Opinion
CV185043126
05-31-2019
Jan GAWLIK v. Dannel MALLOY et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
James W. Abrams, Judge
The plaintiff, Jan Gawlik, who is an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution, brought this matter by complaint dated May 22, 2018. He alleges that various state officials violated his rights by refusing to allow him to openly display various religious articles, including a scapular, crucifix, and rosary.
There are fifty defendants in this case. The first group of defendants are members of the executive branch, specifically Governor Dannel P. Malloy; Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman; Secretary of the State Denise Merrill; and the Commissioner of Correction, Scott Semple. The second group of defendants are employees of the Department of Correction: Deputy Commissioner Monika Rinaldi; Reverend Father Anthony Bruno; Director of Security, Christine Whidden; District #2 Administrator, Peter Murphy; District #1 Administrator, Angel Quiros; Warden Anna Cournoyer; Warden Edward Maldonado; Warden William Faneuff; Deputy Warden Richard Laffargue; Warden Scott Erfe; Lieutenant Harris, Officer Salmon; Officer Tasarz; Lieutenant Archer; Officer Rosado; Officer Spring; Lieutenant McCarthy; Officer Tardiff; Captain Taylor; Officer McMahon; Officer Cunningham; Officer Burns; Officer (Mr.) Feliciano; Officer Shelton; Officer Jura; Officer (Ms.) Feliciano; Officer Anthony; Officer Deveau; Officer Campbell; Officer Sandulli; Officer Ortiz; Officer Gonzalez; Officer Briatico; Officer Bugbee; Officer Lally; Officer Hannis; Officer Vassar; Officer Riddick; and Officer Swanson. Finally, the third group of defendants are legislative officials: Senator Martin M. Looney, Senator Bob Duff, Senator Leonard A. Fasano, Senator Brendan Sharkey, Representative Joe Aresimowicz, Representative Themis Klarides and Executive Director, Legislature, James P. Tracy.
On September 24, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of the plaintiff’s claims except for those against the Commissioner, in his official capacity seeking injunctive relief pursuant to the Connecticut Religious Freedom Act, the anti-discriminatory state statutes, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law. On November 9, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law objecting to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The defendants filed a reply memorandum on December 14, 2018, and the parties were heard at short calendar on February 4, 2019.
FACTS
The plaintiff’s allegations focus on two rules established by a Department of Correction (department) directive. The first rule, under a section titled "Religious Articles," states that "[r]eligious articles shall be worn or carried under the inmate’s clothing, and shall not be openly displayed." The second rule, which is found in a section called "Inmate Dress Code," states that "[r]eligious headwear may be worn at all times." In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the directive was promulgated by the general assembly and the commissioner. He also alleges that the department, through the authority of the commissioner- who in turn was appointed by the governor and approved by the general assembly- has, with this directive, established a policy that permits inmates of every faith to openly wear religious headwear as well as religious articles, provided that the inmates are not Christian or Catholic. The plaintiff further alleges that the policy put in place by the directive discriminates against Christians and Catholics because it prevents them from venerating their religious articles.
In terms of punishment, the plaintiff alleges that as a consequence of wearing religious articles outside of his clothing he has been threatened with bodily injury, a disciplinary report, and placement in administrative segregation. The plaintiff also alleges that he was once denied access to Mass. after failing to conceal his religious articles twice in one day and arguing with the officer who told him to place his articles underneath his clothing.
Although unnumbered, the plaintiff’s complaint appears to state twenty-one claims. As the plaintiff does not otherwise specify, each claim is apparently directed against every defendant. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated: state equal protection statutes, General Statutes § § 52-571a and 53-37b; two penal code statutes, General Statutes § § 53a-62 and 53a-192; General Statutes § 52-571b, the Connecticut Religious Freedom Act; anti-discriminatory state statutes, General Statutes § § 46a-69, 46a71, and 46a-78; the Connecticut Constitution, article first, § § 3, 8, 9, and 20, and article seventh; the first, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1; 42 U.S.C. § 1985, by conspiring to deprive him of his rights; and an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump. The plaintiff further alleges a claim for "transfer and retaliation," in which he asserts that if he faces punitive measures such as transfer to another facility, he will seek monetary damages. In terms of relief, the plaintiff requests monetary damages, declaratory judgment as to the validity of the challenged directive, and prospective relief by way of altering the language in the directive.
DISCUSSION
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014). "[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute ... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2015).
"Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case ... [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts ... Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). "[I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... other types of undisputed evidence ... and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52.
At the outset, it should be noted that the plaintiff, who is self-represented, has requested that the court issue a "special solicitude" order. In light of the plaintiff’s status, it is appropriate to note that "[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party ... The modern trend ... is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ... The courts adhere to this rule to ensure that pro se litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard, regardless of their lack of legal education and experience ..." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d 761 (2005). Affording self-represented parties a degree of solicitude does not require issuing an order. Accordingly, the court may consider the plaintiff’s self-represented status when analyzing the parties’ arguments without issuing an order to that effect.
I. Penal Code Statutes
The defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in the plaintiff’s complaint that rely on penal code statutes because those statutes do not confer a private cause of action. As mentioned, the plaintiff alleges violations of General Statutes § § 53a-62 and 53a-192. In response to the defendants’ argument, the plaintiff contends that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over criminal matters, that he has not lost the right to file criminal charges due to his incarceration, and that he earns a private right of action upon filing a complaint with the state attorney’s office and the state police.
General Statutes § 53a-62 provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2)(A) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (B) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror."
General Statutes § 53a-192 provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of coercion when he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct which such other person has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which such other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in such other person a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will: (1) Commit any criminal offense; or (2) accuse any person of a criminal offense; or (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair any person’s credit or business repute; or (4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action."
"The Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear criminal matters from its authority as a constitutional court of unlimited jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pompei, 52 Conn.App. 303, 307, 726 A.2d 644 (1999). "The Superior Court’s authority over criminal cases is established by the proper presentment of the information ... which is essential to initiate a criminal proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daly, 111 Conn.App. 397, 401-02, 960 A.2d 1040 (2008), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 909, 973 A.2d 108 (2009). "There can be little doubt in Connecticut that historically the prosecution of crime has always been within the province of the state’s attorney, appointed as a judicial officer." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Killian, 30 Conn.Supp. 87, 101 (1973).
Although the Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction, in cases where a statute does not give rise to a private cause of action, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. See J.P. Alexandre, LLC v. Egbuna, 137 Conn.App. 340, 358, 49 A.3d 222, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 913, 53 A.3d 1000 (2012). "Our Supreme Court has noted that there exists a presumption in Connecticut that private enforcement does not exist unless expressly provided in a statute ... Our Supreme Court also has recognized that a plaintiff may overcome that presumption but that the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that such an action is created implicitly in the statute." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Massey v. Branford, 119 Conn.App. 453, 463, 988 A.2d 370, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 921, 991 A.2d 565 (2010).
