Opinion
Civil Action 00-0019-RV-M
April 13, 2001
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an Alabama inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint and two subsequent amendments to the same under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, encompassing four claims. This action has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that, because each claim is frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i), prior to service of process, three of Plaintiffs claims be dismissed with prejudice and that one claim be dismissed without prejudice.
I. Plaintiffs Allegations.
In Plaintiffs initial complaint, filed with this Court on February 3, 2000, he identified the following Defendants: Michael Haley, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC); Ron Jones, Warden at the ADOC's Elmore Correctional Center; Correctional Officers Archie Dansby, Carl Watson and Andy Jenkins, who were assigned to the ADOC's Fountain Correctional Center;. Captain Walter Allen of the Fountain facility; and Willie Thomas, Warden of the Fountain facility. (Doc. 4) The Defendants to Plaintiffs first amended complaint, filed on April 26, 2000, are Captain George Edwards and Correctional Officers Scott Godwin and Erma Henderson of the Fountain facility. (Doc. 7) The Defendants to Plaintiffs second amended complaint, filed on July 11, 2000, are Edwards, Godwin, and Correctional Officer Vicki Moye of the Fountain facility. (Doc. 8)
The allegations in Plaintiffs initial complaint stem from two separate events. The first event concerns Plaintiffs allegation that, in March 1995, postage stamps and money "illegally" were removed from his possession while he was assigned to the Elmore facility. (Doc. 4, at 6) The second event gives rise to several allegations that Plaintiff was "denied due process" stemming from a disciplinary proceeding in December 1999 at the Fountain facility wherein he was disciplined for "indecent exposure" and sentenced to 30 days in disciplinary segregation. (Doc. 4, at 5a)
In his first amended complaint (Doc. 7), Plaintiff alleges a violation of his "due process rights" regarding the circumstances surrounding his discipline in February 2000 by officials at the Fountain facility. (Doc. 7, at 6) With respect to this claim, Plaintiff does not indicate why he was disciplined, but does state that as a result of a disciplinary proceeding he was sentenced to 45 days in disciplinary segregation. (Doc. 7)
In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff again alleges a denial of "due process," regarding the circumstances surrounding his discipline in June 2000 by officials at the Fountain facility. (Doc. 8, at 5) With respect to this claim, although Plaintiff indicates that he was punished for throwing hot water on a prison guard, he does not indicate the specific nature or duration of the punishment imposed, other than to request as relief "$25.00 a day for each disciplinary segregation day." (Doc. 8, at 7)
In Plaintiffs initial and two amended complaints, he does not state specifically that he is alleging a deprivation of a life, liberty or property interest to which he is entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Docs. 4, 7 and 8) U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing, in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."). However, in view of the nature of Plaintiffs action, the Court is construing Plaintiffs claims as seeking a remedy for due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In summary, in the initial and amended complaints,, Plaintiff seeks the following relief: $25.00 per day for each day he was subjected to disciplinary segregation; $25,000 in compensatory damages; $25,000 in punitive damages; reimbursement of legal fees and costs; reimbursement of postage stamps and money; an improved disciplinary appeals process in the ADOC; and expungement of records in his file relating to the disciplinary procedures about which he complains. (Docs. 4, 7 and 8)
II. Applicable Law.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is reviewing Plaintiffs complaint, as amended, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be dismissed as "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 325, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, the claim seeks to enforce a right which clearly does not exist id., or there is an affirmative defense that would defeat the claim, such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia Pardons Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1990). Judges are accorded "not only the authority to dismiss [as frivolous] a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
The predecessor to this section was 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d).
III. Discussion.
A. Claim Regarding Postage Stamps and Money
The Court first will discuss Plaintiffs claim regarding the postage stamps and money that he alleges were "illegally" removed from his possession in March 1995. (Doc. 4, at 6) Again, although not stated directly in his complaint, the Court construes this claim as one alleging a deprivation of a property interest in violation of the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 4)
The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action in Alabama is two years. Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1105-06, 1108 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 326, 121 L.Ed.2d 246 (1992); Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l). The statute of limitations
"does not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." Calhoun v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 705 F.2d 422, 425 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930 (5th Cir. 1975)). Thus Section 1983 actions do not accrue until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that he has been injured. Calhoun, 705 F.2d at 424; Rubin [v. O'Koren], 621 F.2d [114,] 116 [(5th Cir. 1980)]; Lavellee [v. Listi], 611 F.2d [1129,] 1131 [(5th Cir. 1980)]. Nor will a section 1983 action accrue until the plaintiff is aware or should have been aware who has inflicted the injury. Lavellee, 611 F.2d at 1131 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)).Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987).
In the present action, it is apparent that, in March 1995, Plaintiff knew of his claim regarding the postage stamps and money, because in his complaint he gives a precise date the alleged offense occurred, March 1, 1995, and further alleges that, since that date, he has been subjected to "[t]he suffering of slavery" by "not being able to write loved ones" and being forced to "work without any form of pay." (Doc. 4, at 4, 5 and 8a)
Nonetheless, Plaintiff waited to file his complaint on February 14, 2000. (Doc. 4) The filing of this action is well in excess of two years from when this claim accrued. Knowing of no other reason that would preclude the application of the two-year statute of limitations to Plaintiffs claim regarding the removal of his postage stamps and money, the Court concludes that this claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations and is due to be dismissed with prejudice because it is frivolous as a matter of law. Lufkin, 956 F.2d at 1108.
B. Claims Regarding Disciplinary Hearings in December 1999 and February 2000
As explained supra, in Plaintiffs initial complaint and in his first amended complaint, he alleges that his due process rights were violated on two different occasions regarding discipline imposed upon him by officials at the Fountain facility. In the instance referred to in his initial complaint, Plaintiff states that the discipline imposed was disciplinary segregation for a duration of "30 days." (Doc. 4, at 5) In his first amended complaint, he states that the discipline imposed was disciplinary segregation for a duration of "45 days." (Doc. 7, at 5)
In order to state a claim under § 1983, there must be a violation of the Constitution. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). For Plaintiff to have suffered a due process violation, Plaintiff must be deprived of "life, liberty, or property." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, supra. The liberty deprivation that Plaintiff appears to allege that he suffered is temporary confinement to disciplinary segregation for, in one instance, 30 days, and in the other instance, 45 days. (Docs. 4 and 7)
There is no right inherent in the Constitution not to be placed in disciplinary segregation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 476, 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2296, 2302, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Therefore, because Plaintiffs allegations do not concern a right inherent in the Constitution, Plaintiff must establish that he has a state-created liberty interest not to be confined to disciplinary segregation without being accorded due process. However, he has failed to do so.
The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the Sandin decision as recognizing
two circumstances in which a prisoner can be further deprived of his liberty such that due process is required. The first is when a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-93, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263-64, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (holding that a prisoner is entitled to due process prior to being transferred to a mental hospital). The second is when the state has consistently given a certain benefit to prisoners (for instance, via statute or administrative policy), and the deprivation of that benefit "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (prisoners may not be deprived of statutory "good-time credits" without due process); cf. Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining how the state creates liberty interests). [Footnote omitted.] In the first situation, the liberty interest exists apart from the state; in the second situation, the liberty interest is created by the state.Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the present action, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff is attempting to advance claims based on the latter circumstance. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming that two months' confinement to administrative segregation was not a deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty interest).
The United States Supreme Court in Sandin altered the analysis for determining if a prisoner has a state-created liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. In Sandin, the Supreme Court found that there was not a state-created liberty interest to be free from disciplinary segregation. Id. The Sandin Court, in reviewing an action in which a Hawaiian prisoner sued prison officials under § 1983 for allegedly being denied due process during a disciplinary hearing before he was confined to disciplinary segregation for 30 days, concluded that segregation as a form of punishment was not a "dramatic departure" from the ordinary conditions of incarceration. Id. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301. The Court ruled that confinement to disciplinary segregation "did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 486, 115 S.Ct. at 2301. As such, the Court found that confinement to disciplinary segregation did not amount to a "grievous loss." Id. at 480, 115 S.Ct. at 2298. Unlike the loss of good-time credits at issue in Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, the Court determined that mere confinement to disciplinary segregation was a type of discipline that should be expected by an inmate as an incident to his criminal sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301.
In concluding that confinement to disciplinary segregation does not implicate due process, the Court held that,
neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the Due Process Clause itself, afforded Conner a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to the procedural protections set forth in Wolff. The regime to which he was subjected as a result of the misconduct hearing was within the range of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life.Id. at 487, 115 S.Ct. at 2302. In so holding, the Court explained that its ruling was a return to the due process principles established in prior case law and stated that the Due Process Clause protects state-created liberty interests which are "generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, . . ., nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300.
