Opinion
CV176031154
06-12-2018
Ronald C. GUADLAP v. ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Calmar, J.
The defendant moves to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that it is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act as provided by General Statutes § 31-284(a).
This action arises out of an alleged work-related incident. In the complaint filed on August 4, 2017, the plaintiffs, Ronald Gaudlap (Ronald) and Heidi Gaudlap, allege the following facts. On or about July 29, 2015, while in the course of his employment, Ronald attended fall protection training provided by the defendant, Electric Boat Corporation. During the training, the defendant’s trainer told Ronald and other employees to ignore the tags on the harnesses, which indicated that the harnesses were defective. The defendant’s trainer told Ronald and the other employees the defective harnesses were okay for training purposes. The defendant’s trainer did not check or did not know how to properly check Ronald’s harness to ensure it was fitted correctly before he was lifted in the air. Ronald suffered strangulation from the harness he was wearing, which resulted in serious injuries. Prior to the incident, the defendant knew or was aware that two other employees were injured when using the harnesses, including one employee who lost consciousness. As a result of the alleged work-related incident, Ronald has received workers’ compensation benefits. The plaintiffs’ complaint contains two counts alleging intentional tort and loss of consortium on behalf of Heidi Gaudlap, respectively.
On January 25, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint. The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion. On March 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion. The matter was heard at short calendar on March 19, 2018.
"The proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial." Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn.App. 305, 309, 620 A.2d 181 (1993). "[A] party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party’s claim by filing a motion to strike." Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 564, 898 A.2d 178 (2006). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to set forth a claim that overcomes the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act as provided by General Statutes § 31-284(a). Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs have not alleged that the defendant was wilful or malicious in its actions or that there was intent on the part of the defendant to cause Ronald’s injuries. Alternatively, the defendant contends that the allegations, assuming they sufficiently allege a claim under the exception, fail because the defendant’s trainer cannot be viewed as an alter ego of the defendant for purposes of the exception. The plaintiffs argue in response that they have satisfied the substantial certainty exception to the exclusivity provision, as articulated in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 109-10, 639 A.2d (1994) (Suarez I), and Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255, 257-58, 698 A.2d 838 (1997) (Suarez II). The plaintiffs further argue that the defendant’s alter ego claim presents a question of fact and that a corporation may be liable in common-law tort.
General Statutes § 31-284(a) provides: "An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter, except that compensation shall not be paid when the personal injury has been caused by the wilful and serious misconduct of the injured employee or by his intoxication. All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation."
The plaintiffs also argue that the defendant’s motion to strike is a procedurally improper method to raise the exclusivity argument, which should be raised in a special defense. This argument is unpersuasive. See Brosnan v. Sacred Heart University, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 333544 (October 21, 1997, Levin, J.) (20 Conn.L.Rptr. 509) (holding motion to strike is proper vehicle to raise exclusivity of workers’ compensation).
General Statutes § 31-284(a) provides in relevant part: "An employer ... shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment ..."Section 31-284(a) is the exclusivity provision of the act and provides that an employer, although required to compensate an employee as set forth in the act for death or personal injury sustained in the course of employment, is not liable in a civil action for damages arising from that injury." Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 118, 889 A.2d 810 (2006). An exception to this general rule of exclusivity exists when a plaintiff can establish an intentional tort claim by demonstrating that his employer either: (1) "actually intended to injure the plaintiff (actual intent standard)"; or (2) "intentionally created a dangerous condition that made the plaintiff’s injuries substantially certain to occur (substantial certainty standard)." Suarez II, supra, 242 Conn. 257-58.
The plaintiffs in the present case seek to recover under this second theory of liability. "The substantial certainty test provides for ... a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against an employer where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez I, supra, 229 Conn. 109-10. "Although it is less demanding than the actual intent standard, the substantial certainty standard is, nonetheless, an intentional tort claim requiring an appropriate showing of intent to injure on the part of the defendant ... Specifically, the substantial certainty standard requires that the plaintiff establish that the employer intentionally acted in such a way that the resulting injury to the employee was substantially certain to result from the employer’s conduct ... To satisfy the substantial certainty standard, a plaintiff must show more than that [a] defendant exhibited a ‘lackadaisical or even cavalier’ attitude toward worker safety ... Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his employer believed that its conduct was substantially certain to cause the employee harm." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., supra, 277 Conn. 118.
