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GLOVER v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMP. BD. OF REV

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Nov 9, 2004
No. 924 C.D. 2004 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004)

Opinion

No. 924 C.D. 2004.

Submitted: September 10, 2004.

Filed: November 9, 2004. Order Filed: January 18. 2005.

BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge; JUBELIRER, Judge; FLAHERTY, Senior Judge.


ORDER


NOW, January 18, 2005, having considered respondent's application for reargument, and petitioner's answer, the application is denied.

Reconsideration is granted however, an our opinion and Order filed November 9, 2004, are hereby withdrawn.

The parties may file new briefs (15 copies) within 14 days of this Order. See Pa. R.A.P. 2140(a). This case shall then be submitted to the Court on briefs without oral argument.


OPINION


Richard A. Glover, Jr., (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that affirmed a referee's decision disallowing Claimant's receipt of an additional cycle of Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) benefits under the Trade Act after he exhausted his first cycle.

The referee found that Claimant was originally employed by Motion Control and lost his position due to a plant closure in January 2002. His separation from employment was covered by the Trade Act, which established a federal program that provides TRA benefits to workers who are certified by the United States Secretary of Labor as persons adversely affected by unfair or injurious import competition. After Claimant's termination from Motion Control, he filed an Application for Training under the Trade Act on January 28, 2002. A few days later, he filed a Request of Determination Entitlement to Trade Act benefits with an impact date of February 23, 2000 and a termination/expiration date of June 21, 2003. In February 2002, he received a determination indicating that he was entitled to TRA benefits; that document did not state the specific amounts Claimant would receive.

As we have previously observed:

The Trade Act, passed by Congress to "safeguard American industry and labor against unfair or injurious import competition," 19 U.S.C. § 2102, authorizes the United States Secretary of Labor to grant allowances to certain workers whom the Secretary determines to be unemployed as a result of certain types of foreign industrial competition, 19 U.S.C. § 2273. It envisions a symbiotic relationship between the federal allowances and the unemployment compensation laws of the various states, and provides that state law shall be applied. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to the Trade Act provide that, after the Secretary determines which general categories of workers are eligible for assistance, the unemployment insurance agencies of the states have jurisdiction to determine the entitlements of individual claimants, and that appeals from such agency determinations shall follow the applicable route under state law.

Panczak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 409 A.2d 929, 930-931 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1980) (footnotes omitted).Accord Ford v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 409 A.2d 1209 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1980).

"`Impact date' means the date stated in a certification issued under the [Trade] Act on which total or partial separations began or threatened to begin in a firm or a subdivision of a firm." 20 C.F.R. § 617.3(v) (2004).

The record also shows that, in April 2002, Claimant filed a Request by Worker for Training Approval and Allowances While in Training, which was granted on August 29, 2002. His training was scheduled to end in May 2004.

Critical to this case is the undisputed fact that in August 2002, only days after Claimant began his training, he also began working two part-time jobs: one at Product Assurances, where he earned $50.00 per week, and the other at Ridgeway BiLo, where he earned $123.40 per week.

In November 2003, after Claimant's termination date, the Board mailed Claimant a Notice of Financial Determination. This notice advised Claimant that he was financially eligible for an additional cycle of TRA benefits, but that such benefits would be paid only if, inter alia, "[y]ou have exhausted all other unemployment insurance and basic TRA available to you." (R. Item No. 8.) The notice further indicated that (1) Claimant's weekly TRA benefit rate is $421.00; (2) the maximum combined total of his basic and additional TRA entitlement is $16,419.00; (3) he is entitled to $8.00 per week dependents allowance; and, (4) his additional TRA eligibility period begins on November 2, 2003 and ends on May 1, 2004. This paragraph of the notice stated, " If you are entitled to State or Federal unemployment insurance, you cannot receive TRA benefits for those weeks." (R. Item No. 8) (emphasis added). Finally, the notice advised Claimant that he had a partial benefit credit of $169 and that, if he earned that amount or less, he "may be eligible" for full benefits and, if he earned more than $169 but less then $590, he "may qualify [sic] for partial benefits." (R. Item No. 8.) In fact, due to his two part-time jobs, Claimant earned $175.00 per week, which was $6.00 more than his partial benefit credit. In early January 2004, Claimant filed for the additional TRA benefits for the week ending December 27, 2003. However, the Bureau of Employment Security disallowed his request because it concluded that Claimant did not exhaust all rights to any state unemployment insurance benefits to which he would be entitled if he applied. Claimant appealed this determination. On appeal the referee held that because Claimant, by December 2003, had earned sufficient base year wages from his two part-time positions to qualify for regular unemployment compensation, he was not entitled to additional TRA benefits under the exhaustion provision of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2291. This provision allows an employee to receive TRA benefits only where "he has exhausted all rights to any unemployment insurance, except additional compensation that is funded by a State and is not reimbursed from any Federal funds, to which he was entitled (or would be entitled if he applied therefor)." 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Concluding that Claimant, because of his base year earnings from the part-time jobs, would be entitled to regular state unemployment compensation benefits should he apply for them, the referee disallowed Trade Act benefits. On appeal, the Board summarily affirmed. Claimant now appeals to this Court.

