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Glen Travel Plaza v. H.G. Anderson Equipment

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Jul 3, 1986
122 A.D.2d 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)

Opinion

July 3, 1986

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Schenectady County (Dier, J.).


Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in 1982 and thereafter obtained a default judgment upon defendants' failure to interpose an answer. Defendants retained new counsel and the parties vacated the default by stipulation. On September 6, 1984, plaintiffs made a demand for a bill of particulars and for discovery and inspection. Defendants failed to respond and, in December 1984, plaintiffs brought on a motion for an order to compel compliance. On January 16, 1985, plaintiffs obtained a conditional order, purportedly consented to by defendants, precluding defendants from offering evidence at trial unless they complied with plaintiffs' demands within 30 days. At a pretrial conference on July 8, 1985, plaintiffs' counsel pointed out that the conditional order had not been complied with. Thereafter, on July 31, 1985, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, contending that the conditional order had become final, and since defendants were therefore precluded from offering any evidence at trial, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that they had not consented to the conditional order and had first been made aware of its existence at the July 8, 1985 pretrial conference. They cross-moved to compel plaintiffs to accept a bill of particulars and response to the demand for discovery and inspection which were served on August 8, 1985. Special Term denied plaintiffs' motion and granted defendants' cross motion. This appeal by plaintiffs ensued. We now affirm.

Although summary judgment is an appropriate remedy where an order of preclusion prevents a party from defending a cause of action (see, Gass v Gass, 101 A.D.2d 849, 850), the failure to comply with such an order may be excused where the defaulting party proffers a reasonable excuse for its neglect, shows the existence of a meritorious defense and an intention to defend the action, and the opposing party fails to establish prejudice (see, Epstein v Lenox Hill Hosp., 108 A.D.2d 616, 617-618; Heffney v Brookdale Hosp. Center, 102 A.D.2d 842, appeal dismissed 63 N.Y.2d 770).

Defendant's attorney averred in his affidavit that defendants did not consent to the conditional order and were unaware of its existence. He stated that he knew that a motion had been made by plaintiffs to compel compliance with their demands, but claimed to be uninformed as to the outcome of the motion and maintained that he unsuccessfully attempted to contact plaintiffs' attorneys to determine its status. We reject plaintiffs' contention that defendants are precluded from making this defense because of the unrebutted affidavit of service by mail of a copy of the conditional order upon defendants, raising a presumption of delivery (citing Engel v Lichterman, 95 A.D.2d 536, affd 62 N.Y.2d 943). The affidavit of service relied upon by plaintiffs was executed some six months subsequent to the alleged mailing. Plaintiffs have not made a showing therein or otherwise of their adherence to an office practice geared to ensure the likelihood of proper mailing. Thus, the presumption of delivery does not arise (see, Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 N.Y.2d 828, 830; Matter of Feinerman [Roberts], 97 A.D.2d 920; Engel v Lichterman, supra).

Moreover, even were we to accept plaintiffs' position, the foregoing suggests that defendants' neglect was due to law office failure. Defendants have established, through their verified bill of particulars and other motion papers, the existence of a meritorious defense and that there was no intent to abandon the defense, as demonstrated by the continued pretrial activities participated in by both parties. The delay was not inordinate (see, Heffney v Brookdale Hosp. Center, supra, p 843) and plaintiffs have not established any prejudice. Under these circumstances, it was within Special Term's discretion to vacate the default (see, CPLR 2005; Epstein v Lenox Hill Hosp., supra; Paoli v Sullcraft Mfg. Co., 104 A.D.2d 333, 334; Heffney v Brookdale Hosp. Center, supra).

Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P.J., Main, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Glen Travel Plaza v. H.G. Anderson Equipment

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Jul 3, 1986
122 A.D.2d 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
Case details for

Glen Travel Plaza v. H.G. Anderson Equipment

Case Details

Full title:GLEN TRAVEL PLAZA, INC., et al., Appellants, v. H.G. ANDERSON EQUIPMENT…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Jul 3, 1986

Citations

122 A.D.2d 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)

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