Opinion
No. 2660 C.D. 2010 No. 2661 C.D. 2010
04-04-2012
Goshen Valley II Condominium Association v. Amrit Lal and RTS Partners, Appellants Goshen Valley I Condominium Association v. Amrit Lal and RTS Partners, Appellants
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Amrit Lal and RTS Partners appeal from judgments entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County in the amounts of $15,000 and $10,500. These consolidated cases involve two condominium units, one owned by Amrit Lal and the second by Amrit Lal and RST Partners (collectively, "Lal"). Goshen Valley I and II Condominium Associations (collectively, "the Association") instituted the instant actions in an attempt to recoup the fees and expenses incurred in opposing Lal's efforts to overturn two jury verdicts. We affirm the judgments entered in favor of the Association and against Lal.
The relevant background of these cases is as follows. Upon Lal's failure to pay dues, assessments, late charges and fines for the two units and following numerous requests for payment, the Association in 2003 filed two suits in the district magistrate's court which found in favor of the Association and against Lal. Lal appealed to common pleas and demanded jury trials. The cases were submitted to mandatory arbitration, where Lal lost. Lal appealed, again demanding jury trials. Two juries found in favor of the Association. After common pleas denied his motions for post-trial relief, Lal filed appeals with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court transferred the cases to this Court, which affirmed common pleas and denied Lal's motion for reconsideration. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Lal's petition for allowance of appeal and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari.
Under Section 762(a)(5) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 42 Pa. C.S. § 762(a)(5), the Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction over appeals from courts of common pleas involving the corporate affairs of non-profit corporations and the statutes regulating those affairs.
The Association thereafter instituted the instant actions in December 2008, and common pleas held a hearing in April 2010, where evidence was adduced regarding the Association's actual fees and expenses. Lal argued that the awards to the Association for its expended legal fees in both the previous and current cases were unreasonable because they were grossly disproportionate to the amount of the Association's claims. After a bench trial common pleas disagreed, noting that it reduced the Association's claim to a small extent to reflect charges that appeared to be excessive or for services that were not adequately proven to have been performed. The court additionally noted that the Association's claims were otherwise justified in that it prevailed only after Lal vigorously contested the jury verdicts, which included petitioning the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Lal's appeals from the judgments entered by common pleas are now before us.
We first address the Association's contention that Lal failed to preserve his right to appeal due to his failure to present his post-trial motions to the trial judge in compliance with Chester County Rule of Civil Procedure (C.C.R.C.P.) 227.2. C.C.R.C.P. 227.2(c) provides that "copies of post-trial motions must be served upon the trial judge." In addition, C.C.R.C.P. 227.2(g) provides as follows:
Post-trial motions will be brought before the Court by filing a praecipe for determination under C.C.R.C.P. No. 206.6. The praecipe for determination shall be filed at the time of the filing of the post-trial motion. Upon the filing of the praecipe for determination accompanying a post-trial motion, oral argument shall be scheduled forthwith by the Court.
The common pleas docket entries reflect that, although Lal filed post-trial motions, he never filed praecipes for determination. Additionally, the trial judge indicated that Lal failed to serve him or otherwise bring the post-trial motions to his attention. As a result, six months passed and the motions for post-trial relief were never adjudicated. The Association then filed praecipes for entry of judgments pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 227.4(1)(b), which, in pertinent part, provides:
[T]he prothonotary shall, upon praecipe of a party:
(1) enter judgment upon a nonsuit by the court, the verdict of a jury or the decision of a judge following a trial without jury, if
. . . .
(b) one or more timely post-trial motions are filed and the court does not enter an order disposing of all motions within one hundred twenty days after the filing of the first motion. A judgment entered pursuant to this subparagraph shall be final as to all parties and all issues and shall not be subject to reconsideration. [Emphasis added].
Lal nonetheless argues that his failure to comply with C.C.R.C.P. 227.2 should be excused, noting that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 229(b)(1) provides that "[l]ocal rules shall not be inconsistent with any general rule of the Supreme Court or any Act of Assembly." Lal ignores, however, the fact that C.C.R.C.P. 227.2 is not inconsistent with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 227.1(f), which requires "[t]he party filing a post-trial motion [to] serve a copy promptly upon every other party to the action and deliver a copy to the trial judge." (Emphasis added). Accordingly, Lal's failure to present the post-trial motion to the trial judge precludes consideration of "all issues and shall not be subject to reconsideration." Pa. R.C.P. No. 227.4(1)(b).
In any event, even if we were to address the merits of these cases, we would find in favor of the Association. Common pleas concluded that Lal could not pursue a constitutional challenge to Section 3315(a) of the Uniform Condominium Act (Act), as amended, 68 Pa. C.S. § 3315(a), providing for the assessment of reasonable costs of an association, including legal fees, because he failed to notify the Attorney General as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 235. In pertinent part, Rule 235 provides that "[i]n any proceeding in a court subject to these rules in which an Act of Assembly is alleged to be unconstitutional . . . and the Commonwealth is not a party, the party raising the question of constitutionality . . . shall promptly give notice thereof by registered mail to the Attorney General . . . together with a copy of the pleading or other portion of the record raising the issue . . . ." The Association acknowledges that Lal eventually provided notice to the Attorney General in September 2010, but points out that this was three months after the June 2010 trial and the trial judge's order. Accordingly, it maintains that such notice was untimely and that, therefore, Lal waived any constitutional challenge. Under any measure, Lal's notice was not "prompt." Indeed, although counsel for Lal indicated that he provided the trial judge with a copy of the September 2010 letter to the Attorney General, the judge nonetheless subsequently determined, and we agree, that Lal failed to comply with Rule 235. See Adelphia Cablevision Assocs. of Radnor v. Univ. City Hous. Co., 755 A.2d 703 (Pa. Super. 2003) (failure to comply with Rule 235 results in a waiver of a constitutional issue). We turn now to the underlying support for the Association's recovery in the instant cases.
Common pleas additionally stated that Lal's "challenge on constitutional grounds to the right of the [Association] to recover at all is against all existing authority" and that Lal "presented no argument sufficient to find the statute or the Association's documents in violation of any provision of the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions." Common Pleas' March 1, 2011 Opinion at 2 and 4. We agree. See Centennial Station Condo. Ass'n v. Schaefer Co. Builders, Inc., 800 A.2d 379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (condominium association entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs under Section 3315 of the Act).
Section 3315(a) of the Act provides that, unless the declaration provides otherwise, reasonable costs of the association, including legal fees incurred in connection with sums due, are enforceable as assessments against a unit owner. Section 3315(f) of the Act specifies that "[a] judgment or decree in any action or suit brought under this section shall include costs and reasonable attorney's fees for the prevailing party." 68 Pa. C.S. § 3315(f). The declaration for both Goshen Valley I and II Condominium Associations, Article 6, Section 2, paragraph 3, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Council incident to the collection of any assessment or the enforcement of any lien, together with all sums advanced and paid by Council for taxes and payments on account of superior liens which may be required to be advanced by Council in order to protect its lien, shall be payable by the Unit owner and secured by such lien.Exhibit B to December 4, 2008 Complaints.
We note with approval the trial judge's reasoning for its awards in favor of the Association:
[Lal] argues that the fees claimed in this case are not 'reasonable' because they far exceed the original sum due and that [the Association] is entitled only to reasonable fees. We agree with the latter point but we find that 'reasonable' in this context must be construed as authorizing [the Association] to pay reasonable fees to counsel to do whatever is required to enforce its rights. To hold otherwise would permit a condominium owner to avoid paying fees altogether (thus placing an additional burden on other owners) by requiring the condominium association to expend relatively large fees to recover relatively small amounts. If the association could not recover its fees, it would indeed perform the analysis suggested by [Lal] that it would be unwise to expend more in fees than could eventually be collected, thus permitting the recalcitrant unit owner to escape payment at all merely by being willing to make collection exceedingly and unreasonably difficult. That result is untenable.Common Pleas' March 1, 2011 Opinion at 2-3. Case law supports the trial judge's rationale.
In Mountain View Condominium Association v. Bomersbach, 734 A.2d 468, 470-71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), we noted the association's crystal clear right to collect attorney's fees in a situation where the condominium owner "for over ten years, engaged in 'trench warfare' and subjected the Association to a 'pleadings onslaught' that would render even a competent attorney 'shell-shocked.'" In addition, we noted that the association in Bomersbach was entitled to collect attorney's fees expended in collecting attorney's fees.
Moreover, we recently paraphrased the Bomersbach holding in a case similarly involving reasonable attorney's fees recoverable under statute. At issue was Section 617.2 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, and we stated: "[W]here a party has a statutory right to attorney's fees and the opposing party has engaged in 'trench warfare' to prevent collection of those fees, the party need not accept anything less than the full amount to which the party is entitled." Lower Mt. Bethel Twp. v. N. River Co., ___ A.3d ___, ___ n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2076 C.D. 2010, filed January 20, 2012) [citing Bomersbach, 734 A.2d at 471 (emphasis added)]. As for the full amounts to which a party may be entitled, this Court in Centennial Station Condominium Association construed reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be the actual amounts incurred based upon evidence to be submitted of record and remanded to common pleas for a determination of the same.
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 62 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10617.2.
In the present case, the April 2010 hearing transcript reflects the trial judge's efforts to ascertain the actual expenses that the Association incurred in opposing Lal's efforts to overturn the verdicts rendered by the juries in the previous actions. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, common pleas awarded only the amounts to which the Association was entitled. Accordingly, we affirm.
As for any viable issues remaining, we affirm based on the trial judge's reasoning. Regarding Lal's res judicata claim that the Association in the previous cases could have sought the damages which it claims in the instant cases, the trial judge stated that "there is no way in which these damages [those incurred for the appeals to this Court and through to the Supreme Court] could have been claimed before those fees were incurred and no one could have predicted how far [Lal] would pursue his meritless challenges to the [jury] verdict[s]." Common Pleas' March 1, 2011 Opinion at 4. Indeed, C.C.R.C.P. 241(c) provides that when counsel fees are sought, "the party seeking them shall do so by filing an appropriate petition within twenty (20) days of the conclusion of the case in this Court." (emphasis added).
As for Lal's claim that the trial judge erred in reopening the case sua sponte, the trial judge noted that Lal never objected. Further, the judge opined that he had discretion to reopen the cases and that he "carefully examine[d] evidence presented after the case[s] [were] reopened and gave it such weight as our careful scrutiny thereof found it to warrant." Common Pleas' March 1, 2011 Opinion at 4.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 4th day of April, 2012, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County in the above-captioned matters are hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge