Opinion
CIV-23-773-PRW
11-28-2023
EULLIS MONROE GOODWIN, Petitioner, v. WARDEN GOLDEY, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHON T. ERWIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Eullis Monroe Goodwin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a Brief in Support. (ECF Nos. 1 & 3). United States District Judge Patrick R. Wyrick has referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). On initial review, the Court should DISMISS the Petition.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to review habeas petitions promptly and to “summarily dismiss [a] petition without ordering a responsive pleading,” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005), “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” See R. 4, R. Governing § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Ct.
The district court may apply any or all” of the Rules governing § 2254 cases to a habeas petition brought under § 2241. R. 1(b), R. Governing § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Ct.
II. BACKGROUND/CURRENT HABEAS PETITION
In November 2022, while housed in Williamsburg Federal Correctional Institution, Mr. Goodwin was evaluated to determine his eligibility for the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) residential drug treatment program, otherwise known as RDAP. (ECF No. 1:2). Based on his eligibility, Mr. Goodwin was transferred to the Federal Correctional Institute at El Reno in December of 2022, where a “Dr. Averitt” interviewed Petitioner and confirmed his eligibility. (ECF No. 1:3). In July of 2023, Petitioner inquired regarding his RDAP entry status and Dr. Averitt informed Mr. Goodwin that he “should not expect to actually start the program until mid-December or early January 2024.” (ECF No. 1:3).
The basis of Mr. Goodwin's Petition is two-fold, involving a potential sentence reduction and utilization of certain credits he has accumulated while incarcerated. First, Petitioner contends that he upon successful completion of the RDAP, he would be eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which indeed allows the BOP to reduce the sentence of a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year for successful completion of an RDAP. Second, Mr. Goodwin claims: (1) that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under the “First Step Act,” (FSA) having already accumulated 365 days of credits and (2) he has also accumulated 155 days “to be applied towards a Reentry Residential Center-Halfway House-,and or Home Confinement.” (ECF No. 1:3).
According to Petitioner, with a minimum 9-month time frame to complete the RDAP, his “projected completion date” would be October 2024. (ECF No. 1:3). Mr. Goodwin argues that this time frame is problematic because it would allow him only approximately 30 days in a halfway house, and the required “aftercare” portion of the RDAP mandates a minimum of 120 days in a halfway house. (ECF No. 1:3, 4). Furthermore, Petitioner argues that Dr. Averitt's “arbitrary and capricious scheduling of Petitioner's start date in the RDAP program” which “prohibits him from utilizing any First Step Time Credits[,] infringes on Petitioner's liberty interest into the rightfully earned credits that shorten Petitioner's duration in prison.” (ECF No. 1:4). Mr. Goodwin explains:
Petitioner, who has already accumulated 365 days off of his sentence under the First Step Act, plus currently 155+ days to be applied to [Reentry Residential Center/Home Confinement], is being prejudiced in applying these earned credits under the FSA. Dr. AVIRITT was aware at the clinical evaluation in December of 2022 that Petitioner was earning FSA Time Credits but arbitrarily has scheduled his start date more than a year after his transfer to El Reno. The language of the FSA is clear, but it can only stand to reason that Dr. AVIRITT plans on using some “accounting tricks” to give Petitioner less RDAP completion reduction time from his sentence as other similarly situated graduates who complete the program at the same time. This is “manifestly contrary” to both the First Step Act and § 3621(e)(2)(B).
(ECF No. 3:7) (internal citation omitted).
III. DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
To fully comprehend Petitioner's claims, background information is necessary regarding RDAP and the FSA. As stated, under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), the BOP may reduce the sentence of a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year for successful completion of a an RDAP. According to the BOP, the RDAP consists of three phases: (1) the unit-based component; (2) follow-up services while housed at a Bureau institution; and (3) the 120-day Community Treatment Services (“CTS", formerly known as TDAT) component in the community. See BOP Program Statement 5330.11 at § 550.53(3). Successful completion of CTS is required to receive RDAP incentives, such as early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). See id.; (“Inmates ... must complete CTS to have successfully completed RDAP and receive incentives ....”). Therefore, because the CTS component is required for successful completion of RDAP, to earn an early release under § 3621(e), an inmate cannot complete the component on supervised release. Id.
In December 2018, Congress passed the FSA of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (the “FSA”). The FSA was implemented in phases. First, the Attorney General developed and released a “risk and needs assessment system.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). Second, the BOP was required to “implement and complete the initial intake risk and needs assessment for each prisoner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(h)(1)(A). The FSA then gave the BOP two years after completing the risk and needs assessment for each prisoner to “phase in” program implementation. Id. § 3621(h)(2)(A). During the two-year phase-in period, the FSA allowed the BOP to begin offering incentives, including time credits towards prerelease custody or supervised release, to prisoners who participated in Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction programming and Programming Activities. Id. §§ 3621(h)(4), 3632(d)(4)(A). In January 2022, the BOP published its final rule implementing FSA time credit calculation procedures. 28 C.F.R. §§ 523, 541.
Within days of implementing the FSA and applying related credits, the BOP was faced with an influx of inmates becoming immediately eligible for release or an immediate transfer into a residential reentry center (RRC) or home confinement. Thus, the BOP faced potentially competing interests, including the need to open up a significant number of beds in RRCs and for home confinement supervision to accommodate the immediate transfers from institutions and the need for RDAP inmates to complete the CTS component in order to earn their § 3621(e) early release. Vonderahe v. Hudson, No. 223043, 2022 WL 1421570, at *2 (D. Kan. May 5, 2022). Ultimately, the BOP decided RDAP inmates in the community (i.e., already at an RRC or on home confinement) would receive the benefit of FSA credits and their § 3621(e) early release even if they had not completed all 120 days of the CTS component. Id. However, the BOP also determined inmates still housed at BOP institutions would still have to complete a minimum of 120 days of CTS, and their release date under § 3621(e) and application of FSA credits would be adjusted. Id.
Here, with the application of his current FSA credits, Petitioner argues that his release date is October 25, 2025. (ECF No. 1:3). But Mr. Goodwin complains that Dr. Averitt “arbitrarily and capriciously” delayed his entry into the RDAP program, with a potential start date of mid-December, which Petitioner alleges would result in a completion of the 9-month long program in approximately September of 2024. (ECF No. 1:3). According to Petitioner, “[t]his projected completion date, would move Petitioner's release date to October 25, 2024[.]” (ECF No. 1:3). And at the same time, Mr. Goodwin states that the October 25, 2024 date would only allow him to spend 30 days in a halfway house, which Petitioner claims infringes on his due process rights because: (1) he needs to complete 120 days in CTS to receive the sentence reduction under § 3621(e) and (2) he is being prohibited from properly utilizing his FSA credits. See ECF No. 3:6 (“At the current [RDAP] completion date, [Petitioner] will only be receiving 30 days of halfway house time where he is required to have at least 120 days in order to complete the [CTS].”); ECF No. 1:4 (alleging that Dr. Averitt's delay “prohibits [Mr. Goodwin] from utilizing any First Step Time Credits, [which] infringes on Petitioner's liberty interest into the rightfully earned credits that shorten Petitioner's duration in prison.”). The Court construes both of Petitioner's arguments as both a substantive due process challenge as well as a challenge to the BOP's substantive decision regarding Mr. Goodwin's timing into the RDAP program. Both arguments fail.
Based on Petitioner's statement that his current FSA credits (of 365 days) would ”move[] his release date to October 25, 2025,” see ECF No. 1:3, the only conceivable way in which Mr. Goodwin has landed on a “release date” of October 25, 2024, would be if he received the one-year sentence reduction under § 3621(e).
First, as to the due process claims, Petitioner's arguments hinge on his successful completion of the RDAP program. Mr. Goodwin argues that he will be deprived of the sentence reduction under Section 3621(e) based on the timing of his entry into the program and the inability to complete the CTS, but his calculations involve taking into account that he will receive a one-year sentence reduction, which is speculative, at best. Petitioner also argues that the timing of entry into the program will essentially cause him to “lose” his FSA credits, but again, Mr. Goodwin's arguments hinge on a successful completion of the RDAP program. The Court should conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish a due process violation because he has no constitutionally protected interest in a sentence reduction under the RDAP in the first instance.
“A prisoner has no constitutional right to participate in RDAP, ... and similarly, a prisoner has no liberty interest in discretionary early release for completion of RDAP.” Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1280 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that § 3621(e)(2)(B) “allows a decisionmaker to deny the requested relief within its unfettered discretion [and] does not create a constitutionally-recognized liberty interest”)); Brown v. Hudson, Case No. 21-3042-JWL, 2021 WL 843236, at *2 (D. Kan. March 5, 2021) (stating that reduction in sentence for completion of RDAP “is within the discretion of the BOP, and participating prisoners are informed at the outset of the program that early release is not guaranteed”).
“The governing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), does not implicate a constitutionally-protected liberty interest because it does not mandate a sentence reduction.” Brown, 2021 WL 843236, at *3 (citing see Royal v. Scibana, 309 Fed.Appx. 284, 286 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Just as a prisoner does not possess a constitutional right to a reduction of a valid sentence, ..., (he) does not possess a constitutional right to retain provisional eligibility for the reduction of a valid sentence.”) (citation omitted); Reyes v. Ledezma, 2009 WL 1362606 (W.D. Okla., May 14, 2009).) “Section 3621(e)(2)(B) does not require the BOP to grant petitioner a one-year reduction in sentence; it merely permits the BOP to do so.” Brown, 2021 WL 843236, at *3 (citing see Zacher v. Tpp, 202 F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The language of section 3621(e)(2)(B) is permissive, stating that the Bureau 'may' grant early release, but not guaranteeing eligible inmates early release.”)). “Thus, federal courts have consistently held that § 3621(e) does not create a liberty interest in the RDAP or in early release from confinement.” Brown, 2021 WL 843236, at *3 (citing see, e.g. Cook v. Wile, 208 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2000) (A prisoner has no constitutional right to, or other protected liberty interest in, participation in the RDAP, or to early release upon completion of the RDAP.)). Based on the absence of a protected liberty interest in a sentence reduction under § 3621(e), Petitioner's due process claims fail.
Second, as for Petitioner's challenge to Dr. Averitt's decision regarding the timing of Mr. Goodwin's entry into the RDAP program as “arbitrary or capricious,” this claim is construed under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which requires a reviewing court to set aside final agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). However, Mr. Goodwin's particular challenge is foreclosed by 18 U.S.C. § 3625 which provides that “[t]he provisions of sections 554 and 555 and 701 through 706 of title 5, United States Code [the APA], do not apply to the making of any determination, decision, or order under this subchapter [§§ 3621-26].” Because § 3625 exempts 18 U.S.C. § 3621 from the APA's judicial review provisions, which includes Petitioner's entry into the RDAP program, this court may not review the BOP's substantive decision in this regard. See Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d at 1279 n.3 (allowing federal prisoner to challenge the BOP's discretionary determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621 would be inconsistent with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3625) (citing Reeb v. Thoma., 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d at 630 (recognizing that § 3625 may preclude judicial review of the BOP's substantive decision under § 3621(e)(2)(B)); Redmon v. Wie, No. 08-1288, 349 Fed.Appx. 251, 256 (10th Cir. Oct. 13, 2009) (unpublished) (same). As a result, the Court should dismiss this claim as well.
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The Court should dismiss the Petition for failure to state a claim.
Petitioner is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by December 15, 2023, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
V. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this matter.