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Gutierrez v. Cnty. of San Mateo

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Jan 24, 2012
A131553 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012)

Opinion

A131553

01-24-2012

MONICA GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, Defendant and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. CIV487763)

In July 2008, Adrian Sedano, a ward of the juvenile court, escaped from his placement at Camp Glenwood, a juvenile probation camp maintained near La Honda by San Mateo County (County). A few weeks later, he murdered Ramon Buenrostro in Redwood City. Monica Gutierrez (Gutierrez), Buenrostro's mother, brought a negligence action for damages against the County. She appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the County's demurrer to her complaint without leave to amend. Gutierrez contends she pleaded a viable cause of action against the County pursuant to Government Code section 835, alleging that the County's policy of placing dangerous juvenile offenders in an unlocked facility from which they might simply "walk away" caused a dangerous condition of property that resulted in her son's death. She also urges that the statutory immunities set out in sections 845.8 and 846 are not applicable under the circumstances, and asks this court not to allow the County to benefit from its wrongdoing by allowing it to invoke such immunities from liability. While we understand why Gutierrez brought the suit over the loss of her son, we conclude the statutory immunity of section 845.8 does apply and precludes liability on the County's part under the facts pleaded. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2009, Gutierrez filed a complaint against the County for the wrongful death of her son Buenrostro, based on the County's alleged negligence. In her first amended complaint, Gutierrez added several individual defendants and pleaded four causes of action. General allegations stated Sedano was a ward of the juvenile court "with a significant violent criminal history of felonies and misdemeanors." Camp Glenwood was an unlocked facility with "insufficient" lighting and security and "a long history of continued and many 'walk aways' " by juveniles placed there. The County "recklessly and with wanton indifference" placed Sedano in the camp, despite its awareness of Sedano's criminal history and Camp Glenwood's "inability to hold its juveniles." As a result, Sedano, too, "walked away" from the camp on July 15, and murdered Buenrostro "approximately 23 days" later. The "screening process" by which the County reached its decision to place Sedano in the camp was "grossly improper," as indicated by changes made in that process in the aftermath of Buenrostro's murder. Between the time of Sedano's escape and Buenrostro's murder, the County made no attempt to notify its residents that this "dangerous individual" was at large.

The first cause of action alleged the County's conduct had created a "dangerous condition" within the meaning of section 835. The County was aware of "problems" regarding "ongoing security breaches" at Camp Glenwood based on a grand jury investigation, and was also aware of Sedano's "dangerous criminal nature," yet it "recklessly" placed Sedano in the camp. This decision created a "dangerous condition" resulting in Sedano leaving the camp and murdering Buenrostro—one which the County could have avoided "by simply placing Sedano in a locked facility."

The remaining causes of action are not pertinent to this appeal. These alleged causes of action were against Sedano himself, and also a tenant in Redwood City who "illegally harbor[ed]" Sedano in her apartment after he left Camp Glenwood, as well as the owners of the tenant's rental property.

The County filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and on January 24, 2011, filed an order dismissing the County from Gutierrez's action, with prejudice.

This appeal followed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).)

DISCUSSION

We review a ruling on a demurrer to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. In doing so, we assume the complaint's properly pleaded material allegations are true and give the complaint a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all its parts in their context. We do not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125; see also Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)

Under California law, a public entity such as the County is not liable for any injury arising out of the entity's act or omission, or that of its employees "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute." (§ 815, subd. (a).) Gutierrez contends section 835 provides the statutory basis for liability in her case. Under section 835, a public entity is liable "for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred." (§ 835.) Liability under section 835 may be based either on active negligence—proof that "[a] negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition"—or on passive negligence—proof that "[t]he public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition." (§ 835.)

