Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12522 No. 6751
01-09-2019
ARKIMEDES GARCIA, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Emily L. Jura, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Stephen B. Wallace (brief), District Attorney, Kodiak, and Michal Stryszak (oral argument), Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3KO-15-317 CR MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, Frank A. Pfiffner, Judge. Appearances: Emily L. Jura, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Stephen B. Wallace (brief), District Attorney, Kodiak, and Michal Stryszak (oral argument), Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge. Judge ALLARD.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
In June 2015, twenty-one-year-old Arkimedes Garcia broke into the Holy Resurrection Russian Orthodox Church in Kodiak and, in the span of ten minutes, caused significant damage to church property and to various items of religious significance within the church. Garcia injured himself during his attack, and his blood was later found all over the altar room and near entry doors. Among the religious items damaged or desecrated were Saint Herman's Cross, two holy table crosses, two altar crosses (gifts from the head of the church in Russia), the altar tabernacle, the antimens cloth, the reserved sacrament, the chrism oil, and sacred vestments. The monetary damage to the church's property was later estimated at $109,485. But the greater cost to the church and its parishioners was the nonmonetary harm caused by the desecration of sacred items, some of which could not be replaced or fully repaired.
Garcia was arrested as he left the church. He was only partially clothed, and he was sweating profusely. Although he was suspected of being under the influence of a stimulant, a subsequent drug test revealed only the presence of THC (a metabolite of marijuana). Garcia had no prior criminal history.
Garcia is religious and was raised a devout Catholic. He moved to Kodiak from Washington in 2014 to become a commercial fisher. Approximately two weeks before his attack on the church, Garcia suffered a closed head trauma during a professional mixed martial arts fight. Both Garcia's employer and a close friend reported that Garcia's behavior changed dramatically after the fight. He became increasingly erratic and uncharacteristically antagonistic; he was also abusing alcohol and marijuana. Garcia's priest in Kodiak testified at sentencing that he went to see Garcia the night before the incident in response to concerns from Garcia's friends that he was "reaching a crisis state." According to the priest, Garcia appeared exhausted, burned out, and completely drained.
Garcia was originally indicted on one count of burglary in the second degree, eight counts of criminal mischief in the third degree, and one count of criminal mischief in the third degree under a different subsection. The parties later reached a plea agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, Garcia pleaded guilty to a single consolidated count of criminal mischief in the third degree. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. As part of the agreement, Garcia also agreed to waive his right to a jury trial on the State's proposed statutory aggravator — AS 12.55.155(c)(10) ("the conduct constituting the offense was among the most serious conduct included in the definition of the offense"). Sentencing was otherwise left to the discretion of the court.
AS 11.46.310.
AS 11.46.482(a)(1) ("with intent to damage property of another, the person damages property of another in an amount ... of $750 or more").
AS 11.46.482(a)(3) ("the person knowingly (A) defaces, damages, or desecrates a cemetery or the contents of a cemetery or a tomb, grave, or memorial regardless of whether the tomb, grave, or memorial is in a cemetery or whether the cemetery, tomb, grave, or memorial appears to be abandoned, lost, or neglected; (B) removes human remains or associated burial artifacts from a cemetery, tomb, grave, or memorial regardless of whether the cemetery, tomb, grave, or memorial appears to be abandoned, lost, or neglected").
This aggravating factor is otherwise required to be tried to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See AS 12.55.155(f)(2); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
As a first felony offender convicted of a class C felony, Garcia faced a presumptive sentencing range of 0 to 2 years. However, if aggravator (c)(10) was proved, the court would be authorized to impose a sentence up to the statutory maximum term of 5 years.
AS 12.55.125(e)(1).
AS 12.55.155(a)(1); AS 12.55.125(e).
The superior court held a three-day bench trial on the "most serious" aggravator. At the conclusion of this bench trial, the court found that the State had proved this aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. The court based this finding on the totality of the circumstances, which included, inter alia, (1) the significant amount of property damage (estimated at over $100,000); (2) the historical significance of the church and its importance to the Russian Orthodox faithful worldwide; (3) the incalculable harm caused by the destruction and desecration of sacred religious items; (4) the permanent damage caused to St. Herman's Cross; and (5) the number of parishioners affected by the desecration of their church.
Father Innocent testified that the church had 175 regularly participating members and approximately 700 to 800 parishioners in the greater Kodiak community.
At the sentencing hearing that followed, the superior court considered, and rejected, Garcia's request for a suspended imposition of sentence. The court acknowledged that Garcia had good prospects for rehabilitation, and the court found that Garcia's remorse and sorrow for his actions were sincere. The court also acknowledged that Garcia might have recently suffered a brain injury, and the court concluded that Garcia's actions were out of character and unlikely to ever occur again. But the court nevertheless concluded that the Chaney sentencing goals of community condemnation and general deterrence could not be met unless Garcia received a conviction of record. The court therefore sentenced Garcia to 3 years in jail with 18 months suspended (18 months to serve), 3 years probation, and $60,000 in restitution.
See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); AS 12.55.005.
Garcia now appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred when it concluded that his conduct was among the most serious conduct included in the definition of the offense. Garcia also argues that the court's decision to deny him a suspended imposition of sentence was clearly mistaken.
Garcia also appealed one of his probation conditions. However, the Court has received notice that Garcia received early discharge from his probation. Garcia's challenge to his probation condition is therefore moot and is not addressed in this opinion.
In Michael v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "the existence or non-existence of an aggravating or mitigating sentencing factor is a mixed question of law and fact." Here, the superior court made detailed findings of fact in support of its legal conclusion that Garcia's conduct was among the most serious conduct included in the definition of third-degree criminal mischief. For the most part, Garcia does not challenge these findings on appeal. Instead, he argues that the superior court's analysis failed to account for the mitigating aspects of his conduct — i.e., the fact that his actions were out of character, potentially precipitated by a recent closed head trauma, and not motivated by animus or malice.
Michael v. State, 115 P.3d 517, 519 (Alaska 2005).
We agree with Garcia that there were mitigating aspects to his conduct. But the record shows that the sentencing court acknowledged these mitigating factors and concluded that they were greatly outweighed by the nature of Garcia's destructive acts, the monetary damage to the church, and the larger impact of those acts on the local church community and the Russian Orthodox faithful worldwide. Having carefully reviewed the evidence presented at the three-day bench trial and the superior court's detailed factual findings, we conclude that the court's findings are supported by the record and that the court's overall legal analysis is sound. We therefore uphold the superior court's finding that Garcia's conduct was "among the most serious" included in the definition of the offense.
We find the question of whether the court should have granted Garcia's request for a suspended imposition of sentence a closer question. Under AS 12.55.085(a), a trial court has the authority to suspend imposition of sentence for defendants convicted of certain (primarily nonviolent) crimes "if it appears that there are circumstances in mitigation of the punishment, or that the ends of justice will be served." As we have previously explained, "a suspended imposition of sentence is primarily meant to be a one-time opportunity for particularly deserving first offenders."
State v. Huletz, 838 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Alaska App. 1992).
A suspended imposition of sentence is a unique disposition: by providing for the eventual set-aside of a conviction, a suspended imposition of sentence offers the offender an incentive for reform and an opportunity to start anew with a clean slate. A suspended imposition of sentence is different from a sentence that is suspended — i.e., a sentence where there is no active term of imprisonment to serve. Under AS 12.55.086(a), a suspended imposition of sentence can include a term of imprisonment imposed as a condition of the defendant's probation.
Id.
See Owings v. State, 771 P.2d 455, 457 (Alaska App. 1989) (noting that whether the court erred in failing to suspend imposition of sentence and whether the court erred in imposing six months of incarceration are best considered separately).
AS 12.55.086(a) ("When the imposition of sentence is suspended under AS 12.55.085, the court may require, as a special condition of probation, that the defendant serve a definite term of continuous or periodic imprisonment, not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment that could have been imposed.").
Because the primary purpose of a suspended imposition of sentence is rehabilitative, the Alaska Supreme Court requires trial courts to seriously consider a suspended imposition of sentence when sentencing youthful first offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes. On appeal, however, our review is limited to evaluating whether the trial court's decision to impose a conviction of record was "clearly mistaken." The "clearly mistaken" standard contemplates that different judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a permissible range of reasonable sentences.
See Nattrass v. State, 554 P.2d 399, 401 (Alaska 1976); see also Wharton v. State, 590 P.2d 427, 430-31 (Alaska 1979). But see Markgraf v. State, 1992 WL 12153222, at *2 (Alaska App. July 15, 1992) (unpublished) ("Markgraf cites [Wharton] for the proposition that a youthful first offender should presumptively receive a suspended imposition of sentence, and that other sentencing alternatives must be specifically justified. Such a reading of Wharton would put it in conflict with Mullins, which applied the normal 'clearly mistaken' standard of review to a sentencing judge's decision not to grant a suspended imposition of sentence." (citing Mullins v. State, 573 P.2d 860, 861 n.1 (Alaska 1978))).
See Mullins, 573 P.2d at 861 n.1; Jones v. Anchorage, 754 P.2d 275, 280 (Alaska App. 1988); see also McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). We note that Garcia does not argue that a standard other than "clearly mistaken" should apply to this type of sentencing decision.
McClain, 519 P.2d at 813-14.
Here, the superior court acknowledged the factors that weighed in favor of a suspended imposition of sentence, including Garcia's particularly favorable prospects for rehabilitation and the court's own finding that this conduct was likely never to occur again. But the court ultimately decided that other factors related to the seriousness of the crime and the extraordinary damage it caused weighed more heavily in favor of a conviction of record. Having independently reviewed the sentencing record, we conclude that the court's decision to impose a conviction of record was not clearly mistaken.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.