Opinion
No. CIV S-06-2467 LKK DAD P.
October 10, 2008
ORDER
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The in forma pauperis application submitted with plaintiff's complaint on November 6, 2006, is incomplete. However, a properly completed application filed on November 13, 2006, makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will therefore be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is currently without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to his prison trust account. These payments shall be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor.Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). "A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory ofrespondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
In his complaint, plaintiff identifies the following individuals as defendants Warden Felker; Warden D.L. Runnels; Captain Harrison; Captain Gower; Lieutenant Spanger; Sergeant Gamburg; Sergeant Nichol; Sergeant Oberst; Correctional Officer Gorden; Correctional Officer Lamberton; Correctional Officer Bates; Correctional Officer Hill; Correctional Officer Martinez; Correctional Officer Tasi; CC1-Fiegner; CC-II Kopec; Appeals Coordinator H. Wagner; Chief Medical Officer Roche; Dr. James; Nurse Armitta; M.T.A. Hunsaker; M.T.A. Bates; M.T.A. Garrison; Sergeant Patton; Sergeant Holmes; Senior Librarian Flaherty; Director of Corrections Mr. Dovey.
Plaintiff alleges a wide panoply of claims, broadly alleging that defendants have provided him with inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, denied him of his religious rights, retaliated against him, destroyed his property without due process of law, injured his reputation, inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him, and provided him with poor living conditions and poor disciplinary treatment. Plaintiff's complaint is disorganized and difficult to decipher. It contains broad and sweeping claims coupled with virtually endless strings of improper and unnecessary case citations.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Each allegation of the pleading must be "simple, concise, and direct." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must provide each defendant with fair notice of the claims alleged against him or her and must contain factual allegations that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff's complaint does not meet the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The lengthy, fragmented pleading does not contain a short and plain statement of the claims, and the pleading is far from "simple, concise, and direct." As presented, the complaint does not provide each defendant with fair notice of the claims alleged against him or her. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.
In an amended complaint, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating how the specific acts and conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). An amended complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations will not suffice. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff must present his amended complaint on the form provided by the court. He must complete all sections of the form. Plaintiff may attach continuation pages as needed but may not attach a separate document that purports to be his amended complaint. In order to make a short and plain statement of claims against the defendants, plaintiff should include factual allegations that explain how each named defendant was involved in the denial of his rights. In this regard, plaintiff should not include legal analysis or case citations. The court will screen the amended complaint to determine whether it contains factual allegations linking each defendant to the alleged violations of plaintiff's rights. The court will not authorize service of the amended complaint on any defendant who is not specifically linked to the violation of plaintiff's rights.
If plaintiff elects to proceed in this action by filing an amended complaint, the court advises him of the following legal standards that govern his civil rights claims. First, with regards to his medical health care claims, plaintiff is advised that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under § 1983 unless the mistreatment rose to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere 'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action."Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06).
Second, with regards to his property claims, plaintiff is advised that the United States Supreme Court has held that "an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Thus, where the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due Process Clause. An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987).
Third, with regards to his excessive force claims, plaintiff is advised that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It is well established that the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977);Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as "[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
What is needed to show unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain "varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). The plaintiff must allege facts showing that objectively he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation and that subjectively each defendant had a culpable state of mind in allowing or causing the plaintiff's deprivation to occur. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).
Fourth, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to pursue a claim that prison officials failed to protect him, plaintiff is advised that the Supreme Court has held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment "only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Under this standard, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," one of deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety. Id. at 834.
Finally, with regards to his religious freedom claims, plaintiff is advised that prisoners may seek free exercise protection under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Under the First Amendment, a prison regulation infringing on a prisoner's free exercise of religion is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Under RLUIPA, a prison regulation that substantially burdens a prisoner's religious exercise is valid if it furthers a compelling governmental interest and does so by the least restrictive means. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).
Plaintiff is informed that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading will no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
Plaintiff has also filed two nearly-identical requests for injunctive relief. Among other things, plaintiff requests a transfer from High Desert State Prison. Plaintiff is not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief until such time as the court finds that his complaint contains cognizable claims for relief against the named defendants and the named defendants have been served with the summons and complaint. See Zepeda v. United States Immigration Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court."). As discussed above, the court is dismissing plaintiff's complaint and granting him leave to amend. Accordingly, at this juncture, plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief are premature.
Plaintiff filed his first request on October 1, 2007 and his second request on December 11, 2007. The only substantive difference between the two motions is plaintiff's October 1, 2007 motion has exhibits attached to it.
In any event, plaintiff is advised that it is well-established that inmates do not have a constitutional right to be incarcerated at a particular correctional facility or in a particular cell or unit within a facility. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985).
In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's November 13, 2006 application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 6) is granted.
2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court's order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this order; the amended complaint must bear the case number assigned to this case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint"; failure to file an amended complaint that complies with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice.
5. Plaintiff's October 1, 2007 and December 11, 2007 requests for injunctive relief (Doc. Nos. 10 12) are denied.