Where a plaintiff alleged a violation of several criminal statutes, it was noted that "Connecticut criminal laws do not provide private rights of action. See e.g., Desmond v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 138 Conn.App. 93, 98, 50 A.3d 910 (2012) (’Violations of § 31-290c, a criminal statute, may be prosecuted by the state’s attorney, not by private individuals ... [Section] 31-290c does not afford the plaintiff a private right of action’). Because none of the criminal statutes cited by the plaintiff provide private rights of action, these claims are being dismissed ..." Xu v. Neubauer, 166 F.Supp.3d 203, 207 (D.Conn. 2015); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (no private cause of action existed under "a bare criminal statute, with absolutely no indication that civil enforcement of any kind was available to anyone").
In the present case, the court lacks jurisdiction over the counts in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendants have violated penal code statutes. Although the plaintiff correctly notes that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over criminal matters, this is not a criminal case; this is a civil case, filed by the plaintiff, who is an individual and unaffiliated with the state’s attorney office. Although the plaintiff argues that he is entitled to bring these claims because of complaints he has filed, he provides no support for this position. Moreover, there is no support for the proposition that either § § 53a-62 or 53a-192 confer a private right of action. As these statutes do not overcome the presumption that private enforcement does not exist and the plaintiff has not carried his burden of demonstrating that either implicitly affords him a private cause of action, these claims must be dismissed.
In Xu v. Neubauer, supra, General Statutes § 53-37b was among the criminal statutes identified by the plaintiff and dismissed by the court. General Statutes § 53-37b provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person who, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this state or the United States, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state or the United States, engages in the use of force or threat ... shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall be guilty of a class C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B felony." In the present case, it is unclear whether the plaintiff intended to state an independent claim pursuant to § 53-37b or whether his claimed violation of this statute should be read in combination with his allegation that the defendants violated General Statutes § 52-571a, which creates a private cause of action for § 53-37b. To the extent that the plaintiff did intend to raise a separate claim under § 53-37b, the court is able to determine without argument from the defendants that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim for the same reasons articulated with regard to § § 53a-62 and 53a-192.
II. Executive Order
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump on May 4, 2017. The defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction over this claim because the order does not create a private cause of action. The order is attached to the plaintiff’s complaint. After reviewing the order, it is apparent that the defendants are correct: the terms of the order indicate that it applies only to the federal executive branch and, furthermore, the order expressly denies creating any enforceable right. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over this claim.
III. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
With regard to the plaintiff’s claim arising under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the defendants correctly argue that RFRA does not apply to state officials sued in either their official or personal capacities. "RFRA created an explicit private right of action ... That section permits any person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of [the statute] to assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government ... RFRA defines the term ‘government, ’ to include a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2018). Importantly, however, the Supreme Court held that because RFRA exceeded Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unconstitutional as applied to state governments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). Given the fact that RFRA is unconstitutional when applied to state officials in either their personal or official capacities, the claim arising under RFRA in the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed.
IV. Standing
The next issue concerns the plaintiff’s standing to bring claims alleging violations of the Connecticut Constitution article first, § § 9 and § 8, the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, and a claim for "transfer and retaliation." The defendants argue that the plaintiff lacks standing because he has not alleged a personal injury. Specifically, the defendants contend that the plaintiff has not alleged that he was placed in administrative segregation or transferred to another facility and that there are no allegations suggesting that such measures are imminent. The plaintiff offers two arguments in response. First, the plaintiff argues that he was placed into administrative segregation in March of 2018 for assisting another inmate with his mail, and that the plaintiff was then forced to surrender his crucifix and his rosary "under threat of beating, pepper spray, or possible death." Second, the plaintiff contends that the defendants punish him for his beliefs by threatening him with beatings and placement in administrative segregation.
The Constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 9, provides: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law."
The Constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and by counsel; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his behalf; to be released on bail upon sufficient security, except in capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great; and in all prosecutions by information, to a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury. No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive fines imposed. No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law, except in the armed forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger."
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had witnessed inmates being beaten in the past and that such beatings are ongoing. The plaintiff did not, however, allege that he had ever been beaten due to his religious articles or for any other reason. In his brief, the plaintiff notes that the defendants did not respond to his allegations in this regard; in their reply, the defendants contend that a response was not required as the allegations "were not relevant to [the plaintiff’s] claim that he was being prohibited from wearing his scapular, crucifix, and rosary outside of his clothing or any possible punishment for his doing so." Although the plaintiff’s allegation is a serious one, the defendants’ characterization of its relevance to the present case is sound.
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... [When] a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 125, 74 A.3d 1225 (2013).
"An allegation of injury is both fundamental and essential to a demonstration of standing. Under Connecticut law, standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a plaintiff ordinarily establishes his standing by allegations of injury ... As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Rell, 119 Conn.App. 730, 737, 990 A.2d 354 (2010). "Our Supreme Court has stated that [t]here is little material difference between what we have required and what the United States Supreme Court in Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)] demanded of the plaintiff to establish standing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 737 n.7.
In Lujan, the court determined that standing requires an injury that is concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent, rather than not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra, 504 U.S. 560. "Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative ... that the injury is certainly impending ... It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when ... the plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control. In such circumstances we have insisted that the injury proceed with a high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 565 n.2.
In the present case, the plaintiff lacks standing to bring the aforementioned claims as he has not alleged either a direct injury or an imminent injury. The parties appear to agree that these claims depend upon the plaintiff experiencing some serious deprivation, such as transfer to another facility or placement in administrative segregation. Nevertheless, the plaintiff does not allege that he actually experienced either measure as a result of wearing religious articles outside of his clothing. It is therefore apparent that the plaintiff has not alleged a direct injury, which is essential to demonstrate standing.
Neither party contends that the single instance in which the plaintiff was denied access to Mass. qualifies as a sufficient injury.
Although the plaintiff argues in his memorandum of law that he was placed in administrative segregation, those facts are wholly absent from his complaint, and therefore not allegations that may be considered for the purposes of this motion. Even if the court were to consider the facts presented by the plaintiff in his memorandum, however, it is worth noting that the circumstances the plaintiff described still would not demonstrate standing, as the plaintiff’s discipline arose from helping another inmate with his mail, not from displaying religious articles. Furthermore, to the extent that the plaintiff argues that he has standing because he feels he is under imminent threat of physical violence or administrative segregation, this bare assertion is not supported by factual allegations demonstrating that the injury in question is certainly impending. Accordingly, as the plaintiff lacks standing, the court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim for "transfer and retaliation," as well as his claims arising under article first, § § 9 and 8 of the Connecticut constitution, the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution.
