Opinion
No. 01-06-00159-CV
Opinion issued September 24, 2009.
On Appeal from the 270th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2001-65202.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices BLAND and MASSENGALE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James M. (Matt) Gilbert, a pro se litigant, appeals the trial court's judgment imposing a tax lien against his house and granting permission for the taxing authorities to sell the property to satisfy the tax delinquency.
Matt brings eight issues. In five issues, Matt complains about procedural issues relating to his sister's disclaimer of interest in the property. Matt also complains that he did not receive notice of the trial date, that the taxing authorities' trial attorney commented negatively to him, and that the valuation process was unfair as to his property.
We affirm.
Background
Appellee Houston Independent School District filed this lawsuit to recover delinquent property taxes dating from 1987. Other taxing authorities, including appellees Harris County, the City of Houston, and the Houston Community College System, later joined the suit as additional plaintiffs.
The property subject to the tax liability at issue is an improved lot in Harris County that had been owned by John E. Gilbert and Mary V. Gilbert. Both John and Mary died intestate. The taxing authorities filed this in rem suit in 2001, and the court appointed an attorney ad litem to identify John and Mary's heirs. Five heirs were identified, including Matt and his sister Mary Gilbert McAdams. The heirs were joined as defendants and served with process. Only Matt, who had lived since 1985 in a house on the property at issue, claimed an interest in the property.
Because several members of the Gilbert family are discussed in this opinion, we refer to the Gilberts by their first names for convenience.
During the time Matt lived in the house, property taxes went unpaid for significant periods of time. At the time of trial, delinquent taxes were owed:
• to the Houston Independent School District for tax years 1990 through 2004;
• to Harris County for tax years 1988 through 2004;
• to the City of Houston for tax years 1987 through 2004; and
• to the Houston Community College System for tax years 1987 through 2004.
Although Matt filed a written answer and appeared in court, he did not appear for the trial on January 24, 2006. A notice of trial setting for that date includes Matt on the certificate of service, but the U.S. Postal Service returned the service copy to the taxing authorities' counsel, marked "unclaimed."
After a bench trial to a tax master, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the taxing authorities, permitting them to sell the house to satisfy their tax liens and charging Matt with interest, fees, and court costs. Matt appeals.
Pro Se Representation
Matt represented himself in the trial court, and he also appears before this Court pro se. Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs, we nonetheless require pro se litigants to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. See Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) ("pro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure"); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). "Having two sets of rules — a strict set for attorneys and a lenient set for pro se parties — might encourage litigants to discard their valuable right to the advice and assistance of counsel." Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 444. "Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel." Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d at 185; see also Stein v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 481 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that pro se defendants in tax foreclosure are bound by rules of procedure). Construing his briefing liberally, the issues Matt presents lack substantive merit.
Competency of Mary Gilbert McAdams
In five issues, Matt argues that his sister Mary McAdams is legally incompetent and that she was not properly represented by the attorney ad litem, who was appointed to identify the then-unknown heirs of John and Mary Gilbert. The issues lack merit because Matt lacks standing to assert these issues for his own benefit, and he lacks the legal capacity to assert these issues on behalf of his sister.
Matt's first five issues are:
Did the district court err because one of the heirs served, Mary E. Gilbert, aka Mary Gilbert McAdams, is an incompetent as defined by non sui juris?
Is Mary E. Gilbert mentally competent to understand the nature of the HISD lawsuit and the consequences of foreclosure on the family home?
Do HISD's own tests show Mary E. Gilbert's IQ level and learning ability to be sufficient to understand the legal proceedings of the lawsuit against her?
Were scare tactics used to influence Mary E. Gilbert's decision to claim no interest in the estate?
Did the Attorney Ad Litum [sic] properly represent the interests of the heirs of the estate of John E. Gilbert and Mary V. Gilbert?
Standing
Generally, only parties of record have standing to appeal. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Huizar, 740 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. 1987). Standing requires that the parties have a real controversy which can actually be determined by the relief sought. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). In other words, a person has standing to appeal when he is personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996). As a party to the judgment, Matt has standing to appeal. However, Matt is not personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong identified in his first five issues on appeal, i.e., that Mary did not understand the proceedings. Therefore, we hold that Matt lacks standing to complain on his own behalf of alleged violations of Mary's procedural rights. See Goffney v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 01-08-00063-CV, 2009 WL 2343250, *3-4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 30, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant lacked standing on appeal to challenge alleged procedural due process violations against third party).
