Opinion
# 2015-049-024 Claim No. 124443 Motion No. M-86053
03-31-2015
CHRISTOPHER A. GIFFORD v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Christopher A. Gifford, Pro Se Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General By: Roberto Barbosa, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Inmate's motion for summary judgement in a claim sounding in wrongful confinement denied. Claimant ailed to show as a matter of law that the State is not protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-049-024 |
| Claimant(s): | CHRISTOPHER A. GIFFORD |
| Claimant short name: | GIFFORD |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124443 |
| Motion number(s): | M-86053 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | DAVID A. WEINSTEIN |
| Claimant's attorney: | Christopher A. Gifford, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General By: Roberto Barbosa, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | March 31, 2015 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
In a claim filed May 30, 2014, pro se claimant Christopher Gifford seeks damages for his alleged wrongful confinement in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") when he was in Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") custody at Southport Correctional Facility ("Southport"). Claimant's claim has its origin in a tier III hearing, at which he was found guilty of violating a disciplinary rule and sentenced to six months in SHU running from January 23, 2013 through July 23, 2013. The claim alleges that as a result of a one-month reduction in that sentence authorized by the Deputy Superintendent for Security, Gifford was supposed to have been released from SHU on June 23, 2013, but due to an administrative error he was not let out until his original release date of July 23.
Gifford now moves to strike the answer and for summary judgment. In support of his application, claimant submits a memorandum from the Deputy Superintendent for Security Services, informing Gifford of the one-month reduction in his sanction (Aff. in Supp. Ex. A). In addition, Gifford submits an inmate grievance and related appeals he filed at Southport on this issue. The DOCCS Central Office Review Committee ("CORC") ultimately found that "for an unknown reason the paperwork [providing for a reduction in Gifford's sanction] was not received in the Discipline Office to be entered in the computer system" (Aff. in Supp. Ex. G).
Defendant State of New York opposes the motion and argues that "claimant has failed to show that there are no issues of fact regarding the reasons behind defendant's failure to release him from SHU on June 23, 2013." Defendant notes that in certain instances, the release date may be conditional. In support of this contention, defendant cites Perez v State of New York, UID No. 2001-028-0005 [Ct Cl, Sise, Feb. 14, 2001]), where at trial the State established that "the time cut release date is conditional, subject to certain factors, including the availability of an appropriately classified bed" (id.). On this basis, the Court found that "the State was not under a duty to release claimant from SHU on [the conditional date], based upon the time cut he received." The Court did, however, award the claimant damages for the State's failure to release him on a later date it determined to be mandatory.
Discussion
In a motion for summary judgment, a claimant must tender sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to defendant to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of a material issue of fact which requires a trial of the action (see Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562). If claimant fails to meet his burden, summary judgment must be denied, regardless of the sufficiency of defendant's response (see Winegrad, 64 NY2d at 853).
To state a claim for wrongful confinement, claimant must show: "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975] [citations omitted]). Moreover, in the prison disciplinary context, the discretionary acts of officials are protected by quasi-judicial immunity, except as to "unlawful actions of employees taken beyond their authority or in violation of the governing rules and regulations" (see Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 220 [1988]; see also Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765 [3d Dept 2001] [dismissal of wrongful confinement claim upheld where there is no proof of a regulatory violation]). Not all rule violations will overcome such immunity, however - only those that "implicate due process protections" (see Amato v State of New York, UID No. 2014-041-038 [Ct Cl, Milano, J., June 26, 2014]; Wilson v State of New York, UID No. 2014-015-581 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., May 12, 2014]).
In the present case, claimant has failed to show as a matter of law that the State is not protected by such immunity. The record before me does not indicate the basis for the one-month cut in Gifford's sentence, or the governing authority under which it was given. It may be read to indicate that the Deputy Superintendent sought to reduce claimant's penalty as a purely discretionary act, which was then never implemented due to an administrative error. It is not clear that any prison rule or regulation was violated by this course of events, much less that claimant suffered a constitutional deprivation. And while judges of this Court have frequently awarded damages for a prison's failure to adhere to a legally mandated date for release from SHU (e.g. Hernandez v State of New York, UID No. 2015-038-503 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Jan. 22, 2015 [defendant wrongfully confined inmate in SHU when it held him there after sentence was administratively reversed, since there was no "regulatory right to continue claimant's confinement in the SHU following the reversal"]), I can find no caselaw which held the State liable when a State official sought to extend leniency in the exercise of his or her discretion, but others then failed to follow through thereon.
Put another way, the confinement of claimant in SHU was upheld on administrative appeal, and it was at that time "privileged." The fact that the prison rendered a decision voluntarily foregoing its legal right to hold claimant in disciplinary confinement would not appear to make such confinement any less privileged. At the very least, the present record is insufficient to make such a determination, since it merely indicates that for some unknown reason a deputy superintendent cut Gifford's sentence, and for some other unknown reason that reduction was never implemented.
In short, claimant has not set forth sufficient evidence to overcome, as a matter of law, defendant's Arteaga immunity. As a result, he has not met his burden of showing that he is entitled to summary judgment.
I note as well that Gifford's wrongful confinement claim may be sustained only if the additional month he spent in the SHU constitutes "confinement" for purposes of a wrongful confinement claim, that term never having been clearly defined in the context of a claimant who is already incarcerated. Courts in New York have typically presumed that any placement in SHU is, in fact, confinement (see e.g. Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982 [4th Dept 1994]). But as I discussed at length in Callender v State of New York (38 Misc 3d 651 [Ct Cl 2012]), the 1995 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sandin v Conner (515 US 472 [1995]) calls this conclusion into question. Sandin greatly restricted the circumstances in which placement in SHU implicates the Due Process Clause, limiting constitutional due process protection to those cases where the nature of the disciplinary confinement was "atypical and significant" in comparison to the typical incidents of prison life. In Callender, I found that since a claim for wrongful confinement has its roots in the Due Process Clause, such a cause of action should be limited to those cases where the sanction is sufficiently severe that it can only be imposed in accordance with due process (see Calendar, supra). I need not decide whether that is the case with the sanction at issue here, in light of the above finding that claimant has not presented a prima facie case for summary judgment in any event.
In view of the foregoing it is
ORDERED that claimant's motion no. M-86053 be denied.
March 31, 2015
Albany, New York
DAVID A. WEINSTEIN
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Claimant's Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits annexed.
2. Defendant's Affirmation in Opposition to Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
3. Claimant's "Reply Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants [sic] Opposition to Claimants [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment."