Opinion
No. 61, 2006.
Submitted: April 21, 2006.
Decided: June 26, 2006.
Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. ID No. 0204003496.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 26th day of June 2006, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Jamah K. Grosvenor, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's January 6, 2006 order denying his second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Grosvenor's opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In December 2002, Grosvenor pleaded guilty to two counts of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. He was sentenced to seven years incarceration at Level V, to be followed by eight years of decreasing levels of probation. Grosvenor did not file a direct appeal. Grosvenor's first postconviction motion was denied by the Superior Court. This Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision on appeal on the grounds that Grosvenor's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and that his counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in connection with the plea.
Two of Grosvenor's co-defendants went to trial and each received a minimum mandatory term of twenty-four years in prison.
Grosvenor v. State, Del. Supr., No. 141, 2004, Berger, J. (Nov. 22, 2004).
(3) In this appeal, Grosvenor claims that: a) the State's failure to arraign him violated his constitutional rights; b) his attorney coerced his co-defendant into pleading guilty and signing a statement against him; c) his attorney provided ineffective assistance; and d) the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion for postconviction relief on these grounds.
(4) Grosvenor's first claim concerning the lack of an arraignment is procedurally barred because he failed to raise it in his first postconviction motion. Moreover, this Court has previously determined that Grosvenor's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. A voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged defects or errors occurring prior to the entry of the plea. As such, Grosvenor has waived his claim that the State's failure to arraign him violated his constitutional rights.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2).
Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988).
(5) Grosvenor's second claim is that his attorney coerced his co-defendant into pleading guilty and signing a statement against him. Because this claim was litigated previously in Grosvenor's first postconviction motion, consideration of the claim is foreclosed in this action. Moreover, Grosvenor's attempt to bolster the claim with a recent affidavit signed by his co-defendant is unavailing. The affidavit is deficient in both form and substance and the Superior Court was within its discretion to reject it as unreliable.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
Johnson v. State, 410 A.2d 1014, 1015 (Del. 1980).
(6) Grosvenor's third claim is that his attorney provided ineffective assistance. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial. There is no support in the record for Grosvenor's claim that he received ineffective assistance in connection with his guilty plea. In exchange for his guilty plea, Grosvenor was sentenced to only seven years in prison. Each of his co-defendants who went to trial received a twenty-four year sentence. Grosvenor derived an enormous benefit from his attorney's advice to plead guilty. To the extent that Grosvenor's specific allegations of ineffective assistance have not already been adjudicated in his previous motion for postconviction relief, we conclude that they are without merit.
MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1074 (Del. 2001).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
Any allegations of ineffective assistance occurring prior to the entry of Grosvenor's guilty plea have been waived. Downer v. State, 543 A.2d at 311-12.
(7) Grosvenor's final claim is that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not granting his motion for postconviction relief. While the Superior Court based its decision on grounds different from those enumerated here, it, nevertheless, correctly determined that Grosvenor's claims were without merit.
Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995).
(8) It is manifest on the face of Grosvenor's opening brief that this appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.