Opinion
Docket No. 27901.
Filed February 27, 2003.
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Owyhee County. Hon. Gerald L. Weston, District Judge.
Order summarily dismissing application for post-conviction relief, affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Charles Isaac Wadams, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Charles Isaac Wadams argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; T. Paul Krueger II, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. T. Paul Krueger II argued.
Juan Garza appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief. Because Garza did not respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, there arises a question as to whether his appeal is procedurally barred under Sabin v. State, 129 Idaho 257, 923 P.2d 502 (Ct.App. 1996), a case in which this Court declined to review the summary dismissal of a post-conviction action because the applicant had filed no response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. We now conclude that Sabin should be overruled, and we therefore address the merits of Garza's appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this matter to the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
In the underlying criminal case, Garza pleaded guilty to attempted rape, Idaho Code §§ 18-306, -6101(3), -6104, and first degree kidnapping, Idaho Code §§ 18-4501(1), -4502. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a charge of aggravated assault and to not pursue a persistent violator enhancement. Garza was given a unified sentence of fifteen years with ten years determinate for attempted rape, and a concurrent unified term of life, with fifteen years determinate for first degree kidnapping. No appeal was ever filed in the criminal action.
Garza later filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief. The district court appointed counsel to represent Garza in the post-conviction proceedings. The court thereafter issued a notice of intent to dismiss Garza's application, giving him twenty days to respond to the proposed dismissal. Garza subsequently filed an amended application for post-conviction relief. It alleged that Garza received ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal proceedings because: (1) at the change of plea hearing, trial counsel failed to object to the amendment of the information from second degree kidnapping to first degree kidnapping, which increased the maximum possible sentence from fifteen years to life; (2) Garza was unable to instruct counsel to file a notice of appeal because counsel would not accept Garza's collect calls; (3) counsel did not give Garza the opportunity to read a psychosexual evaluation and social/sexual assessment that were presented to the trial court at sentencing, and therefore Garza had no opportunity to inform the court of mistakes and discrepancies in the reports; (4) counsel did not advise Garza that the State's agreement not to pursue a persistent violator enhancement, given as part of the consideration for Garza's guilty plea, was valueless because Garza, having only one prior felony conviction, was not subject to such an enhancement; (5) counsel should have obtained a second psychosexual evaluation because the first was overly negative; and (6) counsel should have insisted upon the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). The application also alleged that Garza was denied due process in that: (1) a full psychological evaluation was not completed, even though such an evaluation was ordered by the court; and (2) a PSI was not completed even though preparation of a PSI was ordered by the court.
After reviewing the amended application, the district court ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held on Garza's claim that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the amendment of the information from second degree kidnapping to first degree kidnapping, but the court again gave notice of its intent to dismiss all other claims and gave Garza twenty days to respond to the proposed dismissal. Garza did not file a response to the notice. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Garza's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the amendment of the kidnapping charge. At the same time, the court summarily dismissed Garza's remaining claims.
Garza appeals, challenging the disposition of only those claims that were summarily dismissed. He asserts that the dismissal is invalid because the court did not give him sufficient notice of the grounds upon which the court was considering dismissal of the claims. The State contends that Garza waived any right to appeal the dismissal order by failing to present any opposition to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Whether Appellate Review Is Barred
We begin with consideration of the State's position that Garza has waived any appellate challenge to the summary dismissal order under the rule we announced in Sabin. In that case, we held that where the trial court issued a notice of intent to summarily dismiss an application for post-conviction relief and the applicant failed to file a response to the notice, the applicant was barred from appellate review of the summary dismissal. Id. at 258, 923 P.2d at 503. Garza concedes that if the Sabin rule is applied, his appeal is barred, but he urges this Court to overrule Sabin.
Stare decisis is an important principle that brings stability and predictability to the law. Therefore, settled precedents should not be lightly overruled. See Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). Nevertheless, as an appellate court we must not be "hesitant to reverse ourselves when a doctrine . . . or a holding in a case, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise." State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 661, 8 P.3d 652, 656 (2000) (quoting Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 990, 695 P.2d 369, 375 (1985)). In Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 801, 473 P.2d 937, 943 (1970), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that "[s]tare decisis is not a confining phenomenon but rather a principle of law. And when the application of this principle will not result in justice, it is evident that the doctrine is not properly applicable." With these guiding principles in mind, on re-examination of the Sabin rule we are convinced that it should be overruled.
The principal infirmity of the Sabin rule is that it compels this Court to affirm even plainly erroneous rulings of the trial courts. It prevents the reversal of a dismissal order even where the rationale given by the trial court is incorrect on its face. It also permits erroneous rulings to stand despite the existence in the record of evidence or legal arguments filed by the applicant that belie the trial court's rationale, merely because those filings were made before the trial court's notice of intent to dismiss was issued.