Representation of Another
Moreover, Matt is not authorized to contest the judgment directly on behalf of his adult sister. In his brief, Matt states:
One of the defendants, and heir to the estate, my sister, Mary E. Gilbert is mentally retarded and under the definition of non sui juris lacks the requisite legal capacity to act on her own behalf, and therefore may be unable to understand the meaning and consequences of this lawsuit. It is my primary basis for this appeal.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 44 sets forth a procedure for certain litigants, including "persons non compos mentis," to sue and be represented by a "next friend." TEX. R. CIV. P. 44. The proper method for appointment of a next friend to another adult is to follow the same procedure for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, as set forth in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 173. TEX. R. CIV. P. 173; Intracare Hosp. N. v. Campbell, 222 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Nothing in the record shows that Mary was adjudicated incompetent or that Matt was her next friend or her guardian.
Also, Matt is not an attorney. Rule of Civil Procedure 44 does not vitiate § 81.102 of the Texas Government Code and allow unlicensed persons to practice law through appointment as next friend. Jimison v. Mann, 957 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ). Rather, persons must be members of the State Bar to practice law in Texas on behalf of others. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.102(a) (Vernon 2005); e.g., Magaha v. Holmes, 886 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (holding that plaintiff's mother could not act as his attorney because she was not licensed to practice law). Although the supreme court may promulgate rules allowing others to practice law in Texas, that power is limited to the practice by (1) attorneys licensed in foreign jurisdictions, (2) bona fide law students, and (3) unlicensed graduate students who attend or attended a law school approved by the supreme court. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.102(b) (Vernon 2005). Accordingly, Matt is not entitled to act pro se to represent his sister's interests.
Limited Role of Attorney Ad Litem
To the extent that Matt complains, in his fifth issue, that the attorney ad litem failed to properly represent Matt's interests along with the interests of the other heirs of John E. and Mary V. Gilbert, he has offered no argument that he was harmed, and in any case, the record reveals that the limited scope of the attorney ad litem's charge was solely to identify the heirs of John E. and Mary V. Gilbert, and not to represent those heirs in the tax foreclosure proceeding.
Although the order appointing the ad litem does not specifically limit his role, it clearly states that the attorney was appointed to represent the unknown heirs. The order appointing the attorney ad litem was signed in May 2003. Matt answered suit in December 2002. Because he was not an unknown heir at the time the attorney ad litem was appointed, the attorney adlitem owed him no duty.
We overrule Matt's first five issues.
Lack of Notice
In his sixth issue, Matt contends that the trial court erred by not serving him with notice of the trial setting.
The law presumes a trial court hears a case only after proper notice to the parties. Osborn v. Osborn, 961 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). "A recitation of due notice of the trial setting in the judgment constitutes some, but not conclusive evidence that proper notice was given." Id. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence in the record. Id.
Matt concedes that this was not an initial trial setting, as he notes in his brief that he had previously appeared in court and that the trial had been reset. Rule of Civil Procedure 245 requires that a trial court must give 45 days notice of a first trial setting, but may reset the trial to a later date on any reasonable notice. See id. The judgment recites that Matt was served with notice of the January 24, 2006 trial, and the notice of trial setting with a certificate of service including Matt appears in the record.
Accordingly, we overrule Matt's sixth issue.
Mental Duress
In his seventh issue, Matt complains about a comment made by opposing counsel. Matt contends that at an oral hearing, an attorney for the taxing authorities told him that his "situation was hopeless," that "nothing could be done to prevent the property from being foreclosed on and going to public auction," and that Matt "was going to lose the family home" and he "might as well `hang it up.'" Matt contends that he became distraught with an "immediate pervading sense of hopelessness," and that he "broke down and openly wept right there in the courtroom."
Matt sought no relief in the trial court, and he seeks no specific relief from this Court with respect to this issue. We thus cannot provide any relief in this regard on his appeal from the judgment of the trial court. We overrule this issue.
Property Valuation
In his eighth and final issue, Matt complains that he was unable to challenge the property's valuation because his parents died intestate and he is not the record owner of the property. He argues, "Because the property may be taxed at an unfair rate, it renders the amount of the judgment invalid." We interpret this as a challenge to the valuation of the property.
This is an appeal from judgment in a lawsuit to recover delinquent taxes. Matt is statutorily barred from challenging the valuation of the house in this case, and we lack jurisdiction to consider such a claim. Chapter 41 of the Tax Code establishes procedures for a taxpayer to protest an appraisal board's valuation of his real property. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. §§ 41.41-.47 (Vernon 2008). Because this remedy is exclusive, improper or "unfair" valuation of property is not a defense to a suit for delinquent taxes. Id. § 42.09(a)(1) ("Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section, procedures prescribed by this title for adjudication of the grounds of protest authorized by this title are exclusive, and a property owner may not raise any of those grounds . . . in defense to a suit to enforce collection of delinquent taxes. . . ."); see Starflight 50, L.L.C. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 287 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ("In the Property Tax Code, the exhaustion of remedies provisions, found in section 42.09, are mandatory and jurisdictional.").
We overrule this issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.