Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05AS01855
NICHOLSON, J.
Plaintiff appeals in pro per from a judgment dismissing her complaint, claiming the trial court was without jurisdiction to rely upon an oral settlement agreement in which plaintiff had agreed to dismiss all claims against defendants. We disagree with plaintiff’s arguments and affirm the judgment. Plaintiff promised to dismiss this action; she must now keep her promise.
FACTS
The County of Sacramento’s Department of Human Assistance terminated plaintiff’s employment in December 2004 for insubordination and rude treatment of other employees. Plaintiff appealed the County’s decision to the County’s Civil Service Commission. A hearing was scheduled for October 26 and 27, 2005.
While her administrative appeal was pending, plaintiff sued the County in April 2005 for damages and punitive damages, alleging discrimination and harassment against her on the basis of race, sex, and disability. The County filed a demurrer and a motion to strike plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.
In 2004, plaintiff had filed four complaints with the state Department of Fair Employment and Housing against the County under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. (FEHA)).
On the first day of the administrative hearing on plaintiff’s termination, October 26, 2005, counsel for the County announced the parties had reached a settlement and desired to put the agreement on the record. Plaintiff agreed to withdraw her appeal to the Civil Service Commission with prejudice, dismiss her civil action with prejudice, release all claims, including her claims pending with the state Department of Fair Employment and Housing, resign her employment effective December 27, 2004, and waive her right to seek reinstatement. She also agreed not to seek employment again with the Department of Human Assistance.
In exchange, the County agreed to withdraw its order of disciplinary action terminating plaintiff, remove all documentation relating to the termination from her personnel file except the settlement agreement, and disclose when inquired of plaintiff’s employment only her dates of employment, positions held, starting and ending salary, and the fact that she voluntarily resigned.
The County also agreed that the settlement would not affect a pending workers’ compensation claim brought by plaintiff.
The hearing officer asked plaintiff in detail if she understood the rights she was giving up. Plaintiff said she did. The officer gave her opportunities to discuss the agreement further with her attorney, of which she took advantage. After she met with her attorney, the officer reiterated and explained the terms of the agreement to her. Again, plaintiff stated she understood the agreement.
The officer then asked if she would agree for the record that she understood the terms of the settlement. She did. He asked her if it was her desire to enter into the settlement agreement. It was. County counsel also confirmed the County’s willingness to settle, and agreed to prepare a written agreement.
The hearing officer agreed to retain jurisdiction to resolve disputes over the settlement terms or to enforce the settlement to the extent he could. However, the officer emphasized that the case was now settled. “And just so that’s clear, [my retaining jurisdiction] doesn’t leave the settlement open. This case is now settled. . . . [¶] . . . And I’ll make sure the settlement gets entered into that is exactly what we’ve entered into today, but it doesn’t mean that you can change your mind. This is your final time to do that.” The officer again asked plaintiff if she agreed to the settlement. She replied, “Yes.”
No written settlement agreement appears in the record.
On December 13, 2005, the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to plaintiff’s civil complaint with leave to amend, and it granted the County’s motion to strike the punitive damages prayer without leave to amend.
On December 30, 2005, and despite the settlement reached before the hearing officer, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against the County for damages, punitive damages, and injunctive and declarative relief under the FEHA. She also named her former supervisors, Lester Heatley and Lucy Lulyeva, as defendants. (We refer to all defendants collectively as the County.)
The County filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint, and again moved to strike the prayer for punitive damages. In addition, the County moved, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, to enter judgment against plaintiff under the terms of the settlement agreement reached on the record in the administrative hearing in which plaintiff agreed to dismiss all claims against the County. The County requested the trial court take judicial notice of the certified reporter’s transcript of the administrative hearing.
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 reads: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”
Plaintiff opposed the County’s motion to enter judgment, arguing the parties did not reach a settlement agreement.
In March 2006, the trial court granted the County’s motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement and enter judgment against plaintiff. Taking judicial notice of the transcript of the oral settlement agreement, the court granted the motion on the following basis: “Under the case of In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 910, the oral stipulation before a retired judge acting as an appointed arbitrator was considered ‘before the court’ for purposes of CCP 664.6. The settlement of the adverse action before the hearing officer is analogous. The settlement fully complies with the requirement of judicial supervision and both plaintiff and her attorney were repeatedly assented to the terms of the settlement, which included dismissal of this case.”
The court overruled the County’s demurrer and motion to strike as moot.
The court entered its order granting County’s motion, and it entered a judgment of dismissal on plaintiff’s first amended complaint in favor of the County. Subsequently, the court denied plaintiff’s motion to set aside the judgment and her motion to stay enforcement of the judgment pending appeal.
Plaintiff filed one notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal, and a second notice from both the order denying her motion to set aside and the judgment of dismissal. We consolidated the appeals for all purposes.
Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred because (1) the County failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the County Civil Service Commission had primary jurisdiction over the settlement agreement; (2) the court could not enforce the agreement without the hearing officer first making written findings; (3) the court, the County, and the hearing officer engaged in unspecified ex parte communications; and (4) the court improperly admitted the transcript of the settlement agreement as evidence of settlement offers or negotiations.
DISCUSSION
I
Exhaustion and Primary Jurisdiction
Plaintiff asserts the trial court abused its discretion in granting the County’s motion because the County had not exhausted its administrative remedies and because primary jurisdiction over enforcement of the oral settlement agreement rested with the Civil Service Commission. Plaintiff misconstrues the doctrines of exhaustion and primary jurisdiction.
Exhaustion and primary jurisdiction are “two closely related concepts [citation]. ‘Both are essentially doctrines of comity between courts and agencies. They are two sides of the timing coin: Each determines whether an action may be brought in a court or whether an agency proceeding, or further agency proceeding, is necessary.’ [Citation.] [¶] . . . ‘“Exhaustion” applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. “Primary jurisdiction,” on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.’ [Citations.]” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 390, italics in original.)
Neither doctrine applies here. Exhaustion does not apply because plaintiff, not the County, was the party that resorted to the courts. The County was under no obligation to exhaust any administrative remedies before defending against plaintiff’s action.
Primary jurisdiction also does not apply because this matter involved no issues which, under a regulatory scheme, were placed within the special competence of an administrative body. The County’s motion sought the enforcement of a settlement agreement –- a task perfectly and legally suited to a court of law without any assistance from an administrative agency. The Civil Service Commission has no unique expertise in enforcing the agreement, and it certainly has no authority to determine whether a judgment should be entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 as a result of the agreement.
The doctrines of exhaustion and primary jurisdiction did not prevent the trial court from ruling on the County’s motion.
II
Lack of Written Findings
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by relying upon the oral settlement agreement because the hearing officer did not issue written findings or a written decision concerning the settlement agreement. She relies on Government Code section 11425.50, which requires an agency’s adjudicative decision made in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act be in writing. The statute does not apply here because the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to local agencies except as required by statute (Gov. Code, § 11410.30, subd. (b)), and plaintiff directs us to no statute imposing the Administrative Procedure Act on the County’s Civil Service Commission.
Even if the hearing officer was required to issue written findings on plaintiff’s administrative appeal, those findings would have no bearing on the court’s determination of whether plaintiff and County had entered into a settlement agreement. The trial court did not err by ruling without first obtaining written findings from the hearing officer.
III
Ex Parte Communications
Plaintiff alleges ex parte communications occurred between the trial court, the administrative hearing officer, County counsel, and the County’s private law firm, resulting in the Civil Service Commission dismissing her appeal from her termination. She cites to no evidence in the record to support her allegations, nor does she explain the alleged communications.
The Civil Service Commission’s apparent dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal is not before us. Even if it were, the fact that the Commission relied upon the same settlement agreement the trial court relied upon does not in any way indicate unlawful ex parte communications occurred in this matter.
IV
Admission of Administrative Hearing Transcript
Plaintiff contends the transcript of the administrative hearing where the oral settlement agreement was placed on the record was inadmissible in the trial court under Government Code section 11415.60 as evidence of negotiations or offers in settlement. We disagree.
Government Code section 11415.60 prohibits the admission into a civil action of evidence of an offer of compromise or settlement made in settlement negotiations of administrative matters. (Gov. Code, § 11415.60, subd. (a).) The statute is part of the Administrative Procedure Act that, again, does not apply to local agencies.
Even if the statute applied, it would not have barred admission of the transcript. The transcript did not contain an offer of settlement; it contained the terms of the settlement. There was no negotiation left to be done. Plaintiff had previously agreed to the terms, and she agreed to them again on the record several times under close and conscientious attention by the hearing officer. She was expressly offered the opportunity to talk about the settlement with her attorney before accepting it. She took advantage of that offer and still agreed to the settlement on the record. Nothing in Government Code section 11415.60 prevents the transcript of an oral settlement agreement entered on the record from being admitted by the trial court.
V
Miscellaneous Arguments
In the introduction portion of her opening brief, plaintiff asserts misconduct by her former attorney. She claims she fired her attorney because counsel allegedly “abandoned” her by taking sides with the County to coerce plaintiff to accept the settlement. Plaintiff also claims her responses to the hearing officer that she understood and agreed to the terms of the settlement were taken under duress.
Plaintiff cites to no evidence in the record supporting any of these claims. The claims are therefore forfeited.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendants. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a).)
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., BUTZ, J.