In the present case, the plaintiffs’ complaint contains numerous allegations of state and federal safety violations, and deficient safety training. The complaint also alleges the defendant intended harm to befall Ronald or anticipated that harm would result from its conduct. The plaintiffs in paragraph ten of their complaint allege: "Prior to Plaintiff, Ronald C. Gaudlap’s, said injury, Defendant knew that the harnesses were in a dangerous and defective condition." In paragraph eleven of the complaint, the plaintiffs further allege: "Prior to Plaintiff, Ronald C. Gaudlap’s, said injury, Defendant knew and/or was aware two other employees were injured when using the harness(es) in question, including one employee who lost consciousness." The plaintiffs allege in paragraph fifteen that "[u]pon information and belief, Defendant knew and/or was aware of other employees having safety concerns prior to the Plaintiff, Ronald C. Gaudlap, being injured."
In paragraph nineteen of the complaint, the plaintiffs further allege in relevant part: "Plaintiff, Ronald C. Gaudlap’s, injuries and losses were caused by the Defendant’s wilful, serious and intentional misconduct in one or more of the following ways: (a) In that the Defendant required the Plaintiff, Ronald C. Gaudlap, to use a harness that Defendant knew was in a defective and dangerous condition; (b) In that Defendant failed and/or refused to replace the harness Plaintiff, Ronald C. Gaudlap, used even though it knew that the harness was not safe thereby intentionally disregarding the safety of the Plaintiff, Ronald C. Gaudlap; (c) In that the Defendant failed and/or refused to hire, properly train and supervise safety officers; (d) In that Defendant failed and/or refused to hire, properly train and supervise the trainers designated to conduct fall protection training ..."
These allegations, if true, are sufficient to satisfy the substantial certainty exception. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew or was aware that the harnesses were in a dangerous and defective condition, that the defendant knew of employee injuries relating to the harnesses, that the defendant continued to use the defective harnesses and that the defendant knew that the condition was substantially certain to cause the plaintiff’s injuries. At least three other Connecticut courts, when presented with similar allegations, have come to the same conclusion. See Sypher v. Getty Granite Co., LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 560350 (October 22, 2002, Hurley, J.T.R.) (33 Conn.L.Rptr. 305); Dakers v. Danaher Tool Group, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-01-0079186-S (October 16, 2002, Sferrazza, J.) (33 Conn.L.Rptr. 310); Ranilla v. Milford Mechanical, Docket No. CV-00072899-S (May 28, 2003, Moran, J.).
Alternatively, the defendant contends that the allegations still must fail because the defendant’s trainer cannot be viewed as an alter ego of the defendant for purposes of the exception. "[A]n employee’s action claiming intentional assault by another employee ‘identified as the alter ego’ of the employer would not be barred by § 31-284." (Citation omitted.) Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 99, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). "There is a distinction between an assault directly committed or authorized by the employer and an assault committed by a supervisory employee." Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 218, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979). In Jett v. Dunlap, supra, 179 Conn. 219, our Supreme Court articulated "[t]he correct distinction to be drawn ... between a supervisory employee and a person who can be characterized as the alter ego of the corporation. If the [actor] is of such rank in the corporation that he may be deemed the alter ego of the corporation under the standards governing disregard of the corporate entity, then attribution of corporate responsibility for the actor’s conduct is appropriate. It is inappropriate where the actor is merely a foreman or supervisor ... The distinction is based on identification, not agency. If the [actor] can be identified as the alter ego of the corporation, or the corporation has directed or authorized the [act], then the corporation may be liable in common-law tort; if the [actor] is only another employee who cannot be so identified, then the strict liability remedies provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act are exclusive and cannot be supplemented with common-law damages." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.)
In the present case, the plaintiffs do not assert an intentional assault by the defendant’s trainer, as the defendant argues. In the plaintiffs’ complaint, they allege that the defendant did not hire properly trained trainers and the defendant did not replace the defective harnesses. Therefore, the court does not need to address whether the trainer was the alter ego of the corporation because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the wrongdoing of the defendant, not the trainer.
The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts, which necessarily imply that the defendant intentionally engaged in conduct that it knew was substantially certain to cause Ronald’s injuries. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint is denied.