Opinion
03-23-00312-CR
05-31-2024
Johntayveon Dequion Teron Gray, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
Do Not Publish
FROM THE 277TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 22-1599-K277, THE HONORABLE STACEY MATHEWS, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS J. BAKER, JUSTICE
Johntayveon Dequion Teron Gray was charged with aggravated robbery, and the indictment included an enhancement paragraph alleging that he had a prior felony conviction, subjecting him to a 15-year minimum punishment if convicted. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.42, 29.02, .03, 46.04. During the guilt-innocence phase, the jury found Gray guilty of the charged offense. At the end of the punishment phase, the jury found the enhancement allegation true and returned a 40-year sentence. See id. § 12.42. In two issues on appeal, Gray contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a prior judgment of conviction and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the person convicted of the offense listed in the enhancement allegation. We will affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
In December 2021, Anwar Zawady went to a bank in Round Rock, Texas, to open an account. After being informed that he could not open one, Zawady left the bank with his sling bag containing his money, phone, passport, and driver's license. Zawady then drove to the parking lot of a restaurant nearby, parked his car, and texted his friend. Shortly thereafter, a car drove into the parking lot and parked behind Zawady's vehicle, and two of the passengers got out of the car and approached Zawady's vehicle. The first passenger was wearing a mask, pointed a gun at Zawady, and told Zawady to hand over his bag. Around that time, the second passenger approached Zawady's door, opened the door, and grabbed the bag. The first passenger then grabbed Zawady's phone out of Zawady's hand. The two passengers then returned to their vehicle, and the driver drove them away. During the incident, both passengers touched portions of the driver's side door and window of Zawady's vehicle. Zawady ran inside the nearby restaurant, and the manager called the police.
During the ensuing investigation, the police determined that surveillance footage from the bank showed the second car leaving the bank shortly after Zawady did and that surveillance footage from another restaurant recorded some of the incident. Additionally, Gray's prints were found on the driver's side door and window of Zawady's vehicle. Once the police identified Gray as a suspect, they obtained a search warrant for his cellphone data. The data showed that Gray's phone was in the vicinity of the robbery at the time of that offense. The police arrested Gray, and he was charged with aggravated robbery. The enhancement paragraph in the indictment alleged that Gray had been convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in Bexar County, Texas, on March 22, 2021.
In the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the State called as witnesses Zawady and police officers who were involved in the investigation. One officer testified that his investigation revealed that Gray lived in Houston, Texas, and two officers testified that Gray's phone data showed that his phone was near the location of the robbery at the time of the robbery. The surveillance footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. Gray called as witnesses his wife and a cellphone forensic consultant. During cross-examination, the forensic consultant testified that Gray's cell phone was in Houston on the day before the robbery, was in Round Rock on the day of the robbery, and returned to Houston after the robbery. After considering the evidence presented, the jury found Gray guilty of the charged offense.
At the start of the punishment phase, Gray entered a plea of not true to the enhancement allegation in the indictment. In this phase, the State recalled one of the crime scene technicians who had previously testified that Gray's fingerprints were found on Zawady's car. During her testimony at punishment, the technician explained that she took prints from Gray in this case and compared those with the prints found on certified prior judgments from 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2021. Specifically, she explained that she determined that Gray's prints matched those present on documents pertaining to convictions for the following offenses from Harris County, Texas, for someone with the same first and last name as Gray: unlawful use of a criminal instrument, unauthorized use of a vehicle, attempted evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, unauthorized use of a vehicle, assault family violence, and aggravated assault family violence. Those six prior judgments and orders were admitted into evidence, and they each contain a certification from the Harris County District Clerk attesting that they are "true and correct" copies.
After the technician finished testifying, the State sought to admit a copy of a prior judgment of conviction for the offense listed in the enhancement paragraph in the indictment in this case. Similar to the other prior judgments, the copy included a certification from the Bexar County District Clerk's Office attesting that the copy "is a true and correct copy." Gray objected to the admission of the judgment because it did "not have a fingerprint" from the defendant and argued that without a print "the jury [could] not determine that [it was] a proper judgment against [him] beyond a reasonable doubt." In response, the State argued that other identifiers in the judgment established that the prior conviction was Gray's. The trial court overruled Gray's objection and admitted the exhibit into evidence as Exhibit 37.
