Opinion
Review Granted Feb. 10, 1987.
Previously published at 186 Cal.App.3d 1617
Tardiff, Johnson & Rothe and Neil S. Tardiff, Santa Barbara, for plaintiff and appellant.
Mullen, McCaughey & Henzell and James W. Brown, Santa Barbara, for defendant and respondent.
GILBERT, Associate Justice.
Here we hold that the statute of limitations for a personal injury action brought by an emancipated minor is one year.
Plaintiff Kimberly Gore is an emancipated minor. She filed a complaint for damages more than one year after she sustained injuries in an automobile accident. Gore appeals the judgment, which ensued after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, a demurrer to her complaint because it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ.Proc., § 340, subd. (3).) We affirm.
FACTS
On August 23, 1983, when Gore was 17 years of age, she filed a verified petition in the superior court to become emancipated under the Emancipation of Minors Act (Civ.Code, § 60 et seq., hereafter EMA). Her parents gave written consent and waived notice. She declared her willingness to live apart from her parents and her ability to manage her own financial affairs. The court made appropriate findings and sustained the petition. (See Civ.Code, § 64.) It issued a declaration of emancipation which is conclusive evidence that the minor is emancipated. (Civ.Code, § 64, subd. (g).)
Two weeks later, on September 8, 1983, Gore was injured in an automobile accident. On December 3, 1984, one year and three months after the accident, her attorneys filed a complaint for damages against respondent, Catherine Stowe. Stowe successfully demurred to the complaint, asserting that it was barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3), which requires personal injury actions to be filed within one year from the date of the accident.
Gore argues that despite her emancipation under the EMA, she could still claim the disability of minority under Code of Civil Procedure section 352, subdivision (a) to toll the statute of limitations until she became 18 years of age.
DISCUSSION
I
With emancipation comes a metamorphosis. It transforms a minor, however The legal consequences of emancipation are expressly stated in the Act (Civ.Code, § 61).
Civil Code section 63 states, in pertinent part, "[a]n emancipated minor shall be considered as being over the age of majority for the following purposes: ... (b) For the purpose of the minor's capacity to do any of the following: ... (3) Sue or be sued in his or her own name...."
Code of Civil Procedure section 352, subdivision (a), the tolling statute in question, states in pertinent part, "[i]f a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter three of this title, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, either: [p] 1. Under the age of majority; or, [p] Insane; or, [p] 3. Imprisoned ...; the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action."
These two code sections are not inconsistent. (Bledstein v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 152, 160-161, 208 Cal.Rptr. 428). Code of Civil Procedure section 352, subdivision (a) still operates to toll statutes of limitation for the vast majority of minors who are not emancipated. It is only inapplicable for those few minors who choose emancipation. The phrase in EMA that one "... shall be considered as being over the age of majority ...," which was enacted after Code of Civil Procedure section 352, subdivision (a), evidences a legislative intent to confer upon emancipated minors the responsibility and obligation to file legal actions before the statute of limitations runs.
The California Assembly Ways and Means Staff Analysis, the California Law Revision Commission Recommendation of 1982, and the IJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards all state that the disability of minority is removed by emancipation.
Said the Ways and Means Committee, in its staff analysis of Senate Bill No. 1473, as amended August 15, 1978, "[w]hen a minor is emancipated he becomes his own person to the same extent as someone who has attained the age of majority. He has the same rights as an adult to enter into contracts, to sue and be sued, and to maintain his own separate residence." (Emphasis added.)
The California Law Revision Commission's Recommendation relating to emancipated minors, whose recommendations for expansion of EMA were adopted by the Legislature as an amendment to EMA, explained that Civil Code section 63 gave emancipated minors important capacities and rights otherwise restricted to adults, including the right to sue and be sued. (Recommendation Relating to Emancipated Minors (Sept.1982) 16 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep. (1982) p. 187.)
The Institute of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, in its Juvenile Justice Standards Project, recognizes that disabilities of minority are eliminated to the extent case law, statutes or a decree relate to the facts of the case at hand. (IJA-ABA Joint Com. on Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Rights of Minors (1977) p. 22.) This is true even though the term "emancipation" is not necessarily coextensive with the removal of disabilities of minority. Particular statutes and regulations may still reserve certain privileges, such as drinking, for chronological adulthood, even though most disabilities of minority are completely removed. (Ibid.)
In states such as California, where the traditional indicia of emancipation include judicial decrees of emancipation under special Although this is a case of first impression under the EMA, previous cases involving emancipated minors and the tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 352 are instructive. These cases hold that statutes of limitations are not tolled under Code of Civil Procedure section 352 for emancipated minors.
Even prescient counsel with a well-polished crystal ball cannot always predict what an appellate court will do.
In Haro v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 594, 62 P.2d 441, disapproved on other grounds in Cross v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 690, 694, 36 Cal.Rptr. 321, 388 P.2d 353, a widowed 19-year-old woman filed a wrongful death action beyond the statutory statute of limitations period. Civil Code section 25, defining the age of majority, then provided that any married female over 18 " '... shall be deemed to be of the age of majority and to be an adult person for the purpose of entering into any engagement or transaction respecting property ..., the same as if she was twenty-one....' " (Haro, supra, 17 Cal.App.2d at p. 596, 62 P.2d 441.)
