Opinion
Case No. CV 13-04500 SS
06-06-2014
CHARLES GREENE, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Charles Greene ("Plaintiff") seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner" or the "Agency") denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed applications for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") on February 12, 2010. (Administrative Record ("AR") 21, 118). In both applications, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of December 21, 2009. (Id.). The Agency denied Plaintiff's applications on August 26, 2010. (AR 81). On September 14, 2010, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 86). Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing held before ALJ Edward P. Schneeberger on September 8, 2011. (AR 21, 32). Randi Hetrick, a vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. (Id.). On September 21, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff DIB and SSI. (AR 28).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision on April 23, 2013. (AR 1-4). Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 1, 2013.
III.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on May 28, 1972 and was thirty-seven years old at the time of his alleged disability onset date. (AR 27). Although Plaintiff attended high school until twelfth grade, he did not graduate. (AR 38). Plaintiff last worked full-time as a dock manager responsible for managing twenty-five to thirty employees for a delivery service company. (AR 40-41). Before being promoted to dock manager, Plaintiff worked as a truck driver for the same company. (AR 40). Earlier in his career, Plaintiff worked as a machine operator, utility specialist and car salesman. (AR 45-46). On October 1, 2008, Plaintiff was laid off as a dock manager. (AR 38, 40, 161). After losing his job, Plaintiff worked part-time as a welder's helper for approximately two to three months and a construction helper for approximately three to four months. (AR 42-43).
Plaintiff suffered a gunshot wound on December 21, 2009, (AR 35-36), and, as a result, experienced a right leg fracture and injuries to his foot. (AR 25, 199). On January 5, 2010, Plaintiff underwent surgery to place an intramedullary rod in his right tibia. (AR 25, 199, 239). A. Relevant Medical History
1. Medical Records
The record contains medical records from three health care facilities: Martin Luther King, Jr. Medical Center, Harbor-UCLA Medical Center and Hubert Humphrey Comprehensive Health Center. (AR 25-26).
After sustaining a gunshot wound to his right leg, Plaintiff traveled to Martin Luther King, Jr. Multi-Service Ambulatory Care Center on December 22, 2009. (AR 281, 286). Plaintiff was diagnosed with a right tibia fracture and was transferred to Harbor-UCLA Medical Center. (AR 286).
On December 23, 2009, Plaintiff's doctors at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center attempted a realignment of the tibial fragments in Plaintiff's leg, and Plaintiff was subsequently placed in a "long leg cast." (AR 193). Plaintiff's December 24, 2009 Discharge Summary from Harbor-UCLA Medical Center indicated that "[t]here were two bullet wounds, one located anteriorly about mid shaft of the right tibia and a second bullet wound located posteriorly midshaft of the tibia." (Id.). Plaintiff was described as temporarily disabled, and his doctors did not anticipate that his disability would persist beyond March 2010. (AR 194). Plaintiff was instructed to "[k]eep the cast dry[,]" "[u]se crutches for walking[,]" "[e]levate the leg to decrease swelling and pain[,]" and return to the emergency room if necessary. (Id.).
Although the Discharge Summary includes the names of three different physicians, (AR 193-194), it is not clear which physician(s) had primary responsibility for examining and treating Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that any particular physician treated him on a consistent and/or continual basis.
On January 5, 2010, Plaintiff underwent surgery to repair his fractured right tibia at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center, which involved placing "an intramedullary nail . . . in his right tibial shaft." (AR 237, 239). Upon his discharge from the hospital, Plaintiff "was instructed to be nonweightbearing in the right lower extremity, with elevation of the leg[]" and "to keep the dressings clean, dry and intact." (AR 238). According to Plaintiff's post-surgery Discharge Summary, Plaintiff's disability was not expected to last beyond April 2010. (Id.).
On September 13, 2010, Plaintiff sought treatment at Hubert Humphrey Comprehensive Health Center for pain and swelling in his lower right leg. (AR 246-47). An August 29, 2011 radiology report indicated that Plaintiff showed no signs of "acute fracture or dislocation." (AR 402). The report noted that "[m]inimal degenerative change [was] present within the knee joint with minimal medial compartment joint space narrowing." (Id.).
2. State Agency And Consultative Doctors
On August 5, 2010, Plaintiff saw Dr. Saeid, a consultative physician, for a Complete Internal Medicine Evaluation. (AR 200-07). As an initial matter, Dr. Saeid noted that Plaintiff experienced no difficulty sitting in a chair or rising from a seated position. (AR 201). The examination "reveal[ed] tenderness in [Plaintiff's] anterior, medial and lateral aspect[s] of [the] right knee[]" and "tenderness in [the] dorsal aspect of the right ankle." (AR 203). Dr. Saeid found that Plaintiff "[had] left foot stance performance and [a] mildly antalgic gait[,]" but was "capable of lifting and carrying [twenty] pounds occasionally and [ten] pounds frequently." (AR 204). Plaintiff could stand, walk and sit for six hours in an eight-hour day. (Id.). However, "[f]or long distance ambulation," Plaintiff may have required use of a cane. (Id.).
On August 16, 2010, Dr. Ahmed, a state agency physician, reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). (AR 215). Dr. Ahmed found that although Plaintiff showed signs of tenderness in the anterior, medial and lateral aspects of the right knee, his left knee range of motion was grossly normal. (AR 213). Plaintiff's knees were without effusion and showed no signs of anteroposterior or mediolateral instability. (Id.). Plaintiff's records indicated tenderness in the dorsal aspect of his right ankle and along the anterior aspect of his right leg. (AR 214). However, x-rays taken seven months after Plaintiff's surgery showed a healed fracture. (AR 215). Based on his review of these records, Dr. Ahmed concluded that Plaintiff was "doing relatively well and [was] expected to continue improvement." (Id.). Accordingly, he assigned Plaintiff a "light RFC." (Id.). Dr. Ahmed found that Plaintiff could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and stand, walk, or sit for six hours in an eight-hour day. (AR 214). Like Dr. Saeid, Dr. Ahmed concluded that Plaintiff may have required use of a cane for "long distance ambulation." (Id.). B. Vocational Expert Testimony
Vocational Expert ("VE") Randi Hetrick testified at Plaintiff's hearing before the ALJ. (AR 21). The VE testified that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff's work experience and exertional limitations could perform Plaintiff's past work as a car salesman. (AR 55, 68). (AR 55). The VE also testified that Plaintiff could work as a cashier, office helper, order clerk or final assembler. (AR 72). However, if an individual having Plaintiff's limitations needed to elevate his legs "four times a day for one half hour per event[,]" that person would not be able to perform any job existing in the national economy. (AR 69-70). C. Plaintiff's Testimony
Plaintiff testified that he was shot in the shin, between the knee and the ankle, and that bullet fragments remain lodged in his leg. (AR 58, 65). After May 2010, Plaintiff started to use a boot brace and cane for support. (AR 58-59). Plaintiff explained that he could move ten to twenty feet without using the cane. (AR 67). However, sitting in one place for a long time caused throbbing in his right leg. (AR 64). Plaintiff explained that he spent most of his time in bed "with [his] leg propped up." (AR 59). He could be on his feet for, at most, two hours in an eight-hour day. (Id.). Plaintiff stated that he elevated his leg for approximately two hours per day. (AR 59-60).
Plaintiff saw a doctor approximately every three months, and he visited the emergency room three times in the six months leading up to the hearing before the ALJ due to pain and swelling in his right leg. (AR 56). Although Plaintiff's pain medication was initially ineffective, Plaintiff had since received stronger medication that resolved his pain more effectively. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he used pain medication three times per day. (AR 63).
Plaintiff testified that he had "been thinking about either taking a vocational class or something . . . , within the next three or four months . . . . " (AR 57). When asked "could you do a job if you had the opportunity that would make you a lot of money where you could sit down and not have to walk around so much?", Plaintiff answered "Yes, I could, Your Honor." (AR 56). Plaintiff suggested that he could perform sedentary work fulltime if given the opportunity to do so, (AR 56, 60, 64), but also testified that he may not be able to do such work on a full-time basis. (AR 64). Plaintiff stated that he felt "a little bit more comfortable" at the hearing "than [he] was [ten] . . . or [twelve] months ago." (AR 67). Plaintiff confirmed that as of the date of his hearing, no doctor had recommended additional surgery to treat his gunshot wound or any injuries resulting therefrom. (AR 66).
IV.
THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work she previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are:
(1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1) & 416.920(b)-(g)(1).
(2) Is the claimant's impairment severe? If not, the claimant is found not disabled. If so, proceed to step three.
(3) Does the claimant's impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is found disabled. If not, proceed to step four.
(4) Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.
(5) Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, the claimant is found disabled. If so, the claimant is found not disabled.
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. Additionally, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record at every step of the inquiry. (Id. at 954). If, at step four, the claimant meets his burden of establishing an inability to perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in "significant numbers" in the national economy, taking into account the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). The Commissioner may do so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as "the Grids"). Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). When a claimant has both exertional (strength-related) and non-exertional limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the testimony of a vocational expert. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988)).
V.
THE ALJ'S DECISION
The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 28). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date of September 21, 2009. (AR 23). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of "status post gunshot wound to right leg, resulting surgery and placement of an intramedullary rod, resulting in reduced range of movement of right knee, ankle, and leg; and obesity[.]" (Id.). In assessing Plaintiff's impairment, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff's medical records. (AR 24).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.).
Next, at step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). (AR 24). However, Plaintiff would be restricted to occasional pushing/pulling with his right lower extremity and further restricted to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, stooping, balancing, kneeling, crouching and crawling. (Id.). Moreover, Plaintiff would not be able to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Plaintiff would also need to use a cane to walk more than twenty feet from his work station. (Id.).
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on a number of factors. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms [were] not credible to the extent they [were] inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment." (AR 25). Although Plaintiff admitted at the hearing that he could perform sedentary work, there was no evidence that he sought out employment in this category of work. (AR 26). Furthermore, the medical records before the ALJ indicated that Plaintiff did not experience any complications from his January 2010 surgery. (AR 26, 37, 215). The record does not contain any treating physician opinions corroborating Plaintiff's alleged symptoms. However, the state agency physician and consultative physician who reviewed his medical records and examined Plaintiff concluded that Plaintiff was capable of light level exertional work. (Id. at 215 (citing the reports of Drs. Saeid and Ahmed)).
Based on these findings and the VE's testimony, the ALJ found, at step five, that Plaintiff could perform his past work as a car salesman. (AR 27). The ALJ also concluded that given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and residual function capacity, there existed other jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as cashier, office helper, order clerk and assembler. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 28).
VI.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The court may set aside the Commissioner's decision when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)).
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). It is "relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Id.) (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the court must "'consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21 (citing Flaten v. Sec'y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).
VII.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to provide legally sufficient reasons for finding his subjective testimony regarding his pain and symptoms less than fully credible. (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Complaint ("MSPC") at 3).
The Court disagrees. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision must be AFFIRMED. A. The ALJ Provided Clear And Convincing Reasons For Finding Plaintiff's Subjective Testimony Less Than Fully Credible
An ALJ may reject a plaintiff's testimony if he makes an explicit credibility finding that is "supported by a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief." Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the plaintiff is malingering, an ALJ's reasons for rejecting the plaintiff's testimony must be "clear and convincing." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, an ALJ may not discredit a plaintiff's pain testimony and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged by the plaintiff is not supported by objective medical evidence. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991). If an ALJ finds that a plaintiff's pain testimony is not credible, he "must specifically make findings that support this conclusion." Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). If an ALJ makes only vague findings that the plaintiff's statements are not consistent with the medical evidence, he has not satisfied his obligation to supply specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting the plaintiff's testimony. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2009). An ALJ may consider many factors in assessing whether the alleged severity of the plaintiff's symptoms is credible, including "(1)ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Where an ALJ's credibility finding is "supported by substantial evidence in the record," the court may not second-guess the ALJ's conclusions and substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, the ALJ provided sufficiently specific and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff's subjective pain and symptoms testimony less than fully credible. First, Plaintiff admitted during the hearing before the ALJ that he could perform sedentary work if given the opportunity to do so. (AR 26). The ALJ asked Plaintiff if he could work, on a sustained basis, in a job that allowed him to remain seated most of the time. (AR 56). Plaintiff responded that he could perform such a job. (Id.). When Plaintiff's counsel asked Plaintiff if he could "maintain [a] job eight hours a day, [forty] hours a week[]" that involved sitting in a chair and answering phone calls, Plaintiff replied that he could perform such work. (AR 60). Plaintiff's counsel then asked Plaintiff the following question:
"[I]f someone gave you a job today starting tomorrow sitting in a chair answering a phone. They were going to pay you $25 an hour, two hours a break, two hours take a lunch, two hour take a break, two hours go home(AR 63-64). For a third time, Plaintiff stated that he would take that opportunity. (AR 64).
and during those two hour intervals, you would be able to just sort of move about, change position. You could stand and sit at your discretion but effectively your only responsibility would be answering the phone. You've got a hands free headset, you know, maybe ask store hours, store locations or any other promotions that they may give you to provide. Do you think you could, would you be able to do that? Would you, again, would you take up the opportunity?"
