Opinion
1:22-cv-00166
12-05-2024
MEGAN BROOK GILLIAM, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Alderson FPC, Respondent.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CHERYL A. EIFERT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court are Petitioner Megan B. Gilliam's pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (ECF No. 1), and Respondent's motion that the petition be denied and this matter be dismissed. (ECF No. 7). This matter is assigned to the Honorable David A. Faber, United States District Judge, and by Standing Order has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having thoroughly considered the record, the undersigned determines that Gilliam is not entitled to relief from this Court; therefore, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that Gilliam's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (ECF No. 1), be DENIED; Respondent's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, (ECF No. 7); and this action be DISMISSED and removed from the docket of the Court.
I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
Megan Gilliam is an inmate currently incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Tallahassee with a projected release date of July 29, 2025. See Inmate Locator, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Number: 53266-074. On April 6, 2022, while incarcerated in this judicial district, Gilliam filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241. (ECF No. 1 at 1). Her petition raises two grounds for relief: 1) she is entitled to credit for her time spent in custody prior to imposition of her federal sentence; and 2) she should receive a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) for her rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated. (ECF No. 1 at 6).
Gilliam's petition lists three grounds for relief, but grounds one and two both request credit for her time spent in federal custody prior to sentencing.
On February 8, 2018, Gilliam was arrested by Tennessee authorities on state charges in Case No. 179568, and for a violation of the terms of her probation in Case No. 176630. (ECF No. 7-1 at 2). At the same time, she had state charges pending in a third matter, Case No. 18CR125. (Id. at 3). On February 20, 2018, her probation was revoked and the original sentence in that case, for 11 months and 29 days, was executed. (Id.). On May 22, 2018, Gilliam was borrowed by federal authorities on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. (Id.). While in federal custody awaiting prosecution on federal charges, Gilliam completed her sentence for the state probation violation (Case No. 176630) on October 6, 2018. (Id.). Gilliam subsequently pled guilty to the federal charge-conspiracy to distribute/possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine-and on February 11, 2019, was sentenced to 110 months of imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (the “Sentencing Court”). (ECF 7-1 at 3). In the judgment, the Sentencing Court ordered that Gilliam's federal sentence should run concurrently with her state sentences in Case Nos. 179568 and 18CR125, and recommended that Gilliam be given credit “for time served from 4/1/17 to the date that she was released on bond and from 2/8/18 to the present.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 18). On March 8, 2019, charges in the pending state prosecution, 18CR125, were dismissed. On March 13, 2019, Gilliam was returned to state authorities via return writ. (ECF No. 7-1 at 3). On April 17, 2019, Gilliam was released by the state to federal authorities to serve her federal sentence. (Id.).
Gilliam later filed a motion to modify her federal judgment, asking the Sentencing Court to grant her additional jail credit, because the BOP had not credited all of the time she spent in county and federal holding facilities prior to imposition of her federal sentence. United States v. Megan Brook Gilliam, 2:18-cr-00049-JRG-MCLC-3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2022), ECF No. 186 at 1-2. The BOP responded that it had not applied the credit to her federal sentence because that time had already been applied to her state probation sentence. Id., ECF No. 195 at 3. The Sentencing Court determined that there was no basis to modify Gilliam's sentence under 18 U.S.C. §3582 and advised that she seek habeas relief in her district of incarceration regarding the jail credit issue. Several weeks after the first motion, Gilliam filed another motion in the Sentencing Court for a sentence reduction or placement on home confinement. Id., ECF 188 at 4. The Sentencing Court found that it had no statutory basis on which to reduce Gilliam's sentence and lacked the legal authority to place her on home confinement. Id., ECF No. 211 at 1.
Gilliam contends that she is entitled to time credit towards her federal sentence for all of her time spent in custody in federal facilities on the federal writ ad prosequendum-from May 22, 2018 until February 11, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at 6). She also argues that she should receive a sentence reduction due to her rehabilitative efforts in prison. (Id. at 7).
Gilliam's petition incorrectly states that her federal sentencing date was February 9, 2019, and that she was borrowed by federal authorities on the writ ad prosequendum in April 2018. (ECF No. 1 at 6). This Court understands her petition as asserting that she is entitled to time credit for the time she actually spent in federal custody, from May 22, 2018 until her correct sentencing date, February 11, 2019.
In response to Gilliam's petition, Respondent moves to dismiss the petition and argues that Gilliam's prior custody credit was properly applied; Gilliam was granted 127 days' prior custody credit towards her federal sentence for the period of October 7, 2018 through February 10, 2019, which was the time between the end of her state sentence in Case No. 176630 and the beginning of her federal sentence. (ECF No. 7 at 1, 7-8). During that time, she was in custody on state charges in Case No. 18CR125, which were later nolle prossed, after her federal conviction was imposed. However, Respondent contends that Gilliam was not entitled to any more credit towards her federal sentence, because the time she spent in custody between February 8, 2018 and October 6, 2018 had already been credited towards her state sentence for the probation violation. (Id.) Respondent's filing did not address Gilliam's second argument about a sentence reduction. (See ECF No. 7). Gilliam was ordered to reply to the response within 60 days. (ECF No. 8). She has not done so within the allotted time; therefore, this matter is ready for disposition.
II. Standard of Review
Respondent does not identify the standard under which he seeks dismissal of Gilliam's petition; however, Respondent filed the response concurrently with the request for dismissal. Therefore, the request should be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009). A motion for judgment on the pleadings applies the same standard of review as a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6), and both motions may be filed in habeas actions. (Id. at 138-39); see also Martin v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, No. cv PWG-17-3335, 2018 WL 2135009, at *1 (D. Md., May 9, 2018).
When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations of the petition as true and “draw all reasonable factual inferences” in favor of the petitioner. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014); Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 169 (4th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, the court is “not obliged to accept allegations that ‘represent unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,' or that ‘contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.'” Massey, 759 F.3d at 353 (quoting Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 2006)). A court presented with a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a federal habeas case must consider “the face of the petition and any attached exhibits.” Walker, 589 F.3d at 139 (quoting Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 169) (internal markings omitted). In addition, the court may consider “matters of public record,” including documents from prior or pending court proceedings, when resolving the motion without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. (Id.) The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint ... as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
III. Discussion
Gilliam's petition includes two grounds for relief: 1) that she is entitled to a prior custody time credit which was not applied to her sentence and 2) that her rehabilitative efforts entitle her to a sentence reduction. Neither ground warrants relief.
A. Prior Custody Time Credit
Gilliam argues that her sentence should be credited for all of the time she spent incarcerated in federal facilities prior to the imposition of her federal sentence, which includes the time period from May 22, 2018 through February 10, 2019. Prior custody time credit is governed by 18 U.S.C. §3585(b), which states that a defendant shall be given credit towards a sentence for any time spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences, either as a result of the instant offense or as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the instant offence, if that time has not already been credited against another sentence. The key part of this statute for Gilliam's case is this last portion-a defendant cannot have the same time period credited towards more than one sentence.
When Gilliam's federal sentence was executed, the time Gilliam spent in custody until October 7, 2018 had already been credited towards her state sentence for the probation violation. (ECF No. 7-1 at 12). The fact that Gilliam was in a federal facility during that time is irrelevant to the application of her time credit. See Branch v. Leu, 2022 WL 4239056 (E.D. N.C., Sept. 14, 2022) (finding that BOP correctly denied petitioner prior custody credit for his time spent in federal facilities on a writ ad prosequendum, as this time had already been credited towards his state sentence). Put simply, her time in custody before October 7, 2018 cannot be credited towards her federal sentence, because it was already credited to a state sentence. The only period in prior custody that had not been applied to another sentence was from October 7, 2018 through February 10, 2019; accordingly, the BOP credited 127 days in prior custody towards her federal sentence. Therefore, the undersigned FINDS there is no legal basis to support this ground for relief.
B. Sentence Reduction
Gilliam asserts she is entitled to a sentence reduction for her rehabilitative efforts while imprisoned, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). (ECF No. 1 at 6). Her claim must be dismissed, both because this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant her a sentence reduction and because her argument is without merit.
This Court lacks authority to grant Gilliam the relief she seeks. Only the Sentencing Court has the authority to reduce a defendant's sentence. Sanders v. Bureau of Prisons, 2021 WL 822269, at *2 (D.S.C., Feb. 9, 2021); report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 809427 (D.S.C., Mar. 3, 2021; Robinson v. Wilson, 2017 WL 5586981 at *5 (S.D. W.Va., Sept. 26, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 5586272 (S.D. W.Va., Nov. 20, 2017); see 18 U.S.C. §3582. Even if this Court could grant a sentence reduction, Gilliam is not entitled to one. Indeed, the Sentencing Court has already considered this request and determined that there is no legal basis to reduce Gilliam's sentence. Gilliam, 2:18-cr-00049-JRG-MCLC-3, ECF No. 211 at 1.
The statute Gilliam cites in her petition, 18 U.S.C. §3553, relates to the initial imposition of a sentence; it does not provide any grounds for later modifying that sentence. Gilliam presumably intended to cite 18 U.S.C. §3582, which provides a few narrow exceptions to the rule against sentence modifications. “Generally, a court ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.'” United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). Under §3852(c)(1)(A)(i), a court may reduce a defendant's sentence, considering the factors laid out in §3553(a), if it finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction. While Gilliam is right to be proud of her completion of RDAP, FIT, and other programs, the BOP expects that many prisoners will complete these kinds of rehabilitative programs as part of their time in prison. If completing these programs was “extraordinary and compelling”, most federal prisoners would qualify for a sentence reduction. For that reason, Congress stated in 28 U.S.C. §994(t) that postsentencing rehabilitation alone could not qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to reduce a defendant's sentence. United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 572 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Barahona, 132 F.Supp.2d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Therefore, as the Sentencing Court previously concluded, Gilliam's rehabilitative efforts do not entitle her to a sentence reduction. The undersigned FINDS no legal basis to support this ground for relief.
IV. Proposal and Recommendations
For the aforementioned reasons, the undersigned respectfully PROPOSES that Gilliam's § 2241 petition, (ECF No. 1), be DENIED; that Respondent's Moton to Dismiss, (ECF No. 7), be GRANTED; and that this matter be DISMISSED, with prejudice, and removed from the docket of the Court.
The parties are notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendations” is hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable David A. Faber, United States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rules 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner shall have fourteen days (filing of objections) and three days (if received by mail) from the date of filing this “Proposed Findings and Recommendations” within which to file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written objections, identifying the portions of the “Proposed Findings and Recommendations” to which objection is made and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted by the presiding District Judge for good cause shown.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be provided to the opposing party, Judge Faber, and Magistrate Judge Eifert.
The Clerk is instructed to provide a copy of this “Proposed Findings and Recommendations” to the Petitioner and counsel of record.