Opinion
03-22-00474-CR
08-30-2023
Quentin Goffney, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
Do Not Publish
FROM THE 299TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-DC-20-904017, THE HONORABLE KAREN SAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DARLENE BYRNE, CHIEF JUSTICE
Appellant Quentin Goffney was found guilty of first-degree felony aggravated sexual assault and was assessed a punishment of 30 years of imprisonment. See Tex. Pen. Code § 22.021. In a single issue, he challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the results of a search warrant directed at T-Mobile for electronic customer data. See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 18B.354 (governing warrants issued for electronic customer data held by cellphone providers). Appellant contends that the affidavit accompanying the search warrant was not supported by sufficient facts to satisfy the probable cause requirement for such a search. Based on the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
In the early morning of June 9, 2018, complainant Cindy Linda, testifying under a pseudonym, was attacked and sexually assaulted by an unknown male suspect. The assailant threatened her with a knife, tied her up "like a dog," forced her to perform oral sex, and forcibly penetrated her vagina with his fingers. During the assault, the assailant struck her arm and slashed her face with a knife, as well as beat and kicked her; Linda lost consciousness before regaining it and crawling away to safety. She reported the assault and underwent a sexual assault forensic exam. DNA samples collected from the examination returned a hit in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) for appellant.
During the investigation, law enforcement officers learned that five days after the assault, appellant pawned two knives at a pawn shop approximately two miles from where the assault occurred. On the pawn shop paperwork, Appellant listed a home address at an apartment complex located less than a mile from the crime scene and listed a specific phone number (the "Phone Number") as his contact information. Appellant's Facebook records, obtained through another search warrant, listed the Phone Number, and included various messages referencing the Phone Number on dates before and after the date of the assault. Other evidence reflected that another individual, Diamond Quintero, was the subscriber named on the T-Mobile account affiliated with the Phone Number, that Quintero was appellant's roommate, and that Quintero had spoken about buying appellant a phone. A search warrant directed at Verizon seeking cell tower data relating to the Phone Number showed that the number had "pinged" a Verizon tower near the crime scene on the date of the offense. Sergeant Ron Lara, an investigator with the Travis County District Attorney's office, obtained a second search warrant directed at T-Mobile (the T-Mobile Warrant) for electronic customer data (which includes location data or cell site location data) for the Phone Number, covering a two-week time period surrounding the date of the assault.
After the investigation, appellant was indicted for, among other things, first-degree felony aggravated sexual assault. Appellant pled not guilty to the charged offense. Relevant to this appeal, during the course of the jury trial, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence derived from the T-Mobile Warrant, which was denied by the trial court. Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree felony aggravated sexual assault and sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion." State v. Wood, 575 S.W.3d 929, 932 (Tex. App.-Austin 2019, pet. ref'd). Under that standard, the record is "viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, and the judgment will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone of reasonable disagreement." Id. (quoting State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, we review the trial court's factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but we review the application of the law to the facts de novo. See Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). "The same deference is afforded the trial court with respect to its rulings on application of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." Wood, 575 S.W.3d at 932 (quoting Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). Mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, as well as purely legal questions, are reviewed de novo. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
DISCUSSION
In his sole issue on appeal, Goffney argues the trial court erred when it failed to suppress the results of the T-Mobile Warrant because he contends that the State failed to establish probable cause supporting the warrant.
The Fourth Amendment requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause exists when "under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability or substantial chance that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location." See Stocker v. State, 656 S.W.3d 887, 900 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. granted) (quoting Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). "A warrant-based search is presumptively reasonable, and it is the defendant's burden to prove that a search is unreasonable." Adkins v. State, 418 S.W.3d 856, 860 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th. Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd). Our review of challenges to the probable cause supporting such a warrant is "highly deferential because of the constitutional preference for searches conducted by way of warrants." Martinez v. State, 660 S.W.3d 179, 192 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2022, pet. ref'd) (quoting State v. Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). "When in doubt, [we] should defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made." Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873. Accordingly, "[t]he test is whether the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding the search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing." Martinez, 660 S.W.3d at 192. "In determining whether an affidavit provides probable cause to support a search warrant, an issuing court and a reviewing court are constrained to the four corners of the affidavit." Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 900.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in their cell-site location data, and therefore the Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to acquire such records. See Martinez, 660 S.W.3d at 193 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018)); see also Holder v. State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (recognizing similar privacy interest under Texas Constitution). In reviewing the search of a person's cell-site location data, the "pertinent inquiry is simply whether the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances 'after considering the public and private interests that are at stake.'" Holder, 595 S.W.3d at 704 (quoting Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2221).
In Texas, article 18B.354 governs search warrants issued for electronic customer data held in electronic storage. See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 18B.354. "To obtain such data from a provider of an electronic communications service, a peace officer must submit an application for a warrant to a district judge." Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 906 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 18B.354(a)). The sworn affidavit accompanying the search warrant application must provide "sufficient and substantial facts to establish probable cause that: (1) a specific offense has been committed; and (2) the electronic customer data sought: (A) constitutes evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense; and (B) is held in electronic storage by the service provider on which the warrant is served under Article 18B.355(c)." Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 18B.354(b). That is, "[t]here must be some factual basis in the affidavit providing a fair probability that law enforcement could expect to find inculpatory location information evidence from the carrier indicating that a specific person committed a particular offense." Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 906-07.
In the present appeal, Goffney specifically challenges whether the facts contained in the sworn affidavit "constitute[] evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense." See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 18B.354(b)(1)(A). The probable cause affidavit accompanying the warrant recites, among other things, the following facts:
• The victim stated that the suspect sexually assaulted her by forcing her to perform oral sex and putting his fingers inside her vagina;
• The suspect had a small knife that he cut her with on the face and arm during the sexual assault;
• The victim agreed to a sexual assault forensic exam, and that during the exam several areas of the victim's body were swabbed in a controlled environment by a qualified sexual assault nurse examiner;
• The completed sexual assault kit was sent to a qualified forensic laboratory for analysis;
• The affiant received an email from the forensic analyst advising of a CODIS match from the CODIS database to the DNA swab taken from the mons pubis of the victim's body;
• The affiant received a subsequent email from the analysis with an attachment of a CODIS match confirmation identifying appellant as the male contributor of the evidence specimen/mons pubis swab;
• Appellant was identified as the seller of two knives at a pawn shop five days after the assault, and that the shop was located approximately two miles from the location of the assault;
• The ticket from the pawn shop identified the seller of the knives as appellant and listed the Phone Number as his contact information;
• Other T-Mobile records identified Diamond Quintero as the subscriber associated
with the account for the Phone Number, and that Quintero told the investigating detective that he lived with appellant;
• Facebook message conversations showed appellant identified the Phone Number as his cell phone number on dates before and after the date of the assault; and
• A separate Verizon search warrant for cell tower data showed that the Phone Number was active and pinged a nearby Verizon tower on the date of the offense.
Considering the evidence contained within the four corners of the affidavit, we conclude that there are sufficient factual assertions from which the magistrate judge could have reasonably determined that there was a fair probability that the location data would provide inculpatory evidence about appellant. See Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 906-07. Appellant is correct that the affidavit contains some conclusory statements, but the affidavit also contains specific facts linking appellant to the victim and to the general location where the sexual assault took place. Although appellant complains that he is not the T-Mobile subscriber listed on the account for the Phone Number, there were also numerous facts included in the affidavit from which a magistrate judge could reasonably infer that appellant, rather than his roommate, used and possessed the cellphone associated with the Phone Number. See Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873 ("When in doubt, [we] should defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made."). Taken together, the facts contained in the affidavit give rise to a fair probability that a search of the electronic customer data associated with the Phone Number would reveal inculpatory evidence that appellant committed the aggravated sexual assault because the location of the phone associated with the Phone Number would be placed at or near the sexual assault at the time of the offense. See Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 908. Accordingly, the sworn affidavit provided "sufficient and substantial facts to establish probable cause" for the challenged warrant, Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 18B.354(b), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress, see Stocker, 656 S.W.3d at 909 (concluding similar evidence was sufficient to show "some quantum of individualized suspicion" to justify search of electronic customer data (quoting Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2221 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wood, 575 S.W.3d at 932.
Appellant also makes passing reference to State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022), but that decision involved a search warrant for the physical cell phone, not for phone location data directly from the provider of an electronic communications service, see id. at 134.
Although not challenged by appellant, we note that the affidavit also meets the other statutory requirements. See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 18B.354(b).
We overrule appellant's only issue.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.