V. Absolute Legislative Immunity
The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants who are legislators- Senator Martin M. Looney, Senator Bob Duff, Senator Leonard A. Fasano, Senator Brendan Sharkey, Representative Joe Aresimowicz, and Representative Themis Klarides- are barred by absolute legislative immunity. Specifically, the defendants contend that voting to confirm a governor’s nominees and declining to reject or require amendments to agency regulations or directives are legitimate legislative activities and therefore these defendants are immune from suit. In response, the plaintiff counters that the defendants do not have absolute immunity if they are sued in their individual capacities.
On a procedural note, absolute immunity has been interpreted as implicating the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Day v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-4027999-S (February 11, 2008, Bellis, J.). The court concluded that "because the doctrine of absolute immunity shares with sovereign immunity the same purpose of protection against ‘having to litigate at all, ’ and because the doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction, this court joins the other Superior Courts that have held absolute immunity to be properly considered in a motion to dismiss." Id. The court’s persuasive reasoning indicates that the question of absolute legislative immunity can be addressed through the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the present case. Moving on to the substance of the defendants’ argument, the Constitution of Connecticut, article third, § 15, provides: "The senators and representatives shall, in all cases of civil process, be privileged from arrest, during any session of the general assembly, and for four days before the commencement and after the termination of any session thereof. And for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place." Noting the lack of Connecticut appellate authority interpreting this provision of the state constitution, the Supreme Court in Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 858 A.2d 709 (2004), looked to federal authority. The court noted that "the design of the federal speech or debate clause is to ensure that the legislative branch will be able to discharge its duties free from undue external interference." Id., 560. "Although, as the text of the provision demonstrates, the core protection afforded by the federal speech or debate clause regards speech or debate exchanged on the floor of the legislative body ... the clause has been extended to cover a wide variety of legislative conduct, for instance: to protect voting ..." (Citation omitted.) Id., 562; see also Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn.App. 605, 611-12, 88 A.3d 552 (as voting on proposed legislation constitutes acting within legislative sphere, absolute immunity barred plaintiff’s claim that legislative defendants attempted to derail legislation), cert. denied, 312 Conn. 901, 91 A.3d 908, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 902, 112 A.3d 778, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 444, 190 L.Ed.2d 336 (2014). Furthermore, provided that the defendants’ conduct is within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, absolute immunity is a complete bar to recovery. Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, 271 Conn. 568; see also Turner v. Boyle, 116 F.Supp.3d 58, 78-79 (D.Conn. 2015) (dismissing claims against officials in their individual capacities because "absolute immunity defeats a lawsuit from the outset").
In the present case, absolute legislative immunity operates to bar the plaintiff’s claims against defendants Looney, Duff, Fasano, Sharkey, Aresimowicz, and Klarides. The allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint concern these defendants’ legitimate legislative activities, including voting on the commissioner’s appointment and, according to the allegations, the directive in question. The plaintiff has not argued that his allegations refer to conduct outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Rather, the plaintiff appears to assert that these defendants are sued in their individual capacities. Although it may be noted that the allegations do not appear to state such a claim against these defendants, based on the nature of the plaintiff’s allegations, absolute legislative immunity defeats a claim against these defendants in either their official or individual capacities. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over each claim against these defendants.
VI. Sovereign Immunity, State Claims
The plaintiff argues that he has alleged claims against the defendants in their official and individual capacities. Assuming, arguendo, that he has done so, it is appropriate to consider whether sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s state law claims against the defendants in their official capacities.
"Sovereign immunity relates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and therefore presents a question of law ... The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law ... It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law ... Not only have we recognized the state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state ... Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).
Nevertheless, "[t]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute. There are [three] exceptions: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity; ... (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; ... and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). The second and third exceptions do not entitle a plaintiff to monetary damages. See Carter v. Watson, 181 Conn.App. 637, 643 and n.3, 187 A.3d 478 (2018). A plaintiff may therefore bring an action against the state for monetary damages only if there is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity- the first exception- or if the plaintiff has received authorization from the claims commissioner. See Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 351. Additionally, "[i]n the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350.
"For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed ... Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 349-50. "When the legislature intends to waive immunity from suit or liability, it expresses that intent by using explicit statutory language." Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 12, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008). Consequently, "even when a statute creates a duty or liability of general applicability, the legislature ordinarily uses language that expressly subjects the state to that duty or liability ... Indeed, this court long has stated that, in the absence of express language indicating that a statutorily created duty applies to the state, the statutory provision will not be construed as constituting a waiver of sovereign immunity." (Citations omitted.) Id., 13-14. Next, as mentioned above, "the second exception permits a plaintiff to bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief based on a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights ... In order to sufficiently raise such a claim, the allegations of the complaint and the facts in issue must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 358. Finally, "[for a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 350.
The defendants’ contentions with regard to sovereign immunity under state law fall into three categories: claims arising under the state constitution, a claim arising out of state statutes guaranteeing equal protection, and claims that concern state anti-discrimination statutes. Each will be addressed in turn. As a threshold matter, however, it should be noted that notwithstanding the plaintiff’s argument that the jury should determine matters of immunity, sovereign immunity implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and it is therefore a question of law for the court. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, supra, 284 Conn. 711. Accordingly, the court may assess the parties’ arguments concerning this issue pursuant to the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
A. Connecticut Constitution
Beginning with the plaintiff’s claims arising under the state constitution, the plaintiff alleges violations of article first, § 3, which provides for the free exercise of religion; article seventh, which bars state preference for any religion; and article first, § 20, which guarantees equal protection under the law. The defendants argue generally that the plaintiff’s claims arising out of the state constitution are barred by sovereign immunity because the second exception is not met. Specifically, the defendants contend that the plaintiff’s claims concerning free exercise and religious preference fail pursuant to the "substantial burden" standard because the directive is justified by a legitimate penological interest and because the plaintiff is afforded alternative means of religious expression. In response, the plaintiff challenges justifications the defendants offer with regard to the directive, contending that the reasons the defendants cite are disingenuous and aimed at perpetuating anti-Christian stigma.
With regard to plaintiff’s free exercise and religious preference claims, the defendants look to the substantial burden standard. Under that standard, "[t]he prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs ... The defendants then bear the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that justify the impinging conduct; the burden remains with the prisoner to show that these [articulated] concerns were irrational." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2006). After reviewing the case law, however, it appears that this test may not apply to the present case.
"The Second Circuit has not determined whether a prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs to assert a First Amendment claim ... Other courts within this circuit have noted that the Second Circuit has applied this standard without specifically adopting it. Thus, they follow suit and will continue to apply the substantial burden test until the Second Circuit holds otherwise." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hayes v. Bruno, 171 F.Supp.3d 22, 30 (D.Conn. 2016).
Even assuming that the test is applicable to free exercise claims, case law indicates that it may not apply when a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion for summary judgment, is before the court. For instance, it has been noted that "assessing the reasonableness of penological interests is a factual and context-specific inquiry" that may be inappropriate at a preliminary stage of litigation. Washington v. Gonyea, 538 Fed.Appx. 23, 27, aff’d, 731 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss where complaint’s factual allegations, accepted as true, "plausibly alleged that the officers’ actions were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests"). Furthermore, in McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2004), the court determined that "the district court improperly dismissed [the plaintiff’s] complaint. The complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, alleges that the defendants significantly interfered with [the plaintiff’s] religious beliefs. Since we so hold, we need not, at this stage, consider whether the plaintiff must demonstrate that the burden on his beliefs was ‘substantial’ in order to state a constitutional claim."
The court in McEachin also noted that "[i]f [the plaintiff’s] allegations are true, an unconstitutional burden may have been placed on [his] free exercise rights. Dismissing [the plaintiff’s] complaint without requiring an answer from defendants, or permitting further discovery ... makes it impossible to evaluate the validity of his First Amendment claim." McEachin v. McGuinnis, supra, 357 F.3d 201.
In view of the foregoing, it is not clear that the court should apply the substantial burden standard to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim pursuant to the second exception to sovereign immunity. Although the second exception to sovereign immunity requires that the plaintiff state a substantial claim that his constitutional rights were violated, the substantial burden standard may import standards that are not appropriate at this stage of litigation. Rather, to determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests, the court could instead consider whether the plaintiff’s allegations align with the criteria identified in cases such as Washington and McEachin .
In the present case, the plaintiff has not alleged a substantial claim that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. First, regardless of the reasonableness of the justifications asserted by the defendants in defense of the challenged directive, unlike the plaintiff in Washington, the plaintiff in the present case does not allege facts in support of his contention that the defendants’ actions were not related to legitimate penological interests. The plaintiff asserts at various points in his complaint that the defendants’ motivations were discriminatory, but fails to allege any facts that would support the conclusion that the defendants promulgated the challenged directive for any reason other than the safe administration of the correctional facility. Furthermore, looking to McEachin, it is apparent that although the plaintiff has alleged that the challenged directive and its enforcement have hampered his ability to openly wear his religious articles, this interference was not significant. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to the directive, he is able to wear religious articles, though he must wear them under his clothes. Accordingly, given the plaintiff’s ability to retain and wear the religious articles in question, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants’ actions significantly interfere with his religious beliefs.
In the absence of allegations that clearly demonstrate an incursion upon the plaintiff’s constitutional protected interests, the plaintiff has not alleged a substantial claim that the defendants have violated his constitutional rights. As the second exception to sovereign immunity is thus not met, the plaintiff’s claims arising out of article first, § 3, and article seventh of the state constitution are barred.
The next issue is whether the plaintiff’s claim concerning equal protection under the state constitution falls under the second exception to sovereign immunity. The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails because he has not alleged a substantial claim pursuant to either of two theories: an express classification based on religion or a facially neutral policy motivated by discriminatory animus.
"Article first, § 20, of the Constitution of Connecticut, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments, provides: ‘No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability.’ As a general matter, this court has interpreted the state constitution’s equal protection clause to have a like meaning and [to] impose similar constitutional limitations as the federal equal protection clause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 68, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
"To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff first must establish that the state is affording different treatment to similarly situated groups of individuals." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 301 Conn. 68. Essentially, "[a]n equal protection claim based on unequal application of the law ... must be established by competent evidence ... showing ... intentional or purposeful discrimination ... [T]he requirement imposed upon [p]laintiffs claiming an equal protection violation [is that they] identify and relate specific instances where persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently ..." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 759, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Moreover, "[a] violation of equal protection by selective [treatment] arises if: (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) ... such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander v. Commissioner of Administrative Services, 86 Conn.App. 677, 684, 862 A.2d 851 (2004).
In the present case, the plaintiff’s allegations do not support a substantial claim that his right to equal protection under the state constitution was violated. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that the defendants were motivated by discriminatory animus and that the enactment and enforcement of the directive aimed to discriminate against Christian and Catholic inmates like the plaintiff. Yet, not only is the complaint devoid of factual allegations that could plausibly support these assertions, the directive itself also cuts against the plaintiff’s allegations to the extent that it is neutral in its application to inmates of all faiths. Furthermore, although the plaintiff also alleges that the state treats inmates of certain religions differently than it treats Christians because the directive permits religious headwear but not the open display of other religious articles, his complaint is devoid of allegations concerning the treatment of similarly situated individuals. Without proper factual support, the plaintiff has failed to allege a claim that fits within the second exception to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s equal protection claim.
B. State Equal Protection Statutes
The next claim that the defendants argue is barred by sovereign immunity arises under the state statutes guaranteeing equal protection. Specifically, the defendants argue that the claim arising from General Statutes § § 52-571a and 53-37b in the plaintiff’s complaint is barred because these statutes do not waive sovereign immunity and there are no allegations that the defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority. In response, the plaintiff first argues that § 52-571a provides a cause of action based on the plain language of the statute, and that no immunity is afforded to defendants alleged to have violated this statute. The plaintiff further argues that "the scope of the defendants conduct went beyond the statutory limits where the [plaintiffs] allegations before the trial jury will be established ... The [defendants] acted outside their directives and statutes and violated this [plaintiff’s] religious rights and freedoms." Neither party contends that the second exception to sovereign immunity pertains to this claim.
General Statutes § 52-571a provides: "Any person aggrieved by a violation of section 53-37b may apply to the Superior Court for injunctive relief, recovery of damages and such other relief as the court deems just and equitable." General Statutes § 53-37b, in turn, provides in relevant part that [a]ny person who, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this state or the United States, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state or the United States, engages in the use of force or threat ... shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall be guilty of a class C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B felony."
Strictly construing the statutes in question, it is apparent that § § 52-571a and 53-37b do not waive sovereign immunity. Neither statute contains explicit language waiving sovereign immunity. Although the plaintiff correctly notes that § 52-571a creates a private right of action, that alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that the legislature waived the state’s sovereign immunity. Rather, even though these statutes create a liability that is generally applicable, neither uses language indicating that the state is subject to that liability. The first exception to sovereign immunity is therefore not met.
In contrast, consider the language in General Statutes § 52-571b, which provides in relevant part: "A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state or any political subdivision of the state ." (Emphasis added.)
With regard to the third exception, which concerns an action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief where a defendant acts in excess of their statutory authority, the plaintiff has not alleged facts that support any such allegations. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants wrongfully enacted and enforced the challenged directive, and that such conduct resulted in the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. None of the allegations in the complaint, however, address whether the defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority. There are no allegations, for instance, that any of the defendants lacked the authority to enact the directive, or that any defendant acted in excess of their statutory authority with regard to enforcing the directive. Accordingly, the third exception to sovereign immunity is inapplicable as to this claim.
In sum, none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply and this claim is barred. The court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants violated § § 52-571a and 53-37b.
C. State Anti-discrimination Statutes
The defendants’ last arguments with regard to sovereign immunity and the plaintiff’s state law claims concerns the claims arising under various anti-discrimination statutes. The defendants argue that General Statutes § § 52-571b, 46a-69, 46a-71, and 46a-78 waive sovereign immunity for non-monetary relief only. The plaintiff, in response, contends that these statutes afford monetary relief and that § 52-571b(f) operates as a waiver.
General Statutes § 52-571b(f) provides: "For the purposes of this section, ‘state or any political subdivision of the state’ includes any agency, board, commission, department, officer or employee of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and ‘demonstrates’ means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion."
Pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a plaintiff may bring an action against the state for monetary damages only if there is a statutory waiver of immunity or if the plaintiff has received authorization from the claims commissioner. See Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 351. The plaintiff in the present case has not represented that he has received authorization from the claims commissioner. In fact, the plaintiff argues that because the statutes at issue waive sovereign immunity, he is not required to do so. In light of the foregoing, the first exception to sovereign immunity- whether the legislature statutorily waived immunity- is the only exception that the court need consider.
With regard to the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § § 46a-69, 46a-71, and 46a-78, General Statutes § 46a-69 provides: "It shall be a discriminatory practice to violate any of the provisions of sections 46a-70 to 46a-78, inclusive." Sections 46a-71 and 46a-78 prohibit discriminatory practices by state agencies and mandate annual reports to the governor concerning efforts undertaken to effectuate this anti-discriminatory statutory scheme, respectively. General Statutes § 46a-99 provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of any provision of sections 46a-70 to 46a-78, inclusive ... may petition the Superior Court for appropriate relief and said court shall have the power to grant such relief, by injunction or otherwise, as it deems just and suitable."
In Prigge v. Dept. of Child & Families, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X06-CV-02-181467-S (March 26, 2004, Alander, J.) , the court determined that § 46a-99 did not abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity against an award of damages. Specifically, the court determined that the statute did not contain an express waiver of immunity from suits seeking monetary relief, and that, in light of the requirement that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity be strictly construed, "the more reasonable interpretation of the language of § 46a-99 authorizing a petition in Superior Court for appropriate relief and providing the court the power to grant such relief, by injunction or otherwise, as it deems just and suitable is that a person proving a violation of § 46a-71 may obtain non-monetary relief against the state, such as injunctive and declaratory relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The Appellate Court reached the same conclusion in Lyon v. Jones, 104 Conn.App. 547, 935 A.2d 201 (2007), rev’d on other grounds, 291 Conn . 384, 968 A.2d 416 (2009). In Lyon, the Appellate Court concluded that "§ 46a-99 does not constitute a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity with respect to claims for money damages." Id., 557. Yet, on appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the Appellate Court should not have considered the argument concerning § 46a-99 and immunity from monetary claims because the issue was moot. Lyon v. Jones, supra, 291 Conn. 395. Although the Supreme Court did not reverse the Appellate Court’s determination on the merits with regard to the effect of § 46a-99 on sovereign immunity, it does appear that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision, the Appellate Court’s conclusion is not binding authority.
In the present case, there is ample support for the conclusion that § 46a-99 does not waive sovereign immunity with respect to claims for monetary relief, and therefore the plaintiff is limited to claims for prospective relief with regard to the claims arising under § § 46a-69, 46a-71, and 46a-78. In addition to the persuasive authority holding as much, it is apparent that § 46a-99 does not expressly afford the plaintiff the right to sue for monetary relief As the court must read statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity in a manner that "makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity"; Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 349; § 46a-99 should be interpreted as waiving sovereign immunity with respect to prospective, but not monetary, relief.
The plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief pursuant to § 52-571b fails for similar reasons. General Statutes § 52-571b provides in relevant part: "A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state or any political subdivision of the state." At least one Superior Court opinion has already determined that "while [§ ]52-571b authorizes a suit against the state, it does not authorize an award of money damages against the state." Francis v. Dept. of Correction, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-5034720-S (July 17, 2014, Pittman, J.). As with § 46a-99, § 52-571b does not contain an express waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity with respect to monetary claims, and the strict interpretation of "appropriate relief" is therefore limited to injunctive or declaratory relief. Furthermore, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s argument, § 52-571b(f) merely defines certain terms within the statute. It does not, in other words, operate as a waiver to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, § 52-571b does not permit the plaintiff to sue the state for monetary relief.
D. General Statutes § 52-571c
As a final note to the issue of sovereign immunity as applied to the plaintiff’s state law claims, the plaintiff argues that because the defendants have not addressed the claim he raised pursuant to General Statutes § 52-571c, the defendants have waived the defense of sovereign immunity with regard to that claim. After reviewing the materials submitted by the defendants, it appears that they may not have recognized that the plaintiff was making such a claim.
The section of the complaint where the plaintiff’s claims are located is organized in such a way that the statutes or constitutional provisions underlying each claim are typed with bold letters and are fashioned as headings. Section 52-571c, however, is merely referenced in the heading of the complaint and briefly within the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to General Statutes § 52-571b.
The court has already noted that the plaintiff, because he is self-represented, is to be afforded a degree of solicitude. See Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 274 Conn. 569. With regard to the plaintiff’s argument, though, even if the court were to determine that the plaintiff had raised a claim under § 52-571c, the defendants’ silence is of no moment because the court could, on its own, decide whether sovereign immunity bars that claim. See Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 324, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).
In that vein, General Statutes § 52-571c, which is captioned "action for damages resulting from intimidation based on bigotry or bias," provides that a victim "may bring a civil action against the person who committed such act to recover damages for such injury." (Emphasis added.) For the same reasons articulated earlier with regard to § 52-571a, it is apparent that § 52-571c does not waive sovereign immunity; there is no express waiver, and no language from which to imply such a waiver. Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff maintains that either the defendants’ silence or the statute itself operates as a waiver to sovereign immunity, the plaintiff is mistaken.
VII. Sovereign Immunity, Federal Claims
Assuming, once again, that the plaintiff has stated a claim against the defendants in their official capacities, the defendants argue that sovereign immunity also bars the plaintiff’s federal law claims. The defendants challenge the plaintiff’s claims under the federal constitution as well as his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA).
A. United States Constitution
The defendants argue that sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the first, fourteenth, and ninth amendments of the federal constitution because the plaintiff has failed to state a substantial constitutional claim pursuant to each amendment. The defendants’ contention in this regard, however, incorrectly hinges on the second exception for sovereign immunity established under state law.
"The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 134, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). "Accordingly, [the Connecticut Supreme Court] has recognized that it must not erect a constitutionally impermissible barrier to the vindication of federal rights in state court. Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 136. [The court has also] acknowledged that [i]t would be a bizarre result if this court were to adopt an interpretation of a claim or defense under § 1983 that is different from that of the federal circuit in which our state courts are located, resulting in a different outcome depending on whether the plaintiff filed his § 1983 action in a state courthouse or in a federal courthouse a few blocks away." Mangiafico v. Farmington. 331 Conn. 404, 204 A.3d 1138 (2019). Therefore, "when sovereign immunity is claimed as a defense to a cause of action pursuant to § 1983, federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence preempts analysis under state law." Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 133.
The plaintiff’s claims concerning his rights under the federal constitution are brought pursuant to § 1983. The defendants’ argument that sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims because he has not put forward a substantial claim that his constitutional rights were violated are inapposite, as that exception applies to claims arising under state law, but not federal law. Rather than examining whether the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the federal constitution meet an exception for sovereign immunity under state jurisprudence, the court must consider federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
"Section 1983 provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States ... Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." (Citations omitted.) Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S . 1240, 114 S.Ct. 2749, 129 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994).
"[T]he Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress did not intend to defeat traditional notions of sovereign immunity in enacting § 1983 ... Instead, these principles inform the meaning of the term ‘person’ as used in § 1983." (Citation omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 140. "A suit generally may not be maintained directly against the State itself, or against an agency or department of the State, unless the State has waived its sovereign immunity ... Suits seeking monetary damages may not be brought against the state or its agencies and departments, pursuant to § 1983; rather, only suits for injunctive relief may be maintained against the state ... State officers acting in their official capacity may, typically, only be sued for injunctive or declaratory relief." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Richards v. Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.Supp.2d 278, 288 (D.Conn. 2004). In other words, "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, [is] a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
In the present case, to the extent that the plaintiff has alleged claims pursuant to § 1983 against defendants in their official capacities seeking non-monetary relief, those claims may proceed at this stage of litigation. The plaintiff’s claims under the federal constitution need not meet the exceptions carved out by state sovereign immunity jurisprudence in order to survive. Accordingly, sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
In their brief, after arguing that sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims, the defendants contend that the plaintiff’s ninth amendment claim is also barred because the ninth amendment "cannot survive independent of other constitutional claims." In light of the determination that sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the court need not address this argument.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants in their official capacities pursuant to § 1985 is barred. Specifically, the defendants contend that, by its plain language, § 1985 permits a claim against one or more persons, but that a claim against a state official in his official capacity is not a claim against a person within the meaning of § 1985; essentially, the defendants argue that because a claim against a state official in their official capacity is a claim against the state, such a claim does not fall within the requirements of § 1985.
"By its terms, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 ... applies only to persons, and the same reasoning underlying Will, 491 U.S. at 71, applies to suits brought under § 1985." Evans v. Dept. of Health, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 98-7160(L), 98-7930 (CON) (2d Cir. July 30, 1999); accord Thompson v. New York, 487 F.Supp. 212, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[i]t remains to be considered whether all of the defendants in this action can be included as ‘person(s)’ within the meaning of Section 1985 ... In resolving this issue, generally the same principles applicable to the definition of a ‘person’ under Section 1983 are relevant"). In Will, the court determined that "a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief would be a person under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra, 491 U.S. 71 n.10. Accordingly, given that "the same reasoning underlying Will ... applies to suits brought under § 1985"; Evans v. Dept. of Health, supra, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 98-7160(L), 98-7930 (CON); a state official in his or her capacity sued for injunctive relief would be a person under § 1985.
In the present case, to the extent that the plaintiff has stated a claim against one or more state officials in their official capacities for prospective relief, those defendants are "persons" under both § § 1983 and 1985. The plaintiff’s claim pursuant to § 1985 is not therefore barred on the ground that he has failed to allege that one or more "persons" conspired against him.
C. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
With regard to the plaintiff’s claim arising under RLUIPA, the defendants argue that the state has only waived sovereign immunity with regard to non-monetary relief. In response, the plaintiff contends that RLUIPA affords him monetary relief and that the jury should determine the question of relief. In Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011), the Supreme Court determined that RLUIPA does not waive a state’s sovereign immunity to suits for money damages; see also Holland v. Goodr, 758 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) ("RLUIPA does not authorize claims for monetary damages against state officers in either their official or individual capacities"). As RLUIPA does not afford the plaintiff the right to monetary relief, the plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim against the defendants in their official capacities may be considered for prospective relief, only.
VIII. Limiting Prospective Relief
Having concluded that certain claims afford the plaintiff prospective relief, the question is whether the plaintiff’s requested relief limits his claims to the commissioner, only. In his complaint, the plaintiff requests that the language from the directive requiring inmates to wear religious articles underneath their clothing be altered to permit inmates to display their religious articles openly. The commissioner is the only defendant with the authority to execute this change to the directive. See General Statutes § 18-81 (empowering the commissioner to create administrative directives for the administration and operation of correctional institutions). As the relief requested by the plaintiff does not concern any defendant other than the commissioner, the defendants correctly argue that the plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief should be limited to the commissioner.
IX. Statutory Immunity
The defendants argue that even if the court determines that the plaintiff has stated claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, those individual-capacity state law claims are barred by statutory immunity because the defendants acted within the scope of their authority when they enacted and enforced the directive, and because the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants’ conduct was wanton, reckless, or malicious.
"[W]here a state official is sued in both her official and individual capacities, if sovereign immunity does not apply to the claim against her in her official capacity, the statutory immunity may then apply to the claim against her in her individual capacity. Thus, before determining whether and to what extent the defendants are shielded by the statutory immunity provided by [General Statutes] § 4-165, it is appropriate to determine whether the claims against them are barred by the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 162-63, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 325.
"Claims involving ... statutory immunity, pursuant to § 4-165, implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Weiner, 154 Conn.App. 592, 597, 106 A.3d 963, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 925, 109 A.3d 921 (2015). The matter is therefore a question of law for the court. Id.
General Statutes § 4-165 provides that "[n]o state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment ..." "In other words, state employees may not be held personally liable for their negligent actions performed within the scope of their employment." Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 319. "State employees do not, however, have statutory immunity for wanton, reckless or malicious actions, or for actions not performed within the scope of their employment. For those actions, they may be held personally liable, and a plaintiff who has been injured by such actions is free to bring an action against the individual employee." Id. "On a threshold [statutory] immunity issue, pursuant to a motion to dismiss ... [the court] does not pass on whether the complaint was legally sufficient to state a cause of action ... [The court] [examines] the pleadings to decide if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts ... with respect to personal immunity under § 4-165, to support a conclusion that the defendant[s] [were] acting outside the scope of [their] employment or wilfully or maliciously." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002).
First, "[t]o determine if a person has acted outside the scope of their employment, courts have been usefully guided by inquiring whether the defendants alleged actions were motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to his employer’s interest ... or whether they acted solely ... to justify their own prior unjustified conduct, and not to carry out the government policy with which they were entrusted." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Smith, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-07-4027999S. Second, "[i]n applying § 4-165, our Supreme Court has understood wanton, reckless or malicious to have the same meaning as it does in the common-law context ... Under the common law, [i]n order to establish that the defendants’ conduct was wanton, reckless. wilful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ... [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Weiner, supra, 154 Conn.App. 598.
In the present case, because the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment or that they were acting maliciously, statutory, immunity bars the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their personal capacities. The plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a conclusion that the defendants enacted or enforced the directive in question based on their own personal considerations. Although he asserts that the defendants were generally motivated by discriminatory animus- or that the impact of the directive is discriminatory- he does not allege any facts to support the contention that the defendants enacted or enforced the directive due to a personal prejudice against prisoners seeking to display religious articles related to the Christian or Catholic faith. Nor does the plaintiff appear to allege or argue that the defendants acted to justify any prior misconduct. With regard to willfulness or maliciousness, the plaintiff has similarly failed to allege sufficient facts to support the determination that the defendants’ conduct involved either highly unreasonable conduct or an extreme departure from ordinary care. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants enacted a policy that applies to religious articles of all faiths that are not worn on the head, and that the plaintiff was told on several occasions that he was required to wear his religious articles under his clothing. In the absence of allegations that the defendants either enacted or enforced the challenged directive in a manner that evidenced a reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s rights or safety, the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the defendants acted maliciously. Assuming that the plaintiff has stated a claim against any defendant in their personal capacity, statutory immunity operates to bar any such claim.
X. Qualified Immunity
The defendants also argue that, to the extent that the plaintiff has stated claims arising under federal law against any defendant in his or her individual capacity, those claims are barred by qualified immunity. Relatedly, the defendants further contend that the plaintiff is unable to bring an individual-capacity claim under RLUIPA.
A. Non-RLUIPA Claims
The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s federal law claims against the defendants in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity because the right in question to openly display religious articles- is not one that is clearly established. In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendants are not entitled to any sort of immunity if they are named in their individual capacities and that qualified immunity is not a question for the court. The plaintiff cites to several cases to support his argument that several circuit courts have concluded that qualified immunity is an issue to be determined by the jury.
As a threshold matter, "[q]ualified immunity protects an official from liability under federal causes of action but is not generally understood to protect officials from claims based on state law." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jenkins v. New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2007). Insofar as qualified immunity concerns claims that arise under federal law, federal jurisprudence controls. See Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn.App. 603, 625, 975 A.2d 59 (2009) ("in reviewing ... claims of qualified immunity we are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials" [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Federal case law supports the defendants’ contention that the court can determine the question of qualified immunity pursuant to a motion to dismiss. "The Supreme Court has made clear that qualified immunity can be established by the facts alleged in a complaint ... and indeed, because qualified immunity protects officials not merely from liability but from litigation, that the issue should be resolved when possible on a motion to dismiss, before the commencement of discovery ... to avoid subjecting public officials to time consuming and expensive discovery procedures." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Doe, 779 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2014). As "the driving force behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that insubstantial claims against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery" the Supreme Court has "repeatedly ... stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
The cases relied upon by the plaintiff do not persuasively indicate that the issue of qualified immunity must be determined by a jury. In McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 5th Cir. 2000), for example, the court noted that "while qualified immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial, if the issue is not decided until trial the defense goes to the jury ..." Id. Similarly, in Keylon v. Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 121718 (10th Cir. 2008), the court also determined that "[q]ualified immunity issues are almost always questions of law, decided by a court prior to trial"; id., 1217; before noting that "in exceptional circumstances historical facts may be so intertwined with the law that a jury question is appropriate ..." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1218. Accordingly, rather than standing for the proposition that qualified immunity is usually a question for the jury, both McCoy and Keylon indicate that qualified immunity is ordinarily an issue for the court to decide before trial, but that it may be determined by the jury if the issue is not decided prior to trial or in exceptional circumstances. As there is no indication that the plaintiff’s claims present exceptional circumstances, the issue of qualified immunity is properly before the court pursuant to the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Other cases cited by the plaintiff in support of his argument that qualified immunity must be determined by a jury also indicate that it is ordinarily a matter to be determined by the court. See Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) ("whether an officer made a reasonable mistake of law and is thus entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law that is properly answered by the court, not a jury"); Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005) ("juries are ill-suited to make the determinations of law required by the qualified immunity analysis"); Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The law of our circuit is clear. The issue of qualified immunity is a question of law for the court, rather than the jury, to decide").
"[Q]ualified immunity is available only to individuals sued for damages in their individual capacity ..." Lee-Walker v. Dept. of Education, 712 Fed.Appx. 43, 45 (2d. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1318, 200 L.Ed.2d 473 (2018). "A [governmental] defendant will be entitled to qualified immunity if either (1) his actions did not violate clearly established law, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions did not violate clearly established law." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 217-18, 9 A.3d 347 (2010). These two inquiries need not be addressed sequentially. See Pearson v. Callahan, supra, 555 U.S. 239. "To determine whether a right is clearly established, [the court] [looks] to (1) whether the right was defined with reasonable specificity; (2) whether Supreme Court or court of appeals case law supports the existence of the right in question, and (3) whether under preexisting law a reasonable defendant would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful ... [The court] [does] not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee-Walker v. Dept. of Education, supra, 712 Fed.Appx. 44-45. Essentially, "[f]or a right to be clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, it is sufficient if decisions of the Supreme Court or of the appropriate circuit have defined the contours of the right with reasonable specificity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 84 (2d Cir. 2000).
Furthermore, "[p]risoners’ free exercise claims are necessarily balanced against the interests of prison officials administering the prison system ... In light of that concern, it has been clearly established that burdens on prisoners’ free exercise rights must be justified by a legitimate penological interest." (Citation omitted.) Barnes v. Furman, 629 Fed.Appx. 52, 56 (2d Cir. 2015). "When officials follow an established prison policy ... their entitlement to qualified immunity depends on whether a reasonable officer might have believed that the challenged order was lawful in light of legitimate penological interests supporting the directive." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 57.
The defendants cite to several cases in support of their argument that "multiple courts have concluded that requiring inmates to wear religious articles under their clothing is permissible to accommodate inmates’ religious exercise while also preventing [the] use of those articles to signal gang affiliation, a legitimate penological interest." The cases the defendants rely upon do indicate that prohibiting the open display of certain religious articles may serve a legitimate penological interest. Other cases similarly indicate that prisons may regulate the wearing of religious garb or articles in order to maintain institutional security. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 1991) (prison policy barring an inmate from wearing a bear tooth necklace and medicine bag around his neck did not violate inmate’s first amendment rights); Butler-Bey v. Frey, 811 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1987) (policy prohibiting wearing fezzes constitutionally sound where "trial court properly deferred to the administrative expertise of the prison officials"); Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1982) (policy prohibiting wearing of prayer caps and robes outside religious services did not violate inmates’ constitutional rights). Given the case law on this point, a reasonable official might have believed that the directive at issue was lawful.
Specifically, the defendants identify Charles v. Frank, 101 Fed.Appx. 634, 636 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S . 980, 125 S.Ct. 479, 160 L.Ed.2d 358 (2004); Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1992); Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F.Supp. 194, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Vann v. Fischer, United States District Court, Docket No. 11 Civ. 1958 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2012).
The court’s analysis on the question of qualified immunity in Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196 (S.D.Cal. 2012) serves as a helpful counterpoint to the present case. In Davis, the court determined that the defendant, a prison warden, was not entitled to qualified immunity on an equal protection claim where the plaintiff-prisoner’s right to be free from discrimination on the basis of religion was clearly established. Id., 1236-37. The policy at issue in Davis concerned access to religious articles; pursuant to the policy, "Muslim inmates would ... be unable to place special orders for both religious and other personal items, while other inmates could order both." Id., 1237. The court noted that the warden would know that the challenged conduct was unlawful, as "[a] reasonable official would know that treating inmates of one faith differently from inmates of another faith was unconstitutional." Id., 1237. The court further noted that it could not determine whether a legitimate penological interest served as the basis for the policy, but that the defendant "would have known that implementing a policy that affects only Muslim inmates would be unconstitutional if it was issued solely for administrative convenience." Id.
In contrast to Davis, the plaintiff in the present case has not demonstrated that the defendants violated a clearly established right by enacting or enforcing the directive concerning the wearing of religious articles. Although the plaintiff alleges discriminatory animus against Christians and Catholics, the directive in the present case is broad enough to impact inmates who are not members of the Christian faith. Given the well-established understanding that a prisoner’s free exercise rights are balanced against certain administrative needs within a correctional facility and that prohibitions concerning the wearing of religious articles may be justified by a legitimate penological interest, it was objectively reasonable for the defendants alleged to have implemented this directive to believe that their actions did not violate clearly established law. Qualified immunity therefore operates to bar any claims arising under federal law against any defendant in their personal capacity.
B. RLUIPA
The defendants correctly argue that RLUIPA does not authorize claims against any of the defendants in their individual capacities. Noting that other federal circuit courts have determined that RLUIPA does not allow individual-capacity suits against state officials, the Second Circuit held that "RLUIPA does not provide a cause of action against state officials in their individual capacities because the legislation was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power ... which allows the imposition of conditions, such as individual liability, only on those parties actually receiving the state funds." Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2013). The court concluded that "as a matter of statutory interpretation and following the principle of constitutional avoidance, we hold that RLUIPA does not create a private right of action against state officials in their individual capacities." Id., 146. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, to the extent that it states a claim against any defendant in his or her individual capacity, must therefore be dismissed.
XI. Declaratory Judgment
Finally, the defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 4-175 because the plaintiff is challenging an administrative directive, not a regulation subject to the requirements of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). In response, the plaintiff contends that the department has replaced the word "regulation" with "directive" in order to circumvent appropriate statutory procedures; in support, the plaintiff offers a directive from 1978 that was labeled as a regulation. To further bolster his argument that the directive was improperly promulgated, the plaintiff also relies on General Statutes § 4-170.
General Statutes § 4-175 provides: "If a provision of the general statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff ... the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the regulation in question or the applicability of the provision of the general statutes, the regulation or the final decision in question to specified circumstances."
General Statutes § 4-170 provides in relevant part: "If the [legislative] committee disapproves a proposed regulation in whole or in part, it shall give notice of the disapproval and the reasons for the disapproval to the agency, and no agency shall thereafter issue any regulation or directive or take other action to implement such disapproved regulation, or part thereof, as the case may be."
Section 4-175 provides for a declaratory judgment under the UAPA. See C.S.E.A., Inc. v. Connecticut Personnel Policy Board, 165 Conn. 448, 452, 334 A.2d 909 (1973). "The [plaintiff’s] ... right to seek a declaratory judgment under the UAPA necessarily involves the jurisdiction of the court." Id. Furthermore, "a declaratory judgment action is the proper proceeding in which to challenge the validity of [a] ... regulation." BCBS Goshen Realty, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 22 Conn.App. 407, 409-10, 577 A.2d 1101 (1990).
The Appellate Court discussed the difference between regulations and directives and the consequent impact on the court’s jurisdiction in Pierce v. Lantz, 113 Conn.App. 98, 965 A.2d 576, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 915, 979 A.2d 490 (2009). In Pierce, the court noted that "[t]he UAPA defines the term regulation as each agency statement of general applicability, without regard to its designation, that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency. The term includes the amendment or repeal of a prior regulation, but does not include ... statements concerning only the internal management of any agency and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public ... The criteria that determine whether administrative action is a regulation are neither linguistic nor formalistic. It is not conclusive that an agency has, or has not, denominated its action a regulation or that it has, or has not, promulgated it procedurally in the fashion that would be required of a regulation ... The test is, rather, whether a rule has a substantial impact on the rights and obligations of parties who may appear before the agency in the future." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 101-02.
The court went on to determine that "[t]he [incarcerated] plaintiff argues that the restrictions ... are regulations that were not properly promulgated and, therefore, are in violation of the UAPA. Our review. however, leads us to conclude that the restrictions are administrative directives, which interpret and apply the regulations that already have been promulgated to govern the department ... General Statutes § 18-81 empowers the commissioner to create such administrative directives for the administration and operation of the correctional institutions. Administrative directives are created for the internal management of the correctional institutions and are not regulations that are subject to the UAPA requirements." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Pierce v. Lantz, supra, 113 Conn.App. 104-05.
In the present case, the plaintiff’s argument that the directive is a regulation and that it was not established in accordance with the proper procedures is similar to the argument rejected by the court in Pierce . As in Pierce, the directive at issue concerns the internal management of a correctional institution. Establishing rules concerning the wearing or displaying of religious articles by inmates in a correctional facility is not a statement of general applicability and does not affect the public’s rights; rather, such a rule merely concerns the operation of a correctional facility. Although the plaintiff correctly argues that the department’s label is not dispositive to the determination of whether something is a regulation or a directive, it is apparent from the substance of the directive that it is not a regulation. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s reliance on § 4-170 is misplaced; the relevant part of that statute concerns conduct following a legislative committee’s rejection of a proposed regulation, a situation wholly different from the circumstances of the present case. The defendants are therefore correct that, because UAPA requirements are inapplicable to a directive, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment.
CONCLUSION
The defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby granted and the only surviving claims are those made against the commissioner in his official capacity seeking injunctive relief pursuant to the Connecticut Religious Freedom Act, the anti-discriminatory state statutes, RLUIPA, and § § 1983 and 1985.