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in applying the Sandin analysis, determined that twelve months of solitary confinement "represent[s] substantially more `atypical and significant hardship[s] . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,' [and] we assume that [a prisoner suffering such] a liberty deprivation and [is] entitled to due process." Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n. 3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 952, 117 S.Ct. 367, 136 L.Ed.2d 257 (1996). However, the Eleventh Circuit has subsequently concluded that confinement to disciplinary segregation for a shorter period of time, two months, was not a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest. Rodgers, 142 F.3d at 1253.
As a result of the Court's decision in Sandin, no longer does the prospect of temporary confinement in disciplinary segregation alone mandate the due process procedures delineated in, for example, Wolff. Disciplinary segregation is not a "dramatic departure" from the ordinary conditions of confinement, nor is it a "major disruption in [a prisoner's] environment." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86, 115 S.Ct. at 2301. Thus, under the authority of Sandin, a prisoner sentenced to a short term of disciplinary segregation has no protected liberty interest to which the due process protections apply. Because there is no right to procedural due process before the imposition of disciplinary segregation, neither the lack of due process nor any deficiency in procedure actually used is actionable under § 1983.
In the present action, Plaintiff alleges only that he was sentenced to 30 days in disciplinary segregation in the instance referred to in his initial complaint, and 45 days in the instance referred to in his first amended complaint. (Docs. 4 and 7) The disciplinary segregation punishment imposed in either instance is neither "atypical" nor a "significant hardship" under the Sandin analysis and either mirrors or is closely comparable to the 30-day punishment received by Conner, rather than the 12-month punishment experienced by Williams. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475, 115 S.Ct. at 2296; Williams, 77 F.3d at 374. Confinement to disciplinary segregation is not a dramatic departure from the ordinary conditions of confinement, nor is it a major disruption in Plaintiffs environment. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of a state-created liberty interest by his confinement to disciplinary segregation for either 30 or 45 days as alleged. Therefore, these two claims are due to be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous because they lack an arguable basis in law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831-32.
C. Claims Regarding Disciplinary Hearing in June 2000
In Plaintiffs second amended complaint, he adds allegations relating to another asserted deprivation of his liberty interest, regarding a disciplinary proceeding occurring on June 10, 2000. (Doc. 8) Although not altogether clear in the complaint, it appears that the incident in question involved Plaintiff "throwing" hot water" on a prison guard at the Fountain facility. (Doc. 8, at 6) Upon a careful reading, the Court finds that the language used in this complaint, as well as in the other pleadings submitted by Plaintiff referred to in this recommendation, is cursory at best and is difficult to comprehend.
However, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff asserts that, at the disciplinary hearing in question, his due process rights were violated in that he was not allowed to ask questions of the disciplinary "board" or of the prison guard on whom water allegedly was thrown by Plaintiff, was not allowed to question the "arresting officer," and that there was "no evidence" to support the allegations against him. (Doc. 8, at 5) Plaintiff sues Captain Edwards of the Fountain facility, whom he asserts "approve[d] (sic) disciplinary action which fail (sic) the due process clause"; Correction Officer Godwin, whom the Court presumes presided over Plaintiffs disciplinary hearing, for "refus[ing] me due process . . . [by] refus[ing] to accept my disciplinary questions"; and Correctional Officer Moye, presumably the alleged victim of the incident, whom he maintains "fail[ed] to present evidence at disciplinary hearing" and "lied about the whole incident." (Doc. 8, at 6) Plaintiff provides essentially no information about this incident or in support of his allegations other than what is stated above. Moreover, even though Plaintiff seeks compensation for each day he was confined to disciplinary segregation, no where in his complaint does Plaintiff indicate the specific nature or duration of his confinement. (Doc. 8)
The Court finds these allegations to be vague and conclusory. See, e.g., Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (vague and conclusory allegations are subject to dismissal). Most of Plaintiffs allegations are mere legal conclusions that his due process rights have been violated with no facts to support them. See Peterson v. Atlanta Housing Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Terms like `due process' are inherently vague and such claims may rest on a virtually infinite number of factual scenarios"). In particular, because Plaintiff at the very least has not even identified the specific nature or duration of the punishment actually imposed, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he suffered an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. Therefore, this claim is due to be dismissed without prejudice as frivolous because it lacks an arguable basis in law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831-32; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct at 2300 (liberty interests are "generally limited to freedom from restraint . . . .").
IV. Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiffs claims in his initial and first amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiffs claims in his second amended complaint be dismissed without prejudice, as each claim is frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i).
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT
1. Objection . Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982) (en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:
A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge's Recommendation" within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify' those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party's arguments that the magistrate judge's recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the objection.
A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.
2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded) . Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.