Opinion
2009-1855.
Decided October 6, 2009.
HINMAN, HOWARD KATTELL, LLP, BY: PAUL T. SHEPPARD, ESQ., OF COUNSEL, BINGHAMTON, NY, COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS.
COUGHLIN GERHART, LLP BY:PAUL J. SWEENEY, ESQ., OF COUNSEL, BINGHAMTON, NY, COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT.
Petitioners filed this hybrid Article 78 proceeding/action seeking, among other things: (1) an order pursuant to CPLR Article 78 reversing and annulling the denial of retiree health insurance coverage to Patricia Giblin; (2) a declaratory judgment regarding the parties' respective rights under a collective bargaining agreement and/or specific performance under said agreement; and (3) designation as a class action under CPLR § 901.
Respondent the Village of Johnson City (hereinafter "Village") opposes the petition-complaint in all respects.
The court heard oral argument from counsel on August 21, 2009.
BACKGROUND
The Village and the Johnson City Firefighters Association, AFL-CIO, Local 921, have entered into a series of collective bargaining agreements and addendums including, as pertinent here, a collective bargaining agreement effective from June 1, 1999 through May 31, 2002 (hereinafter the "1999 CBA").
The Johnson City Firefighters Association, AFL-CIO, Local 921 has been the bargaining agent for Village fire department personnel since 1984.
Petitioner William Giblin was a member of the Village's Fire Department until his retirement on September 21, 2000. During his tenure as a member of the Village Fire Department and at the time of his retirement Mr. Giblin was married to Susan M. Giblin. Together, William Giblin and Susan M. Giblin were enrolled in the Village's health insurance plan with family coverage.
On or about February 24, 2009, William Giblin and Susan M. Giblin were divorced. Upon receiving notification of the divorce, the Village changed Mr. Giblin's retiree health insurance coverage from family coverage to single coverage.
On March 15, 2009, William Giblin married Patricia Giblin (nee Macinski). Soon thereafter, Patricia Giblin applied for health insurance coverage as the dependent of William Giblin via family coverage. On March 23, 2009, the Village denied petitioners' application for health insurance under family coverage advising Mr. Giblin that "[y]ou retired under family coverage, had a change in status and are no longer eligible to receive family coverage" (Record of Proceeding, Exhibit A). On June 23, 2009, petitioners sought a review of said denial. On July 13, 2009, the Village affirmed said denial.
On July 23, 2009, petitioners filed this notice of petition, summons, petition-complaint.
The Village interposed a verified answer on or about August 17, 2009.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue before this court is petitioners' application pursuant to CPLR Article 78 for an order annulling the Village's determination on March 23, 2009 which denied their request for family coverage. This court must determine whether the Village's determination of March 23, 2009 was arbitrary and capricious. The court must resolve any issues which can be determined as a matter of law and, in the event the court is unable to do so, then a transfer to the appellate division would be proper (CPLR § 7804 [g]).
The parties agree that the merits of petitioners' request for class action status and their cause of action under the Human Rights Law are not before the court at this time.
The 1999 CBA states, in pertinent part, as follows:
[a]ll present retirees of the Fire Department and all members who retire in the future shall continue to receive Blue Cross, Blue Shield and Major Medical Insurance coverage for themselves and their dependents (or comparable coverage as may then be in effect). In addition the surviving spouse, and said spouses' dependent children under the age of 21, of a member who dies while in the employment of the Village shall be entitled to the health insurance benefits provided retirees, until such time as the surviving spouse dies or remarries, and in the case of dependent children, said dependent children attain the age of 21 years. The cost of such insurance coverage shall be paid for entirely by the Village.
(Record of Proceeding, Exhibit D, p 10; emphasis added).
Briefly, petitioners' argue the 1999 CBA does not prohibit entitlement to retiree health benefits to individuals who become dependents after retirement such as by way of birth or adoption of a child, upon marriage, or upon remarriage following the death of or divorce from a former spouse.
The Village asserts that the 1999 CBA only allows a retiree to continue health insurance coverage through retirement as it was in effect at the time of retirement and is silent on the right of a retiree to change elections after retirement by adding new dependents.
The Village's reliance on Odorizzi v Otsego N. Catskills Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 307 AD2d 490 [Third Dept 2003]) is unavailing. In Odorizzi, the employee — Mrs. Odorizzi — had elected family coverage during her active employment to provide health coverage for her husband. Upon retirement, Mrs. Odorizzi switched from family coverage to individual coverage because her husband had obtained health insurance coverage through his own employer. Years later, when her husband also retired, Mrs. Odorizzi sought to return to family coverage to include her husband. The district rejected Mrs. Odorizzi's request on the grounds that the self-funded health plan ("Plan") did not permit a former employee to change their enrollment after retirement. The Third Department agreed and found that Mrs. Odorizzi had no right to change her coverage. However, the Third Department's determination was expressly based upon the Plan's language that differentiated between employee coverage and retiree coverage and limited certain enrollment changes to "employees" only. Here, the 1999 CBA contains no such language differentiating between employees and retirees.
The court finds that the terms of the 1999 CBA are unambiguous as a matter of law obviating the need for extrinsic evidence ( Matter of Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. School Dist., 53 AD2d 967, 969 [Third Dept 2008]).
Even more compelling than the distinctions between this case and the Odorizzi case are the similarities to the subsequent Third Department decision of Matter of Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. School Dist., 53 AD2d 967 [Third Dept 2008]). Mr. Bower was a teacher enrolled as an individual participant in the district's health insurance plan. After retirement, Mr. Bower married and requested a change to family coverage so his new wife would be covered. The district refused the change in enrollment on the grounds that a retired teacher was not permitted to change health insurance coverage. The Third Department determined that because the collective bargaining agreement did not create separate categories for employees and retirees, Mr. Bower was permitted to add his spouse to his health insurance coverage post-retirement.
The court finds Bower controlling in this matter. The Village's argument that the 1999 CBA language "shall continue to receive" must be construed as freezing a retiree's right to health insurance coverage as of the moment of retirement is without merit. In view of Bower and the lack of any distinction between retiree coverage and employee coverage within the 1999 CBA, this court finds that the only rational interpretation of the "shall continue to receive" language is that a retiree shall continue to receive health coverage just like employees covered by the CBA which includes the right to change enrollment.
If coverage were truly "frozen" as of the moment of retirement then Mr. Giblin would have remained under the family plan coverage given his then marriage to Susan Giblin. In other words, as compared to his date of retirement, Mr. Giblin's status is the same, namely married with a wife as his dependent, albeit the wife has changed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is granted to the extent that the Village's determination on March 23, 2009 is vacated and annulled. The Village is directed to extend health insurance benefits to Patricia Giblin retroactive to the date of her marriage to William Giblin.
This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court.