Summary
noting that false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims arise from alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment
Summary of this case from Bost v. BraddsOpinion
Civil Action No. DKC 2001-1212
February 11, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights case is the motion by Defendants Mary Richmond and David Rotolone for summary judgment. The issues have been fully briefed and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant Defendants' summary judgment motion.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following are facts either uncontroverted or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff George Gregg. Plaintiff was the president of Montgomery Concrete, Inc., a Delaware corporation licensed to manufacture concrete and concrete products in Rockville, Maryland. Montgomery Concrete is bordered on the north by a Montgomery County landfill, on the south by a composition patch of land, and on the east by a large expanse of parkland/wetland, which separates Montgomery Concrete's plant from the Northwest Branch, a tributary of Rock Creek. This east-bordering parkland/landfill "is filled with old tires, drums, tanks and debris." Paper 17 at ¶ 15.
From 1997 through late winter 1999, the State of Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) regularly inspected Montgomery Concrete's plant facility and found no evidence of significant violations. During the same period, Defendants, agents of the Montgomery County Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), also inspected the facility and discovered evidence of violations, which was disputed by Plaintiff. Allegedly without conducting any reliable testing on Plaintiff's property, DEP claimed that Montgomery Concrete was dumping pollutants into an unnamed tributary of the Northwest Branch. Plaintiff denied these allegations.
On or about April 16, 1999, Defendants Richmond and Rotolone, her supervisor, caused Plaintiff to be arrested and criminally prosecuted for dumping pollutants into the waters of the State of Maryland. The prosecution terminated at the close of the State of Maryland's case in chief, in a not guilty verdict on all counts and charges.
B. Procedural History
On April 23, 2001, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants and Montgomery County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The claims against the County were dismissed. On May 2, 2002, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which retains the same claims against Defendants Richmond and Rotolone. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2003.
In his opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion, Plaintiff states his desire to conduct two additional depositions, even though deposition discovery is complete. See Paper 42 at 2. The court will deny Plaintiff's request, as he has filed neither a motion to extend discovery deadline nor a Rule 56(f) affidavit. Plaintiff could have sought affidavits from these witnesses.
II. Standard of Review
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina v. State of S.C., 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See U.S. v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir. 1985). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in order to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. However, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position will not defeat a motion for summary judgment." Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 536 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Gold v. Panalpina, Inc., 522 U.S. 810 (1997). There must be "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Federal Law Claims: § 1983 and Fourth Amendment
Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but rather imposes liability and authorizes redress only for violations of constitutional and federal statutory rights by state actors. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3 (1979). Therefore, "the first inquiry" in a § 1983 action "is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and laws.'" Id. at 140 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). It follows, then, that "[i]f there is no violation of a federal right, there is no basis for a section 1983 action." Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 167 (4th Cir.) (quoting Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161, (4th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1018 (1994).
The court will assume that Defendants, as agents of DEP, were functioning as state actors for purposes of the § 1983 discussion.
The court will treat § 1983 as the basis for Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment violation claim, arising out of his alleged false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (claims of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment"); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000) ("What is conventionally referred to as a `§ 1983 malicious prosecution' action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130 (2001).
The court will analyze Plaintiff's claims through this Fourth Amendment lens, notwithstanding his assertion that his arrest, imprisonment and prosecution were "in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Paper 17 at ¶ 22.
Thus, on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, "the dispositive question is probable cause." White v. Maryland Transp. Auth., 151 F. Supp.2d 651, 655 (D.Md. 2001). See also Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974) ("there is no cause of action for "false arrest' under section 1983 unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause"); DeVentura v. Keith, 169 F. Supp.2d 390, 396 (D.Md. 2001) ("Probable cause must also be absent to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution").
Plaintiff alleges that his arrest and prosecution violated his constitutional rights because each lacked probable cause. Probable cause is an objective test that examines whether "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir.) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 866 (1998). Indeed, "[p]robable cause is the only and equally valid constitutional basis for arrest with or without warrant." Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1988).
On several occasions in early 1999, Defendant Richmond observed discharge trails coming from Plaintiff's property (Montgomery Concrete) and took samples of the trails. Tests conducted on each sample revealed a high pH level that exceeded the legal level provided in the Maryland water quality statutes. Defendant Richmond documented her findings in monitoring data reports. See Paper 37, Exs. 7, 9-11. Based on these reports, Defendant Rotolone, who was her supervisor, spoke with Schneider several times to discuss the situation and for "guidance" as to whether the State's Attorney's Office wished to treat it as a criminal matter. Paper 37, Ex. 13 at 40, 131. On March 16, 1999, Defendants, Schneider, Ken Medearis (a DEP geologist) and Mark Ecker (an MDE official) met "to review and discuss the testing, observations and inspections of the Montgomery Concrete property and what course to take." Paper 37 at 4-5. Schneider subsequently decided to seek a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest and filed a five-count criminal information, "on her official oath," charging him with (1) unlawful discharge of pollutants into state waters, pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Environment, § 9-322, on January 7, January 13, January 19 and January 25 of 1999, and (2) failure to comply with water pollution monitoring requirements. Paper 37, Ex. 15.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants lacked probable cause to refer his case to Schneider and failed to provide her with complete information. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Richmond "never took any soil samples from Montgomery Concrete's property and never observed any surface water running from the plant's truck wash pit" and "purposefully overlooked" other nearby concrete manufacturing plants as possible sources of the pollution discharge. Paper 17 at 5. Plaintiff avers that "[t]he large truck wash out pit was fully lined on February 8, 1999" and that "[t]he smaller wash out pit was lined in May 1999." Paper 42 at 4. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants should be held liable because his case was prosecuted criminally rather than pursued as a civil enforcement action. See Id. at 4-5.
Defendant Richmond's monitoring data reports of the high pH levels on Plaintiff's property established probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution on charges of unlawful discharge of pollutants into State waters. An observation report prepared by Ecker, the MDE official, on February 4, 1999, bolstered the probable cause showing. After his inspection of Plaintiff's property, Ecker wrote:
With the washout pit not lined, it is reasonable to suspect that the wastewater infiltrates through the fill, and enters the ground water, and/or flows into surface water. The permittee [Plaintiff] was advised last year to line this pit to assure that the only discharge from this pit could be to a surface discharge pipe. . . . In order to eliminate the discharge of the wastewater into the ground water, you must provide a lining on the pit.Id., Ex. 15 at 1-2. Moreover, as Defendants correctly point out, "Plaintiff was not charged with discharging pollutants in February 1999." Paper 45 at 4. As noted, supra, the final date for which Plaintiff was charged was January 25, 1999. Plaintiff has not disputed this chronology. Finally, Defendants had no legal obligation to institute civil proceedings as opposed to contacting the State's Attorney's Office.
Ecker's report also supports probable cause for the fifth charge against Plaintiff regarding noncompliance with reporting requirements: "The permittee has not been properly documenting the sampling requirements of this permit." Id. at 2.
Defendant Rotolone stated under oath that he and Defendant Richmond "presented all the evidence that we had to the State's Attorney's office" and that office made the decision to prosecute Plaintiff. Paper 37, Ex. 13 at 131, lines 4-7. Furthermore, he also noted under oath that he "never had any contact with the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department concerning the case." Id., Ex. 14 at Answer 18.
Where an investigative official presents all pertinent probable cause evidence to an intermediary, such as the prosecutor Schneider here, "the intermediary's independent decision to seek a warrant, issue a warrant, or return an indictment breaks the causal chain and insulates the officer from a section 1983 claim based on lack of probable cause for an arrest or prosecution." Rhodes v. Smithers, 939 F. Supp. 1256, 1274 (S.D.W.Va. 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996) (Table); see also Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 1994). Indeed, the situation of Defendants here is analogous to that of a police officer who provides information in an affidavit to establish the necessary probable cause for issuance of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. The information supplied by the officer in the affidavit must "be `truthful' in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true." United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 402 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978)). To challenge such information successfully as an unlawful seizure, the detainee, such as Plaintiff here, must show that Defendants "made the false statements either deliberately or with reckless disregard for its truth." Simons, 206 F.3d at 402; see also Villeda v. Prince George's County, MD, 219 F. Supp.2d 696, 701-02 (D.Md. 2002), aff'd, 70 Fed.Appx. 720 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished disposition).
Plaintiff also must show that the information "was essential to the finding of probable cause." Simons, 206 F.3d at 402 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72). Defendants' reports comprised the principal basis for issuance of the arrest warrant and prosecution of Plaintiff. Defendants have not contested this point.
Plaintiff has not produced any evidence showing that Defendants provided the allegedly false information to Schneider deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants deliberately concealed or failed to disclose exculpatory information in presenting the evidence to Schneider. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that Defendants initiated or participated in his criminal prosecution. To the contrary, he merely asserts, without more, that a factual dispute exists as to "[w] hether the Defendants presented honest, objective and truthful information to the prosecutor before the criminal charges were filed." Paper 42 at 5. Thus, "the intervening and independent acts" of the state prosecutor to charge and prosecute Plaintiff shield Defendants from liability. Rhodes, 939 F. Supp. at 1279-80. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact with regard to probable cause, he cannot sustain his § 1983 claims against Defendants. B. State Law Claims 1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Where there is no violation of a federal right and thus no basis for a § 1983 action, "it is technically unnecessary" for the court to discuss the issue of qualified immunity, which was raised by Defendants. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 167 (citing Clark, 855 F.2d at 161).
Under Maryland law, the necessary elements of false arrest and false imprisonment claims are the same: "1) the deprivation of the liberty of another; 2) without consent; and 3) without legal justification." Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000); see also DeVentura, 169 F. Supp.2d at 398. To prevail, Plaintiff must prove these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. See Herrington v. Red Run Corp., 148 Md.App.357, 361, 811 A.2d 894, 897 (2002). Because "[t]he tort of false arrest is predicated upon knowing misconduct," it follows that "[n]egligence or other mistake in providing incorrect information to lawful authorities does not give rise to liability." Reaves v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.Md. 1988) (emphasis in original). Similarly, because a false imprisonment claim may arise "when one knowingly gives false information to a law enforcement officer which leads to another person's arrest," a person is not liable "when in good faith he or she provides information, however mistaken, to law enforcement officers." Alien v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 76 Md.App.642, 649-50, 547 A.2d 1105, 1109 (emphasis in original), cert. denied sub nom., Green and Vernon Green Assoc. v. Alien, 314 Md. 458, 550 A.2d 1168 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff has offered no evidence to show that Defendants knowingly gave any false information to the police or to the prosecutor's office. In addition, there is no evidence to indicate that Defendants "had any contact with the arresting officers," Reaves, 683 F. Supp. at 525, or that Defendants were responsible for Plaintiff's detention. See Peacock v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 199 F. Supp.2d 306, 310 (D.Md. 2002). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the false arrest and false imprisonment claims will be granted.
2. Malicious Prosecution
In Maryland, a claim of malicious prosecution requires proof of these elements: "1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; 2) without probable cause; 3) with malice, or with a motive other than to bring the offender to justice; and 4) termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff." Heron, 761 A.2d at 59; see also Nasim v. Tandy Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 n. 4 (D.Md. 1989) ("[plaintiff] must produce evidence with regard to all four elements of malicious prosecution in order successfully to oppose a motion for summary judgment"), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1566 (4th Cir. 1990) (Table). Plaintiff has satisfied the fourth element, as he was found not guilty of the charges brought against him. However, such a favorable outcome does not necessarily establish evidence of a lack of probable cause sufficient to satisfy the second element. See DeVentura, 169 F. Supp.2d at 399.
Even more fundamentally, in the instant case, Defendants conferred with Schneider, the Assistant State's Attorney, as to their findings and what course of action, if any, to take with regard to Plaintiff. Defendants presented Schneider with the monitoring data reports compiled by Defendant Richmond, the authenticity of which has not been contested by Plaintiff. As discussed, supra, these reports and Ecker's observation report established probable cause sufficient to arrest and prosecute Plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that a disputed factual issue exists as to whether Defendants may refer to action taken by Schneider in charging Plaintiff, as admissible evidence, "without an affidavit from her with proffered testimony." Paper 42 at ¶ 8. However, it is Plaintiff, as the party who bears the burden of proof on the malicious prosecution claim, who must challenge Defendants' summary judgment motion with such evidence in order to avoid an adverse judgment.
Although the record does not reveal the entire extent of the evidence Defendants proffered at the meeting, "[t]he most compelling aspect of this conference is clear: at its conclusion," Schneider, in her official capacity, "authorized the charges" against Plaintiff and "explicitly authorized" issuance of the warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541-42 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 993 (2000); see also Paper 37, Ex. 15 (Warrant and Criminal Information). Indeed, although Defendants provided Schneider with material information, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Defendants "controlled the decisions of the law enforcement officials with respect to the investigation and prosecution." Brice v. Nkaru, 220 F.3d 233, 238-39 (4th Cir. 2000) (person who provided information to law enforcement official not responsible "for the official's execution of his independent duty to investigate"). This lack of evidence "substantially undermines" the ability to hold Defendants civilly liable for the prosecution of Plaintiff. Id. at 239.
Although Brice involved the application of Virginia law for malicious prosecution, the elements of the tort are identical to those in Maryland.
However, even assuming that Defendants had sufficient authority to institute or continue the criminal prosecution, Plaintiff has not advanced any evidence that they acted with malice — i.e., "a wrongful or improper motive" — in initiating the criminal proceedings against him. Alvarez v. Montgomery County, 147 F.3d 354, 360 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff's assertion that "personal animus existed" between him and Defendants (Paper 42 at 6), without more, is insufficient to "create a triable issue" as to whether Defendants acted with malice — which is required "to survive summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim." Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 360. In this inquiry, "the critical question is whether" Defendants provided law enforcement authorities with an "honest or good faith belief of the facts." Brice, 220 F.3d at 238. Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that Defendants lacked such a belief.
It is true "that the `malice' element of malicious prosecution may be proven by inference from a lack of probable cause." Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 717, 664 A.2d 916, 924 (1995). This method of proof is foreclosed in the instant case, however, because probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution.
To that end, as discussed supra, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Defendants withheld or concealed exculpatory evidence from Schneider, the state prosecutor. By contrast, in Brown v. Dart Drug Corp., 77 Md.App. 487, 551 A.2d 132, the court denied summary judgment where, "[m]ost importantly," the defendants provided neither the exculpatory statement nor the identity of an exculpatory witness to the police. Id. at 134-35 (once defendant had failed to provide police with exculpatory evidence regarding plaintiff, issue of defendant's liability for malicious prosecution "became a question for the fact finder"). There, in opposition to the defendant's summary judgment motion, the plaintiff included affidavits from the defective and the prosecuting attorney in which each stated that if he had known of the exculpatory statement, the plaintiff "would not have been prosecuted." Id. at 133. Plaintiff has not submitted any such evidence here. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the malicious prosecution claim will be granted.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. A separate Order will follow.