However, when later pressed by his attorney, Plaintiff testified that he could perform such work for only four hours per day. Thus, Plaintiff directly contradicted his earlier testimony regarding his ability and willingness to engage in sedentary work that allowed him to remain seated throughout an eight-hour workday. As discussed above, it is well within the province of an ALJ to discount a plaintiff's credibility due to inconsistent testimony, see Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999), and here, the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff's contradictory statements regarding his exertional limitations rendered his subjective pain testimony less than fully credible.
Second, the ALJ noted that medication resolved Plaintiff's pain and there was no evidence of adverse side effects. (AR 26). Plaintiff indicated at the hearing before the ALJ that medication helped to mitigate his pain. (AR 56). Furthermore, Plaintiff completed a Pain Questionnaire on May 21, 2010, in which he confirmed the ameliorative effects of medication and the absence of adverse side effects. (AR 155-56). An ALJ may consider the effectiveness of pain medication and the lack of adverse side effects in determining the credibility of a plaintiff's subjective pain testimony. See Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, that Plaintiff was able to manage his pain with medication cuts directly against Plaintiff's claims that he was unable to search for employment due to crippling leg pain.
Third, the ALJ found that the medical evidence in the record did not support Plaintiff's subjective pain testimony. To begin, Plaintiff did not experience any post-surgery complications. (AR 26, 37, 215). Indeed, Plaintiff testified that he "[c]ame through okay" after surgery on his right leg. (AR 37). Plaintiff's January 21, 2010 Discharge Summary confirmed that Plaintiff's "condition on discharge was good[,]" and although Plaintiff was deemed disabled after his surgery, Plaintiff's doctor(s) indicated that Plaintiff's disability was not expected to persist beyond April 2010. (AR 238).
The ALJ also found that the reports by Dr. Ahmed and Dr. Saeid undermined Plaintiff's credibility. Dr. Saeid conducted an in-person evaluation of Plaintiff on August 5, 2010. (AR 200-07). Based on his physical examination of Plaintiff and a review of Plaintiff's medical records, Dr. Saeid concluded that Plaintiff was able to lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and could stand, walk, or sit for six hours in an eight hour day. (AR 204). On August 16, 2010, Dr. Ahmed reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and found that Plaintiff was "doing relatively well[,]" and that "[t]he x-rays show healed [fracture] in both bones." (AR 215). Based on his review of Plaintiff's records, Dr. Ahmed assigned Plaintiff a light RFC, finding that Plaintiff could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and stand, walk, or sit for six hours in an eight-hour day. (AR 214). Thus, he concluded that Plaintiff was capable of greater physical activity than that alleged by Plaintiff, and the record lacked any treating or examining physician opinions contradicting these findings.
Finally, the ALJ found no medical support for Plaintiff's claim that he needed to elevate his leg to the extent alleged. (AR 26). Plaintiff testified that he elevated his leg approximately two hours per day. (AR 60). Although Plaintiff's December 2009 and January 2010 Discharge Summaries instructed Plaintiff to elevate his leg, (AR 193-194, 237-238), Plaintiff's doctors did not anticipate that he would remain disabled beyond April 2010. Thus, there was no medical evidence that Plaintiff was required to regularly elevate his leg after April 2010.
While an ALJ may not rely solely on objective medical evidence to discredit a Plaintiff's subjective pain testimony, Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346-347, the lack of supporting medical evidence, taken together with other factors, may justify finding that a claimant's subjective testimony is less than fully credible. See, e.g., Barnhart, 278 at 958-60 (ALJ properly considered the lack of objective medical evidence, as well as other factors, in evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff's subjective testimony regarding the severity of her impairments and pain); Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). Here, the ALJ set forth a number of specific factors that in aggregate were sufficient to discredit Plaintiff's subjective pain testimony. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ presented clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for finding Plaintiff's subjective testimony less than fully credible. Thus, remand is not required and the ALJ's decision must be affirmed.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.
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SUZANNE H. SEGAL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE