Opinion
98 Civ. 8439 (SHS).
December 7, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Susan and Michael Golden, residents of California, brought this negligence action for injuries suffered by Susan Golden when the New York City taxicab she was entering lurched forward and threw her to the ground. Golden sustained injuries to her hip, knee, and elbow.
The action was tried to a jury on August 13 and 14, 2001. The jury concluded that Golden's injuries met the threshold of "serious injury" as defined by N.Y. Ins. Law § 5102(d), specifically finding that Golden had suffered a "significant limitation of use of a body function or system." Based on these findings, the jury awarded $100,000 to Mrs. Golden for past pain and suffering.
Defendants — the company that owned the relevant taxi, the company that owned the taxicab medallion pursuant to which the cab was being operated, and the cab driver — now move for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, or in the alternative, for a new trial on damages or a remittitur pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Defendants charge that Mrs. Golden failed to establish that she suffered a "serious injury" and that the damages awarded were excessive. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions are denied.
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
A court hearing a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) "is required to `consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence. The court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury.' . . . Only if there is `such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture' . . . may the court properly grant the motion."LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 429 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Defendants contend that Mrs. Golden's injuries do not meet the standard of "serious injury" set by New York's No-Fault Law, N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 5101-5108 (McKinney 2001). The No-Fault Law allows recovery for non-economic loss in a personal injury action arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in New York only if the plaintiff sustained a "serious injury," as defined by N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 5102(d), 5104(a). See also, Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 234, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
One category of "serious injury" as defined by the statute is the "significant limitation of use of a body function or system." N.Y. Ins. Law § 5102(d); see also Lanuto v. Constantine, 192 A.D.2d 989, 990, 596 N.Y.S.2d 944 (3d Dep't 1993). To establish a serious injury based on a "significant limitation of use of a body function or system," a plaintiff must prove that she suffered from "something more than a . . . minor, mild or slight limitation of use." Licari, 57 N Y2d at 236, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570; see also Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 679, 512 N.E.2d 309, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1987).
The significance of the limitation must be supported by credible medical evidence and must be objectively measured and quantified. See Lanuto, 192 A.D.2d at 991, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 945. Subjective complaints of pain, unsupported by credible medical evidence, cannot form the basis of a significant limitation. See Scheer, 70 N.Y.2d at 679, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309; Patrello v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Yanez v. City of New York, 29 F. Supp.2d 100, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
While the limitation need not be permanent, the court must consider not only the extent or degree of the limitation, but its duration as well.See Partlow v. Meehan, 155 A.D.2d 647, 648, 548 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1989); Oquendo v. New York City Transit Auth., 246 A.D.2d 635, 636, 668 N.Y.S.2d 398 (2d Dep't 1998).
The Goldens submitted sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Mrs. Golden suffered a "significant limitation of use of a body function or system." She testified that she was hospitalized for five days following the accident and confined to her bed for three weeks after her release. (Trial Tr. at 82-83.) She was unable to walk without the assistance of a cane or walker for a period of "over three months" after the accident, and was unable to drive a car for five months. (Tr. at 85-87.) Mrs. Golden further stated that at the time of trial she continued to take medication for her injuries, had difficulties ascending and descending stairs and was unable to walk for extended periods. (Tr. at 90-91.) Her husband testified that she was unable to perform some of the household activities, such as grocery shopping, vacuuming, and "lift[ing] pots," that she customarily had performed prior to the accident. (Tr. at 118.)
In addition to the plaintiffs' testimony, the deposition of Mrs. Golden's physician, Dr. Kevin Harrington, was read into evidence at trial. Relying on his treatment notes, Harrington testified that ten months after the accident, Golden continued to have pain when "straightening" her knee or "putting stress" on her knee joint. (Tr. at 57-58.) X-rays taken at this time revealed "mild arthritic changes" in the knee which Dr. Harrington believed were unlikely to improve, and he suggested surgical treatment. (Tr. at 58-59.) Dr. Harrington testified on cross-examination that the arthritic changes could be "reasonably attributed at least in great part to the accident." (Tr. at 62.)
Based on the evidence adduced by plaintiffs, this Court is unable to state that there is "`such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture.'" See LeBlanc-Sternberg, 67 F.3d at 429, (quotingSong v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied.
B. Motion for a New Trial on Damages
As an alternative to their request for judgment as a matter of law, defendants move for a new trial on the issue of damages. A motion for a new trial should be granted when "the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or . . . the verdict is a miscarriage of justice."Song, 957 F.2d at 1047 (quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988)). As noted above, there was sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's determination that Golden suffered a serious injury, and the Court will respect the jury's verdict in the absence of any showing that it represents a miscarriage of justice.
C. Remittitur
Finally, and as an alternative to their other motions, defendants seek a reduction of the amount of the jury's award in the form of a remittitur on the ground that the award of $100,000 for pain and suffering was excessive. Because this is a diversity case, this Court must look to New York law to determine whether the damage award is excessive. See Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 (1996);Ortiz-Del Valle v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 42 F. Supp.2d 334, *341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The New York standard for determining the excessiveness of a jury's verdict is whether it "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." CPLR § 5501(c). In applying this standard, courts look to awards approved by the state courts in similar cases. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425.
An examination of New York appellate court decisions involving similar injuries indicates that the jury's award of $100,000 was not, as a matter of law, excessive. See, e.g., Duff v. Mariani, 248 A.D.2d 905, 670 N.Y.S.2d 615 (3d Dep't 1998) (evidence supported award of $100,000 for past pain and suffering where plaintiff had sustained injuries resulting in 15% loss of use of right knee and foot); Urquhart v. New York City Transit Authority, 221 A.D.2d 336, 633 N.Y.S.2d 206 (2d Dep't 1995) ($375,000 award for past and future pain and suffering was excessive to the extent it exceeded $150,000, where plaintiff suffered torn meniscus of the knee and was developing arthritic changes as a result of the injury); Hulsen v. Morrison, 206 A.D.2d 459, 614 N.Y.S.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1994) (award of $175,000 for past and future pain and suffering was excessive to the extent it exceeded $75,000, where plaintiff suffered radioculopathy and arthritic changes in neck region, herniated disk in lower back, and a grade-three chondromalacia in his right knee); Holshek v. Stokes, 122 A.D.2d 777, 505 N.Y.S.2d 664, (2d Dep't 1986) ($250,000 award to plaintiff who suffered permanent, arthritis-producing injury to knees excessive to the extent it exceeded $175,000.)
Accordingly, defendants' request for a remittitur is denied.
D. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motions are denied.