Opinion
November 18, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunkin, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with costs to the defendant.
This libel action involves a letter written by the defendant's principal to the plaintiff while the two were engaged as attorneys in litigating a matrimonial action. A written statement or one made in open court in the course of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged if, by any view or under any circumstances, it may be considered pertinent to the litigation (see, Martirano v. Frost, 25 N.Y.2d 505, 507; Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214; State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Glavin, 18 A.D.2d 629; see, Klein v. McGauley, 29 A.D.2d 418, 420). We agree with the determination of the Supreme Court that the allegedly defamatory letter written by the defendant's principal was protected by absolute privilege since the letter was pertinent to the litigation between the parties. The absolute privilege will apply to any statement that may possibly or plausibly be relevant or pertinent, with the barest rationality (see, Grasso v. Mathew, 164 A.D.2d 476).
Although the letter is subject to an absolute privilege, we decline to impose sanctions upon the plaintiff under the circumstances of this case. Mangano, P.J., Harwood, Eiber and O'Brien, JJ., concur.