The Sabin rule is also subject to criticism because it imposes upon post-conviction applicants an obstacle to appellate review that is not faced by other civil litigants. Post-conviction actions are civil in nature and, except as to discovery matters, they are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Idaho Code § 19-4907(a); Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b). Accordingly, the summary dismissal of a post-conviction action pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is procedurally equivalent to a summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56 in other types of civil actions. State v. Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 868, 934 P.2d 931, 934 (1997); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 796, 992 P.2d 789, 791 (Ct.App. 1999); Chavarria v. State, 131 Idaho 446, 448, 958 P.2d 603, 605 (Ct.App. 1998); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 817, 892 P.2d 488, 492 (Ct.App. 1995). Nevertheless, the Sabin rule permits incongruent treatment for post-conviction applicants at the appellate level. We have not been directed to, nor have we found, any analogous doctrine that precludes appellate review of summary judgments or of orders on other dispositive motions in ordinary civil cases merely because the appealing party filed no opposition to the motion in the trial court.
Our concern about this disparity is magnified by our awareness that many post-conviction applicants act pro se in pursuit of their actions. It is likely that many applicants are unaware that the forfeiture of any right to an appeal is a consequence of failure to file a response to a judicial notice of intent to dismiss. As inmates in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, pro se applicants have no access to a law library and hence no opportunity even to ferret out the rule in Sabin.
On the somewhat analogous issue of whether the trial court may grant summary judgment without regard to whether a factual issue exists simply because no papers opposing the motion were filed or served, it has been held by federal courts that such a result would be inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, because the rule authorizes summary judgment only if the pleadings in evidence before the court demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See United States v. $273,969.04 U.S. Currency, 164 F.3d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1999); Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Administracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985).
Lastly, we observe that the weight of stare decisis principles is tempered here because the rule we contemplate abrogating is not a rule of law that has governed proceedings in the trial courts of this state. It is, rather, a rule of appellate court restraint that has only caused this Court to decline otherwise permissible appellate review. Therefore, our overruling Sabin will not disrupt a settled rule of law that has been relied upon by the trial bench and bar; it is solely the functioning of this Court that will be affected.
The Sabin rule has been neither adopted nor rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Accordingly, we conclude that there exist compelling reasons for departing from our previous ruling in Sabin. Because its continued application creates a risk of injustice, the waiver rule set forth in Sabin is overruled.
B. Summary Dismissal of Garza's Claims
Having determined that there is no procedural bar to this appeal, we will consider Garza's challenges to the summary dismissal of his claims. Summary dismissal of a post-conviction application is permissible only when the applicant has raised no genuine issue of material fact and the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.C. § 19-4906; Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 797, 992 P.2d at 792; Medrano v. State, 127 Idaho 639, 643, 903 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Ct.App. 1995). The trial court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction application, either sua sponte or upon motion of a party. I.C. § 19-4906; Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 797, 992 P.2d at 792. If the court chooses to dismiss an application sua sponte, I.C. § 19-4906(b) requires that the court notify the parties of its intent to dismiss, specify the grounds for the dismissal, and give the applicant at least twenty days to respond. See Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995); Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993); Martinez, 126 Idaho at 818, 892 P.2d at 493. The court's specification of the grounds for dismissal is to give notice of any deficiencies in the applicant's evidence or legal analysis that the applicant may need to address in order to avoid dismissal of the action. Id. If the court's notice of intent does not sufficiently state the reasons for the contemplated dismissal, the applicant receives no meaningful opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence that may demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 323, 900 P.2d at 799. Therefore, if a trial court's notice of intent did not give the applicant notice of reasons for the proposed dismissal, the order dismissing the application must be reversed. Banks, 123 Idaho at 954, 855 P.2d at 39; Martinez, 126 Idaho at 818, 892 P.2d at 493.
Garza contends that because the district court's notice of intent to dismiss did not adequately notify him of the court's rationale for dismissal, he was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond. As to some of his claims, we are constrained to agree.
1. Claims for which notice of grounds for dismissal was not given
The district court's notice stated no grounds for its intended dismissal of Garza's claims that: (1) he was deprived of an opportunity to appeal his conviction because his counsel would not accept collect telephone calls from Garza after sentencing; (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise Garza that the State's agreement not to pursue a persistent violator enhancement was valueless because Garza was not subject to such an enhancement; (3) trial counsel was ineffective in that he should have obtained a second psychosexual evaluation because the first was overly negative; and (4) Garza was denied due process because a full psychological evaluation was not completed even though ordered by the court. Because Garza received no specification of the district court's rationale for dismissal of these claims, the notice cannot be deemed adequate. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal order insofar as it applies to these claims.
2. Claims for which the notice specified grounds for dismissal
The district court's notice did specify grounds for dismissal of those claims which related to reports that were or could have been presented to the court for sentencing. After Garza pleaded guilty, the district court ordered that a PSI and a psychosexual evaluation be prepared for sentencing. A psychosexual evaluation was completed, but no PSI was prepared. Garza alleged in his amended post-conviction application that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the absence of a PSI and for not affording Garza the opportunity to read the psychosexual evaluation and a related social assessment report so that Garza could refute or object to allegedly inaccurate information in the reports. He also alleged that he was denied due process because a PSI was not completed.
The district court stated in its notice of intent to dismiss that these claims would be dismissed because Garza had waived the preparation of a PSI. The district court's determination that the PSI was waived by Garza is supported by the record, which includes a letter to the court from the presentence investigator indicating that the investigator attempted to interview Garza but that Garza refused to comply. As a result, the investigator was unable to prepare a report. A transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that the district court allowed Garza to choose between proceeding with the scheduled sentencing or postponing the hearing for completion of a PSI. Garza personally chose to proceed. Garza's post-conviction application and supporting documents present no evidence or argument that refutes the district court's conclusion that the PSI was waived by Garza. Accordingly, there was no error in the district court's summary dismissal of Garza's claims that are predicated upon the absence of a PSI.
Garza's final claim, that his trial counsel did not give Garza the opportunity to read the psychosexual evaluation and social assessment so as to address any mistakes or discrepancies in those reports, is more problematic. The district court, in its notice of intent, stated that by waiving a PSI, Garza also waived the opportunity to make any corrections to the psychosexual and social assessment reports. This basis for dismissal is erroneous. The waiver of a PSI does not inherently carry with it any relinquishment of the opportunity to read and correct other reports upon which the sentencing court will rely. Therefore, the summary dismissal of this claim must be vacated.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, we overrule our holding in Sabin that applicants for post-conviction relief who do not respond to a trial court's notice of intent to dismiss thereby waive appellate review of the dismissal order. Addressing the merits of Garza's claims, we affirm the district court's dismissal of those claims that related to the lack of a PSI. As to the remainder of Garza's claims asserted in his amended application for post-conviction relief, we vacate the dismissal order due to a lack of notice as to the grounds, or the statement of invalid grounds, for the district court's summary dismissal. Our decision does not preclude the district court from again considering summary dismissal of Garza's remaining claims, providing the court gives adequate notice of its grounds for dismissal and affords Garza a full opportunity to respond to that notice.
The dismissal order of the district court is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge GUTIERREZ CONCURS.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to overturn the ruling in Sabin v. State, 129 Idaho 257, 923 P.2d 502 (Ct.App. 1996). The majority notes that stare decisis is an important principle of law that brings stability and predictability to the law and yet fails to apply it in this case. The Sabin rule has been reaffirmed by this Court in several cases. See Repp v. State, 136 Idaho 262, 32 P.3d 156 (Ct.App. 2001); Chavarria v. State, 131 Idaho 446, 958 P.2d 603 (Ct.App. 1998); Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881, 934 P.2d 947 (Ct.App. 1997). As the majority observes, the Idaho Supreme Court has not adopted nor rejected the rule in Sabin in a published opinion. The Court did, however, rely on Sabin in an unpublished opinion affirming the summary dismissal of a post-conviction relief application. See Hernandez v. State, Docket No. 22818 (Mar. 13, 1997). In that case, the Court concluded that pursuant to the ruling adopted by this Court in Sabin, the applicant waived his challenge to the district court's order summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief by failing to respond to the proposed dismissal previously issued by the district court. Although the Court also addressed the merits of the appeal, the Court considered the Sabin rule and, despite having an opportunity to reject the rule as unwise or unjust, it did not do so.
The ruling in Sabin furthers the purpose of I.C. § 19-4906(b), wherein the legislature has authorized the summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief after a court is satisfied on the basis of the application and the record that an applicant is not entitled to the relief requested and no purpose would be served by further proceedings. This provision, in turn, fosters judicial economy and relieves the trial courts from burdensome and unnecessary proceedings. Additionally, the application of the Sabin rule is consistent with the application of the well-established rule of appellate procedure that issues not raised before a trial court may not be considered for the first time on appeal. See Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). Where a trial court reviews an application for post-conviction relief, determines that the applicant is not entitled to the relief requested and provides the applicant with additional time to convince the court otherwise but the applicant fails to respond, the applicant should not thereafter be allowed to wait until appeal to set forth the reasons that his or her application should not be dismissed.
For these reasons, I believe that the ruling in Sabin remains sound precedent and should not be overruled. I would hold that this Court is procedurally barred from addressing the merits of Garza's challenge to the summary dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief.