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Greene v. Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (America) Inc.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Mar 26, 2008
No. G038132 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2008)

Opinion


DON FOX GREENE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RITCHIE BROS. AUCTIONEERS (AMERICA) INC., Defendant and Respondent. G038132 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Third Division March 26, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David T. McEachen, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Rick L. Raynsford for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Best Best & Krieger, D. Brian Reider, Douglas S. Phillips and Kira L. Klatchko for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

O'LEARY, ACTING P. J.

Don Fox Greene (Greene) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (America) Inc. (Ritchie) in his breach of contract and fraud action. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s (1) decision to exclude parol evidence concerning the contract, (2) refusal to find the certain terms in the contract unconscionable, (3) two evidentiary rulings, and (4) entry of nonsuit. We conclude all of his contentions lack merit, and we affirm the judgment.

I

FACTS

Greene contracted with Ritchie to publicly auction two pieces of used construction equipment: a Caterpillar and a Komatsu excavator. The auction contract twice stated the auction was “without reserve.” On the first page, the first sentence read, “The undersigned (the ‘Owner’) instructs Ritchie . . . (the ‘Auctioneer’) to sell, as its agent, the items set out in Clause G below together with any additional items delivered to the site of the auction by Owner (the ‘Equipment’) at an unreserved public auction to be held at Perris, CA on or about March 15/16, 2005 . . . .” (Italics added.) The second pre-printed reserve clause, located in small type on the second page, stated, “The auction will be without reserve, the Equipment will be sold to the highest bidder and there will be no guarantee whatsoever by Auctioneer as to the gross proceeds to be realized from the sale of the Equipment.”

Section H of the contract specified the auctioneer’s commission rates. It began with the statement “Owner agrees to pay Auctioneer an auction commission based on the gross sale price of the Equipment or any part thereof as follows:” Next came subdivision (a) which contained a pre-printed rate of “14 [percent] for any lot realizing more than $2,500 . . . .” But on Greene’s contract, the 14 percent figure was crossed out and handwritten above the clause was the phrase “9 [percent] to [$]170,000, 15 [Ritchie]/75 Owner split after.”

Relevant to this case, the agreement included an integration clause specifying, “This contract, which may be amended only in writing, constitutes the entire agreement and takes the place of prior contracts or understandings between the parties . . . .”

The auction took place one month later. Ritchie sold the Caterpillar for $30,000 and the Komatsu excavator for $22,000. After retaining a nine percent commission ($4,680), plus the costs incurred to clean and transport the equipment ($1,599.75), Greene received the balance of $45,720.25. Greene believed he had been promised there would be a reserve of $170,000 and sued Ritchie for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and fraud.

Before trial, Ritchie filed a motion in limine to exclude parol evidence that would vary the terms of the contract. The court held a hearing and considered Greene’s testimony. Greene stated he had very little experience with construction equipment or the auction process before his dealings with Ritchie. Greene purchased the equipment in October 2004 for $80,000, and decided to sell it three months later (still owing $50,000). Greene claimed Ritchie’s salesman, Michael Weise, inspected the equipment and guaranteed Greene he would get no less than $170,000 for both pieces, paying 9 percent commission on that $170,000, and 15 percent on anything above that amount. He recalled Weise told him the equipment would likely sell for around $220,000. Greene admitted he agreed to pay for cleaning and touch up paint for approximately $1,700 from the auction proceeds, but also understood there would be a $170,000 reserve.

Greene said he did not have his glasses with him when he signed the contract, and he could not read the small preprinted text. Greene recalled he asked Weise to tell him what it said, and Weise explained a few of the provisions but failed to mention the no reserve provisions or the clause prohibiting an owner from withdrawing his equipment from the auction. Greene claimed he could see Weise’s handwritten notation on page one, section H, stating: “9 [percent] to [$]170,000, 15 [Ritchie]/75 Owner split after.” He understood this signified their deal regarding the reserve amount and commission pricing structure.

Greene conceded that after signing the contract in February 2005, he later read the entire contract with the benefit of his glasses. He saw the preprinted provisions stating the auction would be without reserve, but based on his experience with contracts he knew anything handwritten “supersedes anything that is so small that you can’t read it with a naked eye.” He decided to go forward with the auction, relying on his past experience and assurances from Weise.

After considering the parties’ arguments, the court determined the contract was integrated and the parties intended it to be a final, complete, and exclusive statement of the terms of their agreement. It found Greene’s proposed evidence of an oral agreement to a minimum bid price of $170,000 directly contradicted the two express no reserve provisions. It concluded that to interpret the handwritten commission provision to require 9 percent only if the equipment was sold for exactly $170,000 was not reasonable. The court found the fraud exceptions to the parol evidence rule did not apply and it was not a contract of adhesion. It granted the motion in limine.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Ritchie moved for nonsuit after Greene’s opening statement. The court reserved ruling on the motion, and Greene was the first to testify. He repeated much of what he had said at the earlier hearing. On cross-examination, he admitted he purchased three, not just two, pieces of equipment for $80,000. He revealed the third piece of equipment was a skip loader. He opined the Caterpillar was worth $175,000, and the Komatsu was worth $65,000.

Greene also testified that on the day of the auction, he saw the equipment had been painted and steam cleaned. However, he also noticed the Caterpillar was locked and prospective purchasers could not get inside to look at it. When the Caterpillar sold at auction for only $30,000, Greene repeatedly demanded that Ritchie stop the auction, but it refused. The Komatsu excavator was auctioned next and sold for $22,000.

After Greene testified and rested his case, Ritchie renewed its motion for nonsuit claiming there was no evidence of a breach of contract or fraud. The court granted the motion. Judgment was entered in favor of Ritchie.

II

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

“The parol evidence rule generally prohibits the introduction of extrinsic evidence—oral or written—to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written instrument. [Citations.] According to this substantive rule of law, when the parties intend a written agreement to be the final and complete expression of their understanding, that writing becomes the final contract between the parties, which may not be contradicted by even the most persuasive evidence of collateral agreements. Such evidence is legally irrelevant. [Citations.]” (EPA Real Estate Partnership v. Kang (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 171, 175-176 (EPA Real Estate).)

“Whether the parol evidence rule applies in a given set of circumstances is a question of law, which we consider de novo to the extent that no evidentiary conflict exists. [Citations.] Generally, the resolution of this issue involves a two-part analysis: (1) was the writing intended to be an integration; and (2) is the agreement reasonably susceptible of the meaning urged by the party offering the evidence. (EPA Real Estate, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 176.)

A. Integration?

Greene asserts the agreement “was only partially integrated, and it certainly was not integrated on the issue of minimum bid/sales amount.” He argues there is no evidence to dispute Greene’s testimony he and Weise discussed a minimum bid amount, and this term “quite naturally would have been a part of the auction [c]ontract.” We disagree.

An integration may be partial if the parties intend the writing or writings to fully and completely express only certain terms of their agreement, rather than their agreement in its entirety. (Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E&P, Inc. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1, 14.) Here, the auction contract contains an express and broadly worded integration clause. Specifically, the parties agreed the contract “constitute[d] the entire agreement and takes the place of prior contacts or understandings between the parties.” Because their agreement essentially covered only one topic, the details of an auction sale, there is no reason to suspect the parties intended the integration clause to apply to some, but not all the written terms concerning how the auction would be run.

We conclude the contract fully described the relationship and respective obligations of each party, including Ritchie’s express promise to sell the equipment to the highest bidder but without any guarantee as to the gross proceeds. The notion the parties intended to single out one issue from the integration clause is unreasonable. If the parties had both agreed to a $170,000 reserve, this material change to the preprinted form created and customarily used for unreserved auctions would necessarily require elimination of any conflicting provisions, and the addition of a clause describing the parties’ obligations in a reserve auction. In this case, we find the scope of the integration clause encompassed all the details of an unreserved auction.

B. Is the Agreement Reasonably Susceptible of the Meaning Urged by Greene?

When, as here, a contract is integrated, the next issue to decide is whether evidence of the alleged oral agreement is nevertheless admissible to explain the meaning of the written contractual language. “‘This aspect of the parol evidence rule was stated by the Supreme Court in Pacific Gas & E. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. [1968] 69 Cal.2d 33, 37 . . .: “The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.”‘ [Citation.]” (Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 973, 1008 (Banco Do Brasil).)

In this case, resolution of this issue is quite straightforward because the purported oral agreement is in direct conflict with two provisions of the written instrument. It cannot be said the written provisions discussing an unreserved auction is reasonably susceptible to the proposed collateral contrary agreement of a $170,000 reserve suggested by Greene’s parol evidence. “‘Testimony of intention which is contrary to a contract’s express terms . . . does not give meaning to the contract; rather it seeks to substitute a different meaning. It follows under the P. G. & E. case that such evidence must be excluded.’ [Citations]” (Banco Do Brasil, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.)

Ignoring the two clearly stated no reserve clauses, Greene argues the handwritten sentence is ambiguous and should be clarified with extrinsic evidence showing a $170,000 reserve. The handwritten note contained in section H of the contract states; “9 [percent] to [$]170,000, 15 [Ritchie]/85 Owner split after.” He maintains, “Any interpretation requires the addition of words to clarify the handwritten change. Ritchie would change the phrase to read ‘9 [percent] commission for sale price 1 to $170,000, [Ritchie]15/Owner 85 split after.’ Greene interprets and understands the written changed to read ‘9 [percent] commission applied to minimum price [of] $170,000, [Ritchie] 15/Owner 85 split after.’ Greene’s interpretation is reasonable and does not contradict the terms as hand written.” We find the handwritten note is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation offered by Greene.

“California recognizes the objective theory of contracts [citation], under which ‘[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation’ [citation]. The parties’ undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation. [Citations.]” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.)

“The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” (Civ. Code, § 1638.) Turning to the handwritten provision of the contract in this case, we find it does not require additional words for clarification. First, the provision must be viewed in the context of the entire agreement. Immediately before the handwritten notation, paragraph H begins with the statement, “Owner agrees to pay Auctioneer an auction commission based on the gross sale price of the Equipment or any part thereof as follows: . . .” This paragraph clearly concerns the owner’s promise to pay the auctioneer a commission according to its preset fee scale.

The remainder of paragraph H contains Ritchie’s standard commission structure, which customarily is based on what price the auctioneer ultimately obtains during the auction for the equipment. According to subdivisions (a) and (b) of paragraph H, Ritchie would receive “14 [percent] for any lot realizing more than $2,500 and . . . 20 [percent] for any lot realizing $2,500 or less[,] but with a minimum $50 fee per lot.” This is a clear and explicit statement that anything sold at or below $2,500 entitles Ritchie to a 20 percent commission, and anything above pays a 14 percent commission. There is no ambiguity in this commission structure. If it had not been changed, there is no dispute this is the commission percentage Ritchie would have received after the unreserved auction occurred.

In Greene’s contract, the number 14 is crossed out and written above it is the parties’ agreement Ritchie will receive a reduced rate of “9 [percent] to $170,000” and 15 percent “after.” Given its placement in the section concerning the commission structure, the handwritten notation serves to merely change the percentages and adjust the triggering dollar amount to $170,000. This change benefited Greene because it allowed a lower commission percentage on a larger sale price, and provided an incentive for Ritchie to sell the equipment for more money to receive a larger percentage.

We conclude it is not reasonable to interpret the provision designating 9 percent “to $170,000” as meaning the equipment could not be sold for less than that figure. To do so would require us to ignore the word “to” and insert the word “exactly”—which is something we cannot do. More importantly, we would have to also ignore the two unchanged written provisions specifying the agreement concerned an unreserved auction, with “no guarantee whatsoever by Auctioneer as to the gross proceeds to be realized from the sale of the Equipment.” If those other two unequivocal statements did not exist, or had been crossed out, then perhaps Greene’s extrinsic evidence would reasonably explain an alternative hidden meaning to the handwritten commission change. But that is not the case here. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion the language of the handwritten term is clear, and it is not reasonably susceptible of a meaning that directly contradicts other unambiguous provisions.

C. Unconscionability

Greene argues the trial court should have found the reserve clause in the contract to be unconscionable. He raised this same argument in his opposition to the motion in limine to exclude parol evidence. In its reply, Ritchie briefly responded to the argument noting unconscionability has no bearing on the parol evidence issue. The general remedy for unconscionability is to strike the offending clause, not to admit parol evidence and replace it.

However, because Greene did not also raise or argue unconscionability at the hearing, we find the issue has been forfeited. It is unfair to accuse the trial court of failing to rule on something not put at issue at the hearing. As the court explained in Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869, 879 (Richmond), “an appellate court may allow an appellant to assert a new theory of the case on appeal where the facts were clearly put at issue at trial and are undisputed on appeal. [Citation.] However, ‘if the new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” Greene’s contention he had no opportunity to negotiate the contract and it was substantively unfair depend on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding his meeting with Weise before signing the auction contract. As in Richmond, “we cannot say defendant was reasonably put on notice to present all its evidence surrounding” these issues. (Richmond, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 879.)

In any event, based on the evidence Greene did present, we find his claim lacks merit. “California courts analyze unconscionability as having a procedural and a substantive element. [Citations.] Although both elements must be present before a contract or contract provision is rendered unenforceable on grounds of unconscionability, they are reviewed in tandem such that ‘the greater the degree of substantive unconscionability, the less the degree of procedural unconscionability that is required to annul the contract or clause.’ [Citation.]” (Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1329, fn. omitted (Kinney).) Based on the evidence presented, neither element is present in this case.

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. [Citation.] It focuses on factors of oppression and surprise. [Citation.] The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. [Citations.]” (Kinney, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) It generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, and, “[w]here an adhesive contract is oppressive, surprise need not be shown.” (Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 656.)

As noted by Greene, adhesion contracts are often found in the context of employment agreements because “‘few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration agreement.’” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071.) Similarly, a sick patient seeking hospital admittance is not expected to shop around to find better terms on the admittance form. (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92.) Greene asserts he “did not know any other auction houses which may have been available to him . . . . He turned to Ritchie because of their reputation and their experience.” He maintains that in the absence of meaningful market alternatives, the contract was adhesive. These allegations lack any support from the reporter’s transcript, deposition testimony, or affidavits. To the contrary, there is ample evidence Greene had other options to sell his equipment and certainly had bargaining power in this transaction.

For example, Greene proclaims in a different section of his opening brief that the “sale of the Equipment was totally voluntary on his part. There was no necessity or urgency to sell the Equipment.” He testified at the hearing that he was aware of other auction houses. He stated that before calling Ritchie he conducted research on the internet and spoke to several people about the value of his equipment. He admitted “I looked up several auction houses, and I looked at the comparable equipment.” When questioned further about his internet searches, Greene admitted he looked at many sites having equipment for auction or sale at “used equipment sales houses.” He located Ritchie on the internet. We find this evidence suggests Greene was well aware of other meaningful market alternatives. He was in the position to reject the contract and find another auction company. Having no immediate need to get rid of the equipment, he was in a much better bargaining position than either an employee wanting a job, or a sick person in desperate need of a hospital. The evidence shows Greene exercised his bargaining power because he managed to reduce Ritchie’s commission share from 14 to 9 percent.

Similarly, there is no evidence to support his claim the reserve clauses were substantively unconscionable. “‘Substantive unconscionability’ focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those terms are ‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience.”‘ [Citations.]” (Kinney, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.) As argued by Ritchie, there is nothing inherently unfair or shocking about an unreserved auction. This kind of auction is acknowledged and regulated by the Commercial Code. The provisions regarding an unreserved auction could not have come as a surprise to Greene, because they were part of the preprinted agreement. Greene testified he later read the contract with his glasses and saw the two “no reserve” provisions. Neither his incorrect assumption those provisions were invalid, nor his apparent surprise at the auction to learn of his mistake, renders the contract unconscionable. Not surprisingly, Greene cannot point to any case authority holding the failure to read or understand a contract provision renders it per se unfair or unconscionable.

D. The Fraud Exception

Greene maintains the parol evidence rule does not apply to his claim of fraud in the inducement to sign the contract. Ritchie argues the fraud exception does not apply because only noncontradictory parol statements would be admissible to prove Greene was fraudulently induced to execute the agreement. It asserts Greene is seeking to testify about false representation to vary the terms of the contract by removing the express terms stating the auction was without reserve and replacing them with a promise of a $170,000 reserve. The oral evidence directly conflicts with a material term of the agreement. We agree with Ritchie.

Back in 1935, the Supreme Court adopted the rule that parol evidence of fraud should be barred in cases involving an irreconcilable conflict between the express terms of a written agreement and an alleged extrinsic promise. (Bank of America etc. Assn v. Pendergrass (1935) 4 Cal.2d 258 (Pendergrass).) In the Pendergrass case, plaintiff alleged that a lender had made oral assurances that a promissory note would not be payable on demand despite express language in the instrument to the contrary. (Id. at p. 263, see also Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 388, 419 [contract stating that airplane landing gear “‘is not likely’” to rupture fuel tank held to directly contradict the sales brochure’s claim that fuel tank “‘will not rupture’”].)

The Supreme Court in Pendergrass reasoned the use of promissory fraud to invalidate an integrated agreement would nullify the parol evidence rule, stating, “‘Such a principle would nullify the rule: for conceding that such an agreement [that is, an oral promise not to enforce a term in the contract] is proved, or any other contradicting the written instrument, the party seeking to enforce the written agreement according to its terms, would always be guilty of fraud. . . . For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rule of the common law excludes such oral testimony of the alleged agreement . . . .’” (Pendergrass, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 263.) Stated another way, “the perceived necessity for this promissory fraud limitation lies in the recognition that without it, the fraud exception could swallow the rule. Any party who claimed a promise contrary to that contained in the contract could claim that the contrary contract constituted proof of promissory fraud--that is, that the earlier or contemporaneous promise was false and made without any intention of performing it, as evidenced by its absence in the subsequent agreement.” (Pacific State Bank v. Greene (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 375, 390.)

We recognize the Pendergrass rule has been the subject of some scholarly criticism, but it is still the law and we are bound by it. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) And, we concur with its view parties should not be allowed to litigate commercial disputes over the meaning of contract terms using tort remedies. (See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 485; Banco Do Brasil, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.)

In his brief, Greene acknowledges the Pendergrass rule, but argues his case is factually distinguishable because the alleged extrinsic promise does not directly contradict the “handwritten provision” to the contract. He contends the oral evidence “relates to the meaning and interpretation of Ritchie’s promise, as evidenced by the handwritten provisions,” which Weise told Greene would reflect their agreement. He asserts any ambiguity or inconsistency between the handwritten and printed terms must be construed against Ritchie, as the drafter of the contract.

This argument might be persuasive if the agreement consisted only of the handwritten statement. It is not. When one examines the entire contract, it becomes immediately obvious Greene is claiming a promise was made to him that is directly contrary to that contained in the contract. To accept Greene’s theory that portions of the agreement can be carved out under the fraud exception, regardless of the existence of other contradictory language, would nullify the parol evidence rule.

The Nonsuit Ruling

At trial, Greene testified that Ritchie refused to stop the ongoing auction, and this action breached the contract and cost Greene $144,000 in damages. Greene relied on the section of the contract providing: “Owner shall not withdraw the Equipment, or any part thereof, from the auction sale. If Owner is in breach of this provision, in addition to any other damages which may be assessed, Owner shall pay to Auctioneer all amounts to which Auctioneer would otherwise be entitled pursuant to paragraph 2 hereof based upon the fair market value of the withdrawn Equipment (as determined by the Auctioneer).” It was Greene’s theory the “contract specifically provides for the measure of damages if Greene were to withdraw his equipment. A party is entitled to mitigate its damages, which was all Greene was attempting to do.”

We note Greene failed to provide any case authority or legal analysis to support his argument. Perhaps this is because what Greene is essentially arguing is Ritchie breached the contract simply by not allowing Greene to breach the contract. Not surprisingly there is no authority to support this theory. We find Ritchie satisfied all its obligations under the contract. It auctioned the equipment on the promised date. It incurred some expense to clean and repaint parts of the equipment. It satisfied its obligation under paragraph 1(l) to sell the equipment to the highest bidder. If Ritchie had withheld the equipment from the auction, it would have been in breach of the contract. Given the lack of legal authority or evidence to support the claim Ritchie breached the contract by refusing to allow Greene to breach the contract, we conclude nonsuit was properly granted.

Evidentiary Rulings

Greene argues he should have been permitted to testify about what representations Weise made before and after the contract was signed. He argues these statements constituted admissible operative facts (or a party admission) not barred by the hearsay rule. His brief refers to three pages of the reporter’s transcript as containing the trial court’s purported erroneous evidentiary rulings (reporter’s transcript at pages 143, 144, 158).

As correctly argued by Ritchie, any challenges to these evidentiary rulings were forfeited by Greene’s failure to make any responsive argument or offer of proof below. The record shows that when Greene tried to testify about the statements, Ritchie made hearsay objections and Greene’s counsel did not make any response before the court made its ruling.

“By appealing, [Greene] assumed ‘the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.’ [Citation.] One aspect of that burden requires that the appellant develop the fullest possible evidentiary record before seeking review. Thus, an appellant must make an offer of proof in the trial court in order to claim on appeal that evidence was wrongly excluded. [Citation.] Similarly, if an appellant wishes to argue a point on appeal, it must first make a record by raising the point in the trial court. [Citations.]” (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1433.) “‘“[I]t is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590.)

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: MOORE, J., ARONSON, J.


Summaries of

Greene v. Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (America) Inc.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Mar 26, 2008
No. G038132 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2008)
Case details for

Greene v. Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (America) Inc.

Case Details

Full title:DON FOX GREENE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RITCHIE BROS. AUCTIONEERS…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

Date published: Mar 26, 2008

Citations

No. G038132 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2008)