The Haro court broadly construed the term "transaction" to include the filing of legal actions and held that Haro was not under any disability of minority for the purposes of suit. The court barred her action. (Id., at pp. 596-597, 62 P.2d 441.)
Similarly, in Caraway v. Burns (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 327, 329, 299 P.2d 689, the court held that the tolling provision of section 352 did not apply to a minor emancipated by marriage. The Caraway court specifically rejected the contention that the Haro court wrongly construed Civil Code section 25. (Ibid.) Although the statutory language at issue in Caraway and Haro, like the statutory language in the instant case, did not emancipate a minor for all purposes, the Caraway and Haro courts expressly refused to construe the emancipation provisions as mere narrow exceptions to the concept of parens patriae.
Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1968) 68 Cal.2d 599, 68 Cal.Rptr. 297, 440 P.2d 497, cited by Gore, is inapposite. Williams concerned an unemancipated minor suing a public entity through a guardian, but after the applicable statute of limitations had run. The defendant public entity argued that the presence of only one tolling provision in the applicable statute of limitations which did not include minors, excluded the tolling provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 352 by negative implication. The Supreme Court held that that existence of only one tolling provision in the statute could not be construed as inferentially negating the general tolling provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 352 for minors. (Id., at pp. 603-604, 68 Cal.Rptr. 297, 440 P.2d 497.)
Nonetheless, in 1970, the Legislature responded to the Williams case by requiring all minors to strictly observe the six-month statute of limitations of Government Code section 945.6, concerning actions against governmental entities. (See Code Civ.Proc., § 352, subd. (b); Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 320, 146 Cal.Rptr. 224, 578 P.2d 941.) Obviously, the legislative policy of maintaining strict standards regarding claims and suits against governmental entities to limit governmental expenditures outweighed whatever paternalistic palliative may have existed.
The Williams court at pages 607-608 noted that the California Law Revision Commission made no comment on the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 352 to certain claims against public entities. The Law Revision Commission, on the other hand, urged the expansion of EMA.
In Bledstein v. Superior Court, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 152, 208 Cal.Rptr. 428, the appellate court considered whether or not a prisoner may still rely on tolling provisions The Bledstein court did not require prisoners to file legal malpractice actions within the time limits set by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. Minors, however, who successfully petition the court to become emancipated, independent individuals, with the freedom of an adult, are not similarly situated to prisoners who have lost their freedom.
As the court in Bledstein pointed out, prisoners are frequently geographically isolated, effectively severed from society and unable to readily obtain witnesses on their own behalf or to undertake investigations. (Bledstein v. Superior Court, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 167-168, 208 Cal.Rptr. 428.) Even if a prisoner is able to file a suit, it is frequently impossible for him to appear on his own behalf. (Ibid.) Parolees, however, may not rely on the tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 352, subdivision (a)(3) since they do not suffer the severe restrictions of those who are incarcerated. (Deutch v. Hoffman (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 152, 154-156, 211 Cal.Rptr. 319.)
II
We find no merit to Gore's contention that the application of the statute of limitations to her action is a denial of equal protection of the law. Minority is not a suspect classification. (Kite v. Campbell (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 793, 799, 191 Cal.Rptr. 363, disapproved on other grounds in Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 896-897, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.) And, the right to sue for negligently inflicted injuries is not a fundamental right requiring the strict scrutiny test. (Id., 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 800, 191 Cal.Rptr. 363, citing Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 958-959, 109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601.)
Therefore, we apply the rational relationship test to determine if the purpose of the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Kite v. Campbell, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 800, 191 Cal.Rptr. 363; also see Young v. Haines, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 898-900, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.) The classification of individuals as emancipated minors is rationally related to the salutory purpose of increasing stability in society between emancipated minors and other citizens. This legitimate state interest is codified in EMA and is reflected in the Legislature's development of this statutory scheme. (See Civ.Code, §§ 61, 62, 63 and 66; coms. to Assem.Com. on Judiciary, Bill Dig. of Sen.Bill No. 1473 (1977-1978 Reg.Sess.) as amended June 13, 1978, p. 2; Assem.Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen.Bill No. 1473 (1977-1978 Reg.Sess.) p. 2; Assem.Ways and Means Staff Analysis of Sen.Bill No. 1473 (1977-1978 Reg.Sess.) as amended Aug. 15, 1978, p. 1.)
III
Gore did not raise the doctrine of equitable tolling below and may not raise it for the first time on appeal. (Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896, 902, 219 Cal.Rptr. 341.) Gore has made no showing of a reasonable and good faith pursuit of other remedies prior to filing this suit. (Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 317-318, 146 Cal.Rptr. 224, 578 P.2d 941.) There are no facts in this record to justify Gore's The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, P.J., and ABBE, J., concur.