Opinion
No. 54597-3-I
Filed: May 2, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Skagit County. Docket No: 04-2-00219-5. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 07/19/2004. Judge signing: Hon. George N Bowden.
Counsel for Appellant(s), William Gardiner (Appearing Pro Se), 41638 South, Skagit Highway, Sedro Woolley, WA 98284.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Susan J. Robinson, Robinson Tait PS, 616 1st Ave Ste 550, Seattle, WA 98104-2258.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is barred from bringing a claim that has previously been, or could have been, litigated. Moreover, a party does not have standing to bring a claim if he or she does not have a protectable interest. Here, the doctrine of res judicata applies to William Gardiner's quiet title action because the suit is identical to his prior suit, the evidence in both suits was the same, the same infringement of rights was alleged, and both suits arise from the same nucleus of facts. Additionally, Gardiner does not have standing to bring the claim because any potential claim was extinguished through foreclosure. The trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
In 1995, a deed of trust to certain real estate in Skagit County was executed by Mindy S. Camphouse, as grantor, to First American Title Company, as trustee, in favor of Bismark Mortgage Company, as beneficiary. The deed was properly recorded in Skagit County on August 1, 1995. Five years later, on or about August 15, 2000, Camphouse allegedly agreed to a lease/option and an agreement to sell the real estate to William Gardiner. A quitclaim deed was purportedly executed on the same date; however, this deed was never recorded. In April 2003, the 1995 deed of trust was foreclosed by a successor trustee and the property was conveyed to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) extinguishing any potential interest of Gardiner.
Gardiner claimed the 1995 deed of trust contained an erroneous legal description and that description should not have included the property set forth in the lease/option. In September 2003, Gardiner petitioned the Skagit County Superior Court for an injunction to stop the sale of the property. The property listing was pulled pending resolution, and Gardiner's request for an injunction was withdrawn. In October 2003, Gardiner filed suit seeking an order to reform the legal description of the property. On December 29, 2003, his claim was heard by the court. The court dismissed the claim with prejudice determining that Gardiner had no legally recognized interest in the property because any potential claim had been extinguished through foreclosure. The court awarded attorney fees and costs to Fannie Mae under RCW 4.84.185, finding Gardiner's action was frivolous.
Notwithstanding the court's order, on February 6, 2004, Gardiner filed a complaint to quiet title with regard to the property. On June 11, 2004, Fannie Mae filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, along with a memorandum in support of the motion, seeking (1) dismissal of Gardiner's claims, (2) fees and costs pursuant to RCW 4.84.185, and (3) an injunction, that Gardiner be enjoined from bringing further legal actions without prior leave of the court. After the June 25, 2004 hearing, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the claim with prejudice, awarded fees and costs pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 in an amount to be later determined, and enjoined Gardiner from filing further actions in Skagit County without obtaining prior leave of court. The report of proceedings of that date shows that the trial court's determination was based on a finding that the action was barred by res judicata and Gardiner's lack of standing, as it had previously been determined that he had no legal interest in the property. Gardiner appealed. On July 23, 2004, the order was reduced to judgment awarding fees and costs in the amount of $2,500.
ANALYSIS
Gardiner first contends the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint to quiet title on the doctrine of res judicata and his lack of standing. His claim is not supported.
Res judicata refers to 'the preclusive effect of judgments, including the relitigation of claims and issues that were litigated, or might have been litigated, in a prior action.' Use of the doctrine is intended to prevent relitigation of causes already determined and rein in the multiplicity of actions and harassment in the courts. Res judicata bars all grounds for recovery that could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior action between the same parties. For res judicata to apply,
Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 805, 805 (1985).
Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 395, 429 P.2d 207 (1967).
'a prior judgment must have a concurrence of identity with a subsequent action in (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) the quality of the persons forr against whom the claim is made.'. . . Two causes of action are identical for purposes of res judicata if (1) prosecution of the later action would impair the rights established in the earlier action, (2) the evidence in both actions is substantially the same, (3) infringement of the same right is alleged in both actions, and (4) the actions arise out of the same nucleus of facts.
Civil Service Comm'n v. City of Kelso, 137 Wn.2d 166, 171, 969 P.2d 474 (1999) (quoting Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898 (1995)).
Contrary to Gardiner's assertions, the record shows that the quiet title action has a concurrence of identity with his prior lawsuit as to subject matter, cause of action, persons and parties and the quality of the person against whom the present claim is made. Gardiner disagrees with the fact that the causes of action are identical because he filed them separately with different captions: one as a deed reformation action and the other as a quiet title action. But under the established precedent set forth in Civil Service Comm'n v. Kelso, the causes of action are considered identical. Prosecution of the later action would impair the right established in the first final judgment, which was that Gardiner had no recognized legal interest in the property. The evidence in both suits is identical, the same infringement of rights is alleged, and both suits arise out of the same nucleus of facts. Gardiner argues that his quiet title action concerns a separate parcel from that discussed in his first action. However, all parcels in question were owned by Fannie Mae as a result of the foreclosure of the Camphouse deed of trust.
Further, to have standing to pursue a court action, a party must have a protectable interest. Here, Gardiner has no personal stake in the outcome of a quiet title action because he possesses no recognized legal interest in the property. Any potential claim he may have had to the property was previously extinguished through foreclosure. Gardiner has no protectable interest in the property.
See Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wn.2d 500, 505-06, 772 P.2d 486 (1989); Orion Corp. v. State of Washington, 103 Wn.2d 441, 455, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985).
Gardiner also appears to claim the trial court made its decision to grant Fannie Mae's motion for judgment on the pleadings without evidence of the pleadings from the prior case. But the relevant documents were attached to the motion and were before the court. Gardiner admits he had a copy of the memorandum.
Gardiner also appeals the trial court's grant of attorney fees and costs pursuant to RCW 4.84.185. RCW 4.84.185 authorizes a court to award attorney fees against a nonprevailing party on an action that is deemed frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. An award of attorney fees that is authorized by statute is left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Here, Gardiner's lawsuit was frivolous. It was merely another attempt at the same suit previously dismissed as frivolous. The record supports the trial court's determination in that regard and the grant of fees and costs will not be overturned on appeal.
Gardiner claims that RCW 4.84.185 authorizes an award of attorney fees on frivolous claims only after written findings are entered by the judge. But former RCW 4.84.185 has been amended to allow attorney fees for frivolous actions resolved prior to trial. See Doe v. Spokane Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wn. App. 106, 123, 780 P.2d 853 (1989).
Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 129, 137, 830 P.2d 350 (1992).
Gardiner also claims the trial court erred in ordering an injunction barring him from filing further legal actions in Skagit County unless he obtains prior leave of the court. The granting or withholding of an injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised according to the circumstances of each case. Gardiner claims the trial court erred in granting an injunction because there is no pattern of abusive litigation. But following the original order dismissing his claim with prejudice, which indicated he had no legally recognized interest in the property and that his claim was frivolous, he still chose to bring an additional suit. Here, the trial court's decision was based on the fact that Gardiner filed two frivolous claims and we cannot say the decision of the trial court is an abuse of discretion.
Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Council 28 v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 887, 665 P.2d 1337 (1983); see King v. Riveland, 125 Wn.2d 500, 515, 886 P.2d 160 (1994).
Fannie Mae requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to RAP 18.9(a), which authorizes sanctions for frivolous appeals. Here, there were no debatable issues and no doubts to resolve. Gardiner has no legal right to the property. We determine that Fannie Mae is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs for defending this frivolous appeal. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
GROSSE, ELLINGTON and COX, JJ., Concur.