Then, the State rested its case, and Gray called as witnesses his brother and his mother. Gray's brother testified regarding how Gray's absence would be detrimental to Gray's children and other family members. Gray's mother related that Gray did not have good role models growing up and that he is a good son. During her cross-examination, Gray's mother was questioned about a conviction from "Bexar County" that occurred "on March 22nd, 2021" for the offense of "felon in possession of a firearm," and she admitted that she remembered Gray going to prison for two years in March 2021 but did not know what crime served as the basis for that conviction.
Following closing arguments, the jury found the enhancement allegation to be true and assessed Gray's punishment at 40 years' imprisonment. The trial court rendered its judgment of conviction consistent with the jury's verdicts.
Gray appeals the trial court's judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
In his first issue on appeal, Gray contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection and admitting Exhibit 37 into evidence. In his second issue, he argues that the evidence was "insufficient to prove up the enhancement allegation in the indictment in that the State failed to show that [he] was the same person convicted in the enhancement paragraph." We will address Gray's sufficiency claim first before addressing his remaining issue. See Medina v. State, 565 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist] 2018, pet. ref d) (addressing sufficiency challenge first because it could result "in greater relief than his other issue").
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the enhancement finding, Gray asserts that no testimony was introduced linking Exhibit 37 to him and emphasizes that the exhibit had no fingerprints or photographs of the defendant in the prior case, contained no description of that defendant, and did not list that defendant's birthday. Although Gray acknowledges that his state identification number (SID) appeared on Exhibit 37 and that a SID can be used to link a defendant to a prior conviction, he highlights that the jury was not presented with evidence establishing what a SID was, explaining that SIDs are unique numbers, or stating that a SID could be used to link him to the prior conviction. For these reasons, Gray contends that the evidence was insufficient to link him to the conviction documented in Exhibit 37.
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). In making this determination, "[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider all of the admitted evidence, regardless of whether it was properly admitted." Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577. "The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses." Id. "Juries can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence so long as each inference is supported by the evidence produced at trial," id., and are "free to apply common sense, knowledge, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life in drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence," Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd).
"To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction." Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two elements." Id. "While evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be a preferred and convenient means, the State may prove both of these elements in a number of different ways," including through the defendant's stipulation or admission, through testimony by a person who observed the defendant being convicted and can identify the defendant as the person previously convicted, or through documentary proof that contains sufficient information to establish the existence of the prior conviction and the defendant's identity as the person previously convicted. Id.
Links to the defendant can be shown through different means, including allowing the jury to compare identifying information such as names, sexes, heights, eye colors, and dates of birth. See Williams v. State, 946 S.W.2d 886, 895 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no pet.). No rule exists requiring that a prior conviction be proven by any particular document or type of evidence. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. "In proving prior convictions, identity often includes the use of a combination of identifiers, and '[e]ach case is to be judged on its own individual merits.'" Henry v. State, 466 S.W.3d 294, 301 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015) (quoting Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g)), aff'd, 509 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). "The trier of fact must consider the evidence as a whole, as each piece of evidence may provide little meaning if considered in isolation." Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Provided that the proof of identity is sufficient, no error will be found on appeal even if the proof is "unorthodox." Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 32.
Gray's first and last names as listed in the indictment and jury charge in this case matched the names found in the prior certified judgment from Bexar County admitted as Exhibit 37 and the six other certified prior judgments of conviction from Harris County admitted into evidence. See Benton v. State, 336 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, pet. ref'd) (noting that although "a name alone" is generally insufficient to connect defendant to prior judgment, names not "commonly encountered" can provide stronger link). Additionally, the enhancement paragraph in this case included in the indictment and as read to the jury alleged the following:
And it is further presented that, prior to the commission of the charged offense, the defendant committed the felony of Unlawful Possession of Firearm by Felon and was finally convicted on March 22, 2021 in cause number 2016CR303SB in the 144th District Court of Bexar County, Texas[.]
The date, cause number, district court number, and county all matched the information in Exhibit 37. Moreover, Exhibit 37 stated that the defendant in that case was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. That information was consistent with Gray's mother's testimony that while she did not know the specific offense, Gray was convicted in March 2021 and went to prison for two years.
