Opinion
May 2, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cannavo, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiffs' allegations in the first three causes of action to recover damages for intentional torts arising out of two letters written by the defendant's attorney dated June 29, 1990, and July 27, 1990, were untimely (see, CPLR 215). The allegations made in the plaintiffs' counterclaim in a prior third-party action brought by the defendant did not specifically state a cause of action arising from statements made in those letters and therefore did not toll the one-year Statute of Limitations pursuant to CPLR 203 (d).
Furthermore, the causes of action sounding in defamation arising out of statements made by the defendant in her third-party complaint were properly dismissed on the grounds that those statements were absolutely privileged (see, Martirano v Frost, 25 N.Y.2d 505, 507; Joseph v. Larry Dorman, P.C., 177 A.D.2d 618; Wekstein v. Romm, 87 A.D.2d 867, 868). The cause of action sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon those same statements in the third-party complaint were also properly dismissed as duplicative (see, Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557-558; Sweeney v. Prisoners' Legal Servs., 146 A.D.2d 1, 7; Rozanski v. Fitch, 113 A.D.2d 1010).
The remaining allegations in the first three causes of action of the plaintiffs' complaint were either untimely (CPLR 215) or were not pleaded with sufficient particularity (CPLR 3016 [a]; see generally, Varela v. Investors Ins. Holding Corp., 185 A.D.2d 309, 310, affd 81 N.Y.2d 958; Matter of Gleich v. Kissinger, 111 A.D.2d 130, 131; Randaccio v. Retail Credit Co., 43 A.D.2d 798, 799; Laiken v. American Bank Trust Co., 34 A.D.2d 514). Sullivan, J.P., O'Brien, Santucci and Hart, JJ., concur.