Opinion
No. 99-CV-8062 (NGG).
March 11, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Cecilia Goff, pro se plaintiff, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a Social Security Administration ("SSA") decision denying her claim for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits. The Commissioner ("defendant"), moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of jurisdiction resulting from failure to timely commence the action. For the reasons stated below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I. Background
The plaintiff applied for SSI benefits on March 7, 1996, alleging disability due to chronic fatigue syndrome and depression. See 4/16/98 ALJ Decision, Ex. 1 to 5/4/00 Waxman Declaration ("Waxman Decl."), at 5. The SSA denied her application initially and upon reconsideration. See Waxman Decl., ¶ 3(a). The plaintiff then timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Id. The ALJ conducted the hearing on January 23, 1998. On April 16, 1998, the ALJ affirmed the SSA's original denial of the plaintiff's claim, finding that her various impairments were not severe enough to meet the definition of a disability. See ALJ Decision at 8. Thereafter, the plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. See 2/9/99 Letter to the plaintiff from Appeals Council ("Appeals Council Letter"), Ex. 2 to Waxman Decl., at 1. The ALJ's determination became final after the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for review on February 9, 1999. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
In a letter mailed to the plaintiff's home address dated February 9, 1999, the Appeals Counsel advised the plaintiff of the deadline for filing. Specifically, the letter stated:
If you desire a court review of the Administrative Law Judge's decision, you may commence a civil action by filing a complaint in the United States District Court . . . within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of this letter. It will be presumed that this letter is received within five (5) days after the date shown . . . [Y]ou may ask the Appeals Council to extend the time in which you may begin a civil action. Id.
Under this notice and the applicable regulations, the plaintiff was required to file her complaint by April 15, 1999. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c). The plaintiff did not seek an extension of time from the Appeals Council in which to file her civil action. See Waxman Decl., ¶ 3(b). She eventually filed her complaint in the District Court on December 8, 1999, approximately eight months after the statute of limitations expired. See 12/8/99 Plaintiff's Affidavit at 1.
The plaintiff claims that she was aware of the sixty-day period within which she could commence an action in Federal District Court. She states, however, that the District Court frustrated her attempt file a complaint in April of 1999, and that an SSA administrator told her told her she could not file a complaint in District Court until her unrelated Workers' Compensation case was resolved. As the plaintiff explains in her July 20, 2000 response to the defendant's motion to dismiss:
On April 15, 1999 I went to District Court at 300 Rabro Drive. As I could not find a lawyer I went to file the papers on my own. I was within my sixty day time limit. . . . I went up to the information counter to find out exactly where to go to file my paperwork. There was a slightly heavyweight woman with dark curly hair sitting behind the desk. I was told that I was in the wrong place. The lady sent me to workmen's compensation building.
[At the Workers' Compensation building,] I explained why I was there and was handed some forms. I filled out the forms I was given. I made my deadline, I was just sent to the wrong place. When I received the forms back from workmen's compensation, the forms did not look correct to me. I decided that I needed help so I called the social security office at 1-800-772-1213. . . . I was told that I could not have two disability cases open at the same time. I was told that I had to wait until the workmen's compensation case was closed. See Pl.'s Response at 2.
The plaintiff maintains that the untimeliness of her complaint was not caused by any lack of diligence on her part, but was the result of the erroneous instructions she received from the District Court and the SSA. The plaintiff claims she did not file a complaint in District Court because she was instructed to apply for Workers' Compensation benefits instead.
In corroboration, plaintiff submits correspondence she received from the Workers' Compensation Board, dated May 14, 1999, acknowledging receipt of her application for disability benefits, and requesting additional medical information to process her claim. See Workers' Comp. Letter, exhibit to Pl.'s complaint, at 3. This letter makes no reference to plaintiff visiting the Workers' Compensation building on April 15, but such a visit could reasonably be inferred from the plaintiff's receipt of such a letter. Id.
The plaintiff claims she went to the District Court on April 15, 1999, the last day of the filing period, but was frustrated in her attempt to file. She alleges the following events: (1) she approached the District Court information desk, and asked where to file her Social Security claim; (2) she was told that she was in the wrong building, and was instructed to file a Worker's Compensation claim; and (3) she left the District Court, and went to the Workers' Compensation building, where she applied for Workers' Compensation benefits from the State of New York.
Approximately one month later, the plaintiff received paperwork from the Workers' Compensation Board requesting medical information. See Workers' Comp. Letter at 3. Realizing she had made a mistake by filing for Workers' Compensation, the plaintiff claims she called the Social Security office at 1-800-772-1213 to ask for help. During this phone call, the plaintiff claims she was told by the SSA not to file her claim in District Court until her Workers' Compensation case was resolved. This phone call to the SSA did not take place until May though, until after the plaintiff had received a letter from the Workers' Compensation Board. See Workers' Comp. Letter at 3. By this time, the April 1999 deadline to file her claim had already passed. See Appeals Council Letter at 1.
According to the plaintiff, her Workers' Compensation case was closed at the end of September of 1999. See 11/18/99 Letter at 1. As mentioned above, the plaintiff claims the SSA told her that she could file her claim once the Workers' Compensation case was resolved. Id. However, the plaintiff did not file her claim in District Court in September because she "was having bad chest pains almost constantly." See Pl.'s Resp. at 2. To alleviate the plaintiff's chest pain, Dr. Matthew T. Chengot of the Amityville Heart Center prescribed the heart medication Atenolol.Id. The Atenolol prescription caused swelling and numbness in the plaintiff's knees and hips, which no longer were able to support her weight. Id. at 3. Subsequent X-rays revealed that the plaintiff's kneecaps rotated, and also showed signs of arthritis. Id. Physical therapy was recommended by Dr. Barkin, an orthopedist, to address these ailments, but the plaintiff was unable to go "due to transportation problems." Id.
On November 18, 1999, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the court explaining that she "was now back trying to file again," and thanked the court for its understanding. See 11/18/99 Letter at 2. The plaintiff, however, did not file her complaint in this action until December 8, 1999. See 12/8/99 Plaintiff's Affidavit at 1.
II. Discussion
The statutory deadline for filing a civil action after final rejection of a SSI claim is outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)-(h). The statute states in pertinent part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision . . . No findings of fact or decision by the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or government agency except as herein provided.
The sixty-day time period begins to run when the claimant receives notice of the decision, which is presumed to be five days after the date of such decision, unless "there is reasonable showing to the contrary." 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c).
The sixty-day filing requirement is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478 (1986). Further, the statute containing this limitations period was designed by Congress to be "`unusually protective' of claimants." Id at 480 (citing Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984)). Due to the protective nature of the statute for claimants, the Second Circuit has observed that equitable tolling of the limitations period is "not infrequently appropriate." State of New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1990). "While in most cases the Secretary will make the determination whether it is proper to extend the period within which review must be sought, cases may arise where the equities in favor of tolling the limitations period are so great that deference to the agency's judgment is inappropriate." Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480. Although the process for reviewing disability claims is "unusually protective" of claimants, Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984), equitable tolling is inappropriate on the facts presented here.
Equitable tolling by the court has been found appropriate in the Social Security context in several circumstances. For example, courts have found such tolling to be warranted where the government engages in some affirmative misconduct, or attempts to enforce some clandestine policy that has a negative impact on claimants. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 481; Wong v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir. 1988). Courts have allowed tolling where the claimant suffers from a mental impairment and, because of that impairment, does not understand the deadline included in the Commissioner's notice. Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758-9 (2d Cir. 1991). This is a special exception for those with serious impairments, because "[a]llowing disability claimants who have been denied benefits to toll the sixty-day period on grounds of poor health would thoroughly undermine [Section 405(g)'s] sixty-day limitation period." Wong, 854 F.2d at 631.
Courts have also found equitable tolling appropriate where (i) the claimant rebutted the presumption that the notice of the Appeals Council denial was received within five days, Chiappa v. Califano, 480 F. Supp. 856, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), (ii) the Commissioner's final notice was sent in English to a claimant accustomed to receiving such notices in Spanish, Correa v. Bowen, 682 F. Supp. 755, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), and (iii) where a claimant demonstrated that she received conflicting information about the filing deadline from an attorney and the court, and followed the attorney's incorrect advice. See Hernandez v. Sullivan, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16317 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1991).
Giving the plaintiff's pro se papers a close and sympathetic reading, her submissions suggest two potentially relevant arguments: first, the possibility that the plaintiff might show that government misconduct frustrated her attempt to file her claim by the April 15, 1999 deadline, and second, the possibility that the plaintiff might demonstrate incapacity due to mental impairment during the sixty-day period. However, the record here supports neither possibility.
The plaintiff's experience does not illustrate a situation of government misconduct which would justify equitable tolling. InBowen, plaintiffs in a class action suit challenged an unpublished, secret policy of the SSA, claiming that the failure to notify applicants of the policy denied them due process of law. 476 U.S. at 470. Internal memoranda from the SSA evidenced a systemwide misapplication of disability regulations, which led to the denial of benefits to "countless" eligible candidates.Id. The Supreme Court concluded that tolling was appropriate because "[w]here the Government's secretive conduct prevents plaintiffs from knowing of a violation of rights, statutes of limitations have been tolled until such time as plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to learn the facts concerning the cause of action." Bowen, 476 U.S. at 481 (quoting the underlying decision of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 738 (2d Cir. 1984)).
Here, the plaintiff's bare assertion that she was misled by a SSA employee falls short of the documented evidence of widespread misconduct in Bowen. The plaintiff's allegations that she was misled are belied by the notice she received from the Appeals Council clearly stating that her case must be filed in District Court within sixty days. See Appeals Council Letter at 1.
Even assuming, arguendo, that an SSA representative informed the plaintiff that she could not file a District Court action until after her Workers' Compensation case was resolved, the plaintiff states that her Workers' Compensation case was closed at the end of September 1999. Despite this determination in her Workers' Compensation case, she did not file her complaint in the instant action until more than sixty days later on December 8, 1999. Although the plaintiff claims that ill health prevented her from filing sooner, this ill health was not mental incapacity, but rather the physical ailment that prompted her to file for SSI in the first place. As stated by the Second Circuit in Wong v. Bowen, allowing disability claimants to toll the sixty-day waiting period on the grounds of poor health "would thoroughly undermine section [405(g)'s] sixty-day limitations period."Wong, 854 F.2d at 630-631.
In addition to physical impairments, the plaintiff's medical history does include evidence of mental health problems. These problems, however, do not warrant equitable tolling on account of mental incapacity. In Canales, the Second Circuit held that "equitable tolling of the 60-day statute of limitations of Section 405(g) may be warranted in cases where an SSI disability claimant fails to seek judicial review in a timely manner because of mental impairments." 936 F.2d at 759. However, a "conclusory and vague claim, without a particularized description, is manifestly insufficient to justify any further inquiry into tolling." Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying Canales' analysis in SSI context to claim alleging disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701).
The plaintiff was diagnosed by Dr. Rise on June 5, 1996 with a depressive disorder and personality disorder, and had "moderate psychomatic retardation and some difficulty with attention, concentration, and recall." ALJ Decision at 6. Plaintiff had been hospitalized for a psychiatric disorder at age fifteen, and had received treatment for one year afterwards. Id. Since that time, however, the plaintiff has received no psychiatric treatment, and has not claimed that mental incapacity was an issue during the relevant sixty-day period. Id.
The plaintiff's portrayal of events during the sixty-day limitations period establishes no causal connection between any mental impairment and the lateness of her complaint. In fact, the plaintiff's own letters cite altogether different reasons for missing the sixty-day deadline. First, the plaintiff claims she missed the filing deadline because she was incorrectly sent to the Workers' Compensation building. ("On April 15, 1999 I went to District Court. . . . I was told that I was in the wrong place. The lady sent me to workmen's compensation building." Pl.'s Resp. at 2). Later, after her Workers' Compensation case had been resolved, chest pains, arthritis, and "transportation problems" were the stated reasons for her late filing. See Pl.'s Resp. at 3. These generalized claims of disability may be relevant to the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim, but are insufficient to permit equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity.
Here, every indication is that the plaintiff was able to understand notices and meet filing deadlines, since she met all deadlines that were present throughout the process of applying for SSI benefits. Following a determination at each stage of the five-step administrative process, the plaintiff was instructed to proceed to the next stage within sixty days of receiving notice of the decision. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 472. Her consistent compliance with the statute of limitations during these prior appeals indicates that she was accustomed to operating under time constraints and capable of doing so, even when acting pro se. Furthermore, the plaintiff's own correspondence shows she clearly understood that the deadline to file her claim in District Court was April 15, 1999. ("On April 15, 1999 I went to District Court at 300 Rabro Drive . . . I made my deadline, I was just sent to the wrong place." Pl.'s Resp. at 2). Finally, the plaintiff's response demonstrates that she has sufficient mental capacity to understand the legal issues in her case, arguing that "[a]llowing my case to go through due to extenuating circumstances will not undermine the sixty day limitation period." Pl.'s Resp. at 3.
The Commissioner argues that the failure to abide by the statute of limitations means that plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for "lack of jurisdiction" pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 5/4/00 Def.'s Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Jurisdiction, at 2. However, the Supreme Court in Bowen held that "the 60-day requirement [of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)] is not jurisdictional but rather constitutes a statute of limitations." 476 U.S. at 478. Accordingly, the court will treat the Government's motion as having been brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) rather than Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and grants their motion to dismiss.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is time barred, and the plaintiff's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.