Opinion
21-P-706
08-26-2022
ARTHUR GENOVA [1] & another [2] v. STEPHEN CORNELL.
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Arthur and Patricia Genova, individually and as trustees of a realty trust, sued Stephen Cornell in the Land Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on grounds that he interfered with their passage easement. Cornell appeals from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Genovas. We affirm.
Discussion.
1. Motion for judgment on the pleadings.
We review the judge's order allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo and view factual disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aliberti, 483 Mass. 396, 405 (2019). Although Cornell cites examples where his answers deny certain peripheral allegations in the Genovas' complaint, Cornell admits that he installed and refused to remove a barrier that blocked the Genovas from passing along a portion of Smaland Lane. The Genovas have an easement by estoppel over Smaland Lane based on the conveyance of their deed by reference to the subdivision plan that depicts their lot and Smaland Lane/Crescent Road. See Smaland Beach Ass'n, Inc. v. Genova, 94 Mass.App.Ct. 106, 118 (2018) (Smaland); Patel v. Planning Bd. of N. Andover, 2 7 Mass.App.Ct. 477, 482 (1989), quoting Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 755 (1945) ("where land situated on a street is conveyed according to a recorded plan on which the street is shown, the grantor and those claiming under him are estopped to deny the existence of the street for the entire distance as shown on the plan"). Accord Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675, 678 (1965) ("This rule is applicable even if the way is not yet in existence, so long as it is contemplated and sufficiently designated") . That Smaland Lane exists as a sandy beach or grassy area in front of the Genovas' lot does not diminish their easement rights over it. See Canton Highlands, Inc. v. Searle, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 48, 55 (1980) ("The rights also apply even if the way under consideration is obstructed, overgrown, and impassable"). Nor are we persuaded by Cornell's argument that, even if the Genovas have an easement, it does not apply to the portion of Smaland Lane abutting his property. See Maslow v. O'Connor, 93 Mass.App.Ct. 112, 115 (2018), quoting Murphy, 348 Mass. at 677 ("an abutter to a private way has an easement to traverse 'the entire length of the way,' not just to use it as access to the nearest public way").
Cornell admitted in his answer to the Genovas' verified complaint that he placed the boat trailer and canoe in the way, but he claims that it was "on property that Cornell believed Cornell owned."
We are not persuaded by Cornell's contention that the portion of Crescent Road discussed in Smaland should be considered a different road from Smaland Lane. Indeed, in his amended answer, Cornell acknowledged that Crescent Road was "also called Smaland Lane" when the Genovas installed their dock.
Because the Genovas have an easement right over Smaland Lane, all that remains is a question of law: whether Cornell's blocking the way amounted to a trespass against the Genovas' easement right. See, e.g., World Species List -- Natural Features Registry Inst, v. Reading, 75 Mass.App.Ct. 302, 305 (2009), quoting McGregor v. Allamerica Ins. Co., 449 Mass. 400, 402 (2007) ("[where] there are no material facts in dispute, the only issue is the interpretation of the language in the deed, 'an issue that is purely a question of law'"). On the admitted facts, it is evident that Cornell's intentionally placing obstructions that blocked the Genovas' right to pass and repass on Smaland Lane was a trespass. See Melrose Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, 89 Mass.App.Ct. 594, 602-603 (2016) (finding continuing trespass where easement was blocked). Entry of judgment on the pleadings was proper.
2. Motion to amend the pleadings.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that Cornell was not entitled to a declaration regarding his ownership rights over Island Pond and Smaland Lane (disputed areas) and limiting the Genovas' right to use these areas. See Dzung Duy Nguyen v. Massachusetts Inst, of Tech., 479 Mass. 436, 461 (2018). In Smaland, 94 Mass.App.Ct. at 111 n.12, 113, we held that "the pondward half of Crescent Road and the adjacent pond bed are owned by Kendrick and Hall (or their heirs, successors and assigns)," thereby making them "necessary parties for the adjudication of issues affecting their retained interest." We left open the question whether the bed of Island Pond may be public and thus owned by the Commonwealth. See Id. at 111 n.9. Despite being afforded opportunities to do so, Cornell failed to implead these other parties that appear to have a potential ownership interest in the disputed areas. Without the necessary parties joined, the judge properly declined to declare ownership of the disputed areas. Because Cornell declined to establish his ownership, he was not entitled to a declaration regarding the Genovas' right to use the disputed areas, over which he may have no interest whatsoever. There was no error in the judge's denial of Cornell's motion to amend the pleadings to add counterclaims.
Even assuming, without deciding, that Cornell owns to the centerline of Smaland Lane under the derelict fee statute, G. L. c. 183, § 58, declaration of such a right is immaterial to the Genovas' easement rights.
3. Motion to dismiss.
We review the judge's denial of Cornell's motion to dismiss de novo. See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254, 260 (2017), S_.C., 488 Mass. 555 (2021). In doing so, we accept the facts asserted in the complaint, assuming them to be true, and require "'allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to relief." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). Put bluntly, Cornell's assertion that the judge should have dismissed the Genovas' complaint because they lacked standing and failed to join parties indispensable to the determination of their easement rights is meritless. The Genovas' easement rights against Cornell existed as a matter of law, as discussed previously, irrespective of ownership over the disputed areas. Regardless of what rights the Genovas may have had against other persons, the judge needed no other parties to decide the existence of the Genovas' right to enjoy an easement over property in which Cornell claimed an ownership interest. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 464 Mass. 193, 200 (2013), quoting Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 21 (2006) ("To have standing in any capacity, a litigant must show that the challenged action has caused the litigant injury"); Cheever v. Graves, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 604 (1992) ("As property owners claiming an easement over the defendants' land, they certainly have standing in their own right to pursue this action"). There was no error in the denial of Cornell's motion to dismiss.
4. Motion to report.
A motion to report under Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), may be allowed "[i]f the trial court is of opinion that an interlocutory finding or order made by it so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought to be determined by the appeals court before any further proceedings in the trial court." The judge declined Cornell's motion to report questions because she found them neither novel nor difficult nor material to the ultimate question. See Morrison v. Lennett, 415 Mass. 857, 859 (1993) ("Such a report should be reserved for novel and difficult issues"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 412 Mass. 770, 772 (1992) (only "serious questions likely to be material in the ultimate decision" should be reported). The issues here were well within the judge's ability to resolve, as reflected in her thoughtful memorandum of decision. There was no error in her denial of the defendant's motion.
The Genovas' request for attorney's fees and costs is denied.
Judgment affirmed.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.