Each of the six judgments from Harris County listed the same SID for the defendant, and the same SID appeared in Exhibit 37. In all seven certified prior judgments, the SID was labeled as "State ID No." and appeared right below the defendant's name in each judgment. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921 (noting that certified copies of final judgment and sentence is "a preferred and convenient" way of proving prior conviction). Given that the SID appeared right below the defendant's name in all seven judgments, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the number was included in those documents to refer to and identify Gray as opposed to a reference to some other aspect of the cases. Additionally, as discussed earlier, the crime scene technician testified that the prints on the six judgments from Harris County matched Gray's prints taken in this case.
Moreover, during the guilt-innocence phase, evidence was presented showing that Gray lived in Houston before and after the robbery in this case, and the jury could have considered that evidence when determining whether Gray was the individual reflected in the prior judgments. See Bush v. State, 642 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (considering evidence from guilt-innocence phase when determining if enhancement allegation was proven); Edwards v. State, 97 S.W.3d 279, 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (noting that jury can infer location from evidence presented at trial).
Given our standard of review and considering the reasonable inferences that the jury could have made from this evidence, see Eustis, 191 S.W.3d at 884, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably inferred that the individual who is the subject of Exhibit 37 was Gray and, accordingly, that the evidence was legally sufficient to link Gray to the felony conviction identified in Exhibit 37 and to support the jury's finding of true for the enhancement allegation, see Barnes v. State, 585 S.W.3d 643, 650 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2019) (determining that prior convictions were sufficiently linked to defendant by certified judgments bearing defendant's name and SID), rev'd on other grounds, No. PD-1072-19, 2021 WL 476483 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2021) (op., not designated for publication).
Admission of Exhibit 37
In his first issue on appeal, Gray contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence Exhibit 37 after overruling his objection that the jury would not be able to determine that Exhibit 37 was a prior judgment for an offense that he committed. When presenting this issue, Gray notes that Exhibit 37 had no fingerprints on it or a photograph that could have been used to prove the identity of the defendant in the judgment. Although Gray acknowledges that Exhibit 37 contains his name and SID, he urges that those "are not sufficient in and of themselves to sufficiently link a prior criminal conviction to a defendant" to justify admission of the prior conviction. For these reasons, Gray contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection and admitting Exhibit 37 and that the error harmed him.
Appellate courts review a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Hunter v. State, 513 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Under that standard, a trial court's ruling will only be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside "the zone of reasonable disagreement," Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), or is "arbitrary or unreasonable," State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "If the trial court's evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable theory of law, it will not be disturbed even if the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient reason for the ruling." Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In addition, an appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling considering the record before the court "at the time the ruling was made." Khoshayand v. State, 179 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
When a "defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence about a prior conviction, rather than the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the conviction, the issue is one of conditional relevancy." Johnson v. State, 665 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.); see Tex. R. Evid. 104(b). "Documents such as properly authenticated copies of a convicting court's judgment and sentence may be admissible although their relevance depends upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendant on trial is the same person as the one previously convicted." Johnson, 665 S.W.3d at 906.
Exhibit 37 is a certified copy of a prior judgment of conviction. See Tex. R. Evid. 902 (listing certified copies of public records as type of evidence that is self-authenticating and does not require extrinsic evidence of authenticity to be admitted). Moreover, as discussed above, the defendant listed in Exhibit 37 had the same first and last name as Gray and listed the same SID that appeared in the six other prior judgments of conviction from Harris County, which were linked to Gray by his fingerprints before the trial court made its admissibility ruling regarding Exhibit 37. This type of information was sufficient to support the preliminary finding that Gray was the person previously convicted of the offense reflected in the self-authenticating Exhibit 37 and to justify admission of the exhibit. See Johnson, 665 S.W.3d at 907; Westbrook v. State, No. 10-18-00367-CR, 2021 WL 2252818, at *4 (Tex. App.-Waco May 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Gray's objection and admitting into evidence Exhibit 37 and, therefore, overrule Gray's first issue on appeal. See Tex. R. Evid. 902; Johnson, 665 S.W.3d at 907.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Gray's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
Affirmed.