The record does not explain the status of benefits between June 2003, when Claimant's TRA benefits were to have terminated, and November 2003.

Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the Board's adjudication is in violation of constitutional rights, whether an error of law was committed, or whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Nolan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 797 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

Claimant argues that the referee erred by equating eligibility for regular unemployment benefits with entitlement to them and asserts that the Trade Act did not intend to deter a person from holding a part-time job. A quotation from Claimant's appeal to the Board sets forth his position:

Three factory workers lose their jobs due to overseas competition. The same three apply for and receive TRA benefits. They also attend the same college and will graduate on the same day. Worker one worked just enough to receive benefits and quit stating he wouldn't work if he did not have to. Worker two worked just enough to receive benefits and took over housework and his wife worked more overtime. Worker three has worked one and two part-time jobs and did not quit. Worker one is still receiving TRA benefits. Worker two could not believe worker three lost TRA benefits but was glad he did not look for or find a job. Worker three is me.

(R. Item No. 15.)

Claimant continues to be employed at his part-time positions. Thus, the precise issue before the Court is whether, because Claimant has established a base year for the two part-time jobs, and could apply for benefits if he lost those jobs, he is "entitled" to state unemployment benefits under the Trade Act exhaustion provision. If so, the disallowance of additional Trade Act benefits was proper. The Board's position is that if Claimant loses his part-time employment for reasons that are not otherwise disqualifying, he would be entitled or "qualified" to collect regular state unemployment benefits and, therefore, he has not exhausted his entitlement to state benefits. The Board contends that Claimant, having now established sufficient base year earnings to make him eligible for unemployment benefits based on his two part-time jobs, is "entitled" to state benefits within the meaning of Section 2291(a)(3) even though he is not presently unemployed as to the two part-time jobs, and those part-time jobs were not the employment that qualified him to receive Trade Act Benefits.

The Board concedes there are no cases on point. It relies on Sturni v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 625 A.2d 727 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1993), which concerns a different provision of the Trade Act and does not address the question here. Moreover in Sturni, the claimant was disqualified because her application was filed late. The case had nothing to do with any part-time employment undertaken by the claimant subsequent to her separation for reasons covered by the Trade Act.

We have found no case law in either the state or federal forum construing the word "entitled" as used in 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(3)(B). However, Black's Law Dictionary defines "entitle" as "to grant a legal right to or qualify for." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (9th ed. 1999).

In enacting the Trade Act, Congress has stated:

The purposes of [the Trade Act] are, through trade agreements affording mutual benefits —

(1) to foster the economic growth of and full employment in the United States and to strengthen economic relations between the United States and foreign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world trade;

(2) to harmonize, reduce, and eliminate barriers to trade on a basis which assures substantially equivalent competitive opportunities for the commerce of the United States;

(3) to establish fairness and equity in international trading relations, including reform of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;

(4) to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor against unfair or injurious import competition, and to assist industries, firm [firms], workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international trade flows;

(5) to open up market opportunities for United States commerce in nonmarket economies; and

(6) to provide fair and reasonable access to products of less developed countries in the United States market. 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (emphasis added).

One court has explained Congress' intent in enacting the Trade Act as follows:

The overall purpose of the Trade Act of 1974 was to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade in order to realize the benefits of a trade linked world. . . . Congress established a special program of worker adjustment assistance in the belief that the special nature of employment dislocation resulting from these changes in trade policy necessitated a level of worker protection greater than that available through regular state unemployment insurance programs. Because entire industries may be adversely affected by increased imports, workers may not have realistic opportunities to find new employment. Moreover, the affected industry or industries may be concentrated in a particular region thereby compounding the difficulties of absorbing the displaced workers into other types of employment. . . . Congress, in the Trade Act of 1974, attempted to ease the TRA qualifying criteria in the hope that more benefits would be provided to more workers.

Skrundz v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security, 444 N.E.2d 1217, 1225 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983) (emphasis added and citations omitted).

In order to effectuate its beneficent purposes, the Trade Act entitles workers, who qualify, to receive a benefit allowance, job counseling, testing and placement services, costs for re-training, job search allowances, and relocation allowances. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298. Because the Trade Act's purpose is remedial, its eligibility provisions must be liberally construed. Embaby v. Department of Jobs Training, 397 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986). However, it also contains an express exhaustion requirement in 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(3)(B). This provision states that TRA will be paid if the following condition is met:

. . .

(3) Such worker —

. . .

(B) has exhausted all rights to any unemployment insurance, except additional compensation that is funded by a State and is not reimbursed from any Federal funds, to which he was entitled (or would be entitled if he applied therefor). . . .

U.S.C. § 2291(a)(3)(B). The Board asserts that Claimant does not meet this exhaustion requirement, which Claimant disputes.

Under Section 401 of our state Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), "Compensation shall be payable to any employe who is or becomes unemployed. . . ." 43 P.S § 801 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Claimant was unemployed due to the effects of foreign competition. The Trade Act provides that a claimant, in such circumstances, can receive a certain sum of money per week on which to live while he trains for a new career. Here, Claimant applied for TRA, received permitted benefits and enrolled in the required training, which he was to complete in May 2004. Further, due to his own commendable industriousness, he earned additional money through his part-time employment, which is not prohibited by the Trade Act. Indeed, his industriousness was such that he, ultimately, established base year wages due only to those part-time jobs. This accomplishment, according to the Board, disqualifies him completely from continuing to receive TRA benefits because if he applied for state unemployment benefits, he would be entitled to collect them if he lost his part-time jobs through no fault of his own.

Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 801.

As we have noted for at least a quarter of a century, the unemployment compensation law is remedial in nature and should be construed to provide economic security to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Darby Township v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 429 A.2d 1223, 1227 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1981).

The net effect of the Board's position is that any regular state unemployment compensation benefits to which Claimant would be entitled due entirely to the base year earnings emanating from part-time work (work that is completely unrelated to the job for which he had obtained Trade Act benefits) are essentially imputed to the job that was covered by the Trade Act. Furthermore, under the Board's position, the amount of his regular unemployment benefits would be calculated based only upon Claimant's part-time job earnings, not the earnings he had made prior to the plant closure. Therefore, the unemployment benefits would only replace the income he lost from the part-time employment, and not the income he lost due to the plant closure, even though it is the income from the plant closure that the Trade Act was intended to replace.

We conclude that the Board's position is not correct. First, under our state unemployment law, one is entitled to benefits only if he is "unemployed" from the position for which he seeks benefits. There is no dispute that Claimant was employed, during the relevant period, at two separate part-time jobs. Thus, if he now would apply for state benefits, he would not be "entitled" to collect them. Second, the Board's position is not in keeping with the humanitarian purposes of either the state unemployment law or the Trade Act. Third, the Board's position does not consider the Trade Act's objective of assisting workers in adjusting to changes in international trade and is inconsistent with the Congressional attempt to ease the TRA qualifying criteria so that more workers can obtain benefits. Accordingly, because Claimant is not unemployed and, therefore, not entitled to receive state unemployment benefits at all, we reverse the Board's order. Because of this disposition, we do not reach the issue of whether the limitation in Section 2291(a)(3)(B) of the Trade Act requires the state benefits to which a claimant is "entitled" to be related to the loss of the job for which he was entitled to TRA benefits.

We express no opinion on whether the Board should reduce Claimant's TRA benefits to the extent his earnings exceeded his partial benefit credit, i.e., $6.00.

ORDER

NOW, November 9, 2004, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed.


Summaries of

GLOVER v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMP. BD. OF REV

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Nov 9, 2004
No. 924 C.D. 2004 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004)
Case details for

GLOVER v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMP. BD. OF REV

Case Details

Full title:Richard A. Glover, Jr., Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of…

Court:Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Date published: Nov 9, 2004

Citations

No. 924 C.D. 2004 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004)