Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11334 No. 6197
07-01-2015
DYLAN SCOTT GROSSMAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: John N. Page III, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. William A. Taylor, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-12-831 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, J. Patrick Hanley, Judge. Appearances: John N. Page III, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. William A. Taylor, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Coats, Senior Judge. Judge MANNHEIMER.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).
Dylan Scott Grossman appeals his convictions for reckless driving, breath test refusal, driving while his license was suspended, and violating the conditions of his bail release. In this appeal, Grossman contends that the police subjected him to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and that all of the evidence stemming from that police questioning should be suppressed. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that Grossman was not in custody when the police questioned him, and we therefore affirm his convictions.
Underlying facts
Shortly after 1:15 in the morning on January 25, 2012, the Anchorage police received a report that a Jeep Cherokee, with two people in it, was being driven recklessly in the parking lot of a Fred Meyer store. The Jeep turned out to be easily identifiable: the driver struck a light pole in the parking lot, leaving behind the front bumper and license plate.
Officer Steven Czajkowski was dispatched to the address where the Jeep was registered. The Jeep was not there, but Officer Czajkowski learned that a man named "Dylan" had been driving the Jeep. Czajkowski broadcast a request for other officers to look for the Jeep.
Officer Cory Crane found the Jeep at a nearby grocery store, and he and Czajkowski contacted the two people in the Jeep: David Greist and Mike Morgan. They told the officers that their roommate, Dylan Grossman, had been driving the Jeep earlier, and that Grossman was currently back at their apartment.
The two officers gave Greist and Morgan a ride back to the apartment, and Greist invited the officers to enter the apartment. By then, it was approximately 3:00 in the morning. Both Grossman and his mother were in the apartment: Grossman was sleeping on a couch in the living room, while his mother was in a back bedroom.
Officer Czajkowski awakened Grossman, and they went into the kitchen, where Czajkowski questioned Grossman about the events at the Fred Meyer parking lot. Grossman admitted that he had been driving the Jeep earlier, and that he had been sliding the car around the parking lot. He also admitted that he had been drinking, but he essentially denied being intoxicated.
Czajkowski administered some field sobriety tests to Grossman in the kitchen. Grossman performed poorly on these tests, and Czajkowski placed him under arrest. The entire interaction between Czajkowski and Grossman lasted approximately 15 minutes. Grossman subsequently refused to take a breath test.
After the State filed charges against him, Grossman filed a motion asking the district court to suppress all of his statements to the police — arguing that he had been in custody for Miranda purposes, and that he had not been warned of his rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Grossman had not been in custody during the police questioning at the apartment. Accordingly, the court denied Grossman's suppression motion.
Grossman went to trial on charges of driving under the influence, refusal to submit to a breath test, driving with a suspended license, and violating the conditions of his bail release. The jury convicted Grossman of all these offenses except driving under the influence; they acquitted him of that offense, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of reckless driving.
Now, on appeal, Grossman renews his contention that his statements to the police were the fruit of a Miranda violation.
Why we affirm the district court's ruling on the Miranda issue
Under Miranda v. Arizona, a suspect who is subjected to custodial interrogation must be warned of their right to remain silent, of their right to the assistance of an attorney (at public expense, if need be), and of the fact that whatever they say to the police can be used against them.
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
A person may be subjected to "custodial" interrogation for Miranda purposes even though they have not been formally arrested. The test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances of the questioning, a reasonable person in that situation would have felt that they were not free to break off the questioning and leave — or, in situations like Grossman's, free to ask the police to leave. The ultimate inquiry is whether the suspect was subjected to a "restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest."
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125; 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520; 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983).
State v. Smith, 38 P.3d 1149, 1154 (Alaska 2002); Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Alaska 1979).
Long v. State, 837 P.2d 737, 740 (Alaska App. 1992).
State v. Smith, 38 P.3d at 1154.
Here, Grossman was interrogated in his home — normally an indication that an interrogation was not custodial. It is true that the police had to awaken Grossman to question him, but (as the district court found) this was not the result of a police stratagem; rather, it was the result of the police having to promptly investigate a crime (a potential DUI) that had occurred very recently. Although two officers came to the apartment, the district court found that only one of them (Czajkowski) made contact with Grossman. The other officer, Crane, stood off at a distance and did not physically block any exit from the apartment.
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure (3rd edition 2007), § 6.6(e), Vol. 2, pp. 738-740.
The district court also found that Czajkowski's questioning of Grossman was pointed and direct, but not overbearing. At one point during the questioning, Czajkowski told Grossman, "If you don't want to talk with me, that's fine." And the questioning was relatively short: the entire encounter — including both the questioning and the field sobriety tests in the kitchen — took less than fifteen minutes.
In evaluating Grossman's case, we have considered two court decisions — the United States Supreme Court's decision in Orozco v. Texas, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' decision in Bond v. State, — where defendants were found to be in custody for Miranda purposes after a number of police officers entered their bedroom in the middle of the night, woke them, and interrogated them.
394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969).
788 A.2d 705 (Md. App. 2002).
Although there are similarities between Grossman's case and the facts of Orozco and Bond, we conclude that Grossman's case is distinct in significant ways.
In Orozco, four police officers arrived at Orozco's boardinghouse at 4:00 a.m. to investigate a murder. All four of the officers entered Orozco's bedroom and began to question him while he was still in bed. According to the testimony given by one of the officers, from the moment Orozco gave his name, he was "under arrest" and not free to go.
Orozco, 394 U.S. at 325, 89 S.Ct. at 1096.
The facts in Bond are similar to those in Orozco. Bond was questioned late at night (or in the early morning hours) by three police officers who came into his bedroom. The officers interrogated Bond, while he was still in bed and only partially dressed. And they positioned themselves at the foot of Bond's bed, where they were standing in (or next to) the only exit from the bedroom.
Bond, 788 A.2d at 707-08.
Id. at 708.
As the decisions in Orozco and Bond illustrate, an interrogation can be "custodial" for Miranda purposes even though it takes place in a suspect's home or in other familiar surroundings. The number of officers who participate in the interrogation, their accompanying show of authority, their intrusion into private spaces, their efforts to isolate the suspect, the time of day, and the accusatory nature of their questioning can combine to turn the situation into one where a reasonable person would no longer feel free to terminate the questioning and ask the officers to leave.
See Bond, 788 A.2d at 713; see also People v. Davis, unpublished, 2012 WL 639330 at *2 (Mich. App. 2012) (ruling that a defendant was in custody under facts quite similar to those in Bond).
But not all police intrusions into a suspect's bedroom result in custody. For example, in State v. Milkie, an unpublished decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, two officers who were investigating a reported sexual assault entered the defendant's motel room shortly after 2:00 a.m., where he was asleep in bed. The officers yelled at Milkie to wake him, and then they turned on the lights and asked him what had happened. Milkie initially denied that anything had happened, but he later conceded that he and the victim had had "a verbal argument".
2007 WL 4124069 (Wis. App. 2007).
Id. at *1.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Under these facts, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that Milkie was not in custody for Miranda purposes. The Wisconsin court acknowledged that there were "coercive aspects [to] Milkie's detention": "the abruptness of his awakening to find police officers in [his] bedroom, and his relatively vulnerable position of being questioned while undressed and in bed." But the court found that these aspects of the situation were outweighed by other factors.
Id. at *6.
The court noted that Milkie was confronted by only two officers, neither of whom drew their weapons, handcuffed him, or otherwise physically restrained him. He was not told that he was under arrest, he was in a familiar place, he was told that the purpose of the officer's questions was to elicit his version of what happened that night, and the length of the questioning was "relatively brief".
Ibid.
Similarly, in State v. Worthington, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that a defendant was not in custody under facts similar to those in Milkie. A police officer went to Worthington's residence in the morning to investigate a report of a drug offense that had occurred at Worthington's place of work. The officer contacted Worthington's wife, who let him into the house and took him to Worthington, who had just finished working a night shift. Worthington was sleeping on a couch in the living room when the officer arrived. The officer woke him up and asked him about some drug paraphernalia that had been discovered the night before; Worthington made an incriminating statement in response to the officer's questions. The Utah court found that the circumstances of Worthington's case were materially different from the facts of Orozco because the officer imposed no restriction on Worthington's freedom of movement.
970 P.2d 714 (Utah App. 1998).
Id. at 715.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at 716.
Returning to the present case, we conclude that the circumstances of Grossman's questioning are materially distinguishable from the situations presented in Orozco or Bond. Although the police had to awaken Grossman to question him, they allowed him to get up, and (as in Worthington) the questioning took place in an open living area of his apartment. Grossman was not physically restrained, the officers did not block the exits to the apartment, and only one of the officers conducted the questioning. In addition, three other adults whom Grossman knew — including his own mother — were present in the apartment during the questioning.
We agree with the district court that, under the totality of these circumstances, a reasonable person in Grossman's position would not believe that they had been deprived of their freedom "[to a] degree associated with formal arrest". Rather, a reasonable person would have believed that they were still free to ask the police to stop the questioning and leave. For these reasons, we uphold the district court's denial of Grossman's suppression motion.
State v. Smith, 38 P.3d 1149, 1154 (Alaska App. 2002). --------
Conclusion
The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.