Opinion
No. 57517-1-I.
March 19, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Skagit County, No. 04-2-00356-6, Susan K. Cook, J., entered March 21, 2006.
Counsel for Appellant(s): Donald James Bisagna, Attorney at Law, Mount Vernon, WA, 98273-3806.
Joseph L. Broadbent, Attorney at Law, Bellingham, WA, 98226-3554. Counsel for Respondent(s): John William Hicks, Attorney at Law, Mount Vernon, WA, 98273.
Kenneth Wendell Masters, Wiggins Masters PLLC, Bainbridge Island, WA, 98110-1811.
Reversed by unpublished opinion per Baker, J., concurred in by Schindler, A.C.J., and Coleman, J.
Two heirs allege that their sister, Darlene Sutten, owes money to the estate of their mother, Dagny Adams. The trial court determined that Sutten promised to pay $37,500 to Dagny Adams when Adams quitclaimed her house to Sutten. We reverse and dismiss because the contract was partly oral and subject to the three-year statute of limitations, which expired April 2002.
I.
On December 1, 1997, Dagny Adams quitclaimed her home to one of her children, Darlene Sutten. The deed cited only "love and affection" as consideration. No other writings were executed at that time, and there is no contemporaneous record of any other agreement regarding the house. On January 20, 1998, Dagny Adams executed a new will. It revoked her 1990 will, which left the house to Sutten on the condition that Sutten pay her siblings, George S. Adams III and Saundra Peterson, $20,000 each. The 1998 will did not mention the house, any money owed to Dagny Adams, or to money owed to Sutten's siblings.
In early 1998, Sutten's siblings asked an attorney to write Sutten and demand that she give the house back to Dagny Adams. Sutten refused, writing back that her mother was "adamantly against" having the house in her own name. She stated that the house was gifted to her, but "with the understanding that Saundra and George would receive $20,000 each." However, Sutten thought the $20,000 figure was too low and proposed $35,000. In closing, Sutten wrote, "I believe that it is in my mothers [sic] best interest that we leave ownership of the house as is, with my assurance to all that they will be provided for in a fair and equitable manner (at Mother's discretion) and still ensure Mother has a place to live, independently, for as long as she wishes."
On April 7, 1998, Sutten wrote to Peterson about the family dispute. She expressed regret and reiterated her desire to be fair and protect her mother:
Regarding Mothers [sic] house, I have left things as they are, because this is what she has told me she wants. She does not want the house back in her name, and also knows that when she has moved into the apartments, I will see to it (as I promised her) that you, Mother, and Sonny would definitely get your fair share of what the house is worth. . . . I feel very strong about caring [sic] out Mothers [sic] wishes, and keeping the house accessible for her — either for the immediate future, or later in life, if she needs someone to take care of her.
"Sonny" is George Adams.
In November 1998, Sutten paid Peterson and George Adams $37,500 each. She also paid $10,000 to Dagny Adams. Sutten drew up receipts for the money paid to George Adams and Peterson; no receipt was drawn up for the money paid to Dagny Adams. The only evidence regarding the purpose of the $10,000 payment is from Sutten; she said she gave it to Dagny Adams as a gift. In April 1999, Dagny Adams moved out of the house. She died February 2001.
George Adams was the estate's personal representative under the terms of the 1998 will. He told an attorney that Sutten owed the estate $27,500. The attorney wrote to Sutten and inquired about the debt. Sutten replied that "[t]he $27,500 was gifted to me." On March 4, 2004, George Adams filed a complaint on behalf of the estate to recover the money from Sutten. After a bench trial, the court concluded that the estate had proven a written contract containing all material terms. The court largely relied on Sutten's April 7, 1998 letter and the November 1998 receipts, and entered judgment against her for $27,500 plus interest. Sutten appealed.
II.
Evidentiary decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Review of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law is "limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and, if so, whether the conclusions of law are supported by those findings of fact."
State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 810, 975 P.2d 967 (1999).
Scott, 148 Wn.2d at 708.
Statute of Limitations
Sutten argues that the trial court improperly applied the six-year statute of limitations for written contracts, because the April 7, 1998 letter did not contain all material terms. An action on a written contract must be commenced within six years. The writing must contain all essential elements of a contract: subject matter, parties, promise, terms, conditions, and price or consideration. If extrinsic evidence is required to establish any material element, the contract is considered oral, and the statute of limitations for oral contracts applies. The statute of limitations for oral contracts is three years.
DePhillips v. Zolt Constr. Co., 136 Wn.2d 26, 30-31, 959 P.2d 1104 (1998).
DePhillips, 136 Wn.2d at 31.
The April 7, 1998 letter is not a complete written agreement wherein Sutten promises to pay her mother $37,500 in exchange for a promise to quitclaim the house or forbear from legal action. Sutten's April 7, 1998 letter lacks any mention of consideration. The trial court did not squarely address this material term, but the findings of fact and conclusions of law leave the impression that the house was consideration. However, the letter does not say that. In fact, the estate does not even try to make this argument on appeal. Instead, the estate claims that the consideration was its forbearance from suing Sutten to recover the property. But the letter does not say that, either. At best, the letter reiterates Sutten's gratuitous promise to take care of everyone and to be fair. Price is also missing from the letter. The letter did say that all parties would get their fair share, but this is not proof of a promise to pay $37,500, or even a promise to pay one quarter of the value of the house, to Dagny Adams. Without extrinsic evidence, the letter does not establish the contemplated price.
Because the writing lacked material terms of the agreement, and parol evidence was offered to supplement the writing, the agreement is partly oral and the three-year statute of limitations applies.
Date Action Accrued
Having determined the proper statute of limitations, we must review the trial court's conclusion about when the statute began to run. A cause of action can only be commenced after it has accrued. In a contract case, the action generally accrues on the date of breach. A subsequent promise or acknowledgment of a debt can restart the statute of limitations, but only if it is written and signed by the debtor.
Schwindt v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 140 Wn.2d 348, 353, 997 P.2d 353 (2000).
RCW 4.16.280; Matson v. Weidenkopf, 101 Wn. App. 472, 478, 3 P.3d 805 (2000).
The trial court found that the initial breach occurred when Dagny Adams moved into an apartment in April 1999. Substantial evidence supports this finding: two different letters offered by the estate state that Sutten promised to pay when Dagny moved out of the house and into an apartment. But the trial court ultimately found that the statute did not begin to run until April 3, 2002, because until that time Sutten "continued to promise the payment to Dagny."
Finding of fact 8 cites both April 1999 and April 8, 1998; this appears to be a clerical error. However, the uncontroverted evidence is that Dagny moved 22 months before her death in February 2001. This establishes April 1999 as the correct date.
The trial court erred when it fixed April 3, 2002, as the date of accrual. The finding that Sutten continued to promise payment is apparently based on George Adams's testimony that Sutten orally agreed to pay until that time. The record contains no documentary evidence of any acknowledgement by Sutten, let alone a written and signed acknowledgement, dated after November 1998. Therefore, the statute began to run from the date of breach, or April 1999. The three-year statute of limitations expired in April 2002, two years before this suit was filed.
This action is time barred. The judgment is reversed and the case is dismissed.
REVERSED.