turn in addition to a speeding motorcyclist. The complaint attempted to minimize the extent to which the decedent's speed contributed to the accident, focusing more on Price making the U-turn. However, it also alleged that due to the reduced visibility caused by the curve, drivers traversing the reverse curve cannot stop in time to avoid collisions, particularly with those dropping patients off at Tarzana Treatment Center.

The City relies primarily on Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058 (Salas) and Mixon v. Pac. Gas &Elec. Co. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 124 (Mixon), in arguing that the prior accidents were not substantially similar to the subject incident as to put the City on notice. However, in Salas and Mixon, the plaintiffs did not attempt to use evidence of prior accidents to show that public entities had notice of dangerous conditions. Salas and Mixon attempted to use previous accidents to prove the particular conditions were dangerous, and as discussed in Genrich, supra, this subjects the prior accidents to a stricter standard: "the conditions under which the alleged previous accidents occurred [must be] the same or substantially similar to the one in question." (Mixon, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 138, quoting Salas, supra, at p. 1072, italics added.) In each case, the subject accidents involved vehicles that struck pedestrians, but the other accidents offered as evidence were too dissimilar to prove the relevant conditions were dangerous. In Salas, no other accident involved a pedestrian and a vehicle (Salas, at p. 1073), and in Mixon, the two other pedestrian/vehicle accidents occurred on a different crosswalk and when the intoxicated pedestrian stepped in front of a moving car, respectively. (Mixon, supra, at p. 138.) Under the comparatively relaxed standard for showing notice of a dangerous condition, the prior accidents involving excessive speed and loss of control sufficiently relate to the alleged dangerous condition created by the reverse curve.

Moreover, the City received correspondence and complaints from the public about the reverse curve in the seven years before the accident. First, the Habelmanns cite a letter from a college stating cars traveling at a high rate of speed around a "severe" curve make it difficult for anyone entering or exiting the school driveway to turn onto the road. Further, the letter asserts that the curve creates a "blind spot." Second, the Habelmanns cite a letter from the Tarzana Treatment Center complaining about a "traffic issue" that makes patient drop off and parking difficult. The letter complains that there have been a number of accidents and near misses in the area and asserts that the reverse curve "lends itself to potential driver errors." The Treatment Center further notes that although there are 25 mph signs posted to the east and west, they "have little effect" on motorists using the roadway. Lastly, the Habelmanns cite an email from the college stating that vehicles are driving too fast around the curve and do not slow down for drivers to pull out or into parking lots, which the college believes "will soon cause a fatal accident." The complaints, thus, put the City on notice that drivers were speeding into and out of the curve, where there was reduced visibility, despite the advisory 25 mph sign. Consequently, the Habelmanns raise a triable issue of fact as to the City's notice regarding the alleged dangerous condition of the reverse curve.

2. There is a Triable Issue of Fact as to the Existence of a Concealed Trap and Whether the City Gave Sufficient Warning

a. Concealed Dangerous Condition

Next, we turn to whether the dangerous condition qualified as a concealed trap, i.e., "would not [have been] reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care" (§ 830.8).)

The City argues that the subject location did not constitute a trap. The City's expert, Rock Miller, notes that the suggested 25 mph speed was appropriate based on the curve's radius, and that the roadway design, markings, and traffic signs and signals satisfied applicable standards. He acknowledges that the curvature of the roadway limited sight visibility. However, Miller determined that there was adequate sight distance for vehicles traveling up to 35 mph to make reasonably comfortable stops. Miller states that based upon his inspection of the intersection, the collision history, and consideration of conditions at other locations that have been found to be a trap, there is "no condition at the location that could be established to be a trap for users of the intersection using reasonable care and in compliance with the regulatory traffic control devices present." Thus, Miller's opinion is expressly conditioned upon compliance with the traffic devices present, but the City does not provide any authority to show that drivers who exceed the posted speed limits or recommendations, as a matter of law, fail to exercise due care. (See Muffett v. Royster (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 289, 305 ["questions as to whether a defendant used "'due care'" when exceeding the posted speed on [a] curve are . . . factual questions"], disapproved on another ground in Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 73-74; see also Alexander v. State of California Ex Rel Dept. of Transportation (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 890, 901 [the term "'use(d) with due care'" in section 830 does not as a matter of law include obeying traffic laws; "the existence of a dangerous condition and use with due care are factual questions"].)

In opposition, the Habelmanns submit the declaration of Allen G. Bourgeois (Bourgeois), who conducted a speed survey for the subject roadway and determined the 85th percentile speed for eastbound vehicles entering the curve is 46 mph. Bourgeois states that the 85th percentile speed is the speed at which 85 percent of all drivers are measured driving at or below and is "reasonable and prudent." Bourgeois asserts that the reverse curve does not provide adequate stopping sight distance for eastbound drivers traveling at prevailing speeds above 35 mph, which allegedly describes the decedent at the time of the accident. He opines that "[a]s a result, . . . a [reasonably careful] driver would have inadequate sight distance to appropriately respond to turning vehicles or pedestrians within the curve itself or just beyond the curve. The high 85th percentile speed is an indication that reasonably careful drivers are indeed not anticipating and responding appropriately to the presence of the 'S' curve, which is not readily apparent to a driver [exercising] due care."

In summary, the City provides evidence that any danger caused by limited visibility in the reverse curve can be anticipated by drivers who travel at speeds consistent with the posted signs. The Habelmanns present evidence that even reasonable drivers do not travel at speeds consistent with the posted signs, and thus they cannot anticipate the reduced visibility of the reverse curve. Therefore, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the reverse curve constituted a concealed trap.

b. Sufficiency of Warnings

The City next asserts that it did in fact provide warning signs before the curve for motorists driving eastbound on Oxnard Street. Admittedly, the City provided a reverse curve and advisory 25 mph sign 460 feet prior to the curve for motorists traveling eastbound.

The Habelmanns, however, assert that the warning signs were placed too far in advance of the curve and that the improperly placed signage did not give drivers adequate warning to reduce their speeds before entering the reverse curve. For zones with an 85th percentile speed of 45 mph, the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) recommends placing warning signs advising drivers to decelerate to an advisory speed of 20 or 30 mph 100 feet before the relevant condition. The MUTCD provides, "[w]arning signs should be placed so that they provide an adequate PRT [Perception-Response Time]. . . . Warning signs should not be placed too far in advance of the condition, such that drivers might tend to forget the warning because of other driving distractions, especially in urban areas." Bourgeois asserts that the subject location "is in a fully developed urban area," and that there was an appropriate location available to place the warning signs 130 feet before the reverse curve. Furthermore, he adds that his speed survey revealed that 98 percent of vehicles traversed the curve at speeds of 37 mph or higher and none at less than 35 mph. This evidence suggests that the reverse curve and advisory 25 mph signs were ineffective in warning drivers to reduce their speeds for the curve.

The trial court was correct that the Habelmanns do not point to any statutory authority requiring the placement of traffic signs at certain distances; however, the Habelmanns are alleging that the signs that were present failed to provide adequate warning. As stated above, MUTCD guidelines suggest that signs should have been placed closer to the danger, and Bourgeois found that 100 percent of drivers traveled through the reverse curve above the recommended 25 mph. This evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to the adequacy or sufficiency of the warnings. (See e.g., Bunker v. City of Glendale (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 325, 328 [sign advising oncoming traffic to slow to 15 mph was sited three intersections away from, and approximately 500 feet below, the crest of the hill, and there was evidence that motorists could not tell whether the warning applied to the intersections or to the grade of the hill]; see also Briggs v. State (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 489, 497498 [inadequate signs to warn and direct traffic away from location of threatened landslide].)

The City further contends it is entitled to summary judgment under Compton v. City of Santee (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 591, and Weinstein v. Department of Transportation (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 52, because the approved plans for the design of the road included the placement of the warning signs so the City cannot be liable for failing to warn of the same condition. The City asserts that to the extent this court's opinion in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 423 holds otherwise, it should not be followed. Our Supreme Court recently affirmed Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, and held that "section 830.6 immunizes liability for having created a dangerous traffic condition under section 835, subdivision (a) (a form of active negligence) but does not necessarily immunize liability for failing to warn of a known dangerous traffic condition under section 835, subdivision (b) (a form of passive negligence)." (Tansavatdi, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 659-660, fn. Omitted.) Furthermore, the Supreme Court expressly disapproved the portions of Compton v. City of Santee, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 591, and Weinstein v. Department of Transportation, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 52, suggesting that design immunity categorically precludes claims alleging failure to warn of a dangerous traffic condition created by an immunized design. (Tansavatdi, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 659, fn. 4.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as to the Habelmanns' failure to warn theory of liability. Each side shall bear their own costs on appeal.

We concur: CURREY, P. J., COLLINS, J.


Summaries of

Habelmann v. City of Los Angeles

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Aug 31, 2023
No. B322879 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023)
Case details for

Habelmann v. City of Los Angeles

Case Details

Full title:KRISTINE HABELMANN, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division

Date published: Aug 31, 2023

Citations

No. B322879 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023)