Opinion
No. 04-15-00574-CV
05-18-2016
R. Kinnan GOLEMON, Appellant v. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION and Juan Segundo, Appellees
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 452nd District Court, Mason County, Texas
Trial Court No. 135477
Honorable Robert Rey Hofmann, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Jason Pulliam, Justice AFFIRMED
R. Kinnan Golemon appeals the trial court's order affirming the Texas Workforce Commission decision ruling that Juan Segundo was entitled to unemployment benefits and that Golemon would be subject to chargeback for those benefits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
The following facts were adduced at the district court. Segundo began working for Golemon and his wife, Jacqueline B. Golemon, as a ranch hand in 2006. On January 13, 2013, Mr. Golemon notified Segundo that he should begin looking for other employment, but that he could remain employed until he found other work or until the last day of March. No party has alleged that Segundo committed misconduct. Rather, Mr. Golemon testified that he could no longer afford to pay Segundo and that he no longer needed the types of services that Segundo provided. Also, Mr. Golemon claimed that Segundo had repeatedly said that he could make more money elsewhere, and the Golemons did not want to stand in the way of his earning more money. According to Mrs. Golemon, Segundo told her around March 1 that he had found another job and that his last day would be Friday, March 8; however, he returned to work at the ranch on Monday, March 11 and told her that there was a delay in the job and asked if it was all right for him to work another week. Mrs. Golemon allowed it. Segundo's last day of work at the ranch was Friday, March 15. According to Mrs. Golemon, she told Segundo he could continue working until the end of March if he needed to, and he declined.
Other workers on the ranch testified without specificity that Segundo told them, prior to March 15, that he had found other employment. Segundo, however, testified that he did not find another job in March. He stated that he never told anyone he was going to work on a fencing job. Segundo further stated that after he left the Golemons' employment, he did not work for anyone else. Segundo testified that he remembered Mr. Golemon telling him in January 2013 that his last day of work would be March 15. Segundo also stated that his native language is Spanish, and Mr. Golemon spoke to him in English.
Segundo filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC). Mr. Golemon told the TWC claims examiner that he set a termination date for Segundo because the duties they had for him at the ranch were not the kind he was good at and that from time to time he broke some equipment. The examiner ruled Segundo separated from employment by the Golemons due to discharge rather than a voluntary quit, and that the discharge was not for misconduct. Accordingly, Segundo was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and the Golemons' TWC account was subject to chargeback for any benefits paid to Segundo based on wages he earned working for the Golemons. The Golemons filed administrative appeals, but the Appeal Tribunal, as well as the three-member Commission, affirmed the initial determination.
Golemon filed suit for review of that decision, claiming that Segundo was not discharged, but voluntarily quit because he left the ranch on March 15 even though he could have worked until the end of March. The trial court ruled that substantial evidence supported the TWC unemployment benefits decision and thus affirmed the TWC's decision. Golemon timely appealed to this court. He argues that the TWC's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of a TWC decision regarding benefit payments is by trial de novo in which the trial court determines whether substantial evidence supports the TWC's ruling. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 212.202(a) (West 2015); Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998) (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)). The TWC's action is presumed valid, and the party seeking to set aside the decision has the burden of showing that it was not supported by substantial evidence. Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708; Murray v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 337 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). Because substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence, the evidence in the record may preponderate against the TWC's decision but still amount to substantial evidence. State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 190, 204 (Tex. 1994); Spicer v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 430 S.W.3d 526, 532-33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Dozier v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 41 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
In determining whether substantial evidence exists in support of an administrative decision, the reviewing court may not invade the fact finding authority of the agency. State Banking Bd. v. Allied Bank Marble Falls, 748 S.W.2d 447, 448-49 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on controverted issues of fact. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984). "The reviewing court is concerned only with the reasonableness of the administrative order, not its correctness." Id.; Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708 ("Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the issue is whether the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the time of the [TWC]'s decision that reasonably support the decision."). The ruling of the TWC may be set aside only if it was made without regard to the law or the facts and, therefore, was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708; Murray, 337 S.W.3d at 524.
"We review the trial court's judgment by comparing the TWC decision with the evidence presented to the trial court and the governing law." Kaup v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 456 S.W.3d 289, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (quoting Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Products, L.P., 353 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied)); McCroy v. Henderson, 431 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). The burden is on the party challenging a TWC ruling to show that the ruling is not supported by substantial evidence. Potts v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ). It is for the reviewing court "to decide whether the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not have reached the conclusion the administrative body must have reached in order to justify its actions." Id. (quoting Haas v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 683 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)).
DISCUSSION
Under the Labor Code, an individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if the employee left his last work voluntarily without good cause. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.045 (West 2015). If an employee was fired, he is qualified for benefits unless he was discharged as a result of his own misconduct. Id. § 207.044 (West 2015). By ruling that Segundo was entitled to unemployment benefits, the TWC determined that Segundo was discharged without misconduct. See id. Golemon argues that Segundo voluntarily left his work at the ranch, and thus was not fired. Under the substantial evidence rule, the burden is on Golemon—as the party who seeks to set aside the TWC's ruling—to demonstrate that less than substantial evidence supports the TWC's decision. See Tex. Workforce Comm'n v. City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d 263, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Thus, Golemon must produce evidence that conclusively negates all reasonable support for the TWC's decision—on any ground offered. Tex. Workforce Comm'n v. BL II Logistics, L.L.C., 237 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.).
Golemon essentially argues that the fact that Segundo left two weeks before his termination date negates the fact that he was laid off. The record, however, contains more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the agency's decision that Segundo's separation was not voluntary. Golemon testified that he initiated the separation when he told Segundo that he would no longer be an employee of the ranch after the end of March. In addition, Golemon confirmed that Segundo would not have been permitted to work at the ranch after the end of March had he chosen to do so. Segundo testified that he understood his last day of work was to be March 15, which is undisputedly the last day he worked. Segundo also denied under oath that he left the ranch before the end of March for another job. The evidence, although conflicting, constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence that Segundo did not voluntarily leave his employment with the Golemons, but was discharged. See Dallas Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Warren, 988 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) ("The resolution of factual conflicts and ambiguities is the province of the administrative body, and the aim of the substantial evidence rule is to protect that function."). Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that reasonable minds could have reached the decision that the TWC reached, i.e., that Segundo did not voluntarily quit, but was discharged. Accordingly, we conclude that Golemon failed to establish the TWC's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Given the facts of this case and the limited scope of judicial review, we cannot say that the trial court erred by affirming the TWC's decision. We therefore resolve Golemon's complaints on appeal against him.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice