Opinion
16-74049
10-11-2022
ELVIS GIRON-TREJOS, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted October 6, 2022 Pasadena, California
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Agency No. A073-904-038
Before: LEE and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, District Judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
MEMORANDUM
Elvis Giron-Trejos petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
1. The BIA correctly concluded that Giron-Trejos's asylum application was untimely because it was not filed within one year of his arrival in the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), or within a "reasonable period" after he experienced a material change in circumstances, id. § 1158(a)(2)(D); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii). Giron-Trejos entered the United States in 1994 and was a derivative applicant on his mother's 1995 application for asylum. On September 26, 2007, his mother removed him as a derivative applicant. Giron-Trejos did not then apply for asylum until December 28, 2015. His only explanation for this eight-year delay was that he did not know that he needed to apply earlier. While a loss of derivative beneficiary status constitutes a material change in circumstances, an eight-year delay is not presumptively reasonable, and ignorance of the law does not provide an exception for Giron-Trejos's actions. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that, absent further explanation, 22-months delay was not a "reasonable period"); see also Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse").
2. By failing to challenge the IJ's holding that he did not establish past persecution, Giron-Trejos has forfeited any such argument. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013). Giron-Trejos also fails to challenge the IJ's holding that, in the absence of past persecution, he has not met his burden to establish a clear probability of future persecution. This argument, too, is therefore forfeited. Id.
3. Giron-Trejos has not established that he was not convicted of an offense that would render him ineligible for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (explaining that under the REAL ID Act, the applicant "shall have the burden of establishing that he [] is eligible for any requested benefit or privilege."). Giron-Trejos's testimony shows that he was convicted of being under the influence of cocaine in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11550(a), making him ineligible for such relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (providing that an applicant is inadmissible if the applicant is convicted of any state law "relating to a controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802, which includes cocaine); cf. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S.Ct. 754, 767 (2021) (holding that applicants "seeking to cancel a lawful removal order must prove that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying crime").
PETITION DENIED.
The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.