Gutierrez appears to rely on a theory of liability for passive negligence, suggesting her pleaded facts may be "analogized" with a number of decisions concerning a public entity's failure, after actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, to take measures to protect against that condition. The decisions on which she relies, however, bear no factual or legal resemblance to her case. Each involved a dangerous physical defect in a public roadway, and relied on the theory that, even if the public entity responsible for maintaining the roadway could not be held liable for creating the dangerous condition—due to the application of a statutory design immunity—it might, nonetheless, be liable for failure to post adequate warnings. (See Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 712-717; Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 327-329; Anderson v. City of Thousand Oaks (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 82, 91; Flournoy v. State of California (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 806, 811.)

By contrast, the "dangerous condition" claimed by Gutierrez, in this instance, is the County's use of an unlocked facility to house "violent juvenile offenders," placed there as a consequence of its "grossly inadequate" screening policies. She argues this dangerous condition at Camp Glenwood "extend[ed] out to the [County's] residents," and it was foreseeable that a violent juvenile offender would " 'walk away' " from the camp and commit a crime like one resulting in the death of her son.

We are not persuaded that liability for a dangerous condition of public property under section 835 was intended to extend to the condition alleged by Gutierrez. The placement of a minor adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile court and removed from his or her parent's custody is within that court's discretion, consistent with the placement options and purposes set out in the juvenile delinquency law. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 202, 726, 727, 730, 731.) Placement in a locked facility, such as a county's juvenile hall or a facility maintained by the state's Division of Juvenile Justice is generally an option of last resort. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 730, subd. (a), 731, subd. (a), 734.) The County's maintenance of an unlocked probation camp at Camp Glenwood is thus neither unusual nor unwarranted under the juvenile law, and cannot, in our view, be regarded as a "dangerous condition" of public property in and of itself.

The only effectual, "dangerous condition" alleged by Gutierrez is the alleged inadequate policy or "screening process" employed by the County to decide who might appropriately be placed in the camp. But a "dangerous condition" of property within the meaning of section 835 refers to property itself that is dangerous or defective either structurally or by way of its general use and operation. Liability under section 835 arises from a condition of property as distinguished from the condition of persons on that property. (Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 717.) A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property when the immediate cause of a plaintiff's injury is a third party's illegal or negligent conduct, but only if some physical characteristic of the property exposes users of the property to increased danger from third party negligence or criminality. That is, there must be a defect in the physical condition of the property and that defect must have some causal relationship to the third party conduct that injures the plaintiff. (Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1348; see also Sun v. City of Oakland (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1183.)

Thus, "dangerous condition" is defined for purposes of section 835 to mean "a condition of property that creates a substantial . . . risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used." (§ 830, subd. (a), italics added; see also Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 West's Ann. Gov. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 830, p. 299.)

As we have noted, unlocked juvenile facilities serve a valid purpose under California delinquency law, and the condition of being unlocked cannot by itself be deemed a physical defect. As such, there is no alleged physical defect of Camp Glenwood that bears a causal relationship to the injuries resulting from Sedano's "walk away," and subsequent criminal activity. Gutierrez's cause of action against the County, reasonably interpreted, boils down to a claim that the County utilized an inadequate screening process that resulted in the inappropriate placement of "violent juvenile offenders" in an unlocked camp. Her claim alleges a perceived defective decisionmaking process, but no physical defect of public property giving rise to liability under section 835.

As pointed out at oral argument, the juvenile court after due consideration ordered Sedano placed at Camp Glenwood as a facility suitable for his rehabilitation.

Nor are we persuaded by Gutierrez's argument that we should impose a duty of care on the County under the alleged facts—one the County breached when it "failed to adequately address the ongoing problems with the Camp Glenwood facility and . . . simply ignor[ed] the problem until the death of [her son]." The Supreme Court conducted a duty analysis under similar circumstances, in an action brought against a county by the parents of a child murdered by a juvenile ward one day after the ward was released from confinement to the custody of his mother for temporary leave. The plaintiffs argued the county had breached a duty of care to warn police and neighborhood residents of the release of a juvenile ward who had expressed generalized threats to harm a segment of the population. (Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 746-751 (Thompson).)The court distinguished its earlier decision in Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, where it found the state had a duty to warn the plaintiff of the known violent tendencies of a juvenile ward placed in the plaintiffs foster care. In that instance, the duty arose from the special, ongoing relationship between the state and the foster parent—whom the state placed in clearly foreseeable danger when it placed the juvenile ward in her care. (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 751.) The court in Thompson found no such duty, because the defendant county bore no "special and continuous relationship with the specific plaintiffs" and had not "knowingly place[d] the specific plaintiffs' decedent into a foreseeably dangerous position." (Ibid.)

Here, as in Thompson, Gutierrez has not alleged "a direct or continuing relationship between [herself] and [the] County . . . through which [the] County placed [her] decedent in danger," nor that her decedent was a "foreseeable or readily identifiable target of the juvenile offender's threats." (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 753.) We find the analysis in Thompson persuasive and similarly decline to impose liability on the County for failing to warn its residents generally concerning Sedano's escape or "walk away" from Camp Glenwood.

Finally, and most importantly, the liability of the County is subject to any applicable statutory immunity. (§ 815, subd. (b).) The County asserts it is immune from liability under section 845.8. We agree.

The County also argues it is immune for injury caused by "the failure to retain an arrested person in custody." (§ 846.) Because we conclude section 845.8 applies in this case, we do not address the merits of this claim.
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Section 845.8 provides in pertinent part that a public entity is not liable for any injury caused by "[a]n escaping or escaped prisoner." (§ 845.8, subd. (b)(1).) Gutierrez contends this section does not apply because Sedano was not an "escaped prisoner," but rather a "juvenile housed in an unlocked facility . . . inadequately run by the County."

For purposes of section 845.8 and related immunities, a "prisoner" is defined to "include[] an inmate of a prison, jail, or penal or correctional facility." (§ 844.) Because the definition is inclusive rather than exhaustive, it has been interpreted broadly to include "all inmates of any facility in which they were placed by the courts or law," including wards of the juvenile court. (Jiminez v. County of Santa Cruz (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 407, 409-410.) As expressed by that court, "[c]ertainly a ward of the juvenile court, committed to a place of custody such as a foster home, is 'one involuntarily restrained,' 'one who is in custody as the result of a legal process,' and one 'deprived of his liberty by virtue of a judicial . . . process.' " (Id. at p. 410.) This reasoning applies as much to a juvenile ward committed to an unlocked probation camp as to one committed to a foster home placement. (See also Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 747-749 [applying immunity under another provision of section 845.8 to county's release of juvenile ward on temporary leave].)

Moreover, the immunity under section 845.8 is based on a legislative determination that "the nature of the precautions necessary to prevent escape of prisoners are matters that should be determined by the proper public officials unfettered by any fear that their decisions may result in liability." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 West's Ann. Gov. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 845.8, p. 461.) In our view, the determination of precautions necessary to prevent a juvenile ward from leaving the custody into which he or she has been lawfully committed is entitled to the same immunity as the determination of precautions necessary to prevent a prisoner from escaping.

Under section 815, subdivision (b), statutory immunities generally prevail over any statutory liability. (Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659, 671672.) In the particular area of correctional activities, the Supreme Court has explicitly determined the immunity under section 845.8 effectively places beyond the pale of liability both discretionary decisions themselves and their ministerial implementations. (Whitcombe v. County of Yolo (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 698, 714, citing County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 485.) The County's policy or screening process utilized in placing juvenile wards in Camp Glenwood—which lies at the heart of Gutierrez's cause of action—is such a matter of discretionary decisionmaking and its ministerial implementations. We conclude section 845.8 applies to shield the County from any liability alleged in Gutierrez's cause of action against it. Any change in the law should be addressed by the Legislature. Any change in the policies governing Camp Glenwood should be directed to the appropriate authorities in San Mateo County for review and implementation.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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Marchiano, P.J.
We concur:

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Margulies, J.

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Banke, J.


Summaries of

Gutierrez v. Cnty. of San Mateo

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Jan 24, 2012
A131553 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012)
Case details for

Gutierrez v. Cnty. of San Mateo

Case Details

Full title:MONICA GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE

Date published: Jan 24, 2012

Citations

A131553 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012)